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Articles 
Personal Jurisdiction in Federal 
Question Suits: Toward a Unified and 
Rational Theory for Personal 
Jurisdiction over Non-Domiciliary and 
Alien Defendants 
IRENE DEAVILLE SANN* 
For many years, courts' and commentators2 have struggled with 
the question of the personal jurisdiction3 of state courts over defen- 
dants who did not come within one of the traditional bases of per- 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law, White Plains, New York; 
J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1977. The writer gratefully acknowledges the substan- 
tial and tireless efforts of her secretary, Judy Caporale, and the contributions of her research 
assistants, Julia Kalmus and Scott Shostak, in the preparation of this article. The writer is 
especially grateful to Mr. Shostak, without whose continued efforts, the footnotes to the article 
never would have been completed. 
1. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko 
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. 
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 
U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Hess v. Pawloski, 
274 U.S. 352 (1927); Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925); Pennoyer 
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v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Aycock v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 617 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979); 
H. Ray Baker, Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1979); Capital Dredge 
& Dock Corp. v. Midwest Dredging Co., 573 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1978); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. 
P & C Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Republic Int'l. Corp. v. Amco 
Eng'rs, Inc., 516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975); United States Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & 
Detroit R.R., 495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 
F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th 
Cir. 1972); Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 
U.S. 948, reh'g denied 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 
239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Logicon, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. 
111. 1980); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Certain Lloyds Underwriters and/or London Cos., 487 
F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Wis. 1980); Ayers v. Coppenveld Corp., 487 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex. 
1980); Manufacturers' Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon College, 115 Ariz. 358, 565 
P.2d 864 (1977); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal, 
Rptr. 113 (1969); Kailieha v. Hayes, 56 Hawaii 306, 536 P.2d 568 (1975); Gray v. American 
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Colony Press, 
Inc. v. Fleeman, 17 111. App. 3d 14, 308 N.E.2d 78 (1974); Rath Packing Co. v. Intercontinen- 
tal Meat Traders, Inc., 181 N.W. 2d 184 (Iowa 1970); O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., 
232 Ga. 256, 206 S.E. 2d 437 (1974); Compania de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 
237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955); Marshall Egg Transp. Co. v. 
Bender-Goodman Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161 (1967); Miller V. Glendale Equip. & 
Supply, Inc., 344 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1977); McIntosh v. Navaro Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466 
P.2d 868 (1970); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P.2d 871 (1959); O'Brien v. Com- 
stock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 
116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951); Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & CO., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W. 
2d 872 (1970), appeal dismissed 402 U.S. 902 (1971). On the closely-related issue of obtaining 
jurisdiction to determine a particular dispute involving a non-domiciliary or alien defendant 
by asserting authority over the defendant's real or personal property located in the state, with 
the judgment thus obtained being limited to the value of the property seized, attached or 
sequestered (quasi-in-rem jurisdiction), see Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Shaffer v. 
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Harris 
v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968); Simpson 
v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 2387 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967); Seider v. Roth, 
17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966); see also Atkinson v. Superior Court, 
49 Cai. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958). 
2. See, e.g., Jay, "'Minimum Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jlrrisdiction: 
A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REV. 429 (1981); Kamp, Beyond Minimum Contacts: The Supreme 
Court's New Jurisdctional Theory, 15 GA. L. REV. 19 (1980); Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdic- 
tion to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966); Woods, Pennoyer's 
Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction Regarding 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 20 A m .  L. REV. 861 (1978); Comment, Federalism, 
Due Process, and Minimum Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 80 COLUBI. L. 
REV. 1341 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Federalism]; Developments in the Law- 
State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments in 
the Law]; Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson: Minimum Contacts in a 
Modern World, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 783 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, World- Wide 
Volkslvagen]; Comment, Minimunl Contacts Confused and Reconfused-Variations on a Theme 
by International Shoe-Or, Is This Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 304 (1970); Note, 
In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations: An Interest-Balancing Test, 20 U. FLA. 
L. REV. 33 (1967). On the closely-related issue of obtaining jurisdiction to determine a par- 
ticular dispute involving a nondomiciliary or alien defendant by asserting authority over the 
defendant's real or personal property located in the state, with the judgment thus obtained 
being limited to the value of the property seized, attached or sequestered, see Carrington, The 
Modern Utility of Quasi in Rern Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. REV. 303 (1962); Currie, Aftacti- 
ment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 337 (1961); Silberman, Shaffer 
v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1978); Riesenfeld, Shaffer v. Heitner: 
Holding, Implications, Forebodings, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1183 (1979); Smit, The Enduring Utility 
of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600 (1977); 
Comment, The Seider Era Ends, But the Rush Isn't Over Yet, 47 BROOKLYN L. REV. 203 
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(1980); Note, Rush v. Savchuk: Is the Seider Spoiled or Just Getting Harder?, 9 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 247 (1980); Note, Seider v. Roth Jurisdiction: A Durable Rule Dies a Slow Death 
With the Advent of Rush v. Savchuk, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 139 (1980); Comment, Putting 
the Djinni Back in the Bottle: Rush v. Savchuk and the Demise of Seider Jurisdiction, 1981 
UTAH L. REV. 637. 
3. The ability of a court to assert authority over persons or property usually is denominated 
basis, and basis can be divided into three categories: personal, or in personam, jurisdiction, 
in rem jurisdiction, and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. In rern jurisdiction is the authority of a court 
to determine the rights of everyone in the entire world with respect to a piece of property 
located within the territorial authority of the court and "brought before the court" in a proper 
proceeding. See RESTATELENT (SECOND) OF JUDG~IENTS $30 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 
1973); RESTATE~ENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS $559-65 (1971). As noted by one com- 
mentator, "[tlhe result of a proceeding in rem will affect the defendant's personal rights, but 
its essential function is to determine title to or  status of property subject to the court's jurisdic- 
tion." Developments in the Law, supra note 2, a t  948. In rern actions include suits to register 
title to land, see, e.g., American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911); Tyler v. Judges of 
the Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 55 N.E. 812, appeal dismissed, 179 U.S. 405 (1900), 
condemnation proceedings, see, e.g., Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. & Improvement Co., 130 U.S. 
559 (1889); Housing Authority v. Bjork, 109 Mont. 552, 98 P.2d 324 (1940), confiscation pro- 
ceedings, see, e.g., The Confiscation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1874), or  actions to ad- 
minister a decedent's estate, see, e.g., In re Estate of Nilson, 126 Neb. 541, 253 N.W. 675 
(1934). See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1135-36. 
Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction involves adjudication of claims not related to the defendant's prop- 
erty which is located within the territorial authority of the court and which is attached at  the 
outset of the suit to provide both the basis for the court to adjudicate the particular controver- 
sy and the source from which the plaintiff's claim can be satisfied if the plaintiff prevails 
on the merits. See RESTATE~IENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS $32 (1982); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 3566-68 (1971). See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980); Shaffer 
v. Heitner. 433 U.S. 186 (1977); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); 
Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185 (1886); Seider v. 
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). Any resulting judgment is 
only binding between the parties to the adjudication and only to the extent of the property 
seized; such judgment has no res judicata effect. Both in rem and quasi-in-rem jurisdiction 
are beyond the scope of this article; thus, the recent blurring of the lines between and among 
in rem, quasi-in-rem, and in personam jurisdiction in cases such as Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 
320 (1980), and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), will not be addressed. 
Personal jurisdiction is the authority of a court to  render a decision binding on the person 
of the defendant. In order to so bind the defendant, a state court must have some grounds 
to assert its powers over the defendant, grounds that are not inconsistent with the limitations 
imposed on the power of the court by the United States Constitution, by Federal legislation, 
by the state constitution, or by any relevant state legislation. See Developments in the Law, 
supra note 2, a t  912. If a state court has not properly exercised this power, its judgment should 
not be entitled to full faith and credit by sister states; the judgment should not be enforceable 
in any other state. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. See ako von Mehren & Trautman, 
supra note 2, a t  1126; Developments in the Law, supra note 2, a t  912. 
Sometimes, it is helpful for students to  consider the personal jurisdiction of a state court 
in the following way: Hypothetically, any court could assert jurisdiction over any defendant 
located anywhere, whether or not the defendant had any contacts with the forum state. Wholesale 
assertions of jurisdiction, however, would step all over the sovereign toes of the state or  coun- 
try in which the defendant was located and could create situations of extreme hardship to 
the defendant. Thus, to  limit abuses and to create national and international harmony, only 
part of that hypothetically infinite pool of judicial power can be channelled to a particular 
state. The pool of power passes through four successive funnels, those funnels established by 
the U.S. Constitution, any relevant federal legislation, the state's constitution, and any relevant 
state legislation. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to  the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or  to the people.") Each funnel can operate to further reduce the amount of authority being 
channelled to the state court or can pass through the entire amount of power that enters that 
funnel, merely adding its particular imprimatur to the propriety of the state court exercise of 
that power. 
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sonal jurisdiction: presence in the state," domicile in the state,' or 
consent to suit in the state.6 The United States Supreme Court has 
The limiting factor at the United States Constitutional level has been determined to be the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
Thus, while the hypothetically infinite pool of power enters the first funnel, the authority that 
emerges is only those exercises of state court personal jurisdiction not inconsistent with the 
fourteenth amendment. As a general rule, federal legislation does not operate to further limit 
the personal jurisdiction of state courts by prohibiting state suits against certain entities or 
individuals; rather, federal statutes achieve a similar purpose by giving exclusive subject matter 
jurisdiction to federal courts in some areas. See infra note 19. See, e.g.. Tucker Act 42, 28 
U.S.C. $1346(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); 28 U.S.C. $1491 (Supp. V. 1981) (contract actions); 
Federal Tort Claims Act $410, 28 U.S.C. $1346(b) (1976). Moreover, while article 111 of the 
Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts in suits in which the United States is 
a party, the United States may be sued only when a federal statute authorizes such suit. Williams 
v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). 
From this point, the remaining authority passes to the states, with each state determining 
the extent to which it will further limit the personal jurisdiction authority of its own courts. 
Obviously, a state cannot grant its courts more authority than the U.S. Constitution permits; 
when the Supreme Court finds that a state has exceeded the Federal Constitutional and Con- 
gressional limitations, the Supreme Court will invalidate the State statute authorizing such ex- 
ercise of jurisdiction, see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (1977) ("1 . . . agree . . . 
that the Delaware [sequestration] statute is unconstitutional on its face") (Stevens, J., concurr- 
ing); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928) (state nonresident motorist statute invalidated 
because, inconsistent with the requirements of due process, the statute did not expressly require 
notice to the nonresident defendant), or  will declare the application of the statute to the par- 
ticular defendant to be unconstitutional. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 299 (1980) (application of Oklahoma "long-arm" statute to defendant who had "no 'con- 
tacts, ties, or  relations' with the State of Oklahoma" found unconstitutional). Most states have 
enacted "long-arm" statutes that describe the circumstances in which their courts can assert 
personal jurisdiction. Some states, such as California and Rhode Island, merely pass through 
to their courts all the power that has emerged from the fourteenth amendment. The California 
statute, CAL. CN. PROC. CODE $410.10, provides: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdic- 
tion on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." 
The Rhode Island Statute, R.I. GEN. LAWS $9-5-33 (1956) provides: 
Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident of this state. . . , and 
every partnership or association, composed of any person or persons, not such residents, 
that shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island, shall 
be subject to  the jurisdiction of the state of Rhode Island, and the courts of this 
state shall hold such foreign corporations and such nonresident individuals . . . and 
such partnerships or  associations amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not 
contrary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States. 
Other state long-arm statutes attempt to further describe and/or limit personal jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., N.Y. CN. PRAC. LAW 5302(a) (McKinney 1972) (excluding defamation actions from 
long-arm jurisdiction authorized by the statute). For discussion of the historical development 
of the present theories of state court personal jurisdiction, see infra notes 60 to 185 and 
accompanying text. For discussion of the roles of the due process clause and state long-arm 
statutes in respect of one another, see Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 713-14 
(4th Cir. 1966); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 436-440, 
176 N.E.2d 761, 763-65 (I%]). 
Personal jurisdiction must be distinguished from subject matter jurisdiction, which is the 
authority of a court to hear a particular type of dispute. For definitions and descriptions of 
the principal types of federal court subject matter jurisdiction, see infra notes 18 and 19. 
4.  See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 
442 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 3 So. 321 (1888). See also infra note 
76 and accompanying text. 
At the common law, the earliest and principal basis for personal jurisdiction was the presence 
of the defendant within the territorial authority of the court. J. Story, Commentaries on the 
Conflict of Laws $ 539 (8th ed. 1883). Several theories have been advanced for this primacy: 
the limited authority of the sovereign to force a judgment rendered against a non-present defen- 
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attempted to strike a balance between the theory that each state is 
a sovereign whose boundaries determine the extent of its authority,' 
which must be respected by other  state^,^ and the theory that the 
Constitution requires states to afford full faith and credit to the valid 
judgments of sister statesg while protecting the fourteenth amendment 
dant, see Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REV. 427, 427-28 (1929), the basis 
of most common law personal actions in trespass, O.W. HOLMES, THE COA~MON LAW 101 (1881); 
3 \V. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 626 (5th ed. 1942), the common-law view 
that "a judgment . . . is no more than a basis for an immediate levy of execution against 
the defendant's person or  his land." 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO- 
CEDURE 51064, at  206 (1969). 
In the United States, presence coupled with valid service of process always has been upheld 
as a valid exercise of personal jurisdiction, no matter how fortuitous or transitory the defen- 
dant's presence in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913) 
(constructive service by probate court appointing party executor binds party even after he left 
jurisdiction); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (ED. Ark. 1959) (service in airplane fly- 
ing over the jurisdiction); Smith v. Gibson, 3 So. 321, 83 Ala. 284 (1888) (absent fraudulent 
inducement, legally served summons constitutes basis for jurisdiction no matter how transient 
party's presence in jurisdiction); Barrel1 v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819) (service was held 
valid even where the party was merely passing through the jurisdiction on route to  another 
country). See also J. STORY, COA~ENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS $541 (8th ed. 1883). 
But see Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and 
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdic- 
tion, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 241, 259-72; Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial Jurisdiction 
After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J. 729, 730-31 
(1981) (suggesting that "transient jurisdictionu-assertion of personal jurisdiction over defen- 
dants based solely on service coupled with presence in the jurisdiction-be abandoned in favor 
of a unified approach based upon the analysis established by the Supreme Court for cases 
involving estra-territorial service of process). 
5. Although the primary basis for personal jurisdiction in the Civil Law is domicile, 
see generally F. SAVIGNY, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 112 (Guthrie trans. 2d ed. 1880); J. 
WESTLAKE, A T R E A ~ S E  ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (7th ed. 1925), the Supreme Court 
did not establish domicile as a basis for personal jurisdiction in the United States until 1940. 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917) (dic- 
tum). See also infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (actual con- 
sent); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (implied consent). See infra notes 85 to 89 and 
accompanying text (discussing Hess). See also infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
7. Early courts and commentators viewed the several states as independent sovereigns 
for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 
519 (1839); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); G. HENDERSON, THE, POSITION OF FOREIGN 
CORPORATIONS IN A~ERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (1918). See also infra notes 62,69 and 73. 
8. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
9. U.S. CONST. art. IV, $1. The full faith and credit clause provides, in pertinent part: 
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public Acts, Records, and Judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. . . ." 
A judgment rendered by a state court that did not have personal jurisdiction over a defen- 
dant would not be entitled to full faith and credit by sister states; a sister state need not en- 
force such a judgment. See Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 481, 486 (1813). See also 
D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850) (full faith and credit did not require en- 
forcement of default judgment obtained without personal service on the defendant). 
While a judgement rendered by state A is not entitled to full faith and credit in state B 
if state A did not have personal jurisdiction over defendant D (i.e., state B is not required 
to enforce the judgment of state A), the converse is not necessarily true; the concepts of authority 
to adjudicate and recognition of out-of-state judgments are not coterminous. See von Mehren 
& Trautman, supra note 2, a t  1126. The Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122 (1827), U.S. Rev. 
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due process rights of defendantslo from state encroachments. In 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington," the Court established the 
following test for personal jurisdiction over foreignI2 corporate 
defendants: 
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to 
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory 
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 
463. 
. * .  . 
[The] demands [of due process] may be met by such contacts. . .with 
the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our 
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend 
the particular suit which is brought there.'' 
This test, however, has been applied consistently to individual as well 
as to corporate defendants.I4 In subsequent cases, the state and lower 
Stat. $905 (1875), U.S. Comp. Stat. $2431 (1916), enacted by Congress under the full faith 
and credit clause, provided, in pertinent part: 
And the said records and judicial proceeding . . . authenticated [as stated above], 
shall have such faith and credit given to  them in every court within the United States 
as they have by law or  usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken. 
The present version appears at  28 U.S.C. $1738 (1976), a version in which "acts" has been 
inserted before "records and judicial proceedings." As noted by Professor Rheinstein, "[alt 
an early date, it was maintained and recognized that this provision could not be literally ap- 
plied." Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 781 (1955). 
10. See it?fra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
11. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
12. For purposes of this article, a "foreign corporation" is a corporation incorporated 
in and having its principal place of business in a state or  states other than the forum state, 
in the case of state court personal jurisdiction, or  the state in which the federal court is sitting, 
in the case of federal court personal jurisdiction; an "alien corporation" is a corporation in- 
corporated in and having its principal place of business in a country or countries other than 
the United States; a "nondomiciliary" is an individual who is domiciled in a state other than 
the forum state, in the case of state court personal jurisdiction, or the state in which the federal 
court is sitting, in the case of federal court personal jurisdiction; an "alien" is an individual 
who is a citizen of and is domiciled in a country or  countries other than the United States. 
13. 326 U.S. at 316-17. 
14. While many of the seminal cases in this area involved personal jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations, see, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); McGee 
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 
342 U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Buckeye 
Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Gray 
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), the 
language of the Supreme Court in International Shoe is broad enough to include individual 
as well as corporate defendants, and courts have consistently applied the "minimum contacts" 
test to noncorporate defendants. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Han- 
son v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Calagaz v. Calhoun, 1309 F.2d 248, 254-55 (5th Cir. 
1962); San Juan Hotel Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 277 F. Supp. 28, 30 (D.P.R. 1967). Moreover, 
no court has ruled that International Shoe should be read as inapplicable to noncorporate defen- 
dants even though reasonable grounds might exist for such a limitation: the case involved a 
corporate defendant and International Shoe was decided in response to the difficult problem 
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federal courts1* and the United States Supreme CourtI6 have defined 
and redefined the defendant contacts that would be considered 
"minimum" within the meaning of the International Shoe test. While 
this refining process of giving content to "minimum contacts" con- 
tinues, however, a well-accepted unitary approach to the problem 
clearly has been devised." 
The development of a personal jurisdiction doctrine for the federal 
courts, however, has not received extensive treatment by courts and 
commentators. No federal long-arm statute purports to prescribe federal 
standards for assertion of personal jurisdiction in either diversityI8 
of finding a rational theory upon which to assert personal jurisdiction over nondomiciliary 
corporations doing business in the state. See also Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional Bases 
for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U. L. REV. 599, 603 (1955); Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based 
on Local Causes of Action, 1956 WIS. L. REV. 522, 544-45; Reese & Galston, Doing an Act 
or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IOWA L. REV. 249, 251 (1959). 
15. See, e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Pennant Products, Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (7th 
Cir. 1980); Aycock v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 617 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1980); Lakeside Bridge 
and Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979); H. Ray Baker, 
Inc. v. Associated Banking Corp., 592 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1979); Capital Dredge & Dock Corp. 
v. Midwest Dredging Co., 573 F.2d 377 (6th Cir. 1978); Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food 
Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); Republic Int'l. Corp. v. Amco Eng'rs, Inc., 
516 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1975); United State Ry. Equip. Co. v. Port Huron & Detroit R.R., 
495 F.2d 1127 (7th Cir. 1974); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st 
Cir. 1973); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); 
Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Logicon, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Capitol Indem. 
Corp. v. Certain Lloyds Underwriters and/or London Cos., 487 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Wis. 
1980); Ayers v. Coppenveld Corp., 487 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Mueller v. Steelcase, 
Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959); Manufacturers' Lease Plans, Inc. v. Alverson Draughon 
College, 115 Ariz. 358, 565 P.2d 864 (1977); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Rath Packing Co. v. Intercontinental Meat Traders, 
Inc., 181 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1970); O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., 232 Ga. 256, 206 
S.E. 2d 437 (1974); Compagnia de Astral v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955); Marshall Egg Transport Co. v. Bender-Goodman 
Co., 275 Minn. 534, 148 N.W.2d 161 (1967); Miller v. Glendale Equip. & Supply, Inc., 344 
So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1977); McIntosh v. Navaro Seed Co., 81 N.M. 302, 466 P.2d 868 (1970); 
S. Howes Co. v. W.P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okia. 1954), appeal dismissed per stipula- 
tion, 348 U.S. 983 (1955); Zerbel v. H.L. Federman & Co., 48 Wis. 2d 54, 179 N.W.2d 872 
(1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971). 
16. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko 
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. 
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). For a discussion of the develop- 
ment of the "minimum contacts" test, see infra notes 106-80 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 106-80 and accompanying text. 
IS. Diversity cases are those cases in which the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal 
district court arises under 28 U.S.C. $1332 (1976), which section provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the 
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interests and 
costs, and is between- 
(1) citizens of different States; 
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; 
(3) citizens of different States in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are 
additional parties; and 
(4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States. 
Id. 
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or federal questionlg cases.20 In cases in which a state claim is at 
issue between citizens of different states, and the subject matter jurisdic- 
tion of a federal court therefore is based on diversity of citizenship, 
the federal courts generally have accepted the proposition that the 
fourteenth amendment standard of "minimum contacts with the state" 
in which the federal court is sitting should be employed to determine 
the constitutionality of federal court assertions of personal jurisdiction.*' 
19. Federal question cases are those cases in which the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
federal district court arises under 28 U.S.C. $1331 (Supp. V 1981), which section provides: 
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Con- 
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. Diversity cases, see supra note 18, and 
federal question cases make up the vast majority of cases over which the federal courts have 
subject matter jurisdiction. In both types of cases, the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal 
court is concurrent with that of state courts. The federal courts have been granted, either directly 
or by implication, see Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State 
Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1976); Note, Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Federal Cotrrts in 
Private Civil Actions, 70 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1957), exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in 
various areas including Admiralty, maritime and prize cases, 28 U.S.C. $1333 (1976) (although 
"saving to suitors" clauses in the statute has effect of making federal jurisdiction exclusive 
only in limitation of liability proceedings and in maritime actions in retn, C. WRIGHT, THE 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 36 (4th ed. 1983)); Bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. $1334 (Supp. V 1981); 
Patents and copyrights, 28 U.S.C. $1338 (1976); cases involving fines, penalties, forfeitures, 
or seizures under the laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. $51355, 1356 (1976); cases involving 
crimes against the Untied States, 18 U.S.C. $3231; cases involving counsels and vice-counsels 
as defendants, 28 U.S.C. 1351 (Supp. V 1981); cases involving the United States as a defen- 
dant, 28 U.S.C. $1346 (1976) (exclusive by implication, C. WRIGHT, supra); Antitrust actions, 
15 U.S.C. $515,26 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); cases under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
$78aa (1976); cases involving violations of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 7 1 7 ~  (1976); and 
suits on bonds under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. $270b(b) (1976). Finally, certain types of cases 
have been reserved exclusively for the United States Supreme Court, with that court having 
original as well as exclusive jurisdiction. See C. WRIGHT, supra, at 765, 767-69, 773. 
Throughout this article, the term "federal question cases" will be used in a broad sensc 
to encompass not only cases arising under 28 U.S.C. $1331 but also those cases arising under 
exclusive grants of subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts, all "nondiversity" cases that 
can be heard by lower federal courts. See also infra note 195. 
20. See infra note 218 and accompanying text. 
21. The Supreme Court never has spoken directly on the issue. But see Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982) (Supreme 
Court impliedly adopts Arrolvsmilh) (see infra note 481 and accompanying text; 456 U.S. 694, 
71 1-12 (Powell, J., concurring) (concurrence expressly relies on Arrolvsmitlt) (see infra note 482 
and accompanying text)). Most federal courts have followed the analysis of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 
F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), wherein the court determined that, in a diversity of citizenship case, 
as an implementation of the Erie doctrine, the federal court should adopt the state standard 
to determine whether a foreign corporation would be amenable to suit in the federal court. 
See infra notes 453-77 and accompanying text (discussing Arrolvsrnith). See also Jennings V. 
McCall Corp.. 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Smartt v. Coca Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d 
447 (6th Cir. 1963). But see Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). 
See infra notes 434-52 and accompanying text (discussing Jaftex). While this position has some 
appeal in that federal courts sitting in diversity are deciding state claims, this writer questions 
the propriety of determining the authority of a federal court on the basis of limitations imposed 
on state courts. See Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc. 282 F.2d 508, 516 (2d Cir. 1960) 
("[hlence our conclusion is that the question-whether a foreign corporation is present in a 
district to permit of service of process upon it is one of federal law governing the procedure 
of the United States courts and is to be determined accordingly"); von Mehren & Trautman, 
supra note 2, a t  1123 n.6 ("[a]rguably, federal courts do not require enabling legislation to 
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No standard, however, consistently is applied in federal question cases,22 
those "civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties 
of the United States"23 and under special grants of exclusive subject 
matter jurisdiction to federal courts.24 In cases in which a federal 
statute provides for nationwide or even worldwide service of process,25 
most federal courts agree that a defendant's amenability to suitz6 should 
be measured by the due process clause of the fifth, rather than the 
due process clause of the fourteenth, amendment.27 These courts do 
not concur, however, in the substance of that standard. Some argue 
that a "minimum contacts" test similar to that employed under the 
fourteenth amendment should apply. This test aggregates the defen- 
dant's contacts with the United States as a whole, the single federal 
forum of which the particular federal court is merely an arm, to 
determine sufficiency of contacts for jurisdictional purposes.28 Other 
federal courts in similar situations refuse to aggregate the defendant's 
national contacts, choosing instead to examine the sufficiency of the 
defendant's contacts with the state in which the federal court is sitting.29 
Other federal courts do not articulate clearly the standard applied. 
These courts either find that no federal standard need be determined 
because the defendant's contacts with the state in which the federal 
court is sitting satisfy the International Shoe test,30 or fail to find 
or to announce any basis for an assertion of personal juri~diction.~' 
assume adjudicatory jurisdiction under federal standards, even in diversity litigation"); Note, 
Alien Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal JurisdictionaI Standard, 95 
HARV. L .  REV. 470 n.1 (1981) (author acknowledges the possible propriety of adopting a federal 
standard in diversity cases). For further, more extensive discussion of this point, see infra notes 
478-92 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 493-1359 and accompanying text. 
23. 28 U.S.C. $1331 (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 19. 
24. See supra note 19. 
25. See infra statutes cited in note 247. 
26. For purposes of this article, a defendant is said to be "amenable to suit" in a par- 
ticular jurisdiction or  "amenable to service of process" pursuant to the procedure established 
by a particular jurisdiction if the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would 
not be considered constitutionally invalid under the particular tests appropriate to the particular 
assertion of personal jurisdiction. 
Professor Foster defined amenability as "a statement of the grounds or conditions that link 
a defendant to the forum sufficiently to justify entry of a personal judgment against him in 
the action at hand." Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 9, 
11. He argued that notice to  the defendant, "ordinarily achieved by service of a summons 
or  other process announcing the commencement or pendency of judicial proceedings," and 
"amenability" are the two requirements for "the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non- 
consenting party." Id. at 10-11. 
27. See infra notes 579-784 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra notes 687-716 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 717-738 and 
accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 748-53 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 769-84 and ac- 
companying text. 
30. See infra notes 739-47 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 587-608 and accompanying text. 
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In many federal question cases, no special federal statute authorizes 
service upon the alien or foreign corporate defendant or the non- 
domiciliary individual defendant.32 Service of process upon an in- 
dividual defendant, provided the defendant is present or domiciled 
in the state in which the district court is held, can be achieved pur- 
suant to Rule 4(d)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" by 
"delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally 
or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of 
abode."34 Service of process upon certain corporate defendants is 
authorized by Rule 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil P r o c e d ~ r e , ~ ~  
which provides, in pertinent part, that service be made "by deliver- 
ing a copy of the summons and complaint to an officer, a managing 
or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process. . . ."36 Some federal courts 
have ruled that when process is served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(l) or 
4(d)(3), amenability to service of process should be measured by a 
federal, or fifth amendment, ~tandard.~' Among these courts, however, 
the applicability of any particular test, such as the aggregation of 
national contacts, again has not been uniform.38 Some courts, 
moreover, do not expressly adopt a fifth amendment standard.39 
Finally, in some federal question cases in which a federal statute 
for nationwide or worldwide service of process is not available, such 
as those cases in which the defendant is not present or domiciled in 
the state or in which the defendant is a corporation and service can- 
not be made within the state upon some corporate agent, service can- 
not be achieved pursuant to Rule 4(d)(l) or Rule 4(d)(3). The plain- 
tiff instead must serve the defendant by using the long-arm statute 
of the state in which the federal court is sitting. Some courts have 
interpreted former Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
P r o ~ e d u r e , ~ ~  recently recodified, with changes, as Rule 4(~)(2)(C)(i),"' 
- - -- - - 
32. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
33. See infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
34. FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(l). For the full text of Rule 4, see infra note 269. 
35. See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3). For the full text of Rule 4, see infra note 269. 
37. See infra notes 799-887 and accompanying text. 
38. Id. 
39. See infra notes 839-51 and accompanying text. 
40. See infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7) (1981). For 
the full text of former Rule 4(d)(7), see infra note 267. 
41. FED. R. CN. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). For the text of the 1983 amendments to Rule 4, as 
well as extensive discussion of these amendments, see infra note 269 and notes 275 to 286 
and accompanying text. All of the cases of importance to  this article involved former Rule 
4(d)(7) rather than present Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). Textual distinction will be made whenever any 
confusion might arise. 
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as authorizing such use of the state long-arm statute.42 Rule 4(d)(7) 
provided, in pertinent part: 
[I]t is. . .sufficient if the summons and complaint are served. . .in 
the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district 
court is held for the service of summons or other like process upon 
any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general 
jurisdiction of that state.43 
In federal question cases in which extraterritorial service of process44 
purportedly was made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7), some federal courts 
ruled that the amenability of defendants so served to the personal 
jurisdiction of the federal court should be measured by a state 
standard," the International Shoe "minimum contacts with the state" 
test or some similar test, because service had been made "in the man- 
ner" prescribed by state law. Other federal courts in similar cir- 
cumstances espoused a federal standard for federal question cases, 
but for a variety of reasons actually applied" the state standard. A 
few courts adopted and tried to apply a federal standard of amenability 
under the theory that while the method or mechanics of service were 
being prescribed by state statute, the defendant's amenability to suit 
in a federal court on a federal question should be determined by a 
federal ~tandard.~'  
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for "ser- 
vice upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state" 
in which the federal court is sitting." Rule (4)(e) provides, in perti- 
nent part: 
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district 
court is held provides. . .for service of a summons. . .upon a party 
not an inhabitant of or found within the state,. . .service may be 
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the 
statute or rule.49 
Thus, Rule 4(e) expressly provides that federal courts sitting in federal 
question cases as well as in diversity cases may employ the long-arm 
42. See infra cases discussed at notes 915-1038. 
43. FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(7) (1981). 
44. The term "extra-territorial" will be used throughout this article to describe a federal 
court's service of vrocess beyond the territorial boundaries of the state in which the federal 
court is held. 
45. See infra notes 936-55 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 929 and 935 and 
accompanying text. 
46. See infra notes 956-1010 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 920-28 and 
accompanying text. 
47. See infra notes 1011-38 and accompanying text. 
48. See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text. 
49. FED. R. CN. P. 4(e). For the full text of Rule 4, see infra note 269. 
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statutes of the states in which the federal courts are sitting.50 Many 
federal courts in these circumstances have interpreted Rule 4(e) as 
requiring that state standards apply both to the question of mechanics 
of service and to the question of amenability to service of pro~ess .~ '  
Other courts have applied state amenability standards, but for less 
compelling reasons.52 A few courts have announced that the fifth 
amendment should govern amenability even in Rule 4(e) cases,53 while 
even fewer courts actually have tried to apply some federal standard 
to this question.54 When federal courts sitting on federal question cases 
feel compelled to apply state amenability standards, an anomalous 
situation is created in which federal courts sitting in federal question 
cases must apply state standards to the exercises of their federal court 
personal juri~diction.~~ 
While the federal courts have been faced with cases arising in each 
of the categories enumerated above, no coherent or cohesive procedurl 
or theory has emerged either in regard to the entire question of per- 
sonal jurisdiction in federal courts or in regard to federal question 
cases in general or any particular category of federal question cases. 
The cases and courts are in disarray, both as to when a federal stan- 
dard should apply to the question of amenability to service of pro- 
cess and as to what a federal standard might require. The purpose 
of this article is to examine the above-outlined problem in the con- 
text of the various types of cases in which it might arise and to 
prescribe some consistent, sensible scheme of personal jurisdiction in 
federal question cases. This scheme would embody the basic prin- 
ciples of the federal judicial system while recognizing practical limita- 
tions where required. Part I1 of this article examines the historical 
development of state court personal jurisdiction limitations through 
the establishment and development of the fourteenth amendment 
minimum contacts due process standards6 and the historical develop- 
ment of federal court personal jurisdiction limitations or standards, 
including any attempts to formulate an independent fifth amendment 
due process ~tandard.~'  Part I11 categorizes and examines the various 
types of federal question cases in which the issue of personal jurisdic- 
tion has arisen, analyzing particular cases in each category in light 
50. See infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text. 
51. See infra notes 1153-71 and accompanying text. 
52. See infra notes 1123-33, 1142-52, 1172-82 and 1213-43 and accompanying text. 
53. See infra notes 1183-1212 and 1244-1316 and accompanying text. 
54. See infra notes 1269-1316 and accompanying text. 
55. See infra notes 872-84 and 968-69 and accompanying test. 
56. See infra notes 60-185 and accompanying text. 
57. See infra notes 186-560 and accompanying text. 
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of the efficacy of employing some federal standard of amenability 
to suit such as the "aggregation of national contacts" test.58 Part 
IV provides the author's prediction as to the direction of the law 
of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases and her own scheme 
for resolving some of the current issues in this area.5g 
A. State Court Personal J~risdiction~~-The Fourteenth 
Amendment 
Generally the authority of a state to render decisions personally 
binding on a particular defendant, its in personam jurisdiction, arises 
not from any affirmative grant of such authority by the Constitution 
and/or laws of the United States, but rather from the failure of these 
formulations to prohibit such exer~ises .~~ As provided in the tenth 
amendment, "[tlhe powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
58. See .infra notes 561-1355 and accompanying text. 
59. See infra notes 1356-64 and accompanying text. 
60. For a recent, interesting description of the historical development of personal jurisdiction 
theory, see generally von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and 
Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REV. 279 (1983). 
61. Many commentators have traced the historical development of state court personal 
jurisdiction in the United States or various aspects thereof. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 2, at 
429-50, Jursik; "World-Wide" Without "Minimum Contacts": An Analysis of Product Sellers 
Amenability to Suit, 31 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 233, 233-45 (Spring 1981); Kamp, supra note 
2, at 19-44; Ripple & Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: Refections on 
the Road Ahead, 56 NOTRE D A ~ E  LATV REV. 65, 65-81 (1980); Seidelson, Jurisdiction Over 
Nonresident Defendants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long-Arm Statutes, 6 DUQ. 
L. REV. 221, 221-35 (1967-68); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at  1124-63; Woods, 
supra note 2, at 861-80; Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation: When is a Contract 
a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. REV. 375, 375-89 (1981); Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 134-52; 
Note, Minimum Contacts as Applied to Products Liability-World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 1159, 1159-68 (1980); Developments in the Law, supra note 
2, at 909-65; Note, The Role of Foreseeability in Jurisdictional Inquiry: Tyson v. Whitaker 
& Sons, Inc., 32 ME. L. REV. 497, 501-06 (1980); Comment, Asserting Jurisdiction over Non- 
resident Corporations on the Basis of Contractual Dealings: A Four-Step Proposal, 12 PAC. 
L. J. 1039, 1039-49 (1981); Note, World-Wide Volkswagen, supra note 2, at  783-94; Comment, 
Personal Jurisdiction over Retailers and Regional Distributors in Products Liability Litigation: 
Sufficiency of a Single Contact, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 327-32 (1981). 
62. Some commentators have viewed this question as one essentially of appropriate and 
sensible distribution of cases, with questions of sovereignty and protection of the defendant 
from unreasonable exercises of jurisdiction figuring in not as primary analysis but merely as 
important ciphers in the distribution equation. To  one commentator, 
[Personal jurisdiction] is the allocation of judicial business among the several states 
of the United States, according to the relationship between the particular action and 
the state of the forum-the determination of an appropriate geographical location 
for the trial. . .[It] might be examined in the light of the type of action involved, 
so as to require but a single determination of jurisdiction, taking into account all 
those factors relevant to the choice of an appropriate place of trial within a federal 
system. 
Developments in the Law, supra note 2, a t  911-12. 
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States respectively, or to the people."63 This broad authorization is 
the only available Constitutional source from which state court per- 
sonal jurisdiction arguably emanates. The tenth amendment provides 
an excellent starting point for any consideration of the development 
of state court personal jurisdiction, however, because it includes the 
two aspects that consistently define such authority: grant and limita- 
tion. The basic inquiry, even before Pennoyer v. Neff4 has been 
to determine the scope of Constitutional limitations on state court 
personal juri~diction.~' During the course of this search, limitations 
initially were defined very broadly,66 subsequently were drawn much 
more narr~wly,~ '  and, most recently, were broadened again to some 
extent.68 While the limiting language of the Constitution has not 
changed, the construction of that language has varied, partly from 
the viscissitudes of developing any definition of language on a case- 
by-case basis, and partly from the necessity of altering theories that 
could not survive in the increasingly complex and sophisticated 
transportation, communication, and industrial systems of the twen- 
tieth century.69 
Pennoyer v. Neff7' often is considered the cornerstone of the law 
of state court personal juri~diction.~' In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court 
limited the jurisdiction of a state court to the territorial boundaries 
of the state, ruling that a Court had no authority over an individual 
defendant who was not a resident of the state unless he had been 
served with process while present therein.72 This determination clear- 
63. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
64. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
65. See infra notes 70-185 and accompanying text. 
66. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
67. See infra notes 106-28 and accompanying text. 
68. See infra notes 129-55 and accompanying text. 
69. See infra notes 83 and 96 and accompanying text. As noted by one recent commentator: 
The United States is an economically open, highly mobile, industrial society. It is 
also a federation of fifty distinct polities, each with its own judicial system. Thus, 
although the federal system allows people to move freely about the country, it also 
restricts the state's exercise of jurisdiction over them. 
The inability of state courts to  exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
has plagued our federal system since its inception. 
Note, Interstate Jurisdictional Compacts: A New Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 49 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1981) (footnotes omitted). 
70. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
71. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, 81064, at 208-1 1; see generally authorities 
cited supra note 61. 
72. 95 U.S. at  722. The question in Pennoyer involved the validity of an Oregon judg- 
ment which had resulted in the transfer to Pennoyer of title to Neff's land in Oregon. Id. 
at 719. Notice of the Oregon action against Neff, Mitchell v. Neff, had been given by publica- 
tion in Oregon while Neff was outside the state. Id. at  720. Finding that the Oregon court 
had not obtained personal jurisdiction over Neff, the Supreme Court determined that the Oregon 
judgment was invalid, even in Oregon. Id. at 732-33. 
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ly was influenced by the theory that each state is a sovereign whose 
power extends only to the boundaries of its territ~ry. '~ 
The actual significance of Pennoyer, however, in the development 
of a unified, workable theory of state court personal jurisdiction, 
generally is overlooked by courts and commentators. The greatest 
significance of Pennoyer was not in its recognition of traditional strict 
territorial limitations on personal jurisdiction but rather in its recogni- 
tion that the validity of any exercise of personal jurisdiction by a 
state court is to be determined according to the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment.74 Any exercise of jurisdiction consis- 
73. Id. This territorial principle of viewing sister states as separate sovereignties for jurisdic- 
tional purposes was embraced early by the United States Supreme Court. Bank of Augusta 
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). For a discussion of the territorial theory in England 
and its subsequent influence on American courts, see Hazard, supra note 4, a t  252-62. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court gave careful elucidation to those jurisdictional prin- 
ciples on which it rested its determination: 
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, 
many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested 
in the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited 
by that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, 
and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. 
One of these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereign- 
ty over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has 
the power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants. 
. . .The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; 
that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or 
property without its territory. . . .The several States are of equal dignity and authority, 
and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And 
so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State 
have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; 
and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory 
so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. 
95 U.S. at 732-33 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court explained its decision on a "physical 
power" ground: a state court had authority over persons and property within its borders and 
no authority over persons and property outside its borders; ihus, the Oregon court had no 
authority over the person of Neff who was not present in Oregon at  the time he had been 
constructively served by publication in a newspaper. 
The above-quoted passage is significant also for its recognition that the states, being bound 
together in a federation governed by the United States Constitution, were not completely com- 
parable to independent sovereigns. At various times subsequent to this decision, the Court has 
suggested that notions of federalism affect the appropriate scope of state court personal jurisdic- 
tion. See infra notes 11 1-13 and 148 and accompanying text. But see McDougal, Judicial Jurisdic- 
tion: From a Contacts to an Interest Analysis, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1982). 
74. 95 U.S. at  733. The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part: "No State 
shall. . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, $1. The Court stated: 
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .,the validity of. . .judgments 
may be directly questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground 
that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations 
of parties over whom the court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law. 
95 U.S. at  733. As noted by Professors Wright and Miller, however, this "passage. . .must 
be viewed as dictum because of the inapplicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to the case- 
it did not become effective until after the. . .judgment [which was assertedly invalid because 
of lack of valid personal jurisdiction over the defendant] had been rendered. . . ." 4 C. WRIGHT 
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tent with the due process clause would be valid; any exercise incon- 
sistent with the due process clause would be invalid and not entitled 
to full faith and credit.'* The due process clause, therefore, became 
one of the sources of limitation by which subsequent courts would 
measure exercises of personal jurisdiction. According to Pennoyer, 
moreover, any attempt to exercise jurisdiction over a nonpresent non- 
consenting nondomiciliary of the state would violate legitimate con- 
stitutional limitations. 
Certain traditional bases of personal jurisdiction, that had been 
recognized and employed prior to Pennoyer, like pre~ence'~ and con- 
sent to suit," did not prove troublesome after that decision. After 
all, in Pennoyer the Supreme Court found that if the defendant were 
present within the jurisdiction when served with process, then due 
process was not violated. Moreover, consent to suit, either by ap- 
pearing to defend or by appointing an agent for service of process, 
surely would not violate the defendant's due process rights because 
his consent to suit would be a waiver of any rights he might other- 
wise have. A final traditional basis of personal jurisdiction, a defen- 
dant's domicile in the state, was added by the Supreme Court in 1940 
in Milliken v. Meyer." This post-Pennoyer basis would also seem to 
provide no troublesome incursions on the defendant's due process 
rights. 
Another early source of limitation, frequently overlooked by com- 
-- - -- 
& A. MILLER, supra note 4, $1064, at  210. The fourteenth amendment became effective on 
July 28, 1868. This dictum, however, has been followed and amplified by the Supreme Court 
and other courts in innumerable subsequent decisions. See infra notes 106-85 and accompany- 
ing text. 
75. U.S. CONST. art. IV, $1 Failure to satisfy the procedural aspects of due process, such 
as failure to  provide a defendant with proper notice of an action which has been instituted 
against him, see, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), or failure to serve process on 
a defendant in the manner prescribed by the appiopriate service of process statute, or failure 
of the statute authorizing such service to provide an adequate method for notifying the defen- 
dant, see, e-g., Wuchter v. Piuutti ,  276 U.S. 13 (1928) (judgment declared invalid because 
service was pursuant to state nonresident motorist statute which did not expressly require notice 
to non resident defendants, even though defendant actually received timely notice of suit), also 
will lead to invalidation of a judgment on due process grounds and result in a refusal by a 
sister state to afford the resulting judgment full faith and credit. Such questions are beyond 
the scope of this article, except to the extent that a service of process statute is deemed to 
be more than a mere procedural direction and instead is interpreted as determinative of a defen- 
dant's amenability to suit in the jurisdiction. 
76. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (personal jurisdic- 
tion based on service on a nonresident defendant while in an airplane flying over the state 
in which the action was brought). See supra note 4. 
77. See, e-g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); Western Loan & Sav. Co. v. Butte 
& Boston Consol. Mining Co., 210 U.S. 368 (1908); York v. Texas, 137 U.S. I5 (1890); see 
supra note 6.  
78. 311 U.S. 457 (1940); see supra note 5. 
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mentators, is the commerce clause of the Con~ t i tu t ion .~~  As noted 
by one commentator: 
Even if the due-process requirements as currently set forth are 
satisfied, a state's exercise of jurisdiction might unduly burden in- 
terstate commerce. The expense and inconvenience of defending a 
suit may tend to increase the cost and limit the scope of commercial 
operations to a defendant not engaged in substantial operations in 
the forum state.80 
In the 1920's and 1930's, the Supreme Court based several invalida- 
tions of state jurisdiction on the commerce c l a ~ s e ; ~ '  no recent deci- 
sion, however, has been so based.82 
As the United States moved into the twentieth century, the "actual 
presence" limitation attributed to Pennoyer proved frustrating to plain- 
tiffs and state courts. Although at the time of Pennoyer most trans- 
actions had been confined to a single jurisdiction, improved technology 
led to increasingly complex multistate  transaction^.^^ One problem that 
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, $8, cl. 3. The commerce clause gives Congress the power "To 
regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes. . . ." Id. In 1945, the Supreme Court described the nature of the "dormant commerce 
clause": 
For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the com- 
merce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protec- 
tion from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, 
where congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the 
commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national 
interest. 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). Implicit in this grant of authority 
to Congress, whether exercised or not, is a denial to states of the authority to regulate in- 
terstate commerce. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 256 (10th ed. 1980). 
80. Developments in the Law, supra note 2, at 983. 
81. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 
278 U.S. 492 (1929); Davis v. Farmers Co-op. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 (1923). See Farrier, 
Suits against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Commerce, 17 MINN. L. REV. 
381 (1933). 
82. In recent cases, which apply the International Shoe criteria to determine whether due 
process has been violated, see infra notes 106-85 and accompanying text, burdens on commerce 
are probably subsumed in the balancing process as burdens or  inconveniences to  the defendant. 
At least one recent commentator has suggested that the commerce clause still may have a signifi- 
cant role in prescribing the "permissible reach of long arm jurisdiction" in commercial cases. 
Comment, Constitutional Limitations on State Long Arm Jurisdiction, 49 U .  Cm. L. REV. 
156, 174-75 (1982). The commentator noted: 
Jurisdictional standards may impair commerce in two ways. First, the threat of liability 
to suit in a foreign jurisdiction discourages transactions with foreseeable foreign effects. 
Second, assertion of long arm jurisdiction may frustrate the reasonable expectations 
of commercial actors, thereby decreasing commercial certainty. . . . 
. . . .  
The constitutional interest in facilitating interstate commerce seems to require ad- 
ditional jurisdictional limitations beyond the minimum safeguards of causation, notice, 
and relevance provided by due process. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
83. As noted by one commentator: 
Because of changing social conditions-including increased use of the corporate 
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was of increasing concern for the states was the nonresident motorist 
who drove into a state, caused injury, and fled the jurisdiction before 
he or she could be served with process.84 In Hess v. P a w l o ~ k i , ~ ~  the 
United States Supreme Court upheld, as not violative of a defendant's 
due process rights, a Massachusetts statutes6 providing that any non- 
resident motorist who drove into the state was deemed to have ap- 
pointed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles as his agent for service of 
process in any action arising from operation of the motor vehicle in 
the state.s7 The Court upheld this prototype long-arm statute with 
its implied consent provision on the theory that a state has an impor- 
tant interest in safety on its highways. The Court noted: 
entity in the business world, the development of the automobile and other forms 
of more rapid transportation, and the invention of far more sophisticated modes 
of communication-Pennoyer's territorial view of a state's judicial jurisdiction soon 
became unworkable and bore little relation to people's everyday activities. 
McDougal, supra note 73, at 2. The Supreme Court recognized these changes in the structure 
of American society. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., the Court, noting "the fun- 
damental transformation of our national economy over the years," stated: 
Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve parties 
separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has 
come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across state lines. 
At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less 
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a state where he engages in economic 
activity. 
355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957). The Court made a similar statement in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958). See note 130 infra. See also Gray v. American Radiator & Standard 
Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 442-43, 176 N.E.2d 761, 765-66 (1961). See generally 4 C. WRIOHT 
& A .  MILLER, supra note 4, $1065, at 211. At least one commentator has noted the artificiality 
of territorial limitations on state courts: 
People in this country, whether acting as individuals or as members of a group, 
pay little attention to state boundaries. Moreover, when companies and individuals 
engage in business activities, state lines are of almost no moment, since these entities 
often distribute their products in many, if not all, states. . . .Because state lines 
are of such little importance to  the activities of the people in this country, reliance 
on the territorial boundaries of states as a basic limit on the states' authority to 
exercise judicial jurisdiction is destructive of relevant interests. 
McDougal, supra note 73, at  8. 
For a survey of the development of post-Pennoyer jurisdiction, see Kurland, The Supreme 
Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts From Pen- 
noyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958). 
84. Developments in the Law, supra note 2, a t  917. 
85. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
86. Id. at  357. 
87. Compare Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See supra notes 3 and 75. Hess 
was preceded by Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916), wherein the Supreme Court upheld, 
as not violative of due process rights, a New Jersey statute which required, prior to a nonresi- 
dent's use of the state highways, the filing of an instrument actually appointing a New Jersey 
agent for service of process in actions arising from such use. Id. at  169. 
Hess did not expressly overrule the earlier case of Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919), 
wherein the Supreme Court ruled that a state had no power to  exclude a nonresident individual 
from the state and, thus, could not claim that the individual had impliedly consented to suit 
by doing business within the state. Id. at  293. Flexner involved a suit brought in Kentucky 
against an out-of-state partnership doing business in Kentucky. Flexner, however, now is con- 
sidered to have been overruled by implication. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 
673 (1957). See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, $1065, at 214, n.57. 
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Motor vehicles are dangerous machines; and, even when skillfully 
and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to 
persons and property. In the public interest the State may make and 
enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part 
of all, residents and nonresidents alike, who use its highways. The 
measure in question operates to require a nonresident to answer for 
his conduct in the State where arise causes of action alleged against 
him, as well as to provide for a claimant a convenient method by 
which he may sue to enforce his righkS8 
The Court concluded that a state could exclude nonresidents from 
the use of its highways and thus could require, as a condition of 
nonexclusion, the consent of the driver to service of process in related 
Another small jurisdictional excursion beyond the "presence" doc- 
trine was made in Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. G o ~ d r n a n , ~ ~  a case 
in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a state court asser- 
tion of jurisdiction over a nonpresent individual who was doing 
business in the state through agents.g1 An implied consent theory again 
was utilized, the court justifying its decision on grounds similar to 
Hess: the defendant's agents were selling securities, a function sub- 
ject to "special regulation" in the forum state.92 The Court reasoned, 
therefore, that the state could require consent to a related suit as 
a condition of carrying on this business.93 
Despite these cases, in which traditional bases of personal jurisdic- 
tion were exceeded slightly in light of the particular interests of the 
forum states in regulating certain types of individual activities within 
their statesSg4 the Pennoyer doctrine could have continued as the 
guiding principle of state court jurisdiction if jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations had not caused conceptual difficulties for state courts.g5 
88. 274 U.S. at  356. 
89. Id. at  357. The statute upheld in Hess is really an early example of a very limited 
long-arm statute. See infra notes 119 to 126 and accompanying text. 
90. 294 U.S. 623 (1935). 
91. Id. at  628. The Court noted: "Doherty voluntarily established an office in Iowa and 
there carried on business. Considering this fact and accepting the construction given to $ 11079, 
we think to apply it as here proposed will not deprive him of any right guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution." Id. 
92. Id. at  627-28. The Court noted, "Iowa treats the business of dealing in corporate 
securities as exceptional and subjects it to special regulation." Id. 
93. Id. at 628. The Court noted, "The power of the States to impose terms upon non- 
residents, as to activities within their borders, recently has been much discussed". Id. 
94. The Supreme Court decision in Hess led to state legislative enactment of implied con- 
sent statutes in regard to other "dangerous" activities such as the operation of aircraft, see, 
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. $48.19 (West Supp. 1983); 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. $1410 (Purdon 
1963) and the operation of watercraft. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 348.19 (West Supp. 1983). 
95. As late as 1917, the Supreme Court still stuck firmly to the physical power concept 
of personal jurisdiction. In McDonald v. Mabee, the Court noted: 
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power, although in civilized times it is 
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By the early 1940's, many corporations were doing substantial business 
in states other than those in which they had been incorporated, and 
the question of state court personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora- 
tions became very i m p ~ r t a n t . ~ ~  
Satisfaction of the need to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations was not accompanied by sound doctrine. The presence 
formulation, which had worked so well for individual defendants, was 
difficult to apply to corporations. According to the United States 
Supreme Court and other learned authorities, a corporation was a 
creature of the law and had no legal existence outside the state whose 
law had created the corp~ration.~' Even though a corporation might 
be wreaking havoc in a particular state, therefore, the corporation 
could not be served with process because it did not exist in that state. 
The implied consent theory, which had been so satisfactory in regard 
to individuals who were engaging in state-regulated acts within a state,gs 
also was not satisfying conceptually as a doctrine on which to base 
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Implied consent, as 
a basis for personal jurisdiction in Hess and in Henry L. Doherty, 
had been grounded on the authority of a state to bar an individual 
who would not consent to suit.99 In some quarters, however, the in- 
not necessary to maintain that power throughout proceedings properly begun, and 
although submission to the jurisdiction by appearance may take the place of service 
upon the person. . . .No doubt there may be some extension of the means of acquir- 
ing jurisdiction beyond service or appearance, but the foundation should be borne 
in mind. 
243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). 
96. As noted by Judge Clark: 
In the late. nineteenth century, and continuing on into our own, increased use of 
the corporate form, together with the greater mobility afforded by modern means 
of transportation, brought about an expansion of corporate activity to a nationwide 
scale; corporations simply refused to remain penned up within their own states of 
incorporation. The existence of corporations which could-and did-do business on 
a nationwide scale necessitated revision of older, more limited, notions concerning 
jurisdiction. 
Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 1963). 
97. Louisville C. & C. R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844); Bank of Augusta 
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (dictum). See Young, The Nafionality of a Juristic 
Person, 22 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1908). In Bank of Augusta v. Earle, Chief Justice Taney stated: 
[A] corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty 
by which it is created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of the 
law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corpora- 
tion can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot 
migrate to another sovereignty. 
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839). 
For discussion of the history of doctrinal changes in the treatment of assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, see Farrier, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporafiotis, 17 
MINN. L. REV. 270 (1933); Kurland, supra note 83, at 577-86. 
98. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text. 
99. See supra notes 89 and 93 and accompanying text. 
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terstate commerce clause of the Cons t i tu t i~n '~~  was interpreted as not 
permitting a state to interfere in interstate commerce by excluding 
corporations from operating in the state.I0' Without the power to ex- 
clude, from whence would a state court obtain the authority to imply 
consent to suit?'02 Moreover, the implied consent doctrine led to 
anomalous results: foreign corporations that had not followed state 
statutory requirements in consenting to suit in the state were often 
in a better position than those complying with the law. Those cor- 
porations expressly consenting, for example, were held liable to suits 
on matters unreIated to their in-state activities while those impliedly 
consenting by mere transaction of business in the state were held liable 
only on claims arising out of that particular business.'03 
State courts did assert personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora- 
tions, however, despite the difficuIty in rationaIizing such assertions 
of authority.Io4 Regardless of whether a state court claimed to be 
employing a presence analysis or whether the court claimed to be using 
an implied consent theory, the measuring standard of "doing 
- ~~ -- p~ - -- ~ ~ 
100. U.S. CONST. art. I, $8, cl. 3. 
101. A corporation was not a citizen for purposes of enjoying the protection of the privileges 
and immunities clause of the constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, $2. See Blake v. McClung, 
172 U.S. 239 (1898); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). In order to avoid violation 
of the privileges and immunities clause in cases like Hess and Henry L. Doherty, the Supreme 
Court had to find that the particular activity in which the defendant was engaging was subject 
to special state regulation; the state could restrict its own citizens and, therefore, could also 
restrict noncitizens. 
The Supreme Court early held that reasonable restrictions could be imposed on corpora- 
tions engaged in interstate commerce. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (I8 How.) 404 
(1855). Subsequently, however, the Court determined that the interstate commerce clause gave 
corporations a right to do  interstate business and that a state constitutionally could not exclude 
a foreign corporation from engaging in interstate commerce within its territory. International 
Testbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91 (1910). 
102. As noted by Professor Kurland: "It would seem to follow that if the state's power 
to esact consent to be sued depended on its power to  exclude, and it could not exclude, it 
could not esact such consent." Kurland, supra note 83, a t  581 (footnote omitted). 
103. See Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) 
(Hand, J.); 1 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 377 n.2 (1935). 
104. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) (implied consent); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 
59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855) (implied consent); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 
U.S. 579 (1914) (presence). In St. Clair, Justice Field stated: 
The State may. . .impose as a condition upon which a foreign corporation shall 
be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall stipulate that in any litiga- 
tion arising out of its transactions in the State, it will accept as sufficient the service 
of process on its agents or persons specially designated; and the condition would 
be eminently fit and just and such condition and stipulation may be implied as well 
as espressed. 
106 U.S. at 356 (footnotes omitted). 
In regard to the consent doctrine, Professor Kurland noted that even after the Supreme 
Court had ruled expressly that a state constitutionally could not exclude a foreign corporation 
from engaging in interstate commerce within its boundaries, "the Court continued to  hold that 
foreign corporations were subject to the jurisdiction of state courts, even if the business they 
carried on within the state was interstate commerce." Kurland, supra note 83, at  581. 
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business," was the same:lo5 Was the defendant foreign corporation 
"doing sufficient business" in the jurisdiction to be "present" there? 
Was the defendant foreign corporation "doing sufficient business" 
in the jurisdiction to be deemed to have consented impliedly to suit? 
In International Shoe Co.  v. Washington,lo6 the Supreme Court 
devised a jurisdictional theory for foreign corporations that ignored 
both legal fictions,'07 presence and implied consent, and focused in- 
stead on the defendant's contacts with the forum state. The Inter- 
national Shoe case, which involved a foreign corporation whose agents 
solicited orders in the forum state, was the first Supreme Court at- 
tempt to establish a test by which a court might determine whether 
a defendant's due process rights were being violated by the particular 
assertion of personal jurisdiction.'08 The Court stated: 
[Dlue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to 
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory 
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice."'09 
The opinion by the Court in International Shoe, moreover, 
demonstrated a substantial shift in focus from its opinion in Pen- 
noyer, a shift from emphasis on the states as independent sovereigns110 
to a recognition of the states as bound together, by the Constitution, 
into a federal system. The Court said: 
[The] demands [of due process] may be met by such contacts. . .with 
the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our 
federal system of government, to require the corporation to defend 
the particular suit which is brought there."' 
Thus, International Shoe established two criteria that must be satisfied 
- - - - - - - - -  
105. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855) (consent to suit by "doing 
business"); Philadelphia & R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917) (present in state because 
"doing business"). See Kurland, supra note 83, at 584; Rothschild, Jurisdiction of Foreign 
Corporations in Personam, 17 VA. L. REV. 129 (1930). 
106. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
107. As stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in 1912, "The Constitution is not to be satisfied 
with a fiction." Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 390 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
108. See, e.g., Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1341; Note, World-Wide Volks~vagen, 
supra note 2, a t  788-89. 
109. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
110. See Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1341. As noted by the commentator: 
Under the regime of Pennoyer v. Neff, federalism played a key role in the due 
process limits on state in personam jurisdiction. This federalism was tied directly 
to rigid concepts of physical power and state sovereignty. Because each state's sovereign 
power existed only within its own territory, a state court could not exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant absent his "presence" within the state, his domicile 
there, or  his express or  implied consent. 
Id. at  1343 (footnotes omitted). 
111. 326 U.S. at 317 (emphasis added). 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 22 1984-1985 
I984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
in order for the forum state to assert jurisdiction over a defendant: 
the exercise must be consistent with fundamental fairness to the 
defendant112 and must be "consistent with the values of federalism 
embodied in the due process clause."113 Unfortunately, because the 
facts of International Shoe provided an easy case for assertion of 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court never really applied the test it had 
developed to the facts at hand. While noting that this kind of analysis 
might require "[aln 'estimate of the  inconvenience^""'^ between the 
defendant and other interests, the Court did not demonstrate this pro- 
cess for the state courts. The task of giving content to "contacts", 
or determining which "contacts" would be sufficient to be 
"minimum," was left to the state courts.115 
State courts responded with zeal to this expanded scope of per- 
sonal jurisdiction.l16 International Shoe was read broadly"' to apply 
to individual as well as to corporate defendants.l18 State legislatures 
112. Professor von Mehren describes the historical development of personal jurisdiction 
, 
doctrine as a gradual transition from a "power" theory to a "fairness" theory. von Mehren, 
supra note 60, at 300-07. 
113. Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at 1344 (citing Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 
F.2d 1123, 1132, 1140 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring)); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 
78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1589 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS $24 com- 
ment b (1971). 
The commentator goes on to point out that "[tlhe Supreme Court's emphasis on the extent 
of the forum State's interest [in McGee, see infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text] clearly 
suggests that principles of federalism beyond basic notions of territoriality underlie the due 
process clause." Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, a t  1346. See also supra note 110. 
114. 326 U.S. at  325 (quoting Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 
. - 
1930)). 
115. It might be argued that subsequent to the establishment, in International Shoe, of 
the "minimum contacts" test, courts could continue to preserve the traditional bases of 
jurisdiction-presence, consent, and domicile-as separate and distinct from the International 
Shoe analysis. In other words, a court need not engage in a "minimum contacts" analysis 
if it could base assertion of jurisdiction on one of these grounds. To  this writer, the "minimum 
contacts" test, as currently defined, see infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text, should apply 
to all state court assertions of personal jurisdiction, with presence, domicile and consent being 
merely factors, albeit very substantial factors, which weight in the balancing process. In that 
way, a defendant whose presence is quite transitory might not be subject to personal jurisdic- 
tion if sufficient factors weighed against such assertion of jurisdiction. 
116. See supra state court cases cited at note 1. As one commentator observed: 
By 1975, state long arm jurisdiction. . .had enjoyed three decades of unimpeded 
growth towards, and arguably sometimes beyond, the limits of due process. Further- 
more, this inexorable growth process was one the states inherently favored and were, 
therefore, unlikely to stunt voluntarily. 
Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World- 
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v. Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407, 409 (1980) 
(footnotes omitted). 
117. 4 C. WIUGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, $1067, at  234. See Bomze v. Nardis Sports- 
wear, Inc., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948); Lasky v. Norfolk & N. Ry., 157 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 
1946); Dees v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 71 F. Supp. 387 (D. Mo. 1947); Winkler-Koch 
Eng'g Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 70 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); American Cities Power 
& Light Corp. v. Williams, 74 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1947). 
118. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 23 1984-1985 
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16 
drafted long-arm  statute^"^ authorizing their courts to exercise, to 
a greaterIz0 or lesser extent,I2' this new expanded power authorized 
by the Supreme Court as not violating the fourteenth amendment rights 
of defendants.Iz2 Assertions of personal jurisdiction over nonpresent, 
nondomiciliary, nonconsenting defendants were based (1) on substantial 
119. See supra note 3. For further discussion of long-arm statutes, see Brilmayer, How 
Contacts Count: Due Procesr Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 
77; Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 M ~ c n .  
L. REV. 227 (1967); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of E~tended Jtrrisdic- 
tion in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 633; Homburger, The Reach of New York's Long-Artrt Statute: 
Today and Tomorroic: 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 61 (1965); Thode, In Personarn Jtrrisdiction; Arti- 
cle 2031B, the Texas "Long Arm" Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance To Cltallettge 
Jurisdiction in Texas and Else~vltere. 42 TEX. L. REV. 279 (1964); Note, Nonresident Jtrrisdic- 
tion and the New England Experience, 48 B.U.L. REV. 372 (1968); Developments in the Laic: 
supra note 2, at 1002-06, 1015-17; Note, A Reconsideration of "Long Arm" Jurisdicfiott, 37 
IND. L.J. 333 (1962); Comment, In Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Mantrfacturers 
in Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1028 (1965). As noted by one commentator: 
"Long-arm jurisdiction can be, and has been, made to serve the ends of judicial economy 
and to promote the goal of fairness and convenience in selecting a place of trial." Foster, 
Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wrs. L. REV. 9, 10. 
120. Some states, such as California and Rhode Island, empowered their courts to exercise 
all personal jurisdiction authority not inconsistent with the due process clause of the U.S. Con- 
stitution. See supra note 3. Where such a long-arm statute is in effect, the established analysis 
of a personal jurisdiction question-(1) has the state authorized its court to assert jurisdiction 
over this defendant (statutory interpretation) and (2) if so, would such assertion of jurisdiction 
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Gray V. American Radiator 
and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 767 (1961)-becomes telescoped 
into a single determination-would assertion of jurisdiction over this defendant violate due 
process? Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 90 n.4 (1978); Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 
F.2d 779, 782, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); In re Northern District of California "Dalkon 
Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887, 904 n.62 (N.D. Cal. 1981). 
Other states, in their long-arm statutes, describe those circumstances in which their courts 
would be authorized to assert jurisdiction over nonpresent, nonconsenting, nondomiciliary defen- 
dants. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 54(e)(2) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. 548.193(l)(f) (West Supp. 
1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §17(l)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-81); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW 
$302(a) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1980-81); OKLA. STAT., tit. 12, §1701.03(a)(4) (1961); W ~ s t l .  
REV. CODE ANN. 54.28.185 (Supp. 1981). See also supra note 3. 
121. Some states have drafted long-arm statutes which restrict the scope of court jurisdic- 
tion more narrowly than the limitations of fourteenth amendment due process. See, e.g., N.Y. 
Crv. PRAC. LAW §302(a) (describing circumstances in which jurisdiction may be exercised and 
specifically excluding defamation actions from the scope of long-arm authority). See also note 
3 supra. 
122. Other constitutional provisions besides the fourteenth amendment also may restrict 
the authority of a state to assert personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. As noted 
earlier, the commerce clause may limit the reach of long-arm statutes in some commercial con- 
texts. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. A similar restriction might be implied 
from the first amendment in regard to the activities of newspapers and other media in order 
to avoid "chilling" multistate dissemination of information. See New York Times Co. v. Con- 
ner, 365 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1966) ("First Amendment considerations surrounding the law 
of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause than is necessary 
in asserting jurisdiction of other types of tortious activity"). See also Buckley v. New York 
Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470, 
475 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see Church of 
Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1978); Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 
F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 
383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967). 
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and- continuous activity in the state with the claim related123 or 
unrelated12J to  that activity, (2) on isolated acts in the state with the 
claim related to  the in-state c~nduc t , ' ~ '  and (3) on acts committed 
outside the state which had consequences within the state.'26 
In 1957, in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,12' the 
Supreme Court again addressed the question of state court personal 
jurisdiction. The Court determined that the fourteenth amendment 
due process clause was not violated when a California court asserted 
jurisdiction over a Texas corporation that had no agents or offices 
in the state and whose only contacts with the state involved an offer 
to the petitioner, a California domiciliary, to assume a formerly issued 
insurance policy and the receipt by it of petitioner's insurance 
premiums. The Court noted: 
[A] trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope 
of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other non-residents. 
In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our 
national economy over the years. . . . 
[W]e think it apparent that the Due Process Clause did not 
preclude the California court from entering a judgment binding on 
Respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit 
was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that 
State. . . .The contract was delivered in California, the premiums 
were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that State 
when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest 
interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when 
their insurers refuse to pay claims.128 
A year later, in Hanson v. D e n ~ k l a , ' ~ ~  the Court seemed to  retreat 
from the position that due process and, therefore, minimum contacts 
only required that the transaction have a "substantial connection" 
with the state.130 The Court invalidated a Florida state court asser- 
123. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966); Moore-McCormack 
Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962); Pavlovscak v. Lewis, 274 F.2d 523, 
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 990 (1960); Ard v. State Stove Mfrs., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 699 (D.S.C. 
1967); Ostow & Jacobs, Inc. v. Morgan-Jones, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
124. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Green v. 
Compagnia De Navigacion Isabella, Ltd., 26 F.R.D. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
125. See, e-g.. Elkhart Eng'g Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965); In- 
gravallo v. Pool Shipping Co., 247 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
126. See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966) 
(only contact with forum state was injury caused by defendant's product in the state); Gray 
v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (same). 
127. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
128. Id. at 222-23. 
129. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
130. McGee had been interpreted as defining due process requirements as rather easily 
satisfied, with one commentator stating: "It is at least arguable that as a result of McGee 
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tion of personal jurisdiction over a Delaware corporate trustee in regard 
to trust property located outside Florida. The inter vivos trust in ques- 
tion had been created before the decedent had moved to Florida. After 
her move, she had purported to exercise a power of appointment as 
to the remainder in the trust and the Trustee had remitted trust in- 
come to her in Florida. The Trustee had no other contacts with the 
State of Florida. The court stated: 
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with 
a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact 
with the forum State. . . .It is essential in each case that there be 
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus in- 
voking the benefits and protections of its I ~ \ v s . ' ~ ~  
Under this standard, jurisdiction would still have been sustained in 
McGee; the defendant insurer had solicited the reinsurance contract 
in California. Hanson made it clear, however, that language in McGee 
in regard to "substantial connection" with the forum state was mere 
dictum.132 The Court also recognized the continued significance of 
some territorial limits on assertions of personal jurisdiction, stating 
that "restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts. . . .are 
more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litiga- 
tion [; tlhey are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power 
of the respective states." 1 3 3  
The next occasion on which the Supreme Court spoke on the ques- 
tion of personal jurisdiction under the International Shoe ~tandard"~  
was in the case of Kulko v. Superior Court. 13' Kulko involved a sup- 
there is now almost no constitutional limitation on a state court's assertion of jurisdiction." 
Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Minnesota over Absent Defendants, 42 MINN. L. REV. 909, 922 
(1958). 
As in McGee, the Hanson Court noted the effects of 20th Century technology on theories 
of personal jurisdiction: 
As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the 
need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same 
time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit 
in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these changes, the requirements 
for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of Pen- 
noyer v. Neff . . . to the flexible standard of International Shoe. . . . 
357 U.S. at  250-51 (citations omitted). The Court continued, "But it is a mistake to assume 
that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of 
state courts." Id. at  251. 
131. Id. at  253 (emphasis added). 
132. Id. at 252-54. 
133. Id. at  251. 
134. The case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), was decided before Kulko. That 
case, however, dealt with the question of whether a minimum contacts analysis should be extended 
to certain assertions of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction and is beyond the scope of this article. 
135. 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
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port action brought by a California resident against her former spouse, 
a New York resident. The California Court had purported to assert 
jurisdiction over the defendant on the ground that he had permitted 
his daughter to move to California and had purchased a one-way ticket 
to California for his daughter, thereby engaging in a "purposeful act" 
which had an effect in California and by which he had avail7d himself 
of the benefits of the state and had derived economic benefits in that 
he no longer had to pay for his daughter's support during the bulk 
of the year.n6 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that "[w]hiIe the 
interest of the forum State and of the plaintiff in proceeding with 
the cause in the plaintiff's forum of choice are, of course, to be con- 
sidered. . .an essential criterion in all cases is whether the 'quality 
and nature' of the defendant's activity is such that it is 'reasonable' 
and 'fair' to require him to conduct his defense in that State."13' 
Moreover, the Court rejected the argument that the defendant had 
purposefully availed himself of the benefits of California: 
We cannot accept the proposition that appellant's acquiescence in 
[his daughter's] desire to live with her mother conferred jurisdiction 
over appellant in the California courts in this action. A father who 
agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his children's 
preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than 
was required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to 
have "purposefully availed himself" of the "benefits and protec- 
tions" of California's laws.'38 
This statement does not clearly establish that the Court found the 
defendant's actions with regard to California not to be "purposeful." 
The Court did reject any argument that the defendant had benefitted 
from his daughter's residence in C a l i f ~ r n i a ' ~ ~  and seemed to conclude 
that for due process to be satisfied, the defendant's contact with 
California would have to be for the purpose of deriving benefits for 
himself. 
Kulko probably is not very important in terms of its applicability 
to other cases; the case involved very attenuated contacts and a very 
136. Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 524-25, 564 P.2d 353, 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. 
586, 591 (1977) (en bane). Three years after the daughter moved to California, the son followed 
suit, but without the father's permission. Thus, while the support and custody suit involved 
both children, jurisdiction was based only on the defendant's affirmative acts with respect to 
his daughter. Id. 
137. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (citations omitted). 
138. Id. at 94 (citations omitted). 
139. Id. at 94-97. The Court concluded that "any diminution in [defendant's] household 
costs resulted, not from the child's presence in California, but rather from her absence from 
[defendant's] house." Id. at 95. 
140. Id. at 94 n.7. 
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unsympathetic circumstance for the plaintiff.I4l The significance of 
Kulko is twofold: (1) the Supreme Court emphasized concern for 
fairness to the defendant,14* in light of increasing emphasis by state 
courts on the interests of the plaintiff, the forum state, the judicial 
system, and even society in general,143 and (2) the Supreme Court 
recognized that in the "determination of 'reasonableness', the 
'minimum contacts' test of International Shoe. . ., the facts of each 
case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite 'affiliating 
circumstances' are present." 144 
Although the Court in Kulko emphasized a case-by-case analysis, 
in World- Wide Volkswagen v. Wood~on,'~' the most recent determina- 
tion of personal jurisdiction of state courts, the Court seemed to 
establish a new, two-step test for the determination of these cases, 
a test consistent with its stated emphasis on the interests of the 
defendant.'" The plaintiffs in World-Wide had been injured seriously 
when their Audi automobile was struck from behind and burst into 
flames. The accident occurred in Oklahoma, while the plaintiffs, former 
New York residents, were traveling to their new home in Arizona. 
The plaintiffs brought suit in Oklahoma, claiming that their injuries 
had resulted from a defect in the gas tank, and sought to join as 
defendants the local New York dealer that had sold the automobile 
to them, Seaway Volkswagen, Inc., and the regional distributor of 
Audi for New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. Seaway and World-Wide resisted on the ground 
that the Oklahoma court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because 
they lacked sufficient contacts with the state of Oklahoma to satisfy 
the due process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.I4' 
141. A case like Kulko should be distinguished from cases like Gray v. American Radiator 
and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 111. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), in which the defendant's 
out of state conduct resulted in a tortious injury in the state. hloreover, the Court in Kulko 
recognized the sensitivity of any issue involving family relations and expressed its reluctance 
to make any determination which would "impose an unreasonable burden on family relations. 
. . ." 436 U.S. at 98. Finally, the Court found the position of the plaintiff-appellee to be 
particularly unsympathetic: 
[A]n action by [the mother] to  increase support payments could now be brought, 
and could have been brought when [the daughter] first moved to California, in the 
State of New York. . . . Any ultimate financial advantage to [the father] thus results 
not from the child's presence in California, but from [the mother's] failure earlier 
to seek an increase in payments under the separation agreement. . . . 
Id. a t  95 (footnote omitted). 
142. Id. at 92. 
143. See infra notes 155 and 182. 
144. 436 U.S. at 92. 
145. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
146. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92. 
147. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 286-87. 
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The Supreme Court agreed, pointing out that it perceived the 
minimum contacts test as serving "two related, but distinguishable 
functions, [protecting]. . .the defendant against the burdens of litigating 
in a distant or inconvenient forum [alnd [acting] to ensure that the 
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits im- 
posed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal 
To achieve this goal, the Court seemed to devise a two- 
step inquiry for due process cases: (I) Did the defendant have any 
purposeful contacts ("affiliating circumstances") with the forum 
state?149 (2) If so, were these contacts sufficient to be "minimum"?15o 
The Court answered the first or threshold question in the negative, 
finding that the defendants had, in no way, affiliated themselves with 
the state of Oklah~ma. '~ '  The second step of the analysis, therefore, 
was never reached and how the Court would handle that balancing 
test remains unclear: Would it balance all factors including the in- 
terests of the plaintiff, the fopm state, the judicial system and society, 
as well as the interests of the defendant,IS2 or would it merely cumulate 
those factors affecting the defendant?Is3 
148. Id. at 291-92. This statement would seem to indicate that the Court considered 
federalism as part of its due process analysis. See supra note 73. But see infra note 175 and 
accompanying text. 
149. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at  295. The Court has not expressed its holding in exactly 
this manner; the Court found no contacts between the defendant and the forum. See infra 
note 150 and accompanying text. The opinion, however, implies that the finding of some "af- 
filiating circumstance" automatically would not subject the defendant to the personal jurisdic- 
tion of the court. At that point at  least the quality of that contact would be analyzed to  deter- 
mine whether "minimum contacts" were satisfied. See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 
(1980). In Rush, the companion case to  World-Wide, the Court applied a similar analysis to 
a quasi-in-rem case in which the res attached at  the outset of the suit was the defendant's 
liability insurer's obligation to  "defend and indemnify" the defendant on  claims arising from 
automobile accidents. The defendant had no contacts with the forum state, Minnesota, but 
the defendant's liability insurer was doing business there, and thus, arguably, the "res" was 
located in Minnesota. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2.d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 
(1966). The Court denied jurisdiction, noting that "minimum contacts" referred to  the con- 
tacts between the defendant and the forum and not merely the res and the forum. Again, 
the answer to the threshold question was "no," and. thus, what the Court would have done 
had the answer been "yes" remains unclear. 
150. Although the Court never reached this step in World-Wide or Rush, see supra note 
149, in both cases the Court engaged in some discussion of the various interests involved, thus 
implying that the second step would be pursued if necessary. See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at  
292; Rush, 444 U.S. at  329-33. 
151. World-Wide, 444 U.S. at  295. 
152. See infra notes 155 and 182. 
153. Since the Court expressed concern in Kulko, see supra notes 137-42 and accompany- 
ing test, and in World-Wide, see supra notes 148-51 and accompanying text, that due process 
requires "fairness" to the defendant, this latter analysis wouId seem more appropriate. The 
Court stated: 
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or  no inconvenience from being forced 
to litigate before the tribunals of another State; even if the forum State has a strong 
interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum State is the most 
convenient location for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument 
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After World-Wide, for an individual or corporation to so cir- 
cumscribe its activities as to avoid being "haled into court" in remote 
jurisdictions seemed possible.15J The Court, moreover, again was taking 
some interest in the sovereign rights of the states within the federal 
system and seemed to be narrowing the scope of state court asser- 
tions of personal j u r i s d i c t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  
A recent Supreme Court decision, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,lS6 seems to reflect another shift 
in emphasis by the Court, although the case probably leaves intact 
the basic state court jurisdictional test that has evolved from Pen- 
noyer. This case, unlike all of its predecessors in minimum contacts 
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render 
a valid judgment. 
444 U.S. a t  294. 
To this writer, however, no real difference exists between the two sorts of analyses because 
the question becomes merely how one characterizes factors. Under the first analysis, one might 
argue that the plaintiff is an indigent individual with a substantial interest in proceeding to 
judgment in his home forum. Under the second analysis, this factor could be considered, but 
would be characterized as a defendant-interest: the defendant is a large corporation that would 
not be inconvenienced substantially by defending in the plaintiff's home forum. 
154. The expression "haled into court" seems to have derived from the majority and a 
dissenting opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The majority stated, "[M]oreover, 
appellants had no reason to expect to be haled before a Delaware court." Id. at 216. In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan stated, "Admittedly, when one consents to suit in a forum, 
his expectation is enhanced that he may be haled into that State's courts." Id. at 227 n.6. 
In World-Wide the Court used the phrase "haled into court" in reference to the type of 
foreseeability necessary for a finding of minimum contacts: 
[Tlhe foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood 
that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defen- 
dant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there. 
444 U.S. at  297. 
155. After the World-Wide decision, one commentator maintained: 
The Supreme Court's four most recent cases on . . . jurisdiction . . . have created 
a new analytical structure for the determination of jurisdictional issues. This new 
analysis places more emphasis on state sovereignty than on considerations of fairness 
and convenience. In so doing, it subordinates the most progressive theory of the 
post-International Shoe jurisdictional era, that of "interstate venue" or "center-of- 
gravity," to  considerations of state sovereignty. The "interstate venue" theory look- 
ed to a complex of factors such as convenience to the plaintiff and defendant, the 
interest of the forum, the location of witnesses, and the choice of substantive law. 
The present Court looks to  a much narrower question: the quantity and quality of 
the relations of the particular defendant with the forum state. 
Kamp, supra note 2, at  29. But see infra notes 156-82 and accompanying text. From Pennoycf 
through International Shoe to  McGee and back through Hanson and Kulko to World-Wide 
it seems that state court jurisdiction began as quite restricted (Pennoyer), broader considerably 
(McGee), and has now narrowed again (World- Wide). The scope of personal jurisdiction under 
current theory, however, is much broader than that under Pennoyer and seems to  be stabiliz- 
ing. But see notes 156-82 and accompanying text infra. While the application and interpreta- 
tion of the due process standards must necessarily be on a case-by-case basis, as recognized 
by the Supreme Court in Kulko, see supra note 144 and accompanying text, the standards 
themselves are by now well established. 
156. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See Third Circuit Review-Federal Courts and Procedures, 27 
VILL. L. REV. 744 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Third Circuit Review]. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 30 1984-1985 
I984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
analysis, involved not a state court attempting to assert personal 
jurisdiction over a nonpresent, nonconsenting defendant, but rather 
a federal district court, sitting in diversity, purporting to assert per- 
sonal jurisdiction over certain alien corporate defendants.Is7 The facts 
of the case, moreover, as well as its procedural posture, exclude it 
from the mainstream of the Pennoyer - International Shoe line of cases. 
Insurance Corp. of Ireland involved a suit instituted in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania by a 
Delaware Corporation having its principal place of business in the 
Republic of Guinea, Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, against 
twenty-one alien insurance companies, the "Excess Insurers," to 
recover on a business-interruption insurance policy. In their answer, 
some of the defendant companies challenged the personal jurisdic- 
tion of the federal court and subsequently moved for summary judg- 
ment on this ground.lS8 Using discovery procedures authorized by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff sought to discover facts 
that would demonstrate sufficient connections between the defendants 
and the state of Pennsylvania to establish the defendants' amenability 
to suit there.lS9 For more than two and .one-half years, the defen- 
dants resisted discovery, failing to provide requested information, to 
comply with judicial discovery orders, and to object to such requests 
and orders.160 At that point, the District Court sanctioned the defen- 
dants, pursuant to ' ~ u l e  37(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil pro- 
cedure, which provides that "if a party fails to obey [a discovery] 
order. . ., the court. . .may. . .order that the matters regarding which 
the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to 
be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the 
claim of the party obtaining the order. . . ."I6'  The sanction impos- 
157. The propriety of applying fourteenth amendment due process standards in a federal 
court case arising under the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, see supra note 18, will 
be discussed below. See infra notes 376-492 and accompanying text. 
158. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at  698. The complaint was actually in two counts, 
one count against Insurance Company of North America, which had provided the first 10 million 
dollars of insurance coverage on the 20 million dollar business interruption policy obtained 
by the plaintiff, and the other count against the 21 alien insurance companies, the "excess 
insurers," which had provided the remaining or "excess" 10 million dollars of insurance coverage. 
Id. at  696. Insurance Company of North America, as well as four of the 21 "excess insurers," 
did not challenge the court's personal jurisdiction. Id. at  696, 697 n.3. Moreover, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as to 
three other "excess insurers." Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am. 
651 F.2d 877, 886 (1981). Thus, only fourteen of the "excess insurers" were involved in the 
matter before the Supreme Court. 
159. For a discussion of the propriety of requiring satisfaction of state amenability stan- 
dards when a federal court sits in diversity, see infra notes 483-92 and accompanying text. 
160. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at  698-99. 
161. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
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ed was a finding that "for the purpose of this litigation the Excess 
Insurers are subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court due 
to their business contacts with Pennsyl~ania ."~~~ In effect, as a sanc- 
tion for the defendants' failures to comply with the discovery order 
of the court, the court took as established facts that would be necessary 
to support a constitutionally permissible exercise of personal jurisdic- 
tion over the defendants. 
While the District Court also found two bases of personal jurisdic- 
tion independent of the Rule 37 sanction, in its affirmance the Court 
of Appealslb3 relied entirely on the sanction. The appellate court held 
that the discovery orders were not an abuse of discretion by the district 
court, that imposition of the sanction came within the discretion of 
the district court under Rule 37(b), and that the imposed sanction 
had not violated the defendants' due process rights.164 The defendants 
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that their due 
process rights had been violated because a court that did not have 
personal jurisdiction over them would have neither the power to re- 
quire compliance with discovery orders nor the authority to impose 
Rule 37 sanctions.165 
The Supreme Court affirmed the assertion of personal jurisdiction, 
pointing out that while the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts 
is limited by article I11 of the Constitution and those limitations can- 
not be waived by the parties, "[tlhe requirement that a court have 
personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. 111, but from the Due Pro- 
cess Clause."lb6 The Court continued: 
The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an in- 
dividual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power 
not as a matter sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty. 
. . .Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first 
of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived. . . .I6' 
Finally, the Court concluded: 
[Tlhe requirement of personal jurisdiction may be intentionally 
waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped from 
raising the issue. These characteristics portray it for what it is-a 
legal right protecting the individual. . . . The expression of legal 
162. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 699 (citing the Joint Appendix of the parties to 
the litigation). 
163. Comuagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877 (3d 
- - 
Cir. 1981). 
164. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 700. 
165. Id. at 701. 
166. Id. at 702. 
167. Id. at 702-03 (footnote omitted). 
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rights is often subject to certain procedural rules: The failure to 
follow those rules may well result in curtailment of the rights. Thus, 
the failure to enter a timely objection to personal jurisdiction con- 
stitutes, under Rule 12(h)(1), a waiver of objection. A sanction under 
Rule 37(b)(2)(A) consisting of a finding of personal jurisdiction has 
precisely the same effect. As a general proposition, the Rule 37 sanc- 
tion applied to a finding of personal jurisdiction creates no more 
of a due process problem than the Rule 12 waiver. . . . 168 
The Court noted the International Shoe test for assertions of per- 
sonal jurisdiction that do not violate due processlK9 and compared 
the Rule 37(b)(2)(A) procedure followed by the District Court with 
a standard established in another fourteenth amendment case170 "for 
the Due Process limits on such rules."171 Finally, the Court concluded 
that the Due Process Clause172 had not been violated. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell observed that the opin- 
ion for the Court did not require minimum contacts as a prerequisite 
to imposition of Rule 37 sanctions and thus might be read as reject- 
ing minimum contacts as a constitutional requirement for assertion 
of personal jurisdi~tion. '~~ Moreover, he argued: 
168. Id. at  704-05. 
169. Id. at  702-03. 
170. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas. 212 U.S. 322 (1909). 
, . 
171. Ins. Corp. of Irel;;nd, 456 U.S. at  705. 
172. While Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, carefully distinguished between the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the due process clause of the fifth amend- 
ment, id. at 712-13, see infra note 482 and accompanying text, Justice White, in his opinion 
for the Court, seemed deliberately to  avoid any discussion of the standard to  be applied to  
exercises of personal jurisdiction by federal courts sitting in diversity cases-fourteenth amend- 
ment or fifth amendment-by referring, throughout the opinion, to "the Due Process Clause." 
Apparently, however, his reliance on cases interpreting the fourteenth amendment, see supra 
test at notes 169-71, indicates that he felt a fourteenth amendment standard, a standard established 
in cases involving state court interference with individual rights, should apply. For further discus- 
sion of this issue, see infra notes 480-82 and accompanying text. 
173. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at  713. At least one commentator put a similar inter- 
pretation on the Court of Appeals opinion: 
The stark logic of Judge Aldisert's holding establishes the rule that in personam jurisdic- 
tion may be predicted on noncompliance with a discovery order directed to  that issue. 
No showing of minimum contacts is required. The power of the district court rests 
solely in the initial authority to inquire into jurisdiction and authority under the federal 
rules to police the discovery process. 
Third Circuit Review, supra note 156, at  759 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). 
Subsequently, Justice Powell noted that the opinion of the Court could be given an alter- 
native reading, "not as affecting state jurisdiction, but simply as asserting that Rule 37 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represents a congressionally approved basis for the exer- 
cise of personal jurisdiction by a federal district court." Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at  
714. Justice Powell went on to reject such a constntction of Rule 37, basing his concurrence 
instead on the "narrow basis" that the plaintiff had based his assertion of personal jurisdiction 
on the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, id. at  710, that "in the absence of a federal rule or 
statute establishing a federal basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdic- 
tion of the district courts is determined in diversity cases by the law of the forum state," 
id. at  711 (citations omitted), see infra notes 376-476 and accompanying text, and that the 
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By eschewing reliance on the concept of minimum contacts as a 
"sovereign" limitation on the power of States-for, again, it is the 
State's long-arm statute that is invoked to obtain personal jurisdic- 
tion in the District Court-the Court today effects a'potentially 
substantial change of law. For the first time it defines personal 
jurisdiction solely by reference to abstract notions of fair ~1ay . l '~  
Justice White, in his opinion for the Court, countered in a footnote: 
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdic- 
tion, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism 
and the character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other States. . . . 
Contrary to the suggestion of Justice Powell, . . . our holding today 
does not alter the requirement that there be "minimum contacts" 
between the nonresident defendant and the forum state. Rather, our 
holding deals with how the facts needed to show those "minimum 
contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to comply with 
court-ordered discovery. The restriction on state sovereign power 
described in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen 
as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved 
by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the 
personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no men- 
tion of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept 
operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of 
the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdic- 
tion requirement. Individual actions cannot change the powers of 
sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers 
from which he may otherwise be pr0te~ted.I'~ 
This author does not agree with Justice Powell's suggestion that 
plaintiff had made a prima facie showing that the defendants had sufficient contacts with the 
State of Pennsylvania to satisfy the "minimum contacts" requirements of the fourteenth amend- 
ment. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at  716. Justice Powell concluded: 
Where the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts, I have 
little difficulty in holding that its showing was sufficient to warrant the District Court's 
entry of discovery orders. And where a defendant then fails to comply with those 
orders. I agree that the prima facie showing may be held adequate to sustain the 
court's finding that minimum contact exist, either under Rule 37 or  under a theory 
of "presumption" or  "waiver." 
Id. 
174. Id. at 714. 
175. 456 U.S. 702 n.lO. At least one commentator, relying on prior Supreme Court opin- 
ions, would interpret this as a reversal of prior theory: 
In one sense, basic territorial restrictions underlie the minimum contacts doctrine. 
Suit in a neighboring state with which a defendant has had no contact at all will 
often be more convenient and less unfair for him than suit in a distant corner of 
his own state, yet the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment would forbid 
it. Furthermore, the identically worded due process clause of the fifth amendment 
has been construed to permit legislation providing for the nationwide competence 
of federal suits, a clear indication that where sister states are involved, fairness to 
the defendant is not the sole criterion of due process. 
Comment, Federalism, supra note 2,  at 1344. 
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the Court has rejected minimum contacts as a prerequisite to con- 
stitutional assertions of state court personal jurisdiction. First, in the 
course of its due process analysis, the Court cites International Shoe, 
albeit for the proposition that due process requires that "the 
maintenance of the suit . . . not offend traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice."176 This, however, does not mean that 
the Court has rejected minimum contacts as the manner of determin- 
ing whether fair play and substantial justice have been offended. 
Second, the majority opinion can be read fairly as merely prescribing 
that in some circumstances, facts necessary to establish minimum con- 
tacts can be presumed as a Rule 37 sanction.177 The Court, therefore, 
merely may be authorizing an alternative method for establishing 
minimum contacts when the defendants refuse to permit discovery 
on this issue. Third, the Court was not faced squarely with the ques- 
tion of the due process standard applicable under the manner and 
circumstances of service of process utilized in this case but with the 
related but different question of whether a judicial presumption of 
facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, in and of itself, would 
violate the defendants' due process rights. 
The Court, however, does reject explicitly the principle, which 
reasonably could have been inferred from some of its earlier opinions, 
that "the federalism concept operate[s] as an independent restriction 
on the sovereign power of [a state The reasons of the Court 
for this rejection, that limitations on state court personal jurisdiction 
spring from the due process clause, which "makes no mention of 
federalism concerns," and that if personal jurisdiction involved limita- 
tions based on sovereignty, those limitations could not be waived,179 
are quest i~nable. '~~ Even if one accepts the assertions by the Court 
176. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at  703. 
177. The Court asserted: "[Olur holding deals with how the facts needed to show . . 
"minimum contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to comply with court-ordered 
discovery." Id. at 703 n.lO. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. While the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment has evolved into the measure 
of the constitutionality of state court assertion of jurisdiction over a particular defendant, see 
supra notes 70-155 and accompanying text, state court assertions of personal jurisdiction were 
restricted even before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. See supra notes 4-6 and 
accompanying text and note 74. If, as the Supreme Court now states, "the Due Process Clause 
. . . is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement," why didn't state courts run 
amok before adoption of the fourteenth amendment? In fact, as the personal jurisdiction theory 
of the Supreme Court evolved from Pennoyer v. Neff, the due process clause seems to broaden 
the bases of personal jurisdiction permissible in state courts. See supra notes 70-155 and ac- 
companying text. Moreover, even if some limitations on personal jurisdiction spring from the 
due process clause, strong arguments can be made that the orderly administration of justice 
in this federation of states, in which state courts are generally courts of unlimited subject mat- 
ter jurisdiction, requires that some effort be made to allocate cases throughout the system in 
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on this point, however, only the source or rationale for restricting 
the personal jurisdiction of state courts would be affected. The stan- - 
dards by which those restrictions are measured, standards that have 
evolved from Pennoyer to World- Wide, should not change. As the 
Court hastened to respond to Justice Powell's concurrence, its inten- 
tion was not to eliminate minimum contacts with the state as the basis 
for assertion of state court personal jurisdiction.I8' Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland might be viewed as a special circumstance, in which the 
Court did not require a minimum contacts analysis, it might be criticiz- 
ed by commentators who will adopt the concurring opinion as more 
reasonable and consistent with prior doctrine, and it might be touted 
as a clarification of the doctrinal basis for the personal jurisdiction 
tests established to date, but it probably will not be treated as substan- 
tially altering those tests. If anything, the Supreme Court seemed deter- 
mined to avoid any issues that required new substantive law or 
reevaluation of established tests.lS2 
a reasonable manner and that this effort must come through limitations on the location of 
suit (venue--controlled by the states) and on the defendants who may be haled into a par- 
ticular court (personal jurisdiction-controlled, ultimately, by Supreme Court decisions). 
This assertion, however, raises the other argument of the Court: If part of the reason for 
limiting personal jurisdiction of federal courts is to  allocate business among state courts in 
a rational manner and to protect the interests of the various state sovereigns, then why can 
defendants waive personal jurisdiction objections? One simple answer might be that, even before 
the fourteenth amendment came on the scene, defendants always could subject themselves to 
the personal jurisdiction of the state court by coming into the jurisdiction and accepting service 
of process. Thus, even when physical power was the only recognized basis for personal jurisdic- 
tion, surely a principle that grew from notions of sovereignty, see supra note 4,  a defendant 
had the "right" to empower the court to  a:sert its jurisdiction over him. 
Moreover, a strong argument can be made that personal jurisdiction includes both a right 
of the defendant arising from his personal liberty interest and a restriction on the sovereign 
power of the court arising from concepts of federalism. The defendant has the right to insist 
that the power of the particular court be limited, but, if the defendant chooses to waive this 
right, he is, in effect, consenting to the exercise of power. Why should he be required to step 
into the territory of the forum? If he can achieve the result of empowering a particular court 
to assert jurisdiction over his person by stepping into the jurisdiction, won't a symbolic act, 
consent, also be sufficient? 
Most statements by the Supreme Court to  date have revealed a two-pronged purpose to 
be served by limiting personal jurisdiction of state courts: protecting a defendant from unfair 
assertions of jurisdiction and doing what makes sense in a federal system. Usually, both prongs 
are served by the same limitation. But just because some notions of sovereignty have been 
preserved doesn't mean that the power of the sovereign or  limitations on its power are ab- 
solute. Limitations give structure to the system even if the limitations are not absolute. Most 
plaintiffs,will not serve process on a defendant on the mere hope that the defendant will not 
object even though an ironclad objection exists. 
Whether the courts read the Supreme Court language as rejecting concepts of sovereignty 
or  federalism as bases for restrictions on state court personal jurisdiction or not, sovereignty 
concepts will steal back into opinions, in discussions of personal jurisdiction or venue, because 
state courts cannot function in a federal system that does not, in some way, recognize their 
separateness from the courts of other states. 
181. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at  702 n.10. 
182. Considering the recurring emphasis by the Supreme Court on federalism concepts, 
see supra notes 73, 111-13, and 148 and accompanying text, and the prior-expressed views of 
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Unlike the question of federal court jurisdiction, most elements of 
analysis in state court personal jurisdiction are predictable and cer- 
tain. Although the scope of state court jurisdiction may increase or 
decrease slightly in the future, the basic tenets have been developing 
gradually since Pennoyer and are now well-rooted in jurisdictional 
theory.lS3 In short, the present doctrine is the product of decades of 
careful consideration and analysis, and the possibility that the scope- 
pendulum will swing wildly to substantially narrow or substantially 
broad state court jurisdiction seems unlikely.1s4 Instead, only further 
refinements should be anticipated.lS5 
some commentators that federalism might be a more fundamental underpinning of due process 
than any notions of basic territoriality or  personal liberty, see Reese, supra note 113 (forum 
state interest analysis as nonliteral reading of due process clause); Comment, Federalism, supra 
note 2, at  1346, Insurance Corp. of Ireland is more likely to  draw criticism than accolades. 
As noted by one commentator: "The Supreme Court's emphasis on the extent of the forum 
state's interest clearly suggests that principles of federalism beyond basic notions of territoriali- 
ty underlie the due process clause." Comment, Federalism, supra note 2, at  1346. See also 
McDougal, supra note 73. Professor McDougal has urged that the "purposefully availing 
minimum contacts approach" be abandoned in favor of a "comprehensive form of interest 
analysis" that would include consideration of the interests of various states as well as those 
of the plaintiff and the defendant. Id. a t  7, 26. But see Lewis, The 'Forum State Interest" 
Factor in Personal Jurisdiction Adjudication: Home-Court Horses Hauling Constitutional Carts, 
33 MERCER L. REV. 769 (1982) (urging that forum interest should be irrelevant in state court 
personal jurisdiction analysis). Professor Lewis stated his primary thesis in the following 
paragraph: 
The chief contention here is that interests of government should not figure at  all 
in decisions on personal jurisdiction. This conclusion builds on the premise that the 
sole proper concern of due process in the personal jurisdiction context is to assure 
the parties a fair forum. This fairness, in turn, should be exclusively a function of 
the defendant's forum contacts, as leavened by the plaintiff's need for a convenient 
place to  sue. Giving any weight to the interests of a forum or of any other state 
will inevitably disturb the correct equation of fairness between the parties. 
Id. at 771. 
183. See supra notes 70-155 and accompanying text. But see Lewis, supra note 182, at  
769 (urging that current minimum contacts analysis improperly considers factors such as forum 
interest); McDougal, supra note 73, at 7, 26 (urging that minimum contacts analysis be aban- 
doned in favor of an analysis based solely on assessment of various interests); Posnak, supra 
note 4, at 729 (urging abolition of transient theory of jurisdiction and adoption of a new, 
two-tiered test for personal jurisdiction considering the defendant's claim-related contacts with 
the forum and the reasonableness of allowing jurisdiction in the particular case); Comment, 
supra note 82, at  160-61 (urging that the factors now balanced in a minimum contacts analysis 
have no constitutional relevance and suggesting a new, more relevant set of factors). These 
and other writings suggest both that the present formulation is subject to  varying interpreta- 
tions and that many legal scholars are dissatisfied with the test as it stands. Clearly, the "minimum 
contacts" test is fact-dependent-it can only be applied on a case by case basis. The point 
this writer is urging, however, is not that the test is rigid, uniform, and easily applied, but 
rather that the constitutional underpinnings of the present test have been examined clearly by 
a number of courts and commentators and that the formulation of that test has been develop- 
ing over time through a vast number of cases in which the question of personal jurisdiction 
in state courts has been examined carefully. 
184. See supra note 155. 
185. Id. 
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B. Federal Court Personal Jurisdiction-Diversity Cases, Federal 
Question Cases, the Fourteenth Amendment, and (Perhaps) the 
Fifth Amendment 
I .  Introduction 
Unlike state courts, which were viewed originally as judicial arms 
of independent sovereigns, the separate states, federal courts always 
have been considered arms of one judicial jurisdiction, the federal 
forum.lg6 Thus, any limitations that may exist on a particular federal 
court assertion of personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant 
would arise not from any doctrine of territorial limitations on power 
or from any need to promote federalism but only from constitutional 
limitations, Congressional limitations, and considerations of the 
peculiarities of the case at hand, which probably is judged by Con- 
stitutional standards and/or Congressional interpretations or limita- 
tions of these standards.18' Moreover, one might argue strongly that 
most difficulties caused by issues of fairness to the defendant could 
be resolved by transferring the case within the federal system to a 
courtroom that Would be more conveniently located.188 Finally, one 
might hypothesize that whereas most jurisdictional problems in state 
courts are problems of personal jurisdiction rather than subject mat- 
ter jurisdiction, jurisdictional problems in the federal courts primari- 
-- - -  
186. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 26, at  28 ("systematic unity of the federal judiciary 
is commonly overlooked"); Comment, Fifrh Amendment Due Process Limitations on Nation- 
wide Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U.L. REV. 403, 421 (1981) ("[flederal law uniformly controls 
every district in the country") [hereinafter cited as Comment, Fgth Amendment]; Comment, 
National Contacts As a Basis for In Personam Jurisdiction over Aliens in Federal Question 
Suits, 70 CALIF. L. RJW. 686, 686 (1981) ("the jurisdictional determination might be expected 
to focus upon the alien defendant's 'minimum contacts' with the federal forum, namely, the 
United States") [hereinafter cited as Comment, National Contacts]; Note, supra note 21, at 
482 ("unlike the state courts, the district courts are part of a unified system"). In Internatio- 
Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thoman, 218 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1955), Judge Parker remarked that 
"courts of the United States comprise one great system for the administration of justice." 
187. See supra note 3. 
188. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 26, at  28-29; Note, Corporate Amenability to Process 
in the Federal Courts: State or Federal Jurisdictional Standards? 48 MINN. L. REV. 1 13 1, 1 147 
(1964). Professor Foster cites 28 U.S.C. §1404(a), which authorizes transfer of venue "[flor 
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice. . .to any. . .district. . .where 
[the suit] might have been brought," arguing that "any injustice or inconvenience to a par- 
ticular defendant which is insufficient to  warrant a change of venue is certain to fall far short 
of raising any serious constitutional question about requiring him to stand trial in the original 
district." Foster, supra, note 26 at 29 (footnote omitted). Moreover, as noted by the Min- 
nesota commentator: 
An independent federal jurisdictional standard would mean, of course, geographical- 
ly broadening corporate amenability to suit. Any unfairness and inconvenience to 
the corporate defendant, insofar as they are not eliminated by the jurisdictional stan- 
dard itself, should be prevented by the venue provision of section 1391 and the transfer 
provision of section 1404 of title 28. 
Note, supra, at 1147. 
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ly would arise because of the limited subject matter jurisdiction of 
the federal courts,189 with few questions involving assertions of jurisdic- 
tion over the persons of defendants.lgO Unfortunately, the above 
hypothesis does not describe the situation accurately. In federal prac- 
tice, many questions have arisen with regard to subject matter jurisdic- 
tion. Personal jurisdiction questions are even more difficult, partly 
because these issues have received very little sustained, organized treat- 
ment by the courts. The question, however, has received increasing 
attention by scholars1g1 and sporadic, case-by-case treatment by 
but has not been resolved into any readily-described, 
rationally-based, uniform rule or rules of relatively simple applica- 
tion. As noted by one recent commentator: "Exploration of the 
methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction . . . demonstrates a lack 
of uniformity in the federal courts. . . . Federal courts have also 
added to the uncertainty about personal jurisdiction in federal ques- 
tion cases because of their disagreement on whether and how state 
due process limits should be imposed."lg3 Problems of nonuniformity 
189. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. 
190. See supra note 186. 
191. For articles addressing the problem of acquiring personal jurisdiction in federal ques- 
tion cases, see, e.g., Berger, Acquiring in Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases; 
Procedural Frustration Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 285; 
Green, Federal Jurisdiction in Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 
967 (1961); Note, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on Nationwide Federal Jurisdic- 
tion, 61 B.U.L. REV. 403 (1981); Note, supra note 21; Comment, supra note 186, at  686. 
For articles addressing the problem of acquiring personal jurisdiction in diversity cases, see, 
e.g., Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdic- 
tion in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73 (1968). 
Most federal courts have now adopted the position of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit-in Arrowsmith v. U.P.I., 320 F.2d 219 (1963), that when a federal 
court is sitting in diversity, see supra note 18 and infra notes 376-99 and accompanying text, 
the validity of that exercise of personal jurisdiction is to be measured by the fourteenth amend- 
ment due process clause and the standards which have arisen thereunder. See infra notes 376-492 
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of the fourteenth amendment 
standard, see supra notes 60-185 and accompanying text. The validity of this position, which 
has the effect of relegating to state law the determination of whether a federal court sitting 
in that state will open its doors to a particular matter (and which, in turn, leads to nonunifor- 
mity among federal courts sitting in different states) has been questioned seriously. See infra 
notes 376-492 and accompanying text. Moreover, even if the law is considered settled with 
regard to diversity suits in which service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute, questions 
of amenability standards still should abound when service of process is made pursuant to some 
federal statute or a wholly-federal Rule 4 procedure. 
In the area of federal question jurisdiction, even less uniformity exists and even more open 
questions abound. Amenability standards are at  issue regardless of how service of process is 
achieved. See infra notes 493-1355 and accompanying text. 
192. For a discussion of cases involving the problem of acquiring personal jurisdiction 
in federal question cases, see infra notes 493-1355 and accompanying text. For a discussion 
of cases involving the problem of acquiring personal jurisdiction in diversity cases, see infra 
notes 376-492 and accompanying text. 
193. Berger, supra note 191, at  336-37. 
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and uncertainty also have developed in diversity cases.lg4 Although 
the primary focus of this article is personal jurisdiction in federal 
question cases,'95 some space will be devoted to the related, and 
perhaps unseverable, topic of personal jurisdiction in diversity cases. 
2. General Historical Development 
Examination of the historical development of personal jurisdiction 
in the federal courts must begin with article 111, section 2, of the 
Constitution, which limits the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courtslg6 "to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority; . . . to Controversies 
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another 
State;-between Citizens of different States; . . ." and other cases 
involving federal issues.'97 The exercise of this limited judicial power 
constitutionally is vested only "in such inferior Courts as the Con- 
194. See infra notes 376-492 and accompanying text. 
195. For purposes of this discussion, the important distinction is between cases in which 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court rests solely on the ground of diversity of 
citizenship and those cases in which its subject matter jurisdiction rests on some ground other 
than, or  in addition to, diversity of citizenship. This latter group of cases should be referred 
to as "nondiversity" cases, including both federal question cases arising under the general federal 
question jurisdiction authorized by 28 U.S.C. $1331 (Supp. V 1981) and cases arising under 
special grants of authority to federal courts. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. $1333 (1976) (Admiralty, 
maritime and prize cases); 28 U.S.C. $1334 (Supp. V 1981) (Bankruptcy matters and proceedings); 
28 U.S.C. $1338 (1976) (Patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, trade-marks and unfair 
competition). See supra note 19. For simplicity, throughout this discussion the term "federal 
question cases" has been used broadly to encompass all nondiversity federal cases. See also 
supra note 19. 
196. Restrictions on federal subject matter jurisdiction serve to limit the circumstances in 
which a federal court can open its doors. As noted below, see infra notes 196-210 and accom- 
panying text, the First Congress was reluctant to give broad authority to federal courts; some 
members sought to block completely the creation of lower federal courts. 
Restrictions on personal jurisdiction also limit access to  federal courts. The development 
of federal court personal jurisdiction rules paralleled, in some regards, the reluctant, nondirected 
attention accorded subject matter jurisdiction. See infra notes 205-72 and accompanying text. 
197. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $2, cl. 1. Clause 1 of section 2 provides, in full: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Con- 
troversies to which the Untied States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between 
two or more States;-between a State and Citizen of another State;-between Citizens 
of different States,-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants 
of different States, and between a State, or  the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, 
Citizens or  Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. 111, $2, cl. 1. 
Included in this grant of power to lower federal courts is what has become diversity jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. $1332 (1976) and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. $1331 (Supp. 
V 1981). See supra notes 18-19. Neither of these statutory authorizations is coterminus with 
the authority which article 111 permits. See infra note 200. 
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gress may from time to time ordain and establish."198 This Constitu- 
tional language was interpreted as giving Congress the prerogative to 
create lower federal courts.199 Once Congress had decided to create 
federal district and circuit courts, moreover, article I11 was not inter- 
preted as requiring that these courts be vested with the full comple- 
ment of subject matter jurisdiction authorized by the C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  
As noted by the Supreme Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. 
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,'O1 "Lilurisdiction of the lower 
198. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $1. 
199. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), Justice Story based 
his decision that the Supreme Court had the jurisdiction and authority to review all state acts 
under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States on the assumption that article 
111 of the Constitution was "not mandatory, and that Congress may constitutionally omit to  
vest the judicial power in courts of the United States." 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) a t  337. From that 
position, one might argue that Congress was not required to  create lower federal courts at  
all. In his opinion, however, Justice Story also included several paragraphs suggesting that 
article 111 was intended to be "mandatory upon the legislature," 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) a t  328, 
thus requiring that Congress establish lower federal courts vested with all jurisdiction authorized 
by article 111. 
The Supreme Court subsequently resolved the question of Congressional duty to create lower 
federal courts by ruling that although the power of the courts of the United States is granted 
by the Constitution, Congress had the prerogative to  create courts to exercise some or  all of 
that power. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845). Congress "could have declined 
to create any such courts, leaving suitors to  the remedies afforded by state courts, with such 
appellate review by this Court as Congress may prescribe." Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 
187 (1943). 
200. While many commentators have taken the position that "Congress. . .was required 
to establish" the lower federal courts, Symposium Proceedings, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1042 (1981-82) 
(Professor Rice); see also supra note 199, and some have argued that article 111 requires that 
Congress establish lower courts with the full complement of subject matter jurisdiction authorized 
in article 111, see G. GUNTHER, supra note 79, at 57; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) (Story, J.) (dictum suggesting that article 111 was "mandatory upon 
the legislature"), Congress has never done so. Congress' grant to lower federal courts of original 
diversity jurisdiction, now codified at 28 U.S.C. $1332 (1976), for example, is more narrow 
than the authority authorized by article I11 of the Constitution. Exercise of diversity jurisdic- 
tion is limited to those "civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 
of 610,000," 28 U.S.C. $1332 (1976), a jurisdictional threshold amount not required by article 
111, and the diversity jurisdiction authorized by Congress in 28 U.S.C. $1332 (1976) requires 
"complete diversity" (that no plaintiff be a co-citizen of any defendant), Strawbridge v. Cur- 
tiss, 7 U.S. (Cranch.) 267 (1806), while the grant of article 111 requires only "minimum" diver- 
sity (that at least one plaintiff be of a different citizenship from that of at  least one defen- 
dant). See 28 U.S.C. 1335(a)(1) (1976) (requiring only minimum diversity in interpleader actions). 
When the First Congress established the lower federal courts, it did not vest any general 
federal question jurisdiction in these courts. See infra notes 205-30 and accompanying text. 
And even when Congress vested general federal question authority in the federal courts, this 
authority was not coterminus with the maximum power permitted by the article 111 "arising 
under" language. See infra note 230 and accompanying text. Until recently, a'jurisdictional 
threshold of $10,000 "amount in controversy" was required in federal question as well as diversity 
cases. 28 U.S.C. $1331 (Supp. V 1981). Moreover, Congress by separate statute has granted 
federal courts jurisdiction over certain "federal" matters, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. $1338 (1976) 
(Patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, trade-marks and unfair competition); 28 U.S.C. 
$1343 (Supp. V 1981) (Civil rights and elective franchise), thus indicating that the general federal 
question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. $1331 might not include matters that clearly fall under the 
"arising under" language of article 111. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court noted: "Although 
the language of $1331 parallels that of the 'arising under' clause of Article 111, this Court 
never has held that statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Article 111 'arising under' 
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federal courts is further limited to those subjects encompassed within 
a statutory grant of jur i sd i~t ion ."~~~ Thus, while such an interpreta- 
tion was not required constitutionally, the subject matter jurisdiction 
of federal courts is limited to those parts of the article I11 grant that 
Congress has vested in the lower federal courts.203 As will be 
demonstrated below, some courts and commentators have sought a 
similar structure in personal jurisdiction authority of federal courts, 
that is, some constitutional expression of authority coupled with 
affirmative legislation authorizing federal courts to exercise this grant.204 
The Judiciary Act of 178g205 created the first federal trial courts, 
and the authority of those district courts and circuit courts, which 
in some instances also were courts of original jurisdiction,206 was limited 
to admiralty cases, some criminal cases, cases in which the United 
States was a party, and diversity cases.20' These courts were not vested 
&ith any authority over cases and controversies described in article 
I11 of the Constitution as "arising under" the Constitution or laws 
of the United States-general federal question cases. Federal ques- 
tion jurisdiction resided solely in the state courts, and the only possib- 
ility of consideration by a federal court was by appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court from a decision of the highest court of the 
state.208 In view of one of the original purposes of creating a federal 
- --- 
jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true." Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 
1962, 1972 (1983), (citing Romers v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 
(1959)). In Romers, the Court had asserted: "Of course, the many limitations which have been 
placed on jurisdiction under $1331 are not limitations on the constitutional power of Congress 
to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts." 358 U.S. at 379 n.51. See also Powell v. McCor- 
mack, 395 U.S. 486, 515 (1969); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 506 (1900). 
While "[tlhe Constitution. . .and statements in court opinions suggest a broad congres- 
sional authority over lower federal court jurisdiction," G. GUNTHER, supra note 79, at 59; 
see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869) (which has been read to support 
broad power of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, see, e.g., National 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissen- 
ting); Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1965)), the 
Constitution limits Congress control of lower court jurisdiction. G. GUNTHER, supra, at 59-60. 
See genera& Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 
263-69 (1973). For example, the fifth amendment due process clause would preclude Congress 
from exercising "its Article 111 power over the jurisdiction of the court in order to deprive 
a party of a right created by the Constitution." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CON- 
STITUTIONAL LAW 44 (1978). 
201. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See supra notes 165-87 and accompanying text. 
202. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 465 U.S. at  701. 
203. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text. 
204. See, e.g. infra notes 1215 and 1258-59 and accompanying text. 
205. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (now codified in scattered sections of Title 
28 of the United States Code). See infra note 211. 
206. Bartels, Recent Expansion in Federal Jurisdiction: A Call For Restraint, 55 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 219, 224 (1981). 
207. Id. 
208. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, $25, 1 Stat. 73. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-53 (1816). Those few federal questions that could be heard by federal 
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court system, to provide a special forum for the vindication of federally 
created rights,209 this inaction probably is explained best as a com- 
promise in the struggle between the Federalists and the anti-Federalists 
in the First Congres~ .~ '~  
Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 governed the questions of 
service of process and venue in the federal courts,211 but did not ad- 
dress directly the issue of a defendant's amenability to suit, tradi- 
tionally one of the key factors in asserting personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant.212 Under Section 11, valid service of process could be 
~-~ 
courts prior to the 1875 vesting in those courts of federal question jurisdiction, Act of March 
3, 1875, ch. 137, 51, 18 Stat. 470 (codified in 28 U.S.C. 51331 (1976)), concerned matters 
that were peculiarly federal in nature or that involved political exigencies. See P. BATOR, P. 
MISCHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 844 
(2d ed. 1973). 
209. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL P R A C ~ C E  AND PROCEDURE 
$3561 (1975); Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. 
REV. 639 (1942). 
210. As noted by Professor Snepp: 
When the First Congress met, the national struggle between the Federalists and the 
anti-Federalists was reflected in the debates over the jurisdiction to be conferred upon 
the federal courts. One group of anti-Federalists wanted no system of lower courts 
at all, and would have left the enforcement of federal laws to the tribunals of the 
states. . . .The Federalists, on the other hand, favored the establishment of a system 
of federal courts clothed with all the powers granted by the Constitution. 
Snepp, The Law Applied in the Federal Courts, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 165 (1948). 
Professor Warren, in his work which was given such deference by the majority opinion in 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938), and in which he analyzed the debates 
on the 1789 Act, Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 
37 HAW. L. REV. 49 (1923), made similar observations: the final form of the Act was a com- 
promise necessary to obtain the votes of those who "were insistent that the Federal Courts 
be given minimum powers and jurisdiction." Id. at 62. 
211. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 79. Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 provided, in pertinent part: 
But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action 
before a circuit or  district court. . . .and no civil suit shall be brought before either 
of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States by any original process 
in any other district than that where he is an inhabitant, or  in which he shall be 
found at  the time of serving the writ. 
Id. According to Professor Foster, such an  affirmative legislative grant is generally considered 
essential for the exercise of personal jurisdiction: 
As with other aspects of its jurisdiction, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by 
the district court is legislatively grounded. The generally prevailing view is that the 
district court cannot, sua sponte, assert personal jurisdiction merely on the ground 
that to do so would be constitutionally possible; the basis for personal jurisdiction 
must be found in a statute or in a procedural rule having the force of a statute. 
Foster, supra note 26, at  11 (footnotes omitted). 
212. See Foster, supra note 191, at  83; Green, supra note 191, at  968. As noted by Pro- 
fessor Foster: 
The second concept in the Pennoyer dictum is today thought of as "amenability," 
or  as a condition which "subjects" a defendant to a personal judgment. As Justice 
Field saw it, a state could make a nonresident amenable to a personal judgment 
in actions arising out of certain kinds of business activities within the state. Today 
the constitutional scope of amenability involves an  inquiry into the reasonableness 
of trying the particular action against the particular defendant in the case at  hand. 
. . .  
Foster, supra note 191, at  83. 
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made when the defendant was "an inhabitant" or when he could "be 
found" at the time of service, and venue was not proper except where 
valid service of process had been made.213 One recent commentator 
has maintained: 
Because process could follow a defendant and no provisions set forth 
a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction, the process and venue 
language suggests that the amenability basis under the Act was 
physical presence. Using presence as the amenability basis, federal 
district courts could assert jurisdiction over any person found within 
their boundar i e~ .~ '~  
One might argue, instead, that amenability was to exist at least in 
those circumstances in which valid service of process could be made, 
where the defendant resided or where he was found. Whether 
amenability would somehow be more extensive was irrelevant because 
a court could not proceed unless process had been served validly.215 
Under either interpretation, the effect of Section 11 of the Act was 
to allow for suit wherever the defendant could be found, but not 
for nationwide service of process; a defendant could be served where 
he was found, but only by the federal court sitting in the particular 
federal district in which he had been found.216 The Supreme Court fre- 
213. See supra note 211. 
214. Berger, supra note 191, at  320. Federal courts did not seem nonplussed by the specific 
relation of Section 11 only to service of process and venue; they used Section 11 "as a statutory 
foundation for a federal law of corporate amenability." Comment, Federal Jurisdiction Over 
Foreign Corporations and the Erie Doctrine, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 690 (1964). See, e.g., 
St. Louis Wire-Mill Co. v. Consolidated Barb-Wire Co., 32 F. 802 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887); Gray 
v. Quicksilver hlining Co., 21 F. 288 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884); Merchants' Mfg. Co. v. Grand Truck 
Ry., 13 F. 358 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Robinson v. National Stockyard Co., 12 P. 361 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Stout v. Sioux City Pac. R.R., 8 F. 794 (C.C.D. Neb. 1881). 
215. In other words, while presence would be an  adequate amenability basis for circumstances 
covered by the Judiciary Act, other bases also might exist but viould be unnecessary because 
the Act restricts venue and service so that no amenability basis other than presence would 
be necessary; other actions could not be brought because the defendant could not be served 
and/or venue would not lie. 
Another commentator, in the context of the Arrowsmith-Jaftex controversy, see infra notes 
434-92 and accompanying text, has suggested a different interpretation: 
Whatever significance there may be in the original conjunction of the process 
and venue statutes, it is difficult to ascertain how these provisions, if they have 
relevance to amenability at all, provide any more than a ceiling upon the exercise 
of jurisdiction; the terms of both sections restrict the federal courts. They indicate 
when jurisdiction is'not to be asserted and are silent as to when it is to be asserted. 
The problem remains one of finding an affirmative mandate, because the traditional 
base of jurisdiction, physical power, is inapplicable to the abstract corporate entity. 
Note, supra note 188, a t  1141. 
216. In United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878), the Court commented on 
the Judiciary Act of 1789: 
It is true that Congress has declared that no person shall be sued in a circuit court 
of the United States who does not reside within the district for which the court was 
established, or  who is not found there. But a citizen residing in Oregon may be sued 
in Maine, if found there, so that process can be served on him. 
Id. at  604. In Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838), the Court made clear 
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quently has expressed the opinion that "Congress has power . . . to 
provide that the process of every district court shall run into every part 
of the United  state^."^" Although the Court, therefore, apparently 
that "the process. . .is in terms limited to the district within which it is issued." See also Ex 
parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911, 913 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5,657) ("The manifest policy 
bf the judicial system of the united-States, was to  rende; the administration of ~usGce as 
little oppressive to suitors and others as possible; and it corresponds entirely with that conclu- 
sion, tvhich confines the process of the courts within the limits of the district in which the 
court is, and from which it issued"). 
One commentator has concluded that "the [Judiciary] Act, in practice, allowed nationwide 
personal jurisdiction." Berger, supra note 191, at  320-21. This seems to be an overstatement 
of the situation. No single federal court had nationwide personal jurisdiction, but only per- 
sonal jurisdiction within its own federal territory. If a defendant were served with process in 
a federal district in Montana, suit could proceed in a federal court in Montana, not in any 
other state. Thus, the federal system paralleled the state systems, with each state court being 
able to assert personal jurisdiction over individuals found within its borders. Surely, no one 
would characterize that authority as "nationwide personal jurisdiction." 
217. Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925). See Mississippi Publishing 
Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1945) ("Congress could provide for service of process 
anywhere in the United States"); United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 98 U.S. 569, 603 
(1878) ("It would have been competent for Congress to organize a judicial system analogous 
to that of England. . ., and confer all original jurisdiction on a court or courts. . .with authority 
to exercise that jurisdiction throughout the limits of the Federal government. . . ."); id. at  
604 ("There is. . .nothing in the Constitution which forbids Congress to enact that, as to  
a class of cases or a case of special character, a circuit court-any circuit court-in which 
the suit may be brought, shall, by process served anywhere in the United States, have the 
power to bring before it all the parties necessary to its decision"); id. ("Whether parties shall 
be compelled to answer in a court of the United States wherever they may be served, or shall 
only be bound to appear when found within the district where the suit has been brought, is 
merely a matter of legislative discretion, which ought to be governed by considerations of con- 
venience, expense, & C., but which, when exercised by Congress, is controlling on the courts"); ' 
Toland v. Sprague, 12 U.S. (Pet.) 300, 328 (1838) ("Congress might have authorized civil pro- 
cess from any circuit court, to have run into any state of the Union"); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S4(2) and comment (1982). But see Abraham, Constitutional Limita- 
tions Upon Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. REV. 520 (1963); Seeburger, The 
Federal Long-Arm: The Uses of Diversity, or "Tain't So, McGee," 10 IND. L. REV. 480 (1977). 
In each of these cases, however, the statements merely were part of an analysis concluding 
with recognition that Congress had not so empowered the courts, Robertson v. Railroad Labor 
Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) ("But [Congress] has not done so either by any general laws 
or  in terms by $310 of Transportation Act, 1920"); Toland v. Sprague, 12 U.S. (Pet.) 300, 
328 (1838) ("[Congress] has not done so[;] [ilt has not in terms authorized any original civil 
process to run into any other district; with the single exception of subpoenas for witnesses, 
within a limited distance"), or  that Congress in the circumstances before the Court, had made 
limited use of its extensive authority. In United States v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., the Court 
concluded: 
Statutes [removing certain restrictions on personal jurisdiction in specific cases], if 
not so common as to be called ordinary legislation, are yet frequent enough to justify 
us in saying that they are well-recognized acts of legislative power uniformly sustained 
by the courts. It may be said. . .that such statutes when they have been held to 
be valid by the courts, do not infringe the substantial rights of property or of con- 
tract of the parties affected, but are intended to  supply defects of power in the courts, 
or  to give them improved methods of procedure in dealing with existing rights. 
98 U.S. at  606. See also Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 443 (1945) 
(Congress could, through Federal Rule 4(f), authorize that federal process extend beyond the 
particular federal district and run to the borders of the state in which the court was held). 
Utilizing these recognized broad powers to extend the personal jurisdiction of a federal court 
beyond the boundaries of the federal district in which the court sits (in effect, its territorial 
boundaries), Congress has enacted many special federal statutes, see infra note 247 and accom- 
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finds no constitutional limitations on the territorial reach of a particular 
federal court in terms of service of process and, perhaps implicitly, 
in terms of amenability to suit, Congress has never authorized, as a 
general matter, such a broad reach for federal courts.218 
As noted by Professors Hart and Wechsler, under the formulation 
of Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, "[v]enue and personal 
jurisdiction were scarcely distinguishable conceptions in federal prac- 
tice. . . ."219 In 1789, such coextensiveness probably was quite sensi- 
ble for at least two reasons: (1) venue, restriction on the location 
of a trial, always has been considered a restriction to protect defen- 
dants from being sued in inconvenient locationsZZ0 and, in 1789, the 
most convenient sites for trial, from a defendant's point of view, would 
have been the location of his residence or a location where he was 
"present,"221 and (2) service of process within the district in which 
suit was sought was consistent with both the convenience protected 
by venue and the limited authority with which the First Congress 
sought to invest the federal district and circuit courts.222 
panying text, and certain provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see inJra note 
290 and accompanying text, authorizing federal courts to exercise personal jurisdiction in cir- 
cumstances in which a court of the state in which the federal court was sitting could not so 
act. Even in diversity cases, this federal extraterritorial reach has been approved. As noted 
above, however, Congress never has granted to the federal courts the full personal jurisdiction 
power authorized by article 111 of the Constitution. 
In a 1936 House Report on its grant of nationwide service of process in shareholder derivative 
suits, Act of Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 40 Stat. 1213 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 4112 (1940)), the 
Representatives maintained: 
The power of the federal courts to maintain a suit cognizable under the judicial power 
of the United States in any district and to issue process for service anywhere in the 
United States is a matter of legislative discretion, controlled by Acts of Congress 
based upon considerations of convenience to litigants, expense, and promotion of 
justice. 
H.R. REP. NO. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936). This statement is noteworthy in at least 
two respects: (1) it indicated a Congressional attitude that authority for nationwide service of 
process was a serious matter and that such authority would not be granted incautiously, and 
(2) it listed factors affecting its decision to grant nationwide service, "considerations of conve- 
nience to litigants, expense and promotion of justice", factors similar to  those weighed by 
courts in exploring the fourteenth amendment due process limitations on state court exercises 
of personal jurisdiction. See supra notes 106-85 and accompanying text. 
218. See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); Toland v. Sprague, 
12 U.S. (Pet.) 300, 328 (1838). See also supra note 217. Congress has authorized nationwide 
service of process in certain specific circumstances. See infra note 247 and accompanying text. 
In some circumstances, Congress has the power to provide for service of process in foreign 
countries. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, $51133-36. 
219. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SySTEhf 948 (1953). 
220. See F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, JR., Crvn. PROCEDURE 603 (2d ed. 1977). 
221. As noted by one commentator: 
As cast in 1789, Section 11 probably served the needs of the late 18th Century 
reasonably well. The business organizations of the day were generally small, not cor- 
porate in form, and their activities-and most other activities likely to lead to 
litigation-tended to be local in character. 
Foster, supra note 191, at  76. 
222. See supra note 210 and 220 and accompanying text. 
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As interstate contacts and travel increased and became less harrowing 
and hazardous, and as state boundaries became less formidable bar- 
riers to such activities,223 the requirements for venue, service of pro- 
cess, and amenability to suit, all prerequisites for maintenance of a 
suit in a federal court of competent subject matter jurisdiction,224 
diverged,225 with venue remaining the most restrictive requirement.226 
The pattern established in the Judiciary Act of 1789, however, of 
dealing expressly with the purely procedural matters of service and 
location of trial, while dealing by inference or implication with the 
question of amenability to suit in federal courts, has continued to 
be the pattern followed in subsequent jurisdictional enactments.227 
In the 1860s, Congress began to expand the subject matter jurisdic- 
tion of the federal courts.228 Congress acted in a piecemeal way, gran- 
ting, bit by bit, some of the power authorized by article I11 of the 
C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  General federal question jurisdiction, as authorized 
by the "arising under" language of article 111, finally was vested by 
Congress in the lower federal courts in 1875.230 Congress did not, 
223. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
224. see supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
225. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 219, at  948-49. 
226. At present, the general venue requirements for the federal courts are codified in 28 
U.S.C. $1391 (1976). For actions "wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizen- 
ship," venue lies "only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, 
or in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. $1391(a) (1976) (emphasis added). In federal question 
cases, venue lies "only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or  in which the claim 
arose, except as otherwise provided by [special venue statutes]." 28 U.S.C. $1391(b) (1976) 
(emphasis added). First, it is noteworthy that venue in federal question cases is more limited 
than venue in simple diversity cases, a real puzzle since the primary purpose of creating federal 
courts was to provide a forum with particular expertise in federal matters. As observed by 
Professors Hart and Wechsler, "Neither the legislative history nor the decisions yield any answer 
to the enigma." H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 219, at 949. Moreover, under modern 
provisions, a defendant may be served with process wherever he is present; venue would not 
lie, however, unless he and all other defendants reside there, the action arose there, or (in 
diversity cases) all of the plaintiffs reside there. Thus, venue often seriously restricts the plain- 
tiff's choice of forum unless the defendant is willing to waive objections to venue. 
227. See infra notes 228-72 and accompanying text. See also Berger, supra note 191, at  321. 
228. See Bartels, supra note 206, at 224. 
229. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, $5, 12 Stat. 756 (enlarging removal jurisdic- 
tion in some cases involving federal officers); Act of April 9, 1866, Ch. 31, $3 14 Stat. 27 
(codified at  28 U.S.C. $1443 (1976)) (extending removal jurisdiction in certain cases involving 
civil rights of the newly freed slaves); Act of Feb. 5, 1867, Ch. 28, $1, 14 Stat. 385 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. $2241 (1976)) (granting federal courts certain review authority through writs of 
habeas corpus); Act of March 1, 1875, Ch. 114, $3, 18 Stat. 336 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $1343(4) 
(Supp V. 1981) and 42 U.S.C. $2000(a) (granting district courts jurisdiction over civil rights 
suits alleging denial of equal access to  public accommodations); Act of April 20, 1871, Ch. 
22, $1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $1343(3) (Supp. V 1981) (granting district courts 
jurisdiction over civil rights suits alleging deprivation of rights by State action); Act of May 
31, 1870, Ch. 114, $8, 16 Stat. 142 (codified at  28 U.S.C. $1343(4) (Supp. V 1981) (granting 
district courts jurisdiction over civil rights suits alleging interference with voting rights). 
230. Act of March 3, 1875, Ch. 137, $1, 18 Stat. 470. The current version of this enact- 
ment appears at  28 U.S.C. $1331 (Supp. V 1981): "The district courts shall have original jurisdic- 
tion of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id. 
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however, give the matter extended considerat i~n,~~'  thus again 
demonstrating a seeming reluctance or perhaps even a lack of interest, 
which. has been illustrated both by its haphazard treatment of the 
question of amenability in the federal courts232 and by its consistent 
failure to address carefully and directly the federal question subject 
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.233 The nonchalance of Con- 
gress with respect to both of these questions seems to reveal a strong 
desire to limit the authority of federal courts. Federal court power 
can be limited by failing to grant federal courts the authority to hear 
certain types of cases and controversies, restrictions on subject mat- 
ter jurisdiction, or by failing to permit federal courts to exercise 
authority over large classes of defendants, restrictions on personal 
jurisdiction and amenability. 
In 1872, Congress enacted the Conformity Act, which provided: 
[tlhat the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding 
. . . in the circuit and district courts . . . shall conform, as near as 
may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding 
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the State 
within which such circuit or district courts are held. . . . 2 3 4  
The federal courts thus were bound to follow state practice in regard 
to most modes of proceeding such as forms of process and methods 
of service.235 The Conformity Act, however, did not apply to ques- 
tions of personal juri~diction,~'~ and, as noted by one commentator, 
"the independence of the federal judiciary was frequently asserted 
in the maxim that federal jurisdiction could not be enlarged or abridged 
by state statute."237 
231. Chadbourne & Levin, supra note 209, at 643-45. 
232. See supra notes 211-27 and accompanying text. 
233. See supra notes 205-31 and accompanying text. Perhaps Congress' failure to engage 
in extended debate or  discussion of the 1875 Act's grant of federal question jurisdiction was 
caused by time pressure or  by some general agreement that federal question jurisdiction should 
be granted. On the other hand, perhaps debate was limited in order not to  reopen the earlier 
arguments in favor of limiting federal court authority. See supra notes 205-10 and accompany- 
ing text. Perhaps it was thought better to treat the general grant of federal question jurisdic- 
tion as essentially a fait accompli. 
234. Act of June 1, 1872, Ch. 255, $5, 17 Stat. 196. 
235. See, e.g., Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 304 (1889); see also Barrett, Venue and 
Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608, 61 1 
n.17 (1954). 
236. See, e.g., Munter v. Weil Corset Co., 261 U.S. 276 (1923); Mechanical Appliance 
Co. v. Castleman, 215 U.S. 437 (1910); Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Pinkney, 149 U.S. 194 (1893); 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U.S. 202 (1892). 
237. Comment, supra note 214, at 692. See, e.g., Mechanical Appliance Co. V. Castleman, 
215 U.S. 437, 443 (1910); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898); Goldey v. Morning 
News, 156 U.S. 518, 523 (1895); Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 453 (1874); 
Hyde v. Stone, 61 U.S. (20 Hovr.) 170, 175 (1858); -Union Bank v. Jolly's Adm'rs., 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 503, 507 (1856); Suydam v. Broadnax, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 67, 74-75 (1840). 
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In 1887, Congress extensively amended the Judiciary Act of 1789,238 
eliminating service of process based solely on a defendant's presence239 
and creating a new venue provision for cases in which subject matter 
jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of citizenship.240 Suit was 
now authorized only in the district in which the defendant resided 
unless subject matter jurisdiction was based solely on diversity of 
citizenship; in such cases, suit also could be brought in the district 
in which the plaintiff resided. Examination of the legislative history 
of the amendment reveals that a motivating Congressional concern 
was "to diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the Supreme 
Court of the United States, to promote the convenience of the people, 
and to lessen the burden and expense of l i t igati~n."~~' Again, neither 
in the amendments nor in its debates did Congress address the ques- 
tion of amenability to suit or even the effect that the severe limita- 
tion on service of process would have on the personal jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.242 The substantial curtailment of service of pro- 
cess, coupled with limitations on venue in all federal question cases, 
clearly resulted in dramatic limitations on the effectiveness of the 
federal courts under their new federal question subject matter jurisdic- 
tion. Suit only could be maintained where the defendant resided, and, 
in the case of multiple defendants who did not all reside in the same 
federal district, no federal court would be an appropriate forum. Such 
federal question cases necessarily would be relegated to the state courts. 
Following the pattern established in its enactment of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789,243 Congress did not respond with any comprehensive 
treatment of federal court personal jurisdiction. Instead, it dealt with 
particular jurisdictional problems by stopgap, piecemeal amendments 
and enactments.244 As Judge Hufstedler has observed: 
238. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, $1, 24 Stat. 552. 
239. Id. The amended section provided that "no civil suit shall be brought before either 
of [the lower federal courts] against [an inhabitant of the United States] by any original pro- 
cess. . .in any other district than that where of he is an inhabitant." Id. Compare Act of 
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, $11 1 Stat. 73, 79, quoted supra at  note 211. 
240. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, $1, 24 Stat. 552. The new venue statute provided: 
"[Wlhere the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of 
different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff 
or  the defendant." Id. 
241. 18 CONG. hc. 613, 613 (1887) (Rep. Culbertson). 
242. See Berger, supra note 191, at 321. 
243. See supra notes 205-22 and accompanying text. 
244. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849 (War frauds cases: service 
of process "from the district court of the district wherein such suit is brought shall run in 
any other district and service . . . upon any defendant may be made in any district within 
the United States or the territorial or  insular possessions thereof. . . ."; venue wherever a 
single defendant resided or  where "the cause of action or  any part thereof arose"); Credit 
Mobilier Act, ch. 226, §4, 17 Stat. 485, 509 (1873) (Credit Mobilier scandal: service of process 
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[C]ongressional reaction to issues of federal jurisdiction has always 
been fitful and . . . the fits are usually induced by strong pressures 
imposed by particular events or by powerful constituencies that seek 
to influence results in particular causes that concern them. Congress 
has rarely undertaken a comprehensive reexamination of federal 
jurisdiction. Indeed, it has not made the attempt for almost 100 
In addition to the general grant of federal personal jurisdiction 
authority included in the Judiciary Act, as amended and as 
supplemented,246 Congress has enacted specific statutes that authorize 
nationwide or even worldwide service of process in regard to certain 
areas of particular federal concern.247 As with the Judiciary Act, most 
as the court in which the action was pending "shall deem necessary to bring in new parties 
or the representatives of parties deceased, or to carry into effect the purposes of this act," 
such service to "run into any district;" venue "in the circuit court in any circuit"); Act of 
Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $112 (1940) (current version at 
28 U.S.C. $1695 (1976)) (stockholders' derivative suits: service of process in any district "wherein 
such corporation resides or may be found"). 
245. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary, 
47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 842-43 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
246. See supra notes 228-45 and accompanying text. The Judiciary Act of 1789 and its 
amendments was displaced as a general jurisdiction and venue statute when the Judicial Code 
was revised formally in 1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 945 (codified as amended 
at 28.U.S.C. $81391, 1693, 1695 (1976)). 28 U.S.C. $1693 (1976) provides: "Except as othcr- 
wise provided by Act of Congress, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another 
in any civil action in a district court." This language virtually is identical to the service of 
process language of the Judiciary Act of 1789, see supra note 211, and Judge Clark argued, 
with substantial support from legislative history, that 28 U.S.C. $1693 is a codification of the 
process and venue provisions of the 1789 Act. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 
219, 234 (2d Cir. 1963) (Clark, J., dissenting); Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 
508, 512 (2d Cir. 1g60). But see Comment, Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporaliorrs 
in Diversity Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 752; 759-60 (1964). 
Current general venue provisions, codified at 28 U.S.C. $1391, see supra note 226, are more 
generous than those under the 1789 Act, as amended; suit now also may be brought in the 
district "in which the claim arose." This has eliminated some of the difficulties in finding 
a suitable federal forum for federal question cases in which the defendants did not all reside 
in the same federal district. See supra note 226. 
247. Credit Mobilier Act, 17 Stat. 485, ch. 226 (1873) (current version at 45 U.S.C. $88 
(1976) (mandamus actions against Union Pacific Railroad); Commodity Exchange Act of 1974, 
7 U.S.C. $13a-1 (1976) (action brought by Commodities Futures Trading Commission); Plant 
Quarantine Act, 7 U.S.C. $150dd(c) (action brought by Secretary of Agriculture); Federal Ar- 
bitration Act, 9 U.S.C. $9 (1976) (confirmation of arbitrator's award); Bankruptcy Act, 11 
U.S.C. $105(a) (1982) (bankruptcy court jurisdiction); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpora- 
tion Act, 12 U.S.C. $1455(b) (1976) (action brought by Federal Home Mortgage Corporation); 
National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §1725(c)(4) (creation of Federal Savings & Loan Insurance 
Corporation); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. $55, 10 (1976) (joinder of additional parties); Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. $22 (1976) (action brought by United States against a corporation); Clayton 
Act, 15 U.S.C. $25 (action to restrain violation of the Act); Federal Trade Commission Act, 
15 U.S.C. $49 (1976) (action by Federal Trade Commission to enforce a subpoena); Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. $77v(a) (action to prosecute violation of the Act); Trust Indenture 
Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. $77wv(b) (action to enforce the Act or to prosecute violation of the 
Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. $$78u(b)(C) (subpoena of witnesses); Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 078aa (1976) (action to enforce the Act or to prosecute viola- 
tion of the Act); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. $80a-43 (1976) (action to en- 
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of these statutes do not address directly the question of amenability, 
but instead prescribe the circumstances that would trigger expanded 
authority to serve Often, the service of process, venue, 
and amenability provisions are so intertwined as to be indistinguish- 
force the Act or to prosecute violation of the Act); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 
$Sob-14 (1982) (action to enforce the Act or to prosecute violation of the Act); Antitrust Civil 
Process Act, 15 U.S.C. $1312(d)(l), (2) (1982) (demand by the United States Attorney for an- 
titrust investigation); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. $1719 (action to 
enforce the Act or  to prosecute violation of the Act); Indian Self-Determination and Education 
Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. $375 (1976) (determination of heirship of deceased members of cer- 
tain Indian Tribes); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. $1330 (1976) (nonjury civil 
action against non-immune foreign country); Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. 
$1391(e) (1976) (action against federal officers); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 
28 U.S.C. $1608 (1976) (actions against foreign sovereign); 28 U.S.C. $1655 (1976) (lien en- 
forcement); 28 U.S.C. $1695 (1976) (shareholder derivative action); Interstate Commerce En- 
forcement Act, 28 U.S.C. $2321 (1976) (action by United States under Interstate Commerce 
laws); Interstate Commerce Enforcement Act, 28 U.S.C. $2413 (1976) (execution in favor of 
United States); Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. $1132(e)(2) 
(1976) (actions to enforce pension plans); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. $293 (1976) (worldwide service 
in patent suit if suit is filed in District of Columbia); 38 U.S.C. $784(a) (1976) (action on 
United States government insurance); Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. $27O@) (1976) (action on payment 
bond for private contractor's labor on public project); Atomic Energy Damages Act, 42 U.S.C. 
$2210(n)(2) (1976) (public liability action by Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 
248. Section 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. $1391(e) (1976), for 
example, provides: 
A civil action in which a defendant is an  officer or  employee of the United States 
or  any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, 
or  an agency of the United States, or  the United States, may, except as otherwise 
provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the , 
action resides, or  (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved 
in the action is situated, or  (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved 
in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to-any such action in 
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue 
requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, 
employees, or  agencies were not a party. 
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and com- 
plaint to the officer or  agency as required by the rules may be made by certified 
mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought. 
Id. This statute has been interpreted as authorizing the court to assert personal jurisdiction 
over the defendant if he has been served within the United States pursuant to  the statute. 
See, e.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, 
Colby v. Driver, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (statute permits jurisdiction based on defendant's presence 
in federal district where served (see infra notes 641-74 and accompanying text)); United States 
v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (statute permits jurisdiction based on 
defendant's having "requisite 'minimum contacts' with the United States"). But see Kipper- 
man v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 871 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (28 U.S.C. $1391(e) describes only 
the mechanics of effective extra-territorial service but does not provide an amenability basis 
for exercise of personal jurisdiction). Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. $22 (1982) 
provides: 
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may 
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it  is an inhabitant, but also in 
any district wherein it may be found or  transacts business; and all process in such 
cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may 
be found. 
Id. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 51 1984-1985 
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16 
able.249 In other circumstances, venue or personal jurisdiction expressly 
depend on proper service of process and the satisfaction of subject 
matter jurisdiction criteria, in effect rendering the additional re- 
quirements of personal jurisdiction and venue quite valueless.250 
249. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, for example, provides: 
The district courts of the United States, and the United States courts of any Ter- 
ritory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and 
of all suits in equity and actions at  law brought to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this chapter or  the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal pro- 
ceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting 
the violation occurred. Any suit or  action to enforce any liability or duty created 
by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder or to  enjoin any violation of 
such chapter or rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in 
the district wherein the defendant is found o r  is an inhabitant or transacts business, 
and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant 
is an inhabitant or  wherever the defendant may be found. . . . 
15 U.S.C. 578aa (1976). This provision has been interpreted as authorizing nationwide service 
of process and amenability to suit if defendant is present in or is a resident of the federal 
district in which he is served. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 
1979) (infra notes 630-36 and accompanying text); Mariash v. Morill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1139-40 
(2d Cir. 1974) (infra notes 622-29 and accompanying text); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 
909. 911 @. Md. 1971) (infra notes 616-21 and accompanying text). 
250. Section 2 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. $1330 (1976) provides: 
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in 
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 
1603(a) of this title as to  any claim for relief in personam with respect to which 
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under section 1605-1607 of this 
title or  under any applicable international agreement. 
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief 
over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service 
has been made under section 1608 of this title. 
Id. In a recent opinion, Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983), the 
Supreme Court found that the subject matter authority granted by Congress in subsection (a) 
did not exceed the scope of article 111 of the Constitution, even though, on its face, it authoriz- 
ed a suit by a foreign (alien) plaintiff against a foreign sovereign in federal court, so long 
as the substantive requirements of the Act were satisfied. See infra notes 520-46 and accompa- 
nying text. The Court did not directly address the question of personal jurisdiction under subsec- 
tion (b) but noted, in a footnote, that if the criteria for subject matter jurisdiction are not 
satisfied, then neither are the criteria for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1967, n.5. 
Moreover, the Court stated, in the midst of its discussion of the subject matter authority 
available under article 111: 
By reason of its authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations, Congress 
has the undisputed power to decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and under 
what circumstances foreign nations should be amenable to suit in the United States. 
Id. at  1971 (emphasis added). The Court also noted that Congress had protected against the 
danger of federal courts being "turned into 'small international courts of claims"' in which 
non-U.S. citizens could routinely bring suit by "enacting substantive provisions requiring some 
form of substantial contact with the United States." Id. at  1969. Thus, although the Court 
never directly addressed the "world-wide" amenability to  suit programmed into subsection (b) 
of the Act, it did make some references, in its analysis of the subject matter question, to 
personal jurisdiction concepts-amenability and contacts. The opinion by the Court is subject 
to several distinct interpretations on the personal jurisdiction question, including the following: 
(1) that the Court included the personal jurisdiction analytical references in its discussion because 
the statute conditions personal jurisdiction on subject matter jurisdiction plus service of pro- 
cess and, thus, some consideration of amenability standards should be made; (2) that the Court 
did not intend those references to  support any conclusion that personal jurisdiction would be 
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Not until the 1938 adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
P roced~re ,~~ '  which "superseded . . . the practice under the Confor- 
mity Act of adhering to different state procedures,"252 did Congress 
attempt to give more general latitude to federal courts on the ques- 
tion of service of Professors Wright and Miller maintain 
that Rule 4, which "governs service of process in the federal courts 
. . . , was designed to provide maximum freedom and flexibility in 
the procedures for giving all defendants . . . notice of the commence- 
ment of the action and to eliminate upnecessary technicality in con- 
nection with service of process."254 Rule 4 provides the only general 
statement of federal policy with regard to those defendants over which 
the federal courts are empowered to assert their authority. Yet, even 
though Rule 4 is often cited as "govern[ing] the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction in most civil actions brought in federal court"25s or as 
being "the principal guide to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by 
the District or even as contaiping "[tlhe general federal 
measure of amenability. . . ,"257 Rule 4 does not address directly 
the issue of amenability, but rather is concerned expressly with "the 
methods of service through which personal jurisdiction may be 
obtained."258 In his concurring opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland 
appropriate, concluding that a remand was required in order to determine whether the subject 
matter criteria (nonimmunity) were satisfied; (3) that the Court intended, in its discussion of 
amenability, to reassert its position that Congress constitutionally can provide for extraterritorial 
service of process by the federal courts; or (4) that the Court, deliberately or otherwise, fused 
elements of personal jurisdiction into its discussion of subject matter jurisdiction. For further 
discussion of the Verlinden w e  in regard to its significance on the question of personal jurisdic- 
tion in federal question cases, see infra notes 520-60 and accompanying text. 
251. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were first promulgated under the authority of 
the Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. $2072 (1976)) (Rules 
Enabling Act). The Rules became effective September 16, 1938. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, 
supra note 219, at 586-89. 
252. Comment, supra note 214, at 692. 
253. See genera0 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, $1061; Berger, supra note 
191, at 286. 
254. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, $1061, at 198. 
255. Berger, supra note 191, at 286. 
256. Foster, supra note 191, at 92. 
257. Note, supra note 21, at 471 n.6. 
258. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 715 
n.6 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'I, 
320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), see infra notes 453-82 and accompanying text, Judge Friendly 
countered the argument that in a diversity case the constitutionality of service which provides 
for a purely federal method of service, was to be measured by a federal amenability standard 
by pointing out that "F.R. Civ. Proc. 4(d)(3) . . . relatels] to the manner of service and leave[s] 
open the question whether the foreign corporation was subject to service in any manner." Id. 
at 224. Amenability, he maintained, was "[to be] determined in accordance with the law of 
the state where the [federal] court sits. . . ." Id. at 223. See also Note, supra note 188, at 
1142 ("Rule 4 . . . is not concerned with amenability"). But see Mississippi Publishing Corp. 
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1945) ("the service of summons is the procedure by which 
a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over 
the person of the party served"). 
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v. Compagnie des Bauxite de G ~ i n e e , ~ ' ~  Justice Powell addressed this 
issue in the following footnote: 
Although Rule 4 deals expressly only with service of process, not 
with the underlying jurisdictional prerequisites, jurisdiction may not 
be obtained unless process is served in compliance with applicable 
law. . . . For this reason Rule 4 frequently has been characterized 
as a jurisdictional provision. . . . 260 
The question of the extent to which Rule 4 codifies a congressional 
position on the question of amenabilityz6' to service of process in suits 
initiated in federal courts is-central to many of the problems to which 
this article is addressed. As will become clear, Rule 4 may have in- 
creased "freedom and flexibility" in service of process in the federal 
courts, but it has not aided in the establishment of uniform stan- 
dards of personal jurisdiction in diversity and/or federal question cases. 
Instead, it has operated as an obstacle to any such goals.262 
In original form, Rule 4 expanded the territorial reach of federal 
process from the federal district within which the federal court was 
sitting to the boundaries of the state in which the federal court was 
held.263 The Rule also permitted a federal court, in some circumstances, 
259. 456 U.S. at 709. 
260. Id. at 715 n.6. In a recent opinion, Justice Stewart addressed a related question- 
whether 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), see supra note 248, which authorizes extraterritorial service of 
process in some circumstances, affects personal jurisdiction: 
The petitioners . . . argue . . . that §1391(e) does not confer personal jurisdiction. 
It  is the petitioners' position that §1391(e) was designed only to govern venue and 
service of process, not to confer personal jurisdiction. The flaw in this argument 
is that, as a general rule, service of process is the means by which a court obtains 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and in the cases before us the petitioners have 
failed to  demonstrate that there was any defect in the means by which service of 
process was effected. 
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553 n.5 (1979) (dissenting opinion). Justice Stewart failed 
to address the issue of amenability, preferring, instead, to rely on the formula that jurisdiction 
is obtained by non-defective service of process. Perhaps his analysis depends on an assumption 
that a valid service is one that would not violate the defendant's due process rights and that 
the protection of those rights was programmed into the provisions for service of process, Con- 
gress only has authorized that process be served in circumstances in which assertion of personal 
jurisdiction would not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. For further discussion of 
Stafford, see infra notes 665-75 and accompanying text. 
261. As noted over 25 years ago by one writer: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the manner in which service of pro- 
cess may be made on a foreign corporation. . . . However, there is no rule or statute 
which informs the courts when foreign corporations are amenable to process so that 
in personam jurisdiction may be had over them in diversity and most nondiversity suits. 
Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts over Foreign Corporalions, 69 HARV. L. REV. 
508, 508 (1956). While Rule 4 twice has been substantially amended since the publication of 
the article quoted above, see infra notes 265-72 and accompanying text, the statement remains 
true. 
262. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191, at  286-98. 
263. FED. R. CN. P. 4(f) provided: 
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits 
of the state in which the district court is held, and, when a statute of the United 
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to adopt service procedures utilized by the courts of the particular 
state in which service was to be made.264 In 1963, Rule 4 was amended, 
and the service of process rules were made more liberal. Professors 
Wright and Miller note: 
These changes were in large part a codification of liberal interpreta- 
tions given to the original provisions of Rule 4 by the federal courts 
and a recognition of the important changes that had taken place 
since 1938 in state practices regarding jurisdiction and service of pro- 
cess. They also incorporated some of the reforms suggested by 
various writers over the years and made an attempt to .meet some 
of the exigencies of litigation in a modern and mobile society.26s 
The amendments authorized the following: service outside the bor- 
ders of the state in which the federal court was sitting but within 
100 miles of the service "under the circumstances and 
in the manner prescribed" by a statute of the state "in which the 
district court is held,"267 and several procedures for service in a foreign 
Staies so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state. A subpoena may be 
served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45. 
In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1945), the Supreme Court upheld 
this statewide authorization of service of process, arguing (1) that "Congress could [constitu- 
tionally] provide for service of process anywhere in the United States," id. at  442, (2) that 
Rule 4(f) did not violate the Rule 82 proscription of enlargement of federal court venue or  
subject matter jurisdiction by a Federal Rule but only "serve[ed] to implement the jurisdiction 
over the subject matter which Congress has conferred by providing a procedure by which the 
defendant may be brought into court a t  the place where Congress has declared that the suit 
may be maintained," id. at  445, and (3) that Rule 4(f) was "in harmony with the Enabling 
Act which, in authorizing [the Supreme] Court to prescribe general rules for the district courts 
governing practice and procedure in civil suits in law and equity, directed that the rules 'shall 
neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."' Id. 
264. FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(7) provided that service could be made "in the manner prescrib- 
ed by the law of the state in which the service is made. . . ." This provision was amended 
in 1963 to authorize service according to  the law of that state in which the "district court 
Ts held" rather than the state "in which the service is made. . . ." FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). 
265. 4 C. \VRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, $1061, at  199. 
266. The amended Rule 4(f) provided: 
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits 
of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute 
of the United States or  by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state. 
In addition, persons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as addi- 
tional parties to a pending action or  a counter-claim or  cross-claim therein pursuant 
to Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of subdivision 
(d) of this rule at  all places outside the state but within the United States that are 
not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced, or  to 
which it is assigned or  transferred for trial; and persons required to respond to an 
order of commitment for civil contempt may be served at  the same places. A sub- 
poena may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45. 
Id. 
267. The amended Rule 4(e) provided: 
Whenever a statute of the United States or  an order of court thereunder provides 
for service of a summons, or  of a notice, or  of an order in lieu of summons upon 
a party not an  inhabitant of or  found within the state in which the district court 
is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed 
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Further, extensive amendments to Rule 4 became effective on 
by the statute or  order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner 
of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or  rule of court of 
the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, 
or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant 
of or  found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to  him to appear 
and respond or  defend in an  action by reason of the attachment, or  garnishment 
or similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case 
be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule. 
Id. Rule 4(e) was captioned, "Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or  Found Within State." 
Rule 4(d)(7), under the 1963 amendments, apparently described an alternative method of ser- 
vice for individuals and corporations that were inhabitants or found within the state in which 
the district court was held. The amended Rule 4(d)(7) provided: 
Upon a defendant of any class referred to  in paragraph (1) [individual] or (3) [cor- 
poration] of this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and 
complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States 
or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court is 
held for the service of summons or  other like process upon any such defendant in 
an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state. 
Id. Professor Kaplan, Reporter for the 1963 amendments, felt that 4(d)(7) and 4(e) really were 
not intended to be mutually exclusive (with 4(e) applying only to "nonpresent" individuals 
and corporations and 4(d)(7) applying only to "present" individuals and corporations), but 
that the two sections merely were intended to encompass state law on service of process. Kaplan, 
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963(1), 77 HARV. L. REV. 601, 
619-23 (1964). Rule 4(d)(7) is noteworthy, however, because it authorized service "in the man- 
ner prescribed by the law of the state." thereby suggesting to some commentators that the 
state law was not being incorporated into the federal rule but that the federal rule merely 
prescribed the adoption of the state "technique" for service of process, see, e.g., Comment, 
Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: Use of State or Federal Law to Determine Foreign Cor- 
poration's Amenability to Suit, 1964 DUKE L. J. 351, 357 [hereinafter cited as Comment, Choice 
of Law] (better view is that 4(d)(7) provides "only for the more mechanical aspects of service 
of process, rather than containing, by inference, differing indicia as to when a defendant becomes 
amenable to  such service"); Note, supra note 188, at  1135 ("absence of . . . language ['under 
the circumstances'] in Rule 4(d)(7) may indicate that when service is made within the state 
in a state-prescribed manner, the federal courts need not imply a state standard for in per- 
sonam jurisdiction from 'manner' or  be concerned with the appropriateness of the situation 
for use of the state service, but only the mechanics of state service"); but see Walker v. General 
Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963) (state standard applied to service under Rule 
4(d)(7)), while Rule 4(e) authorized service "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed 
in the [state] statute or  rule," thereby suggesting that the state law was being incorporated 
into the federal rule, including all substantive elements of the state statute such as state court 
interpretations of the criteria necessary to trigger the statute. See, e.g., Comment, Return to 
the Twilight Zone-Federal Long-Arm Jurisdiction and Amenability to Federal Rtrle of Civil 
Procedure 4,3) Bulge Service of Process: Sprow v. Hartford Insurance Co., 41 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 685, 701 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Return to the Twilight Zone] ("[slince state 
long-arm jurisdiction is subject. to the fourteenth amendment due process constraints of the 
International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine, it follovfs that a federal court borrowing the 
state long-arm power is also bound by the dictates of International Shoe"). But see Arrowsmith 
v. United Press Int'i, 320 F.2d 219, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1963) (whether service is made under Rule 
4(d)(3) or  Rule 4(d)(7), question of amenability is separate and does not depend on language 
of the Rule). 
268. Rule 4(i), Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country, provided: 
(1) Manner. When the federal or  state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule 
authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or  found within the state in 
which the district court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a 
foreign country, it is also sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made: 
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that 
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or  (B) as directed 
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February 26, 1983.269 Most changes involved issues outside the scope 
by the foreign authority in response to  a letter rogatory, when service in either case 
, 
is reasonably calculated to give actual notice; or  (C) upon an individual, by delivery 
to him personally, and upon a corporation or  partnership or  association, by delivery 
to an officer, a managing or general agent; or  (D) by any form of mail, requiring 
a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to  the 
party to be served; or  (E) as directed by order of the court. Service under (C) or  
(E) above may be made by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 
years of age or who is designated by order of the district court or  by the foreign 
court. On request, the clerk shall deliver the summons to  the plaintiff for transmis- 
sion to the person or  the foreign court or officer who will make the service. 
(2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of this 
rule, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court. When service 
is made pursuant to subparagraph (l)(D) of this subdivision, proof of service shall 
include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee 
satisfactory to the court. 
Id. 
269. Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527. On January 15, 1982, the Advisory Committee 
on Federal Civil Rules submitted its proposed amendments to Rule 4. Siegel, Practice Cam- 
mentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4 (Eff. Feb. 26, 1983) With Special Statute of Limita- 
tions Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 88, 90 (1983). The Supreme Court adopted the proposal, which 
was then to take effect August 1, 1982 unless Congress acted to delay or amend the proposal. 
Id. at 91. In response to many objections to the proposed amended Rule 4, Congress post- 
poned the effective date to October 1, 1983 (Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246). 96 F.R.D. 
at 91-92. Congress substantially revised the proposal. The amendment was signed by the Presi- 
dent on January 12, 1983 and became effective, according to the enactment, on February 26, 
1983 (Pub. L. No. 97-462). 96 F.R.D. at  92. Rule 4, as effective on February 26, 1983, is 
reproduced in its entirety below. 
Rule 4. 
PROCESS 
(a) Summons: Issuance. Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith 
issue a summons and deliver the summons to the plaintiff or  the plaintiff's attorney, 
who shall be responsible for prompt service of the summons and a copy of the com- 
plaint. Upon request of the plaintiff separate or  additional summons shall issue against 
any defendants. 
(b) Same: Form. The summons shall be signed by the clerk, be under the seal of 
the court, contain the name of the court and the names of the parties, be directed 
to the defendant, state the name and address of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, other- 
wise the plaintiff's address, and the time within these rules require the defendant 
to appear and defend, and shall notify him that in case of his failure to  do so judg- 
ment by default will be rendered against him for the relief demanded in the com- 
,plaint. When, under Rule 4(e), service is made pursuant to a statute or rule of court 
of a state, the summons, or notice, or  order in lieu of summons shall correspond 
as nearly as may be to that required by the statute or rule. 
(c) Service. 
(1) Process, other than a subpoena or a summons and complaint, shall be served 
by a United States marshal or deputy United States marshal, or  by a person specially 
appointed for that purpose. 
(2)(A) A summons and complaint shall, except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and 
(C) of this paragraph, be served by any person who is not a party and is not less 
than 18 years of age. 
(B) A summons and complaint shall, a t  the request of the party seeking service or  
such party's attorney, be served by a United States marshal or  deputy United States 
marshal, or by a person appointed by the court for that purpose, only - 
(i) on behalf of a party authorized to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to  Title 
28, U.S.C. 8 1915, or a seaman authorized to  proceed under Title 28, 8 1916, 
(ii) on behalf of the United States or an officer or  agency of the United States, or  
(iii) pursuant to an  order issued by the court stating that a United States marshal 
or deputy United States marshal, or a person specially appointed for that purpose, 
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is required to serve the summons and complaint in order that service be properly 
effected in that particular action. 
(C) A summons and complaint may be served upon a defendant of any class referred 
to in paragraph (1) or  (3) of subdivision (d) of this rule - 
(i) pursuant to the law of the State in which the district court is held for the service 
of summons or other like process upon such defendant in an action brought in the 
courts of general jurisdiction of that State, or 
(ii) by mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint (by first-class mail, 
postage prepaid) to the person to  be served, together with two copies of a notice 
and acknowledgment conforming substantially to form 18-A and a return envelope, 
postage prepaid, addressed to  the sender within 20 days after the date of mailing, 
service of such summons and complaint shall be made under subparagraph (A) or 
(B) of this paragraph in the manner prescribed by subdivision (d)(l) or (d)(3). 
(D) Unless good cause is shown for not doing so the court shall order the payment 
of the costs of personal service by the person served if such person does not com- 
plete and return within 20 days after mailing, the notice and acknowledgment of 
receipt of summons. 
Q the notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons and complaint shall be 
executed under oath or  affirmation. 
(3) The court shall freely make special appointments to serve summonses and com- 
plaints under paragraph (2)(B) of this subdivision of this rule and all other process 
under paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule. 
(d) Summons and Complaint: Person to  be Served. The summons and complaint 
shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with 
such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made as follows: 
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering 
a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or  by leaving copies 
thereof at  his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable 
age and discretion then residing therein or  by delivering a copy of the summons and 
of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service 
of process. 
(2) Upon an infant or an incompetent person, by serving the summons and com- 
plaint in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the service is made 
for the service of summons or  other like process upon any such defendant in an 
action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state. 
(3) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other unincor- 
porated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering 
a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or  to any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service 
of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the 
statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the defendant. 
(4) Upon the United States, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the com- 
plaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought 
or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United 
States attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court and by sending a copy 
of the summons and of the complaint by registered or  certified mail to the Attorney 
General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia, and in any action 
attacking the validity of an order of an officer or agency of the United States not 
made a party, by also seniling a copy of the summons and of the complaint by 
registered or  certified mail to such officer or  agency. 
(5) Upon an  officer or agency of the United States, by serving the United States 
and by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or cer- 
tified mail to such officer or agency. If the agency is a corporation the copy shall 
be delivered as provided in paragraph (3) of this subdivision of this rule. 
(6) Upon a state or  municipal corporation or other governmental organization thereof 
subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the 
chief executive officer thereof or  by serving the summons and complaint in the man- 
ner prescribed by the law of that state for the service of summons or other like 
process upon any such defendant. 
(e) Summons: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State. Whenever 
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a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service 
of a summons, or  of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party 
not an  inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is held, 
service may be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the 
statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of ser- 
vice, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the 
state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or 
of a notice, or  of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of 
'or found within the state, or (2) for service upon or  notice to him to appear and 
respond or  defend in an action by reason of the attachment of garnishment or  similar 
seizure of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made 
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or  rule. 
(f) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. All process other than a subpoena may 
be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court 
is held, and when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules, 
beyond the territorial limits of that state. In addition, persons who are brought in 
as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional parties to a pending action or a 
counterclaim or  cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19, may be served in the man- 
ner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of subdivision (d) of this rule at  all places outside 
the state but within the United States that are not more than 100 miles from the 
place in which the action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or  transferred 
for trial; and persons required to respond to an order to commitment for civil con- . 
tempt may be served at  the same places. A subpoena may be served within the ter- 
ritorial limits provided in Rule 45. 
(g) Return. The person serving the process shall make proof of service thereof to 
the court promptly and in any event within the time during which the person served 
must respond to  the process. If service is made by a person other than a United 
States marshal or deputy United States marshal, such person shall make affidavit 
thereof. If service is made under subdivision (c)(2)(C)(ii) of this rule, return shall 
be made by the sender's filing with the court the acknowledgment received pursuant 
to such subdivision. Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity 
of the service. 
(h) Amendment. At any time in its discretion and upon such terms as it deems just, 
the court may allow any process or  proof of service thereof to be amended, unless 
it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of 
the party against whom the process issued. 
(i) Alternative Provisions for Service in a Foreign Country. 
(1) Manner. When the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) of this rule 
authorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in 
which the district court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in a 
foreign country, it is also sufficient if service of the summons and complaint is made: 
(A) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that 
country in an action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed 
by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory, when service in either case 
is reasonably calculated to give actual notice: or  (C) upon an individual, by delivery 
to him personally, and upon a corporation or partnership or  association, by delivery 
to an officer, a managing or general agent; or (D) by any form of mail, requiring 
a signed receipt, to  be addressed and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the 
party to be served; or  (E) as directed by order of the court. Service under (C) or 
(E) above may be made by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 
years of age or who is designated by order of the district court or by the foreign 
court. On request, the clerk shall deliver the summons to the plaintiff for trans- 
mission to the person or the foreign court or officer who will make the service. 
(2) Return. Proof of service may be made as prescribed by subdivision (g) of this 
rule, or by the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court. When service 
is made pursuant to subparagraph (l)(D) of this subdivision, proof of service shall 
include a receipt signed by the addressee or  other evidence of delivery to the ad- 
dressee satisfactory to the court. 
G) Summons. Time Limit for Service. If a service of the summons and complaint 
is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint and 
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of this article.270 The amendment, however, might have some effect 
on the question of federal court service of process as it relates to 
personal jurisdiction of the federal courts: certain language from 
subsection 4(d)(7) was dropped from the statute and other language 
inexplicably was changed; the section also was moved to subsection 
(c) of Rule 4 and renumbered as 4(~)(2)(C)(i).~~' These changes will 
be discussed below where appropriate.272 
3. Current Rule 4 
Before discussing the issue which has been so studiously ignored 
by Congress-amenability standards in the federal courts, and, more 
particularly, in federal question cases in the federal courts-this writer 
must examine the various methods by which federal courts may effect 
service of process under Rule 4. After considering the amenability 
issue in general, the writer will turn to. the particular cases on which 
this article is focused: federal question cases in federal courts. 
Rule 4(d)(l) authorizes a federal court to serve individual defen- 
dants who are either domiciled in, or present in, the state in which 
the federal court is held by personal service on the defendant or 
by substituted service "at his dwelling house or usual place of abode 
. . .or by deliver[y]. . .to an agent authorized by appointment or 
by law to receive service of process."273 Rule 4(d)(3) provides a similar 
the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show good cause why 
such service was not made within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to 
that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with notice to such 
party or  upon motion. This subdivision shall not apply to service in a foreign coun- 
try pursuant to  subdivision (i) of this rule. 
Id. 
270. The primary stated purposes of the 1983 amendments to Rule 4 included "taking 
the federal marshalls almost entirely out of summons service, allowing mail as a service method 
with some qualifications, and introducing for the first time a limit for serving the summons 
after the filing of the complaint." Changes in Federal Summons Service Under Amended Rlrle 
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, % F.R.D. 81, 81 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Cl~anges 
in Federal Summons Service]. The only changes of significance for the question of personal 
jurisdiction in the federal courts is the elimination of references in old Rule 4(d)(7) (new Rule 
4(c)(2)(C)(i)) to service pursuant to federal statutes, compare Rule 4(d)(7), F.R.C.P. (1963) (quoted 
supra in note 267) with Rule 4(C)(2)(C)(i) (1983) (quoted supra in note 269), and the change 
in the text of Rule 4(d)(7) which authorized service "in the manner prescribed by the law of 
the State in which the district court is held," see supra note 267, to the language "pursuant 
to  the law of the State in which the district court is held." See supra note 269. These changes 
were not addressed in the practice commentary provided by Professor Siegel, see generally Chat1ge.s 
in Federal Surnmons Service, supra at Appendix A-Congressional Record. For further discus- 
sion of this issue, see infra notes 1094-1102 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra note 270 and infra notes 1094-1102 and accompanying text. 
272. See infra notes 1094-1102 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra note 269. As noted by Professors Hart and Wechsler, this rule "tells how 
service of process is to he made upon a corporation which is subject to service, but it docs 
not tell when the corporation is so subject." H. HART AND H. WECHSLER, supra note 219, 
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federal procedure for service upon domestic or foreign corporations, 
partnerships or other unincorporated associations: "by deliver[y within 
the state in which the district court is held]. . .to any. . .agent authorized 
by appointment or by law to receive service of process. . . . 7,274 
New Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) provides an alternative federal method for 
serving 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) defendants: mailing service and an 
acknowledgment form by first class mail if "such form is received 
by the sender within 20 days after the date of mailing. . . ."275 Other 
federal means of service are authorized for service upon the United 
States (Rule 4(d)(4)), service upon an officer or agency of the United 
States (Rule 4(d)(5)), and service upon a state or municipal corpora- 
tion or other governmental organization (Rule 4(d)(6)).276 The remain- 
ing provisions for service of process involve incorporation into the 
federal rule of some procedure authorized by state rule or statute 
or by some federal statute. Under Rule 4(d)(2), for example, federal 
service upon an infant or incompetent is to be "in the manner prescribed 
by the law of the state in which service is made for service. . .upon 
any such defendant in an action brought in the courts of general 
jurisdiction of that state."277 As an alternative to the federal methods 
of service provided in Rules 4(d)(l), 4(d)(3) and 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), such 
defendants also may be served "pursuant to the law of the State 
in which the district court is held for. . .service. . .upon such defen- 
dant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of 
that state" (Rule 4(~)(2)(C)(i)).~~* The version of this subsection that 
was in effect prior to the 1983 amendments, former Rule 4(d)(7) (now 
omitted), also provided that "it is also sufficient if [service is made] 
. . .in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States" 
and described the alternative state service as "in the manner pre- 
scribed by the law of the state, e t ~ . " ~ ~ ~  The legislative history on 
these recent amendments does not shed any light on these particular 
at 959. Must the court then utilize state law to determine amenability, or  is amenability implicit 
in the grant of authority to serve process? 
274. See supra note 269. 
275. Id. One of the primary reasons for amending Rule 4 was to  enact a federal method 
for making valid service of process by mail. See Changes In Federal Summons Service, supra 
note 270, at Appendi A-Congressional Record. The changes in Rule 4 approved by the Supreme 
Court permitted service by certified mail, rzturn receipt requested. Id. This proposal was criticized 
on the grounds that certified mail is not an effective method of providing actual notice to 
defendants of claims against them because signatures may be illegible or may not match the 
name of the defendant, or because it may be difficult to  determine whether mail has been 
"unclaimed" or "refused", the letter providing the sole basis for a default judgment. Id. 
276. See supra note 269. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
279. See supra note 267. 
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changes.280 The incorporation of other federal methods of service pro- 
bably was dropped because the new federal procedure of service by 
mail was considered a sufficient federal alternative for service upon 
defendants "of any class referred to in" 4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3).28' The 
change from "in the manner prescribed by" state law to "pursuant 
to" state law is both puzzling and provocative.282 The draftsmen possibly 
intended that this change eliminate emphasis on the word "manner", 
which had been interpreted as limiting former Rule 4(d)(7) to incor- 
poration of the procedure or technique utilized by the courts of the 
state but not to incorporation of the fourteenth amendment due pro- 
cess standards by which such state service was measured.283 By chang- 
ing this language to the ambiguous phrase "pursuant to" state law, 
however, no real clarification has been achieved. Moreover, the change 
from "in the manner" to "pursuant to" has not aided in the con- 
struction of the related Rule 4(e) which, in certain circumstances, 
authorizes service "under the circumstances and in the manner prescrib- 
ed)' in a state statute or rule.z84 Rule 4(e), by employing quite dif- 
ferent language from Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), now might be interpreted to 
mean that when a federal court utilizes a state long arm statute to 
serve process on a nonpresent defendant, the federal court is not 
acting under the state statute, as if it were a state court using the 
statute, but is instead adopting only the technique and circumstances 
of such service.285 On the other hand, because of the silence of the 
280. See generally Changes Ztz Federal Summons Service, supra note 270. This v~riter has 
found no references in the legislature history or  Professor Siegel's commentary to these changes. 
281. At least, one can argue rather forcefully that the part of Rule 4(d)(7) that permitted 
utilization of available federal statutory methods for service on nonpresent defendants was 
rendered unnecessary by the adoption of a workable general federal method-service by first 
class mail. Dropping reference to other federal methods of service would seem to promote 
uniformity among the federal courts with respect to the question of techniques for making 
valid service. See Berger, supra note 191, at 286-98 (disturbing lack of uniformity among federal 
courts on the question of personal jurisdiction). 
282. Compare text of Rule 4(d)(7), supra note 267, with text of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), atpra 
note 269. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. 
283. Many courts and commentators have suggested that the language in former Rule 4(d)(7), 
permitting service "in the manner prescribed by" state law, was to be interpreted as permitting 
the federal court to adopt any technique of service used by the state in tvhich the federal court 
was held but not requiring the federal court to apply state substantive law to the question 
of amenability." See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra note 269. 
285. This might be too fine a distinction. Under prior law, by comparing the language 
in former Rule 4(d)(7) with that in Rule 4(e), see supra note 267, however, courts and com- 
mentators argued that when a federal court made service of process by using the state long-arm 
statute, the language of Rule 4(e)-"under the circumstances" (which was added to Rule 4(e) 
in the 1963 amendments)-established that the court was bound to follow not only the technical 
tenets of the statute in regard to manner of service and to the persons on whom such service 
could be made, but also was bound by any state substantive law interpreting the statute and 
by any state standards of determining whether a particular defendant would be amenable to 
suit-fourteenth amendment due process analysis. See, e.g., 4 C. WRIGHT AND A. MILLER, 
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legislative history on this question, one might argue that the change 
in language was unintentional or nonpurposive or that a similar change 
to Rule 4(e) erroneously was omitted from the amendment. The ques- 
tion of the relationship among former Rule 4(d)(7), new Rule 
4(c)(2)(C)(i), and Rule 4(e) will be reexamined in the discussion of 
amenability standards in federal question cases.286 
Rule 4(e) deals with the problem of serving "a party not an in- 
habitant of or found within the state in which the district court is 
held." This section authorizes the federal court to make service "under 
the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by" any pertinent 
federal statute providing for extraterritorial service of process.287 If 
no federal statute exists, then Rule 4(e) authorizes the federal court 
to utilize any state long-arm statute for extraterritorial service, again 
"under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by the state 
statute.2ss 
Rule 4(i) provides several methods for service in a foreign country 
and reiterates that the Rule 4(e) procedure of adopting a federal or 
state statutory procedure includes any such authorization to make ser- 
vice outside the country.289 Rule 4(f) provides that, as a general matter, 
federal process runs to the borders of the state in which the federal 
court is sitting or, in some procedural settings, outside those borders 
within a radius of 100 miles from the courthouse in which the case 
is to be heard, unless extraterritorial service is "authorized by a statute 
of the United States or by these rules."290 
While, as noted above, Rule 4 provides many different procedures 
for validly serving process on a defendant, the Rule does not deal 
expressly' with the question of amer~ability.~~' This lack of an 
amenability standard raises a number of questions, including the 
following: Does the mere fact that Rule 4 authorizes a particular type 
of service automatically subject the person or corporation thus served 
to the personal jurisdiction of the federal court? Or, must the at- 
supra note 4, 5 1075, at  312-13; Edward J. Moriarity & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 
289 F. Supp. 381, 390-92 (D. Ohio 1967) (see infra notes 1253-65 and accompanying text); 
U.S. v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). The change in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) 
to the language "pursuant to" state statute might be interpreted as demonstrating that Con- 
gress knew how to express the concept of a federal court actually acting under a state statute 
as opposed to the court merely adopting some procedural aspects of the statute. Under this 
analysis, that Congress did not amend Rule 4(e) to change "in the manner and under the cir- 
cumstances" language to the "pursuant to" language included in 4(c)(2)(C)(i) would be significant. 
286. See infra notes 893-914, 1062-73, and 1094-1102 and accompanying text. 
287. See supra note 269. 
288. Id. See also supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra note 269. 
290. Id. 
291. See supra notes 251-62 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 63 1984-1985 
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. I6 
tempted assertion of jurisdiction survive some additional test similar 
to the fourteenth amendment due process standard imposed on state 
court assertions of personal jurisdiction? And, if some standard of 
amenability must be satisfied, would that standard be the same 
regardless of the manner of service? Moreover, what tvould be the 
source of any standard or standards? Because of Congress' unwill- 
ingness to directly address the question of amenability,292 courts and 
commentators have been required to make law in this area,293 and 
the law that they have made is often nonuniform and not always 
rational in terms of the purported underpinnings of the federal court 
4. Amenability Standards in the Federal Courts 
a. The Problem 
As noted above, the Supreme Court often has expressed the opin- 
ion that Congress, consistent with the United States Constitution, could 
authorize nationwide or even worldwide service of process.295 The 
Court, however, has not dealt directly with the question of whether 
such authority also would include amenability to The argu- 
ment can be made that the. ability of Congress to authorize service 
would be useless if the service cannot meet amenability standards. 
On the other hand, however, a federal statute authorizing nationwide 
service of process might be quite appropriate in the abstract. Each 
purported exercise of personal jurisdiction pursuant to the statute might 
be examined by some standard of amenability just as state exercises 
of judicial power authorized by state long arm statutes still are 
examined to determine whether the defendant is amenable to suit. 
Would assertion of personal jurisdiction over this defendant violate 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment?297 
Commentators and courts generally have taken a number of dif- 
ferent positions and have made varying generalizations concerning the 
question of amenability to suit in federal courts. In a recent article 
proposing a shift from a "contacts" analysis to an "interest" analysis 
in state court personal jurisdiction cases, Professor McDougal noted: 
[Allthough the discussion in this Article is about the states' authority, 
it also applies, in most cases, to a federal court's authority to exer- 
292. See supra notes 205-50 and accompanying text. 
293. See infra notes 295-1355 and accompanying text. 
294. Id. See also Berger, supra note 191. at 286-98. 
295. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
296. See infra notes 400-92, 515-55, 579-86, and 637-75 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 106-85 and accompanying text. 
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cise jurisdiction over a defendant who is not a resident of the state 
in which the federal court sits.298 
Professor McDougal also noted some circumstances in which Con- 
gress had expanded federal court jurisdiction by authorizing service 
of process beyond the boundaries of the state in which the district 
court was held.299 He did not, however, distinguish between federal 
question and diversity cases, nor did he consider any standard that 
might apply in general to federal court assertions of personal jurisdic- 
tion or, at least, to those situations of expanded federal court jurisdic- 
tion. On the contrary, he implied that the fourteenth amendment 
analysis generally would be determinative in federal courts. 
In another recent article, Professor Weintraub asserted: "The outer 
limits of personal jurisdiction are marked by the due process clause 
of the fifth (federal courts) and fourteenth (state courts) amendments 
of the United States Con~t i tu t ion . "~~~  
Although failing to distinguish between diversity and federal ques- 
tion cases, Professor Weintraub raised the question whether a federal 
court using a state long-arm process also must follow state limits on 
amenability imposed when the statute was used by state courts and 
argued that a "suggestion that [the] federal court need not follow 
state limits on personal jurisdiction. . .seems very q~estionable."~~' 
He also mentioned the possibility of "a special federal statute grant- 
298. McDougal, supra note 73, at  7-8 (footnotes omitted). See also Kamp, supra note 
2, at 53-54 (stating that limitations on the jurisdictional reach of state courts also apply to 
federal courts employing the long-arm of the state court pursuant to Federal Rule 4(e) and 
suggesting, by citation of both diversity and nondiversity cases, that these limitations would 
apply to all cases in which service had been made according to the state statute). 
299. McDougal, supra note 73, at  8 1-1-49. 
300. Weintraub, Jurisdiction Over the Foreign Non-Sovereign Defendant, 19 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 431, 432 (1982). See also Comment, supra note 82, at  163 11.43 ("fifth amendment's 
due process clause should limit federal jurisdiction . . . and the fourteerlth amendment's due ' 
process clause should limit state jurisdiction. . . .); Foster, supra note 26, at  31 ("In theory, 
at  least, the due process clause of the fifth amendment, not the fourteenth, should control 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a district court"). As Professor Green observed more 
than 20 years ago: 
A great deal has been written about the personal jurisdiction of state courts and 
particularly about the applicable due process requirements. Much less has been con- 
tributed by commentators on the subject of due process requirements applying in 
personam jurisdiction of a United States district court. Perhaps the reason is the 
difficulty of finding a rationale in the pertinent decisions. These fail to  distinguish 
between the conditions necessary for valid service of federal court process as con- 
trasted with those essential to the proper service of state process. They also fail to  
explain why the constitutional provision brings about the result which they announce. 
Green, supra note 191, at  967 (footnotes omitted). From the time of his writing to the present, 
very little has changed: commentators and courts still make bald, unsupported assertions in 
regard to personal jurisdiction in federal courts, with few even making a genuine effort to 
sort out the significant questions, let alone setting about, in an organized fashion, to  resolve 
some or all of these issues. See infra note 329 and accompanying text. 
301. Weintraub, supra note 300, at 437. 
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ing jurisdiction over the defendantYfl3O2 but did not discuss standards 
in those situations. Thus, while asserting that the fifth amendment 
and the fourteenth amendment would apply in federal and state courts, 
respectively, Professor Weintraub did not define any fifth amendment 
standard nor describe when such a standard would be appropriate. 
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court touched on the 
question in a different way in Atkinson v. Superior Court,303 in which 
he employed a "center-of-gravity" test to assert jurisdiction over a 
nonresident trustee of a California employees' trust fund. In the course 
of his opinion, he argued that if federal courts were constitutionally 
entitled to nationwide service of process in some cases, state courts 
also should have such an entitlement: 
It is doubtful whether today the United States Supreme Court would 
deny to a state court the interstate interpleader jurisdiction that 
federal courts may exercise. A remedy that a federal court may pro- 
vide without violating due process of law does not become unfair 
or unjust because it is sought in a state court instead.3b4 
In this statement which displays a definite rejection of any doctrine 
requiring recognition of the separate sovereignties of separate statesY3O5 
Justice Traynor apparently recognized no distinction between "due 
process of law" as it would be applied in federal courts or state courts. 
He suggested, moreover, that limitations on states should be coexten- 
sive with those imposed on federal courts. Furthermore, like the com- 
mentators noted above, he did not distinguish between diversity and 
federal question cases. 
Professor Peterfreund recognized one aspect of the federal court 
personal jurisdiction problem: 
Unfortunately, the courts have not yet decided what the due process 
limits of federal jurisdiction are. As applied to foreign corporations, 
does the International Shoe formula, prescribing the limits of state 
jurisdiction, likewise control federal jurisdiction? Here, too, basic 
302. Id. 
303. 49 Cal.2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed sub notn. Columbia Broad- 
casting System, Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958). 
304. Id. at  348, 316 P.2d at 966. 
305. Professors James and Hazard have described such a concept of "reverse" soirereignty: 
Instead of thinking of the states as independent sovereigns between which peaceful 
relations must be maintained through the Due Process Clause, the state court systems 
taken as a whole can be conceived as the primary mechanism for adjudicating cases 
domestic to the country as a whole, other than those based on federal law. As such, 
they have not only the power but the duty to extend their process, in the form of 
notice, to all parties who should or  might be joined under modern concepts of party 
joinder. 
F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 812.30, at 661-62 (2d ed. 1977). CJ Note, Inferstale 
Jurisdicfional Compacts: A New Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 49 F O R D ~ A ~ ~  L. REV. 1097 
(1981) (suggesting expansion of the personal jurisdiction of state courts by interstate compacts). 
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considerations are different. State sovereignty is limited by its boun- 
daries, and minimum contacts with the forum state may properly 
be required under the fourteenth amendment; but for federal actions 
Congress could, consistent with the fifth amendment, provide for 
nationwide service as it has done in various special situations. The 
solutions to such problems are none too clear. . . . 306 
Since this statement was written, little or no ground has been gained 
in the establishment307 of a fifth amendment standard different from 
the standard applied in state courts under the fourteenth amendment.308 
As Professor Peterfreund sensibly noted, such a distinction seems 
justified because the positions taken by various courts are 
Professors Hart and Wechsler have asserted that state law might 
control some aspects of federal court personal jurisdiction: 
When federal service is sought to be justified. . .by reference to 
state law, it is clear, is it not, that the limitations of state law are 
controlling?. . .By the same token, federal constitutional limitations 
upon the acquisition of jurisdiction by state courts may also be con- 
sidered relevant, not because they apply directly to federal courts, 
but because federal consequences cannot properly be attached to an 
unconstitutional state 
They noted, however, that "[tlhe cases. . .seem largely to have pro- 
ceeded on the assumption that state law, and the due process restric- 
tions on acquisition of jurisdiction by state courts, are controlling 
upon the federal district courts in all  situation^."^" Finally, they sug- 
gested that uniform federal standards might be appropriate in all cases 
in federal courts or, at least, in federal question 
306. Peterfreund, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 491, 499 (1957) 
(footnotes omitted). this position assumes that state courts are restricted by notions of sovereignty 
and would not be entitled, as federal courts could be, to national service of process. This 
is contrary to the position taken by Justice Traynor. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying 
text. 
307. See infra notes 329-1255 and accompanying text. Some commentators and courts have, 
implicitly or explicitly, taken the position that the due process clauses are coterminus. See, 
e.g., supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text and infra notes 739-47, 823-38, and 866-71 
and accompanying text. Others have argued that while some distinction should exist, four- 
teenth amendment standards would be more strict than fifth amendment standards and since 
the case in point satisfied fourteenth amendment standards no fifth amendment test needed 
to be formulated therein. See, e.g., infra notes 969-71, 1199-1200, and 1209-10 and accom- 
panying text. Finally, others have urged that different standards apply to state and federal 
courts, but then have failed to formulate any such standards. See, e.g., infra notes 834-38 
and 920-28 and accompanying text. 
308. See infra notes 329-1355 and accompanying text. See also supra note 300. 
309. Id. 
310. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 219, at 959. 
311. Id. at 960. 
312. Id. 
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Professors Wright and Miller recognized many of the distinctions 
that are important for the question of personal jurisdiction in the 
federal courts: 
As a general rule the broad principles [applying to state courts] apply 
with equal force to the United States district courts in the absence 
of a federal statute extending or contracting the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. An interesting issue. . .is whether in the absence of 
an applicable federal statute a federal court is limited by and is 
obliged to follow the particular jurisdictional principles of the state 
in which it sits or whether it is free to develop a federal test of 
amenability to suit. . . . The law is quite clear that when suit is 
brought in a federal court on a federally created right, the terms 
of any applicable federal statute, general federal law, and the con- 
cepts of due process. . .provide the guidelines as to whether a foreign 
corporation is amenable to process. However, if the right sued on 
is state-created and subject matter jurisdiction rests on diversity of 
citizenship, the question becomes more complex. When the federal 
court is sitting in a state that has extended its jurisdictional reach 
to or near the limits permitted by the Constitution, it probably makes 
little difference whether state or federal law controls, since the two 
will be virtually identical. . .[T]he states are not required to assert 
jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause if 
they do not choose to do so. Thus, when suit is brought in a federal 
court sitting in a state that has decided to stop short of the con- 
stitutional limits, the question whether a federal court is at liberty 
to go further than the state standard would permit a state court 
to go in exercising jurisdiction is a matter of somewhat greater 
~ignificance.~'~ 
This statement falls far short, however, of distinguishing all signifi- 
cant issues. First, the writers assume that the due process clauses are 
coextensive and that any territorial limitation to be recognized when 
a .federal court relies on state methods of service would be that of 
the state in which the federal court is held. Second, they maintain 
that the "law is quite clear" with regard to federal rights, with "ap- 
plicable federal statute[s], general federal law, and the concepts of 
due process" providing amenability  guideline^.^'^ This assertion fails 
to recognize that most applicable federal statutes are silent on the 
issue of amenability, providing only for service of process beyond 
the borders of the state in which the federal court is ~itt ing.~" This 
313. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 4, $1075, at 302-04 (footnotes omitted). 
314. The cases cited for this proposition support an assertion that some federal standard 
should apply, but the perimeters and parameters of that standard are not established in those 
cases. 
315. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text. 
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gives rise to a conflict as to whether amenability is implicit if process 
can be served on the defendant or whether an amenability standard 
also must be satisfied.316 Third, little, if any, "general federal law" 
seems to exist on the question of amenability, which hardly is startling 
considering the nonchalant and haphazard way in which Congress and, 
by necessity, the courts, have dealt with all aspects of federal court 
juri~diction.~" Reliance on "the copcepts of due process," moreover, 
begs the question of whether these concepts are the same when ap- 
plied in federal courts as they are when applied in state courts. Finally, 
while Professors Wright and Miller recognize that diversity cases might 
be treated differently from nondiversity cases, these writers neglect 
to distinguish between those diversity cases in which service is achieved 
pursuant to some state long-arm statute and those in which service 
is made pursuant to a federal procedure. 
Professor Wright, in his treatise on the federal courts, has recently 
taken the following position:318 
The due process limitations on the amenability of a foreign cor- 
poration to suit within a state are not peculiarly, nor even 
particularly, a problem for the federal courts. . . . 
There is an aspect of the problem, however, that is peculiar to 
the federal courts. The principles discussed so far [-procedure for 
service of process under Rule 4,319 presence and/or domicile in a 
state as a basis for state court personal jurisdiction and for federal 
court jurisdiction "if the procedure for service satisfies due process 
requirements by providing a means reasonably calculated to give him 
notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard,"320 and 
the development of limitations on state court assertions of jurisdic- 
tion over foreign  corporation^'^'-] represent federal constitutional 
limitations. If suit in federal court is on a federally-created right, 
these federal general law concepts are the sole guide as to whether 
a foreign corporation is amenable to process.322 The matter is not 
so simple, however, where the right sued on is state-created and 
jurisdiction rests on diversity. The landmark jurisdictional decisions 
of the Supreme Court show the extent to which the states may go, 
316. See infra notes 561-798 and accompanying text. 
317. See supra notes 205-50 and accompanying text. 
318. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS $64, at 419-20 (1983) (footnotes omitted). 
319. Id. at 411-15. 
320. Id. at 415. 
321. Id. at 417-19. 
322. Many other commentators have made similar bald, unsupported assertions. See infra 
note 329. Courts also have followed the procedure of "pronouncing" the law to be as described 
by Professor Wright. See, e.g., Singleton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 20 F.R.D. 15, 17 
(1956) (dictum: "It seems clear that, where a federally-created right is being asserted in a federal 
court, federal law governs whether a foreign corporation is doing business within the district 
in which that federal court is sitting."). See also infra note 497. 
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consistent with due process, in making foreign corporations suable 
in their courts, but due process does not compel the states to go 
this far if they do not choose to do so. If a corporation cannot 
be sued in state court, because the state has not gone as far as the 
Constitution permits, is it consistent with the Erie doctrine for a 
federal court to entertain a diversity action against the corporation 
in that state? 
While Professor Wright recognizes a possible distinction between diver- 
sity and federal question cases, he fails to address any possible dif- 
ficulties with federal question cases, assuming both that a federal stan- 
dard would apply and that a federal standard does exist. Contrary 
to his assertion that he had discussed "federal general law concepts" 
which "represent federal constitutional limitations," Professor Wright 
merely addressed cases involving limitations on state court assertions 
of personal jurisdiction and Federal Rule 4 procedures for serving 
He therefore never reached the significant and troubling 
issue of the definition of a truly federal standard. Moreover, he failed 
to recognize that methods of serving process, whether state or federal, 
might affect the personal jurisdiction of the federal court in question.324 
Instead, he separated federal question cases from diversity cases, pro- 
nouncing personal jurisdiction in federal question cases a purely federal 
323. One might argue that implicit in his analysis is the assumption that Rule 4 includes 
federal amenability standards as well as procedures for service of process. This simplistic and 
conclusory approach, however, obscures the difficult issue involved and creates the false im- 
pression that some well-defined federal standard has been established. An examination of the 
cases cited in support of Professor Wright's assertion that "federal general law concepts are 
the sure guide" of amenability in federal question cases reveals that the question was anything 
but settled. See Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry, 397 F.2d'l (2d Cir. 1968) (disc~rssed itflra 
at  notes 823-33 and accompanying text), and Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & 0. 
R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954) (discussed infra at notes 856-65 and accompanying test). 
324. Often in federal question cases no special federal statute authorizes extraterritorial 
service of process, and process must be served, pursuant to Rule 4(e), "under the circumstances 
and in the manner prescribed" in a statute or rule of the state in which the court is held. 
See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1915) (Rule 4(e) applies to 
federal question as well as diversity cases); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 
216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (same). Did Professor Wright include these as cases in which "federal 
general law concepts [would be] the sole guide?" Of course, one might argue that Rule 4(e) 
has "absorbed" or "incorporated" the state statute into federal law and that, therefore, the 
state statute, with or without its various substantive interpretations, has become part of "federal 
general law." Professor Wright, however, does not raise such a possibility. This question does 
not arise too frequently because of the substantial limitations, under 28 U.S.C. §1391(b), on 
venue in federal question cases. Moreover, in some diversity cases, service of process is achieved 
by wholly federal means such as service upon an individual "by leaving copies . . . at his 
dwelling house or usual place df abode" (FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (d)(l)) or upon a corporation 
"by delivering a copy . . . to an officer" of the corporation (FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(3)) or upon 
either "by mailing a copy . . . to the person to be served, together with two copies of a 
notice and acknowledgement." (FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)). Should the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by a federal court be limited to those exercises granted by state legislatures to state 
courts of the state in which the federal court is held even though no state statute for service 
of process had been utilized? Again, Professor Wright did not address this distinction. 
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matter of simple solution and personal jurisdiction in diversity cases 
"not so simple." 
Finally, in an  article written almost twenty years ago, Professors 
von Mehren and Trautman commented:325 
We do not deal separately with problems of adjudicatory jurisdic- 
tion in the federal courts of the United States, but nothing in the 
situation of these courts renders our analysis inapplicable in princi- 
ple to them. The analysis does not take into account the perplexities 
and the opportunities that derive from the ambiguous situation of 
our federal courts which, in one aspect, function as parts of a unitary 
legal system but, in another, are fragmented and function as organs 
of the distinct legal orders of the several states. Insofar as the federal 
judiciary functions as a unitary system, the problem of adjudicatory 
jurisdiction disappears internally, and determination of the place of 
trial might well be handled administratively. . . .326 At least with 
respect to diversity jurisdiction, however, it is hard to imagine such 
a development within the foreseeable future. Instead, the federal 
system is likely to continue to combine elements of unity and 
diversity. 
They continued: 
In any event, in enforcement of claims arising under federal law, 
there is little reason for a federal court to refuse to proceed merely 
because the courts of the state in which it is sitting would not claim 
jurisdiction. 
Perhaps because of a traditional reluctance to prescribe federal 
standards in the case of diversity litigation as well as an instinct 
for symmetry, federal law does not today directly prescribe general 
and comprehensive jurisdictional regulations for the federal courts 
in either type of litigation. Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. . .applies without distinction to federal-question and diver- 
sity litigation. The rule provides for the use of federal jurisdictional 
standards to the extent these are furnished by "a statute of the United 
States." The rule further adopts jurisdictional provisions contained 
in "statute[s] or rule[s] of court of the state in which the district 
court is held. . . . 9 ,  
This approach incorporating state jurisdictional provisions is fully 
understandable for diversity cases. . . .In the absence of a complete 
jurisdictional scheme provided by a federal statute, the approach also 
seems clearly necessary and proper for federal question cases. . . 
.Rule 4(e)'s incorporative approach can, however, produce perplex- 
ities when federal claims are to be litigated. The difficulties derive 
325. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1123. 
326. As observed by Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in U.S. v. First Nat'l City 
Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 387-88 (1964), "But 'jurisdiction' is not synonymous with naked power. 
It is a combination of power and policy." 
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from the fact that any given state necessarily views the jurisdictional 
problem from the perspective of its community, but, insofar as 
federal-law questions are concerned, the appropriate community may 
become the nation as a whole. Jurisdiction to adjudicate may well 
be properly assumed from the latter perspective though refused from 
the former.327 
Professors von Mehren and Trautman discussed a federal question 
case in which the defendant's connectibns with the entire United States 
were far more significant, for the federal claim, than its connections 
with the state under whose long-arm statute service had been made. 
They continued: 
Perhaps it would be useful when state provisions are used, as it 
were by default, in the enforcement of federal claims, to recognize 
that some aspects of the state law can be disregarded. . . .That clearly 
should occur with restrictions in the state-law provisions that are 
irrelevant in the federal context. . . . 328 
These statements reveal a clear understanding of some of the prob- 
lems of personal jurisdiction in federal courts, recognizing possible 
distinctions between federal question and diversity cases and between 
state and federal court assertions of personal jurisdiction. Although 
the authors suggest the inappropriateness of employing a state 
amenability standard in federal courts in some circumstances, they 
do not, nor do they intend to, address the issue of exactly what federal 
standard would be sufficient. They nevertheless clearly recognize signifi- 
cant distinctions between state and federal courts and the ways in 
which those distinctions might affect the analysis of personal jurisdic- 
tion questions. 
b. The Fiffh Amendment 
Most courts and commentators generally agree that federal courts 
are limited in their assertions of personal jurisdiction by the fifth 
amendment due process clause of the Constitution and that state courts 
are subject to fourteenth amendment  proscription^.^^^ Almost no one, 
327. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 2, at 1123-24 n.6. 
328. Id. at  1125 n.6. 
329. Commentators: See, e.g., Green, supra note 191, at 968 (quoting (Tent. Draft No. 
3 1956) Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws $38: "The rendition of a judgment by 
a federal court when the United States has no judicial jurisdiction is a violation of the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution; similar action on the part of tlie 
state violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Weintraub, supra note 
300, at 432 ("The outer limits of personal jurisdiction are marked by the due process clauses 
of the fifth (federal courts) and fourteenth (state courts) amendments of the United States 
Constitution")); Note, Federal Jurisdiction Over Out Foreign Corporations, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
591, 598-99 (1935) ("filurisdiction of a particular district court over foreign corporations may 
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however, seems to be able to enunciate a fifth amendment standard.330 
The assumption is that the limitation would be less restrictive than 
that on state because state territorial boundaries should be 
less significant in a federal context than in a state context.332 Finding 
become flexible in the hands of Congress [but] there are . . . intimations that this power is 
restricted by the Fifth Amendment"); Note, supra note 261, at  516-17 ("Whereas inconve- 
nience may be relevant in determining whether the territorial power of a state has been exceed- 
ed, it can only be a fifth amendment criterion, applicable to the federal courts, if there is 
some limit to arbitrary assignment of jurisdiction within a single national sovereignity"). See 
also Abraham, supra note 217, at  531 ("Aside from Erie, another possible source of constitu- 
tional limitations upon the territorial reach of federal process is the due process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment"); Victor & Good, Personal Jurisdiction, Venue and Service of Process in 
Antitrust Cases Involving International Trade: Amenability of Alien Corporations to Suit, 
46 ANTITRUST L.J. 1063, 1076 (1977) ("In federal question cases, such as those under the an- 
titrust laws, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment technically controls") Comment, 
National Contacts, supra note 186, at  697-98 ("The due process clause of the fifth amendment 
represents the only constraint upon a federal court's in personam power where the claim arises 
under federal law"); Comment, Choice of Law, supra note 267, at  355 n.18 ("One possible 
explanation for the deference given to International Shoe by the [federal] courts . . . is that 
the constitutional proscriptions set forth there may be binding on the federal courts under the 
fifth amendment due process clause"); Note, The Limits of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Under 
Rule 4(fl of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 268, 296-97 (1979) 
("Fifth amendment due process limitations on personal jurisdiction of the federal courts im- 
port the same considerations of fairness as those applicable to the states by virtue of the four- 
teenth amendment [hereinafter cited as Note, Limits of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction]); Note, 
supra note 261, at  516 ("it can only be a fifth amendment criterion, applicable to the federal 
courts"); 10 SETON HALL L. REV. 699, 717 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Jurisdiction] 
("Although it is clear that Congress has extensive power in designing the federal judicial system, 
it is not clear what exact limitations the due process clause of the fifth amendment place on 
the exercise of that power"); Comment, Return to the Twilight Zone, supra note 267, at  697 
("The due process considerations controlling on the federal courts are those found in the fifth 
amendment"). Courts: See infra note 497 and accompanying text. But see Insurance Corp. 
of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). In Insurance 
Corp. of Ireland, a diversity case, the Supreme Court failed or  refused to distinguish between 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments, stating: "The requirement that a court have personal 
jurisdiction flows not from Art. 111, but from the Due Process Clause." Id. 
330. As one recent commentator noted: 
Given [the] distinction between the constitutional due process authority of state and 
federal courts to exert personal jurisdiction, the question remains what due process 
standard is to govern federal courts' power. In the context of state in personam jurisdic- 
tion, the International Shoe minimum contacts doctrine has evolved as the standard 
by which fourteenth amendment due process is to  be measured. No comparable due 
process doctrine has been unequivocally developed for implementation of the fifth 
amendment's constraints on the federal courts, presumably because Congress generally 
has not structured the federal judicial power in a manner that would allow federal 
court assertion of personal jurisdiction to the nationwide limits permitted by the 
Constitution. 
Comment, Return to the Twilight Zone, supra note 267, at  699. Professor Berger describes 
some of the different judicial approaches to this question: 
Some federal courts duplicate the state court fourteenth amendment due process 
analysis. Others purport to  apply a fifth amendment due process test, while in reality 
applying fourteenth amendment standards. Still others apply a fifth amendment test, 
examining the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the United States. Although 
federal courts all espouse one of those three approaches, several courts actually rely 
on federal venue or  transfer of venue statutes to ensure fairness to a defendant. 
Berger, supra note 191, a t  310-11 (footnotes omitted). 
331. See, e.g., infra notes 969-71, 1199-1200 and 1209-10 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
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that federal limitations should be "looser" than those on the states, 
courts and commentators often fall back on the state standard, argu- 
ing that .if a particular assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies the 
fourteenth amendment, or the even more restrictive grant of personal 
jurisdiction by the states to their courts, the fifth amendment also 
must be satisfied.333 Clearly, such "definition by overincl~sion'~ has 
not helped resolve the question of an appropriate, workable fifth 
amendment standard. 
In seeking to define a fifth amendment limitation, others have at- 
tempted to parallel the test developed for fourteenth amendment due 
process limitations on state courts.334 An immediate problem in any 
consideration arises, however, because earlier limitations on state courts 
were purely territorial in nature, allowing states to assert jurisdiction 
over anybody or anything within their borders. People or things out- 
side state borders were off-limits to the early state court.335 To truly 
parallel the development of the fourteenth amendment standard, a 
territorial limitation of federal courts first must be defined. As sug- 
gested by Professor Barrett:336 
Gn the one hand, [Congress] might have treated the continental United 
States as a single jurisdiction. On this basis service of process would 
have been permitted throughout the United States. . . .On the other 
hand, Congress might have treated the individual federal districts as 
independent states. On this basis service of process would have been 
restricted to the district in which suit was brought. . . . 337 
The Judiciary Act of 1789,338 as adopted the second alter- 
333. See, e.g., infra notes 969-71, 1199-1200, and 1209-10 and accompanying text. 
334. See, e.g., infra notes 683-784 and accompanying text. 
335. See supra notes 4 and 76 and accompanying text. As noted by one early writer, reliance 
on any territorial notions may be wholly inappropriate: "The power of state courts is limited 
by territorial sovereignty; the distribution of power among the federal district courts, however, 
is derived from the will of Congress." Note, supra note 261, at 509. 
336. Barrett, supra note 235, at  608. 
337. As to venue, Professor Barrett argued that, under the first alternative, "venue rules 
would have been designed to channel litigation into the most convenient district, and provision 
would have been made for a motion for change of venue to be granted wherein the suit was 
commenced in a district which did not have venue," while, under the second alternative, "venue 
of transitory actions would have been made proper in any district in which the defendant could 
be found for service of process." Barrett, supra note 235, at 608. 
338. See supra notes 205-22 and accompanying text. 
339. See, e.g., Ex parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5657). In 
Graham, Mr. Justice Washington commented: 
The absence of . . . power [to issue process outside the district], would seem necessarily 
to result from the organization of the courts of the United States. . . . This division 
and appointment of particular courts, for each district, necessarily confines the jurisdic- 
tion of the local tribunals, within the bounds of the respective districts, within which 
they are directed to be holden. 
Id. at  912. See also Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.E.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134) 
(effectiveness of writ limited to  judicial district because of "organization" of the federal court 
system). 
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native by treating the judicial districts as separate  jurisdiction^.^^^ This 
choice clearly limited the personal jurisdiction of federal courts even 
more substantially than did similar limitations on state courts; often, 
federal judicial districts were smaller than the states in which the federal 
district courts sat.34' With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1938, the authority of federal courts to serve process 
was extended to the boundaries of the states in which the federal 
district courts were situated.3J2 Therefore, the territorial reach of a 
federal court in 1938 was coextensive with that of the courts of the 
state in which it sat, and, in any analysis based on paralleling develop- 
ment of fourteenth amendment standards, the parallel lines 
converged.343 Meanwhile, however, Congress had authorized federal 
courts to serve process extraterritorially in certain limited 
circumstances344 and to exceed territorial boundaries when necessary 
to resolve some multiple party problems.345 Apparently, therefore, the 
fifth amendment does not impose territorial limits other than, perhaps, 
the boundaries of the United States, on the federal courts; otherwise, 
Congress would have exceeded those limits in enacting the aforemen- 
tioned statutes. 
The inference cannot be made, however, that the fifth amendment 
imposes no limitations on federal court exercises of personal jurisdic- 
tion. At least one commentator maintains, for example, that nation- 
wide service of process for federal courts in all circumstances might 
not go unchallenged; that is, present Congressional authorizations of 
nationwide service of process have not been seriously challenged 
because the statutes have been very narrowly drawn.346 This reason- 
ing, in turn, ties in with the goal of "reasonableness" that has been 
pursued so fervently in the development of fourteenth amendment 
due process standards.347 
Others have sought to parallel fourteenth amendment analysis by 
applying a "minimum contacts" test to determine the reasonableness 
340. Foster, supra note 26 at 9; Note, supra note 188, at  1143. See Philadelphia & Reading 
Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917). 
341. See Foster, supra note 26, at  9. 
342. See infra note 363 and accompanying text. Thus, federal process was still generally 
limited by state lines. 
343. As one commentator noted: "Thus in a sense the federal courts have remained local 
courts, and a jurisdictional standard such as International Shoe evolved for the territorially 
limited jurisdiction of the state, is not without relevance for the federal courts." Note, supra 
note 188, at  1144. 
344. See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text. 
345. 28 U.S.C. $2361 (1976) (Interpleader); 28 U.S.C. $1695 (1976) (Shareholder's deriva- 
tion suits); 49 U.S.C. $11705(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (Interstate Commerce Commissions Act). 
346. Foster, supra note 26, at  37. 
347. See supra notes 106-85 and accompanying text. 
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a 
of an assertion of jurisdiction by a federal court over a particular 
defendant.348 In turn, this leads back to the question of territoriality. 
If a defendant's contacts are to be examined in order to determine 
whether they are sufficient to satisfy a "minimum contacts" analysis, 
the territorial entity with which the defendant's contacts are to be 
measured must be identified. In some recent cases,349 particularly those 
in which process was served according to a federal statute authoriz- 
ing nationwide service of process,350 the territorial entity-the 
sovereign-has been defined as the United States, with the defendant's 
contacts with the country as a whole being examined for suffi~iency."~ 
In sum, those commentators and courts that actually have attempted 
to describe or define some Fifth Amendment standard of due process 
usually have argued: (1) that Congress can authorize nationwide ser- 
vice of process, and (2) where Congress has done so, the defendant's 
contacts with the United States should be examined under a minimum 
contacts analysis. This solution, however, falls short of resolving the 
entire fifth amendment question. First, one might argue that such 
reliance on notions of territoriality would be misplaced. Instead of 
rotely following the fourteenth amendment minimum contacts test into 
a larger jurisdiction, some argue that, "[iln the context of the fifth 
amendment,. . .due process should limit the exercise of federal in 
personam jurisdiction to what is fair and reas~nable.""~ Aggrega- 
tion of a defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole, 
moreover, might not be "fair and reasonable," especially since a defen- 
dant would be amenable to suit in every federal district which could 
serve him with process, no matter how inconveniently located, if he 
had sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.353 As noted 
below, any unfairness in this regard could be eliminated by limita- 
348. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1966) ("the constitu- 
tional limitation upon service of process from a state court . . . provides a helpful and often- 
used guideline"). 
349. See infra cases discussed at notes 687-738, 872-87, and 1269-1316. 
350. See infra cases discussed at notes 687-738. 
35 1. See, e-g., Note, Limits of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 329, at 297 ("due 
process requires minimum contacts with the territory of the sovereign exercising judicial power 
[, and w]hen process is served pursuant to the bulge provision of Rule 4(f), the sovereign exer- 
cising judicial power, even in a diversity case, is the United States") (footnotes omitted); Com- 
ment, Return to the Twilight Zone, supra note 267, at 699-700 ("In the few cases that have 
addressed a standard of fifth amendment due process constraints on the federal courts, the 
majority of lower federal courts have analogized to the International Shoe fourteenth amend- 
ment minimum contacts doctrine and held that a federal court can assert personal jurisdiction 
over a party if that party is present within the territorial limits of the United States or has 
a sufficient nexus (i.e. minimum contacts) with the United States"). 
352. Note, Jurisdiction, supra note 329, at  718. See Foster, supra note 26, at 36; Oxford 
First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-201 (1974) (appropriate test of 
fifth amendment due process should be based on fundamental fairness to the defendant). 
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tions on the location of triala3'" One writer has suggested a modifica- 
tion of the "national minimum contacts" test which might be more 
fair to  defendant^:^^' 
Defining [the fifth amendment] standard in the realities of the federal 
system should not. . .result in the same test which has been 
established for the exercise of state court jurisdiction-minimum con- 
tacts. On the other hand, the fair and reasonable standard in the 
federal context should not be satisfied solely by the procedural due 
process requirement of notice. While notice should be one of the 
factors considered, other factors worthy of consideration are: (1) 
the defendant's contacts with the forum; (2) the inconvenience to 
the defendant resulting from distant litigation; (3) the likelihood of 
multiplicious litigation; (4) the probable situs of discovery; and, (5) 
the nature of the activity upon which the litigation is based, especially 
in regard to the scope of the activity outside of the particular 
forum.3S6 
A second problem with the "national minimum contacts" test as 
a measure of fifth amendment due process requirements is that it might 
be limited to cases in which a defendant had been served with pro- 
cess pursuant to some federal statute authorizing nationwide service.357 
The test most aptly parallels the fourteenth amendment test in only 
those circumstances. If that were the result, it is clear that the goal 
of devising a single fifth amendment amenability standard would not 
be achieved. 
Efforts to define a workable fifth amendment test for federal court 
exercises of personal jurisdiction have been far from satisfactory. This 
353. The only amenability standard would be "presence where served." 
354. See infra notes 657, 693, 880-82, and 1086 and accompanying text. 
355. Note, Jurisdiction, supra note 329, at  718-19 (footnotes omitted). 
356. One commentator has recently proposed as a federal amenability standard the defen- 
dant's presence in the jurisdiction in which valid process is served pursuant to one of the methods 
available to a federal court. See Berger, supra note 191. Professor Berger's suggestion deals 
rather neatly with the difficulties of rationalizing federal cases involving all of the myriad methods 
for service of process available to federal courts. The amenability standard moreover, could 
be employed in diversity as well as federal question cases because the test is completely in- 
dependent of the grounds on which the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court is based 
and the means by which service is made. While proposing a plan which would go a long way 
toward making order out of the federal court personal jurisdiction chaos which she so aptly 
describes in her article, Professor Berger does not address the question of a fifth amendment 
due process standard. See Berger, supra at  286-98. If such standard is based, in part, on fairness 
or reasonableness to the defendant, her proposal completely ignores these issues, for what she 
suggests really eliminates any requirement of a separate evaluation of amenability; personal 
jurisdiction would exist whenever the defendant could be validly served. Using "presence" as 
an amenability standard would really be redundant with the requirement that the defendant 
be served; the bottom line of such a proposal would be that implicit in the authority of a 
federal court to serve process is the authority to assert personal jurisdiction over the person 
so served. 
357. See infra notes 687-738 and accompanying text. 
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is understandable in the context of the following circumstances: (1) 
Congress has expended little concentrated, organized effort in defin- 
ing the personal jurisdiction of federal courts;35s (2) no federal statute 
comparable to state long-arm statutes exists;359 (3) federal statutes that 
specifically authorize extraterritorial service of process usually cover 
only service of process and do not include any affirmative grant of 
personal jurisdiction authority to accompany proper service of pro- 
cess, nor do these statutes refer, in any way, to amenabi1ity;"O (4) 
the only federal rule dealing with personal jurisdiction speaks 
specifically to service of process alone and, like the statutes, does 
not include any affirmative grant of personal jurisdiction authority 
to accompany proper service of process nor does it refer, in any way, 
to amenabi l i t~ ;~~ '  (5) the methods of service of process available to 
a federal court under Rule 4 include both purely federal methods and 
state methods; depending, therefore, on interpretation of Rule 4 and 
the subsection of Rule 4 under which service is made, the service 
methods, including any due process limitations imposed on state courts 
utilizing the same statutes, either are incorporated into federal law 
or merely provide the technique for achieving service of process with 
amenability to be determined in an independent federal analysis;3G2 
(6) the Supreme Court, in its majority opinion in a recent diversity 
case, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
G ~ i n e e , ~ ~ ~  refused to distinguish between the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments or discuss the appropriate amenability standard in this 
diversity case involving service pursuant to a state long arm statute 
in which the District Court, in response to repeated failures of the 
defendants to comply with discovery orders in regard to jurisdictional 
facts, sanctioned the defendants by assuming such facts. The Supreme 
Court referred throughout its opinion to "the Due Process Clause"364 
and cited International Shoe,365 a case establishing a fourteenth amend- 
ment due process standard for state courts.366 
Obviously, a workable and theoretically sound fifth amendment stan- 
dard can be devised only after careful consideration of all of the dif- 
ferent contexts in which federal courts are called upon to assert per- 
See supra notes 205-50 a?d accompanying text. 
See supra notes 246-50 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 273-94 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 267. 
456 U.S. 694 (1982). See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 329. 
456 U.S. at 703. 
See supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 78 1984-1985 
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
sonal jurisdiction. The examination of these contexts begins with diver- 
sity cases. 
c. Federal Court Cases 
When Professor Green suggested that federal court personal jurisdic- 
tion should be measured by a standard different from state court per- 
sonal jurisdicti01-1,~~~ the courts were still divided on the question of 
amenability standards in diversity cases.368 Professor Green thought 
the federal courts should be judged according to the fifth amendment369 
which, in his analysis, required only that a particular corporate defen- 
dant have sufficient contacts with the United States in order that asser- 
tion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant be constitutionally 
permissible.370 Professor Green therefore could analyze all federal court 
367. Green, supra note 191, at 967-68. As an earlier commentator observed, "In the absence 
of congressional guidance [on the issue of amenability], the federal courts have traditionally 
held that the constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of state courts are relevant to the standard 
for federal jurisdiction." Note, supra note 261, at  508. Many federal courts accepted the Inter- 
national Shoe formula as applicable to questions of federal court personal jurisdiction. See 
supra notes 106-85 and accompanying text. Diversity cases: See, e.g.. Latimer v. S&A Industries 
Reunidas F. Matarauo, 175 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 823 (1958); Back v. 
Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 167 F.2d 679 (6th Cir. 1948), Clover Leaf Freight Lines, Inc. 
v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass'n., 166 F.2d 626 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948); 
Hanley Co. v. Buffalo Forge Co., 89 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Smith v. Hall, 79 F. 
Supp. 473 (N.D. Tex. 1948). Federal question cases: Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore 
& O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954) (Carmack Amendment); Consolidated Cosmetics v. 
D-A Pub. Co., 186 F.2d 906 (7th Cir. 1951) (trademark action); Winkler-Koch Eng'g Co. v. 
Universal Oil Prods. Co., 70 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (antitrust action). This enthusiastic 
adoption of a standard developed in a state court context might be explained by the lack of 
any congressional or judicial direction to federal courts to develop different standards. See 
infra notes 476-77 and accompanying text. While International Shoe was not binding precedent 
on federal courts, it did provide a jurisdictional formula which had been developed and ap- 
proved by the Supreme Court. 
368. As Professor Green observed in a footnote, as of the date of publication of his arti- 
cle, "[tlhe lower courts [were] in conflict as to whether state law determines what constitutes 
doing business." Green, supra note 191, at 980 11.86. This was really a question of whether 
state or federal law would govern amenability in diversity cases in which process had been 
served pursuant to a state long-arm statute which required that the defendant be "doing business" 
in the state in order to be amenable to suit. 
369. Green, supra note 191, at 968. 
370. Green, supra note 191, at  969-70. Professor Green argued: 
The principle laid down in the International Shoe case . . . when applied to the 
service of federal process in the light of the fifth amendment appears to require only 
that the defendant have contacts of the described character with some part of the 
United States. 
Id. at 970. In another line of reasoning, he concluded: 
If due process does not require presence in the state where suit is brought nor in 
the state where service is made as a basis for personal jurisdiction of a state court 
it certainly does not for a national court. What it requires for service of a summons 
from a federal court are sufficient contacts with the territory of the United States. 
Id. at  972. Professor Green is usually credited as the progenitor of the "National Contacts" 
or  the "Aggregate Contacts" test or  theory of federal court personal jurisdiction, a theory 
"under which a defendant's contacts throughout the United States are considered in the analysis 
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personal jurisdiction cases together, arguing that "[tlhe Supreme Court 
has never said that the Erie doctrine affects the in personam jurisdic- 
tion of the district Many subsequent cases have addressed 
the particular question of personal jurisdiction in diversity cases as 
a distinct issue."* More recent commentators have focused either on 
personal jurisdiction in diversity cases373 or on personal jurisdiction 
in federal question cases.374 While many basic principles may overlap, 
therefore, the discussion must be divided according to the grounds 
for subject matter jurisdiction in the particular case. The treatment 
of diversity jurisdiction necessarily will be brief because it is produc- 
ed here more for historical than for analytical purposes. Wherever 
possible, particular issues such as service of process pursuant to par- 
ticular provisions of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the amenability standards appropriate in each of those cases will 
be addressed in the discussion of federal question cases,37s even though 
such procedures for service of process also might be followed in diver- 
sity cases. Many of the same issues, however, are significant in the 
context of diversity cases in which service of process is achieved in 
some manner other than pursuant to the long-arm statute of the state 
in which the federal court is situated. 
i. Diversity Cases 
Diversity cases are those cases in which federal subject matter 
jurisdiction is based under 28 U.S.C. 5 1332 on the diversity of citizen- 
ship of the parties to the This discussion is concerned only 
with those cases in which there exists no other ground for the federal 
court assertion of subject matter juri~diction.~'~ 
A primary reason for conferring diversity jurisdiction on the federal 
courts was to protect, in suits involving citizens of different states, 
against "home court advantage," or local prejudice against 
of personal jurisdiction." Note, supra note 21, at 470. See Comment, National Contacts, supra 
note 186; Comment, Fqth Amendment, supra note 186. See also Berger, supra note 191. 
371. Green, supra note 191, at 980. 
372. See infra notes 434-92 and accompanying tezt. 
373. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 26; Comment, supra note 214; Note, Diversity Jurisdic- 
tion of the Foreign Courts over Foreign Corporations, 49 IOWA L. REV. 1224 (1964); Note, 
supra note 188; Comment, supra note 246. 
374. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191; Note, supra note 21; Note, Fifrh Amendment, supra 
note 186; Comment, National Contacts, supra note 186. 
375. See infra notes 561-1355 and accompanying text. 
376. See supra note 18. 
377. Those cases involving more than one ground of federal subject matter jurisdiction 
necessarily will involve a federal question, either under 28 U.S.C. 5 1331, or under some special 
federal jurisdictional statute. See supra note 19. 
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nonresident.37s Thus, if plaintiff (P), a citizen of State A, sued defen- 
dant (D), a citizen of state B in state B because P could only get 
personal jurisdiction over D in B, P might be prejudiced by the hostility 
of the B judge and jury to an A-ite. Contrariwise, if P was able to 
bring suit against D in A, D might be prejudiced by the hostility 
of the A judge and jury to a B-ite. To protect against potential in- 
justices, federal courts were created as a neutral alternative. If P could 
get personal jurisdiction over D only in By P could institute suit in 
the federal district court held in B.379 If, on the other hand, P could 
and did get personal jurisdiction over D in A and instituted suit in 
the A courts, D could remove the action to the federal district court held 
in A.380 Of course, diversity jurisdiction also applied if P brought suit 
378. See Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599 (1856); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); Bank of the United States v. Deveaus, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 
61, 87 (1809); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc. 688 F.2d 328, 330 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982); Aerojet- 
General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 716 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 968 (1975). 
See also Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 407, 409 (1956); 
Yntema & Jaffin, Preliminary Anabsis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 869, 
880 (1931). 
379. This assertion entails the assumption that, if personal jurisdiction can be obtained 
over D by a B court, a federal district court sitting in B could also obtain personal jurisdiction 
over D. This assumption is really not at issue: if D is present in state B when served with 
state process, Rule 4(d)(l) would authorize federal service on D by delivery to D of a summons 
issued by the federal court sitting in B; if D is not present, service by B courts would be 
pursuant to B's long-arm statute and Rule 4(e) authorizes the federal court sitting in B to 
adopt the B long-arm statute. Of course, amenability in the federal court suit would still be 
required. Assuming D is present in B, however, federal courts also have used presence in the 
federal district (and, later, the state in which the federal court is sitting), as an amenability 
basis, and, assuming D was served extraterritorially pursuant to the B long-arm statute, because 
such service satisfies the amenability standards of B it should also satisfy whatever standards 
apply to the federal courts sitting in B using the B long-arm statute. In other words, the con- 
sensus is that if state amenability standards are satisfied, federal standards also would be satisfied. 
The question at issue in this article is whether, if the amenability standards of the state 
in which the federal court is sitting are not satisfied, federal amenability standards still might 
be satisfied, thus allowing a federal court sitting in state B to assert personal jurisdiction over 
persons and/or entities not amenable to suit in the B courts: Can a fec'cral court assert per- 
sonal jurisdiction where a state court could not? In Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 
(1898), a New York statute would have barred a foreign cause of action against an English 
corporation on ground that the defendant was not amenable to suit in New York. The Supreme 
Court upheld the jurisdiction of the federal court, apparently negating the then current notion 
that amenability in state courts was essential to federal court jurisdiction. 170 U.S. at  110. 
See, e.g., Maxwell v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R., 34 F. 286 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1888); United States 
v. American Bell Tel. Co., 29 F. 17 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1886); Boston Elec. Co. v. Electric Gas 
Lighting Co., 23 F. 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1885); Easton v. St. Louis Shakespear Mining & Smelting 
Co., 7 F. 139 (C.C.E.I?. Mo. 1881). The Supreme Court ruled that the personal jurisdiction 
of federal courts "is not created by, and does not depend upon, the statutes of the several 
states." Barrow, 170 U.S. at 110. After the Supreme Court decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tonlpkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the question of federal court personal jurisdiction in diversity 
cases was reopened, with the apparent current result that federal courts sitting in diversity are 
limited by the amenability standards of the states in which they are sitting. See infra notes 
407-92 and accompanying text. 
This is only one of several ways in which the question arises as to whether state door- 
closing should also close federal doors. The problem has also surfaced where state courts bar 
certain individuals as plaintiffs, see, e.g., Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) 
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against D in states X, Y, or 2. In those circumstances, potential state 
court unfairness to nonresidents probably would not favor one party 
over the other,381 and, therefore, no real policy reason exists for this 
(state statute barred out-of-state corporations which had failed to comply with local requirements 
for qualification to do business from instituting suits in state courts), and where states refuse 
to permit certain types of remedies. See, e.g., Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) (state 
statute barred recovery in state courts for deficiency judgments on foreclosure sales). In both 
Woods and Angel, the Supreme Court, arguing from the Erie decision, ruled that the doors 
of the federal court also should remain closed. Venue restrictions, on the other hand, may 
close federal court doors where state court doors would remain open. 
380. The action could be removed to a federal court sitting in state A ,  pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1441(a) & (b), so long as the defendant was not a citizen of state A (an impossibility 
under the proposed hypothetical facts). 
§1441(a) provides: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought 
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdic- 
tion, may be removed by the defendant or  defendants, to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action 
is pending. 
28 U.S.C. §1441(a) (1976). 
§1441(b) provides: 
Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on 
a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States 
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or  residence of the parties. Any 
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly 
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought. 
28 U.S.C. §1441(b) (1976). The limitation on removal in potential diversity cases to situations 
in which no defendant is a citizen of the state in which the case was instituted presumably 
is a recognition that diversity jurisdiction is intended to protect nonresidents from local pre- 
judice, a situation not pertaining when a defendant is sued in his home state. The plaintiff, 
who has selected the state B forum rather than a federal forum, clearly does not fear local 
prejudice. See supra text at  note 379. This creates an anomalous lack of symmetry, however, 
between the original jurisdiction of federal courts and the removal jurisdiction of federal courts 
because P, a citizen of A,  may institute a diversity action against D, a citizen of B, in a federal 
court sitting in B. 
Removal jurisdiction is really a particular type of federal court subject matter jurisdiction 
which derives from the state court's subject matter jurisdiction over the case. A case therefore 
cannot be removed to the federal court unless the state court had proper jurisdiction over 
the subject matter of the case. Most commentators, moreover, take the position that because 
authority of the federal court in removed diversity cases derives directly from the state, state 
amenability standards must be applied when considering personal jurisdiction questions. That 
result, however, is not required by any doctrine of removal jurisdiction. While federal subject 
matter jurisdiction is derivative and the defendant presumably was served with process pur- 
suant to state law, a federal amenability standard still might apply to the question of the defen- 
dant's federal liability to service of process. Since federal courts generally may assert personal 
jurisdiction in all circumstances in which courts of the states in which they are sitting may 
assert personal jurisdiction, with the only real question being whether federal courts might have 
a broader reach, and since the defendant chooses to remove to federal court, there seems no 
reason why a less strict federal standard of amenability should not apply to him. If the defen- 
dant wished to challenge the personal jurisdiction of the state court, he could have done so 
in that forum. He selected instead to remove the case to what he perceived to be a more favorable 
forum. That choice entailed submission to the particular rules and procedures of the federal 
forum and one of those rules and procedures might be a federal amenability standard. In sum, 
there seems no reason to treat removal cases any differently than those cases originally brought 
in federal courts in which service of process is achieved by some state method. 
381. In Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898), the Supreme Court stated: 
The object of the provision of the constitution and statutes of the United States, 
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broader scope of diversity jurisdiction.382 
When a federal court is sitting on a diversity case, the matter in 
controversy between the parties involves state-created rights and 
liabilities.383 Courts and commentators have expressed the opinion that 
a federal court sitting in diversity is actually just a state court because 
it is performing a state court function.384 This premise leads to the 
following argument and conclusion: federal courts sitting in diversity 
perform the same function as state courts, adjudication of state-created 
rights; therefore, federal courts sitting in diversity in state X should 
not adjudicate any action which a state court could not adjudicate 
because of lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant; therefore, 
federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state amenability stan- 
dards. In other words, whenever a state court would close its doors 
in conferring [diversity jurisdiction] . . . was to  secure a tribunal presumed to be 
more impartial than a court of the state in which one of the litigants resides. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
382. Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. $1332 sweeps more broadly than is necessary 
to achieve the purpose of protecting nonresidents from local prejudice. One might suppose, 
for example, that a state C judge and jury would be equally hostile and/or indifferent to P 
and D, citizens of states A and B, respectively, if P brought suit against D in a C state court. 
Yet, the P v. D litigation could be brought in a federal court sitting in state C. On the other 
hand, of course, one might argue that unless P and D are citizens of the same state, the judge 
and jury of state C s  court might, for reasons of prejudice based on citizenship, be more favorably 
disposed to one litigant than to the other. 
The original institution of diversity jurisdiction also might reflect a certain federal skep- 
ticism about the quality of justice afforded in state tribunals. In most circumstances which 
did not involve a purely parochial dispute, like a suit between citizens of the same state on 
a state-created right, the defendant was afforded the choice of a federal forum if the plaintiff 
had brought suit in a state court. The exception to this would be a "diversity action" instituted 
in the defendant's home state. See supra note 380. Even under this suggestion, some cases 
just do not fit, like those cases involving residents of state A where suit is brought in state 
B. This case could not be removed by the defendants because there is no diversity of citizen- 
ship, regardless of any hypothetical incompetence of the B court. Any local prejudice, however, 
\vould be directed equally at  the plaintiff and the defendant. 
383. If it involved substantial federally-created rights and liabilities, the case would in- 
volve a "federal question", and the case would be a federal question rather than a diversity 
case. For a discussion of federal question cases, see infra notes 493-1355 and accompanying text. 
384. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945). See also Com- 
ment, supra note 214, at  705. The Columbia commentator noted: 
The organization of federal districts along state lines and the notion that the federal 
courts are localized forums for the adjudication of state-created rights suggest that 
they should not extend their jurisdiction beyond the limits imposed on the states 
in which they sit, in the absence of a valid federal statute or  rule; constitutional 
guarantees that could be invoked in a state court should not be forfeited merely 
because the action is brought in an alternative federal tribunal. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
What these statements fail to recognize is that, except for areas of exclusive federal jurisdic- 
tion, see supra note 19, state courts may adjudicate cases based on federally created rights 
and liabilities and yet no one argues that the state courts so acting are, in effect, extra federal 
courts. 
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because of lack of personal jurisdiction, a federal court sitting in the 
state should be required to do likewise.385 
Although most federal courts now have taken the position that federal 
courts sitting in diversity should apply the amenability standards of 
the state in which the federal court is situated,386 the matter is not 
so simple. First, the lack of a readily definable federal court standard 
of amenability387 makes one wonder whether the determination to app- 
385. Relying on the Erie decision, the Supreme Court has so determined in some other 
"door-closing" contexts. See supra note 379. On the other hand, federal courts sitting in diver- 
sity have opened their doors to parties who could not be included in similar actions brought 
in a state court. Under Rule 4(f), a third party defendant who bears an appropriate relation- 
ship to the territory of the federal district in which service is made may be served with process 
within 100 miles of the federal courthouse in which the case is being heard even though the 
third party defendant is served in a state other than the state in which the federal court is 
sitting. See supra note 269. A state court hearing the same action would not be able to join 
the third party defendant unless he was amenable to the process of the state in which the 
suit was brought. Therefore, although a federal court sitting in diversity might be adjudicating 
a state-created right, because of Rule 4(f) the federal court can adjudicate a third party claim 
which a state court could not adjudicate. This creates some uniformity among federal courts 
but not between federal and state courts sitting in the same state. 
Moreover, in a federal interpleader action brought pursuant to the Federal lnterpleader Act, 
28 U.S.C. $1335, a particular type of diversity action in which only "minimum diversity" is 
required, see supra note 200, nationwide service of federal process is authorized by 28 U.S.C. 
$2361 (1976), which provides: 
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 
of this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order 
restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United 
States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader 
action until further order of the court. 
Id. Again, a federal court may extend its jurisdictional reach beyond the territorial limits of 
the state in which it is sitting even though the grounds of its subject matter jurisdiction is 
diversity of citizenship and a state court could not necessarily, because of limitations on the 
extent of its personal jurisdiction, entertain the same action with the same configuration of 
parties. Again, while in interpleader the federal court is usually adjudicating some state created 
right, it is not an alter-ego of state courts; it can open its doors when state courts cannot. 
From the above it is clear that federal courts sitting in diversity may, in some circumstances, 
exert personal jurisdiction over individuals over whom state courts may not exert personal jurisdic- 
tion. Such extensions of federal court jurisdiction clearly implement federal policy favoring 
adjudication of an entire case or  controversy in one lawsuit. See Note, Federal Courts, 77 
HARV. L. REV. 559, 561 (1964). They also, however, preclude the argument that, in all cir- 
cumstances, federal courts sitting in diversity can have no more extensive jurisdictional reach 
than can state courts sitting on similar matters; where federal policy is clear, Congress and 
courts have not required identity of jurisdiction between state courts and federal courts sitting 
in diversity in those states. Whatever basis is urged for the proposition that federal courts 
sitting in diversity should, as a general matter, follow the amenability standards of the state 
in which they are sitting, such a result, as demonstrated above, is not required by the United 
States Constitution. Otherwise, Rule 4(f) and other federal "outreach" statutes could not he 
used in diversity cases. 
386. See infra notes 434-92 and accompanying text. 
387. See supra notes 295-351 and accompanying text. The argument that "[tlhe absence 
of a fully developed federal standard . . . should not preclude a ruling in favor of the ap- 
plicability of federal law [in diversity cases]" is persuasive. In the absence of such a standard, 
however, courts have seemed reluctant to rule that one should be prescribed and then devise 
it, preferring, instead, to rely on the well-developed state standard. Even most courts and com- 
mentators that urge an independent federal standard under the fifth amendment fall back on 
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ly state amenability standards was induced partly by the absence of 
a federal standard.388 Second, while the authority of the federal courts 
generally has been circumscribed by territorial boundaries,389 such limita- 
tions do not flow from the nature of federal courts as do such limita- 
tions on state courts,390 and Congress could eliminate territorial limita- 
tions on federal courts even in diversity cases. Third, adoption of state 
amenability standards in diversity actions leads to nonuniformity in 
the federal system.39' Fourth, while the Supreme Court early took the 
position, in a diversity case, that federal court personal jurisdiction 
"is not created by, and does not depend upon, the statutes of the 
several States,"392 the Court has, in a recent case, impliedly adopted 
the position that amenability standards in diversity cases are establish- 
ed by the due process clause of the fourteenth Fifth, 
the state standard of "minimum contacts" and "fundamental fairness" as describing the federal 
standard as well. See, e.g., K. Shapiro, Inc. v. New York Central R.R., 152 F. Supp. 722 
(E.D. Mich. 1957) (suggesting that the Supreme Court, in Riverbank Labs v. Hardwood Prods. 
Corp., 350 U.S. 1003 (1956), directed federal courts to apply International Shoe as a federal 
amenability standard in diversity cases). 
388. The analysis really should involve two questions: (1) whether federal courts sitting 
in diversity should apply a federal rather than a state amenability standard, and (2) what the 
provisions of such a federal standard would be. Often, however, courts have answered ques- 
tion (1) in favor of a state standard because such a standard existed and Congress and the 
courts had not devised a federal standard. At least one commentator has pointed out the fallacy 
of this analysis: 
It would seem that the question whether jurisdictional rules have been formulated 
by Congress is not relevant. If such rules do not now exist, they can be made, and 
a determination of what standards apply is not beyond the scope of judicial con- 
sideration. . . . The absence of a fully developed federal standard . . . should not 
preclude a ruling in favor of the applicability of federal law. The crucial issue is 
whether a federal standard, if it were to exist, should be applied to diversity cases 
or whether the policy of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins precludes its use. 
Note, Federal Courts, 49 CORNELL . Q. 320, 322 (1964) (footnotes omitted). 
389. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
390. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
391. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191, at  286-98; comment, supra note 214, a t  706; Note, 
supra note 385, at  561. See also Note, supra note 188, at  148 (advocating development of 
a federal amenability standard to enhance federal court uniformity). But see Note, supra note 
388, at 324 (application of federal law in diversity cases "would tend to discriminate against 
those not qualified to bring a diversity action, accentuate conflicts between federal and state 
policy, and only to a small degree promote uniformity. . ."). 
392. Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 108 (1898). 
393. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694 (1952). See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, although 
an unusual case on its facts, was a diversity case, and the Supreme Court, in discussing the 
"test for personal jurisdiction" applicable in such a case quoted the International Shoe test 
of "minimum contacts." Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at  702-03. The Court studiously 
avoided the direct question of an amenability standard, using the term "Due Process Clause" 
throughout its opinion without specifying whether the reference was to the fifth amendment 
or the fourteenth amendment clause. By citing International Shoe and by its strenuous argu- 
ment, in a footnote, that its holding "[did] not alter the requirement that there be 'minimum 
contacts' between the nonresident defendant and the forum state [but rather dealt] with how 
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while Erie R.R. Co. v. T ~ m p k i n s ~ ~ ~  was decided in 1938, and several 
subsequent Supreme Court cases have "clarified" the Erie doctrine,395 
the question remains whether Erie requires a federal court sitting in 
diversity to apply state amenability standards or whether those stan- 
dards might be incorporated into the federal law by Rule 4(e), which 
authorizes federal courts to serve non-resident defendants "under the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the" state long-arm 
statute.396 Sixth, although in many diversity cases process is served pur- 
suant to Rule 4(e), by using the long-arm statute of the state in which 
the federal court is sitting,397 some involve service under a purely federal 
rule such as 4(d)(3).398 ShouId state amenability standards apply in both 
circumstances? 399 
the facts needed to show those 'minimum contacts' can be established when a defendant fails 
to comply with court-ordered discovery," id. at 702 n.lO, the Court seemed to imply that 
is was applying the state amenability standard to the question of establishing personal jurisdic- 
tion in a diversity case. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell maintained: 
[I]n the absence of a federal rule or  statute establishing a federal basis for the asser- 
tion of personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of the district courts is deter- 
mined in diversity cases by the law of the forum State. 
Id. at 711 (citing Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Co., 575 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); Wilker- 
son v. Fortune Corp., 554 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Poyner v. 
Erma Werke GMBH, 618 F.2d 1186 (6th Cir. 1980); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Corp. v. Moun- 
tain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Lakota 
Girl Scout Council v. Havey Fundraising Mgmt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1975); Arrowsmith 
v. United Press Int'l., 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358 (10th 
Cir. 1974)). In footnote 6 of his concurrence Justice Powell made it clear that he did not 
feel that Federal Rule 4 was itself a jurisdictional provision. Justice Powell therefore adopted 
Arrowsmith with almost no discussion. See infra notes 453-92 and accompanying test. As Justice 
Powell's citations indicate, the Supreme Court has declined to review the question of amenability 
in diversity cases. Now, Justice Powell, directly, and the Court's opinion, by implication, accept 
the Arrowsmith result almost as a fait accompli. 
A recent case has cited Justice Powell's concurrence for the proposition that, "[iln the absence 
of a federal rule or  statute establishing a federal basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction, 
the personal jurisdiction of the district courts is determined in diversity cases by reference to 
the law of the state in which the federal court sits." Kendall v. Overseas Dev. Corp., 700 
F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1983). 
394. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See infra notes 407-14 and accompanying text. 
395. See infra notes 4!5-33 and accompanying text. 
396. See supra note 267 and accompanying text and infra note 1156 and accompanying text. 
397. See infra notes 1103-1316 and accompanying text. 
398. See infra notes 799-887 and accompanying text. 
399. The language of Justice Powell's concurrence in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. 
v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982), suggested that state amenability 
standards might not apply where "a federal rule or  statute establish[es] a federal basis for 
the assertion of personal jurisdiction." Id. at  711. He went on to note, however, that Rule 
4 does not prescribe any amenability basis, id. at  715 n.6, and, as described above, see supra 
notes 247-49 and accompanying text, federal statutes authorizing extra-territorial service of process 
never include amenability standards. Was Justice Powell merely ruminating that if Congress 
were to establish federal standards of amenability by Rule or statute, such standards might 
take precedence even in diversity cases? In other words, was he merely recognizing the authority 
of Congress to establish such standards in the future, or was he suggesting that some such 
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In order to unravel this problem to some extent, to describe the 
present state of the law, and to comment thereon, perhaps it is best 
to trace the chronological development of personal jurisdiction stan- 
dards in diversity cases. As noted above, the Supreme Court, in Bar- 
row S.S. Co. v. Kane,400 adopted the position that personal jurisdic- 
tion of federal courts did not depend on the existence or non-existence 
of state statutes.401 In a circumstance in which a state court would 
have applied a "door-closing" statute precluding the state court from 
asserting jurisdiction over the defendant, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the federal courts were still free to open their doors. One should 
note, however, that the Court merely authorized the lower federal 
courts to ignore a state statute which barred assertion of personal 
jurisdiction; the Court did not define some federal standard for 
amenability402 nor did it comment on the efficacy, in federal courts, 
of any state statutes affirmatively authorizing personal jurisdiction.403 
One must remember, moreover, that, at the time of the Barrow deci- 
sion, states did not have long-arm statutes. State court assertions of 
jurisdiction were limited severely by territoriality, with the most signifi- 
cant amenability questions involving whether a foreign corporation 
could be sued on a consent or presence theory.404 The situation after 
Barrow is well-described, in the context of corporate amenability, in 
the following passage:405 
[TJhe independence of the federal judiciary was frequently asserted 
in the maxim that federal jurisdiction could not be enlarged or 
abridged by state statute. Thus, determination of the scope of 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations devolved upon the federal 
courts. In the absence of congressional direction and binding restric- 
tions of state law, the organization of districts along state lines with 
no general provision for extraterritorial process apparently suggested 
reference to the due process limitations binding under the fourteenth 
standards did exist, implicit in federal statutes, or  was he merely "hedging his bets" because 
no such federal rule or statute was applicable here? Why, moreover, did he limit the creation 
of such a standard to Congress? After all, the Supreme Court and other judicial bodies established 
the state amenability standards now generally applicable. See supra notes 60-185 and accom- 
panying text. See also Note, supra note 388, at  322 (suggesting that lack of federal standard 
of amenability can be remedied by judicial action). 
400. 170 U.S. 100 (1898). 
401. Id. at  108. 
402. Id. at 108. 
403. See generally 170 U.S. 100 (1898). 
404. See supra notes 60 to 105 and accompanying text. 
405. Comment, supra note 214, at 692 (footnotes omitted). 
406. Again, a possible argument is that only one standard of amenability was available, 
and, since federal courts looked so much like state courts, no reason existed not to adopt 
the available standard. 
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amendment on the states. Thus, the same standard of corporate 
amenability was applied without discrimination to circumscribe the 
state and federal courts.406 
With the 1938 promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure407 came several federal methods of service of process but 
no particular amenability standards.408 In the same year, however, 
the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Erie R.R. Co. v. 
T o r n p k i n ~ , ~ ~ ~  in which the Court reversed 100 years of federal prac- 
tice by ruling that federal courts were to apply state law in diversity 
cases rather than applying "federal common law" to the substantive 
issues of the case.410 In 1938, therefore, prior practice in diversity 
cases was almost totally reversed. Under the Conformity Act, the 
,federal courts had been required to "conform, . . . to the practice, 
pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding" of the states in which 
they had ~ a t . ~ l ' T h e  federal courts now were required to follow the 
uniform federal procedure provided in the Federal Rules. Under the 
earlier decision of Swiff v. TysonY4l2 the federal courts sitting in diver- 
sity had been free to apply "general federal common law" to substan- 
tive issues. They were now required, under Erie, to follow the substan- 
tive law of the states in which they sat. 
In Erie, the question at issue was clearly "substantive," whether 
the plaintiff, who had been walking on a footpath adjacent to railroad 
tracks, was a "trespasser" and therefore entitled to recover only for 
willful or wanton conduct on the part of the defendant, or whether 
he was a "licensee," entitled to recover for negligence."' Subsequent, 
cases, however, posed more difficult questions which could not be 
resolved by reference to the "talismanic" labels of "substance" and 
"procedure. "414 
407. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text. 
408. See supra notes 253-94 and accompanying text. 
409. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For comprehensive discussion of Erie and its progeny, see Clark, 
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE 
L.J. 267 (1946); Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762 (1941); Hart, The 
Relations Between Stale and Federal Law, 54 Co~uar. L. REV. 489 (1954); Hill, The Erie Doc- 
trine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 427 (1958); Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, 
Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 494 (1949); Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 
49 VA. L. REV. 1082 (1963); Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336 
(1938); Comment, supra note 214. 
410. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. 
41 1. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text. 
412. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
413. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69-71. 
414. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, 
noted, " 'Outcome determination' analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman." Id. 
at 466-67. See also infra notes 434-35 and accompanying text. 
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In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,"ls the Court came very close to 
describing a weighing process,416 similar to that later settled on in 
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-op.,"" but instead relied on 
a "shorthand" description of its decision: state law, including state 
procedural rules, must be followed if "outcome-determinative" because 
"the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substan- 
tially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litiga- 
tion, as it would be if tried in a State Court."418 This decision substan- 
tially seemed to make federal courts into state courts, for any rule 
which differed from a state rule in any genuine manner could affect 
the outcome of a litigation."l9 
The effect of Erie on questions of personal jurisdiction was raised 
in Pulson v. American Rolling Mill C O . " ~ ~  In Pulson, the First Cir- 
cuit laid down the following two-step analysis to determine whether 
a federal court had personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporat i~n:~~'  
(1) whether the state had "provided for bringing the foreign corpora- 
tion into its courts under the circumstances of the case presented;" 
and (2) if so, whether such an assertion of personal jurisdiction by 
a state court would violate federal due process. The Pulson court did 
not cite Erie or Guaranty Trust. The Court, therefore, did not clarify 
whether the rule flowed from the Erie doctrine and was a 
415. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
416. Id. at 108. The court stated: 
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much talked about . . . 
as though they defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, 
of course, "substance" and "procedure" are the same keywords to  very different 
problems. Neither "substance" nor "procedure" represents the same invariants. Each 
implies different variables depending upon the particular problems for which it is used. 
Id. 
417. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). See infra notes 430-33 and accompanying text. 
418. Guaranty Trust. 326 U.S. at  109. 
419. Whenever a procedural rule, such as manner of service of process, would bar suit 
in the state because the rule had not been satisfied, whereas the method utilized was sufficient 
under federal procedure so that a federal court suit would not be barred, the "outcome" of 
the litigation would be affected if the federal court employed its own seemingly procedural 
rule; the suit could continue in the federal court but could not continue in the state court. 
To  satisfy the "outcome determinative" language of Guaranty Trust, therefore, the federal 
courts would have to defer to  state court practice whenever a distinction existed. See, e.g., 
Bernhardt v.  Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Ragan v. Merchants, Transfer 
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). As one commentator noted: "If 
the York outcome-determinative test is applied . . . to its literal extreme, very few Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure would have any effect in a federal court action in which subject- 
matter jurisdiction is grounded on diversity of citizenship." Comment, Return to the Twilight 
Zone, supra note 267, at 705. 
420. 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948). 
421. Id. at 194. 
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constitutionally-required result,422 or whether Pulson represented a deci- 
sion that when service was made under former Rule 4(d)(7) accord- 
ing to some state method, then the state jurisdictional standard also 
should be applied.423 As noted by one commentator: 
In the great majority of appellate decisions that have chosen be- 
tween federal and state jurisdictional standards, service has been made 
422. In Erie, the majority took the position that the result was mandated by the Constitu- 
tion. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938). Many scholars have struggled 
to determine the Constitutional source of the Court's assertion. See generally C. Wright, Law 
of Federal Courts 359-364 (4th ed. 1983). If Erie is constitutionally required, and if, as rea- 
soned by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Com- 
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709-16 (1982). Erie requires the result in 
Arrolvsmith, id. at 711-12, then one might argue that a different federal standard of amenability 
for diversity cases is precluded by the Constitution. 
This argument, however, sweeps too broadly. Justice Powell recognized the potential for 
application in diversity of "a federal basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction," such 
basis being established by "a federal rule or statute." Id. at 711. Under Byrd V. Blue Ridge 
Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, (1958), see infra notes 430-33 and accompanying text, a 
federal court may balance the state interests in application of the state rule against federal 
interests in application of a conflicting federal rule or statute. Justice Powell therefore recognized 
the possibility of a federal amenability standard for diversity cases, which standard would be 
established by Congress. He did not, however, recognize the equally justifiable possibility of 
a judicially created federal standard which would conflict with a state standard. Erie did not, 
as many believe, eliminate federal common law. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry 
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). It  merely eliminated the prior federal practice of apply- 
ing "general federal common law" in defining state-created rights and liabilities, a practice 
which had caused nonuniformity in vindication of state-created rights and obligations as well 
as creating a substantial problem of state-federal forum-shopping within the borders of a particular 
state. See, e.g., Black & White Taxicab &Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellotv Taxicab &Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
The creation of new federal common law by federal courts also did not terminate upon 
the decision in Erie. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) 
(federal law governed application of act-of-state doctrine in a federal diversity case); Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal law governed issue regarding effec- 
tiveness of guarantee of prior endorsements on a government check). See also Mishkin, The 
Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and 
State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 798-800 (1957). A federal court therefore 
need not rely on some established federal law, statute, or rule in order to Byrd balance but 
may actually determine first whether some uniform federal law would be preferable to applica- 
tion of the state rule before it and then set about to establish that federal common law. The 
question of personal jurisdiction would not seem to be, as a general matter, so bound up in 
the vindication of state-created rights and liabilities that Erie requires application of state law 
without resort to Byrd balancing. This writer believes that the reasons federal courts have not 
taken the initiative to develop a separate federal amenability standard are because state stan- 
dards had already been well-established, no federal standard had been suggested by the Supreme 
Court, and federal rules and statutes do not expressly provide for an amenability standard. 
Reliance on well-established state amenability standards that have received extensive Supreme 
Court treatment is easier than pioneering a separate federal standard. For a discussion of the 
types of state interests that should supervene federal interests absolutely as opposed to those 
state interests that should merely be considered in the Byrd balancing process, see Comment, 
supra note 214, at  703-06; Note, supra note 385, at  561-62. 
Finally, this discussion presumes that the Arrowsmith case and result flow from the Erie 
doctrine. If, instead, they arise from some incorporation of state amenability standards, under 
former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e), into federal law, then the above analysis would not pertain. 
423. See infra notes 893-1102 and accompanying text. 
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pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7), and in those cases the choice was over- 
whelmingly in favor of the state standard, although the cases are 
unclear as to whether state standards were used because of Rule 
4(d)(7) or because of Erie.42' 
Angel v. B ~ l l i n g t o n ~ ~ ~  and Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.426 were 
two cases subsequent to York that involved jurisdictional questions, 
although not the issue of amenability, to which the Supreme Court 
applied the Erie doctrine in following state "door-closing" policies. 
In Angel, recovery would have been unavailable in a state court because 
of a state statute that barred certain types of relief.427 In Woods, 
the suit would have been barred from a state court because of a state 
statute that precluded suits by foreign corporations that had not com- 
plied with state qualification requirements.428 
After Woods, federal courts sitting in diversity were truly becoming 
the alter-egos of state courts.429 In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric 
Co-op.,430 however, the Supreme Court picked up again the thread 
that it had been pursuing in Guaranty Trust prior to its "shorthand" 
statement of the "outcome determinative" test. In Byrd, a case in- 
volving the question of whether a judge or jury should decide the 
issues of whether the plaintiff had been an "employee" of the defen- 
dant within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the 
Supreme Court decided in favor of the "federal?' method of decision 
by jury.j3' The Court ruled that except in those areas where the state 
rule is "bound up with [the state-created rights and obligations sought 
424. Note, supra note 188, at 1134. 
425. 330 U.S. 183 (1947). See also supra note 379. 
426. 337 U.S. 535 (1949). See also supra note 379. 
427. The Supreme Court also closed the doors of the federal court sitting in diversity, 
doors which ordinarily would have been open to such a litigation, on the ground that Erie 
had "drastically limited the power of the federal courts to entertain suits in diversity cases 
that could not be brought in the respective state courts. . . ." Angel, 330 U.S. at 192. 
The dissenting justices responded: "[Iln diversity litigation the federal courts are not simply 
courts of the state. They are so far as the enforcement of the substantive laws of the state 
are concerned, but not when procedure or  power to act is involved." Id. at 200 (Reed, J:, 
dissenting). 
428. Again the majority of the court found the result compelled by Erie and the "out- 
come determinative" test of Guaranty Trust in order to preserve uniformity among the state 
and federal courts sitting in the state. Woods, 337 U.S. at 538. Again the dissent argued that 
the upshot of Erie and Guaranty Trust was not that federal courts in diversity cases were merely 
other courts of the states in which they sat. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541, 560 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in both Woods and Cohen). Moreover, Justice Rutledge 
argued that the "outcome determinative" test should be replaced, in these quasi-procedural 
areas, by some sort of weighing test. Id. 
429. See supra dissenting opinions cited in notes 427 and 428; Merrigan, Erie to York 
to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 720-21 (1950). 
430. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). For discussion of the effect of Byrd, see Smith, Blue Ridge 
and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REV. 443 (1962). 
431. Byrd, 356 U.S. at  536. 
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to be enforced] in such a way that its application in the federal court 
is required,"432 the federal court must consider the interests of the 
state in having its rule applied, including the effect of application 
on the outcome of the suit, against any "affirmative countervailing 
considerations" which would favor application of the federal rule or 
procedure.433 The technique for deciding "borderline" questions after 
Byrd, therefore, was to "Byrd balance" state and federal interests. 
Subsequent to the decision in Byrd but before the Supreme Court 
decision in Hanna v. P l ~ m e r , ~ ~ ~  which, in effect, established the 
precedence of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over any conflict- 
ing state procedures regardless of "outcome" or the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Jaftex Corp. v. 
Randolph Mills, Inc.436 and in Arrowsmith v. United Press 
Internat i~nal ,~~'  considered the question of amenability standards in 
diversity cases. Although early cases had applied a federal standard,438 
almost all diversity cases subsequent to Erie had applied a state 
amenability standard, although not all such courts had based their 
decisions on the Erie doctrine.439 In Jaftex, a diversity action for per- 
sonal injuries, the third party defendant, a North Carolina corpora- 
tion on which service had been made by serving its "selling agent" 
432. Id. at 535. 
433. Id. at 537-38. 
434. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). For discussion of the effect of Hanna, see McCoid, Hanna 
v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884 (1965); Note, Choice oJ 
Procedure in Diversity Cases, 75 YALE L.J. 477 (1966). 
435. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-74. 
436. 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960). For favorable commentary on Jaftex, see Comment, 
supra notes 214; Note, supra note 373; Note, supra note 188; Comment, supra note 246. 
437. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). 
438. See, e.g., Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917); Barrow 
S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898). 
439. See, e.g., Jennings, v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Walker v. General 
Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Smartt v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d 
447 (6th Cir. 1963); Mutual Int'l. Export Co. v. Napeo Indus., Inc., 316 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 
1963); Connor v. New York Times Co., 310 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1962); Waltham Precision In- 
strument Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 310 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1962); Moore-McCormack 
Lines, Inc. v. Bunge Corp., 307 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1962); Ark-La Feed & Fertilizer Co. v. 
Marco Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1961); Edwin Raphael Co. v. Maharam Fabrics 
Corp., 283 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1960); Iliff v. American Fire Apparatus Co., 277 F.2d 360 (4th 
Cir. 1960); Stanga v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959); Westcott- 
Alexander, Inc. v. Dailey, 264 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1959); Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.2d 
893 (7th Cir. 1955); Smith v. Ford Gum & Mach. Co., 212 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1454); Partin 
v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1953); Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. William 
E. Hooper & Sons Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1952); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 
179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 
1948). But see Berlanti Constr. Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 190 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) 
(applying federal standard); Kennedy v. Long Island R. Co., 26 F.R.D. 589 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) 
(same). See also Hart, supra note 409 (favoring federal standard); Hill, supra note 409 (same); 
Meador, supra note 409 (same). 
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in New York, sought to vacate service for lack of proper service, 
arguing that it was not "doing business" in New York and hence 
was not amenable to suit in the federal district court sitting in New 
York."* The district court had granted the dismissal of the third 
party defendant on the following reasoning:44' while Randolph Mills 
was "doing business" in New York so that service would be valid 
under federal law, it was not "doing business" under state law to 
permit valid state service, and, under Erie, the state law must be ap- 
plied. The district court determined, therefore, that in a diversity ac- 
tion Erie required that amenability to suit be measured by a state 
rather than federal standard. 
Writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir- 
cuit, Judge Clark, the chief draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, found two alternative grounds for refusal to dismiss the 
third-party complaint: (1) ". . . service was valid under either New 
York or federal law,"442 and (2) ". . . the question whether a foreign 
corporation is present in a district to permit service of process upon 
it is one of federal law governing the procedure of the United States 
courts. . . ."443 In his argument developing the second alternate ground, 
Judge Clark noted that federal rule 4(d)(3) and former federal rule 
4(d)(7) "deal with the manner of service upon corporate defendants, 
rather than with their amenability to process" and found "the man- 
ner of service . . . was sufficient under either After finding 
440. Jafta, 282 F.2d at 508-11. 
441. Id. at 509-10. 
442. Id. at 510. 
443. Id. at 516. Judge Clark apparently seized the opportunity to  make clear his position 
on the issue of amenability in diversity cases. Judge Friendly, in Arrowsmith v. United Press 
International, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963), seemed even more anxious to  have a "go" at  the 
matter, framing his response as advice to the district court on a remand to consider, ab inifio, 
amenability of a particular foreign corporation to service of process in a diversity action in 
a federal district court sitting in Vermont. See infra note 461 and accompanying text. 
444. Jaftex, 282 F.2d at  511-12. Many commentators have noted the absence of an 
amenability standard in either the federal rules or in federal statutes authorizing extraterritorial 
(beyond the territory of the state in which a federal court is sitting) service of process. One 
commentator has argued for a presence standard (presence where service is authorized), a posi- 
tion that in effect, makes amenability coextensive with valid service of process and therefore, 
implicit in the authorization for extraterritorial service of process. See supra note 356 and ac- 
companying text. Other commentators have argued that where a federal court is authorized 
by Federal Rule 4 to adopt methods of service of process available to the state courts of the 
state in which the federal court sits, the effect is to  incorporate into the federal rule not only 
the state procedure or  technique for service of process but also any state amenability standards 
pertaining to the procedure or  technique. Justices Black and Douglas commented with disap- 
proval on the apparent reliance, under the then-proposed Rule 4(e), on state long-arm statutes: 
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas object to the changes in Rule 4, which 
for the first time permit a Federal District Court to obtain jurisdiction over a defen- 
dant by service of process outside the State . . . under the circumstances and in 
the manner prescribed by state law. We . . . see no reason why the extent of a 
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no Supreme Court direction on the question, Judge Clark found, in 
the historical development of federal process and venue statutes, "a 
deliberate and long-avowed federal practice with reference to the basis 
of federal judicial action."445 Using the Byrd approach, he examined 
the state and federal rules on amenability, finding them "not so 
mutually at odds that the federal decision will seriously damage state 
He argued, moreover, that "so long as Congress opens 
the national courts to cases 'between citizens of different States,' 
Federal District Court's personal jurisdiction should depend upon the existence or 
nonexistence of a state "long-arm" statute. 
Statement of Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, 374 U.S. 865, 869 (1963). Implicit 
in this statement is recognition that federal courts should have some separate grant of personal 
jurisdiction authority and that the authority of federal courts over defendants, whether in diversity 
or federal question cases, should depend on some uniform federal law. If one rejects presence 
as federal amenability standard yet recognizes no standard implicit in federal authorizations 
for extraterritorial service of process, one must admit that no Jederal amenability standard 
has yet been devised and that federal courts, faced with this absence, have understandably 
turned for guidance to state standards. 
445. Jaftteu, 282 F.2d at  513. On the historical point, Judge Clark argued: 
The requirement of personal service in the district (except for the special exceptions 
made by Congress) is an old one going back to the Judiciary Act of 1789, $11, 1 
Stat. 79, and continued in Rev. Stat. $739, Judicial Code $51, and the former 28 
U.S.C. $112. During all this period the requirements as to service and venue were 
treated together, a not unnatural course in view of their close connection. With the 
revision of Title 28, United States Code, the provisions were separated, the venue 
requirements going to 28 U.S.C. $1391 and the service requirements going to 28 U.S.C. 
$1693. The latter act seems particularly important as bringing the original requirements 
of 1789 down into modern law [by preserving the wording of Section 11 of the 
Judiciary Act of 17891. At any rate the requirement has been steadily applied and 
as yet has been changed by Congress and the Rules in only limited and particular 
ways. . . . Wholly consistent and apparently required by this background is the parallel 
condition that a corporation must be "present," i.e., doing business, within the district 
in order to be subject to  suit there. 
Id. at  512 (footnotes and citations omitted). Judge Clark used this as evidence of a continuing 
federal policy in regard to amenability to suits in federal courts. He did not, however, describe 
the federal amenability standard nor did he note how it differed, if at all, from the state standard. 
Still, Judge Clark's argument is convincing. Before Erie, federal cburts were charged with 
the determination of federal court jurisdiction according to federal standards, including deci- 
sions as to when a foreign corporation (one not incorporated in the state in which the federal 
court was sitting) would be "doing business" within the federal district so as to be amenable 
to suit in the federal courts. While these courts may have relied on state standards, they did 
so not because compelled by law so to do but as an independent choice of standard by a 
federal court. , 
Many of the problems discussed here clearly would have been obviated if Congress had not 
chosen to organize the federal judicial system territorially, first with each lower court having 
authority within a single federal district that was either coextensive with a single state or that 
lay entirely within a single state and later by extending general authority of these courts only 
to the boundaries of the state in which they sat. If the federal system had not been structured 
on a territorial basis similar t o  that of the states, a wholly federal standard of amenability 
would have been easier to establish. On the other hand, Congress permitted the federal courts, 
in certain limited circumstances, to reach beyond the territorial boundaries of the state in which 
they were held and to do so in ways not available to those state courts. Therefore, exclusive 
reliance by federal courts on state amenability standards also would be inappropriate. 
446. Id. at  513. 
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. . . it would seem that they are entitled to the essentials of a trial 
according to federal standards."447 He also urged federal uniformity 
of procedure rather than state-federal uniformity, noting authority 
against the position that federal courts sitting in diversity are merely 
extra state 
Judge Friendly, in his concurring opinion, took issue with the alter- 
nate ground of the opinion, noting that he knew "of no . . . federal 
standard [of corporate presence] except the Constitutional one,"449 
citing Pulson and other circuit court opinions in favor of the pro- 
position that a federal court needed federal statutory authority to apply 
a federal amenability standard.450 He found no such grant of authority 
either in federal statutes or in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
nor did he find any "practice of considering this question as one 
of federal law [which has] become so we11 estabIished that it must 
be deemed to be sanctioned by the Judicial Code or the Federal Rules, 
even though both are silent on the subject."451 He concluded, therefore, 
that Erie required the federal court to adopt the state amenability 
Three years later, in Arrowsmith v. United Press Internat i~nal ,~ '~ 
the positions of Judges Clark and Friendly were reversed, with Judge 
Friendly writing the majority opinion which overruled the alternative 
ground in Jaftex and with Judge Clark writing a strong dissent. The 
issue was whether, in a diversity action, the presence of a foreign 
corporation in a district for purposes of amenability to suit was to 
be determined by a state or federal standard.454 The underlying suit 
was for defamation, clearly instituted in a federal court sitting in Ver- 
447. Id. This argument could proceed directly from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., see 
supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text, in which the Supreme Court ruled that one of 
the "essentials" of a federal trial, an "essential" which had its roots in the seventh amend- 
ment, was that certain questions of fact, in a jury trial, were triable to a jury rather than a judge. 
448. Jaftex, 282 F.2d at  513-14. 
449. Id. at 516. 
450. Id. at  516-17. Judge Friendly continued: 
[Tlhis matter falls in the zone where, subject to the due process guarantee of the 
Fifth Amendment, Congress may validly direct, or  authorize the Supreme Court to 
direct, the federal courts to fashion their own standards even in diversity of citizen- 
ship cases. . . . Valid inferences from article 111, $8, support action by Congress 
or  the rule-making power within this "twilight zone," . . . in derogation of state 
law, even when federal jurisdiction rests solely on diversity of citizenship. The ques- 
tion is whether such a direction has been given as to the subject here at  issue; I 
think it has not. 
Id. at  518. 
451. Id. at  520. 
452. Id. 
453. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963). 
454. Id. at  221. 
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mont because Vermont had a particularly long statute of limitations 
in regard to such matters."The defendant's contacts with Vermont 
had been insubstantial. The defendant wire service, U.P.I., had eleven 
subscribers in Vermont and one employee in Vermont.4s6 Service of 
process had been made upon the employee pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), 
as service upon an "agent" of the defendant corp~ration.~~' The defen- 
dant made a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss, inter alia, for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted.4ss The district court dismissed 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and 
did not rule on the personal jurisdiction or venue issues.4s9 
The Court of Appeals remanded, finding that the District Court 
had erred in ruling on the sufficiency of the complaint before first 
determining the procedural questions of personal jurisdiction and 
The Court, however, in what might be described as an "ex- 
cess of zeal," proceeded to "decide what standard should govern the 
judge's determination as to the jurisdiction of the District Court for 
Vermont over the person of the foreign corporation defendant-in 
particular, whether a 'state' or a 'federal' standard should here be 
applied. "461 
After citing an overwhelming number of cases in which circuit courts 
455. Id. and n.2. 
456. Id. at  222. 
457. Id. See supra note 269. 
458. Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at 221. 
459. Id. 
460. Id. 
461. Id. One cannot resist the inference that Judge Friendly had been merely biding his 
time, anxiously awaiting an opportunity to  "correct" the error he perceived in the alternative 
ground in Jaftex. Clearly, Jaftex was the law of the Second Circuit at the time when the 
Arrowsmith case first arose. The court of appeals had been called upon to decide one matter: 
whether the district court had erred in determining that the complaint was legally insufficient 
before the district court had decided whether it had personal jurisdiction over the defendant 
and whether venue had been properly laid. Only about a page of the opinion was devoted 
to that question. The court of appeals then proceeded, in approximately 13 pages of analysis, 
to determine the standard by which such personal jurisdiction would be judged. This would 
have been appropriate if no standard had been established in the Second Circuit. JaJleu, however, 
clearly presented the lower court with a Second Circuit position on the question of whether 
a state or federal amenability standard should apply. The more appropriate time for the court 
of appeals to speak, therefore, would have been on appeal from the district court decision 
on personal jurisdiction. 
At least two possible explanations can be offered for this rather singular procedure: (I) Judge 
Friendly wished to overrule the alternative ground in Jaftex and was afraid that the opportunity 
might not be presented on appeal; (2) Judge Friendly, as noted in his opinion, felt that no 
federal amenability standard existed, and, thus, he was determined to correct JaJtex rather 
than present the district court with the paradoxical problem of being required by Jaftex to 
apply a federal standard but having no clue as to what that standard might be. Either way, 
it seems the court of appeals (Judge Friendly) wanted "first licks" at the problem rather than 
being required to begin from a district court opinion. 
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had advocated state standards462 and dismissing Judge Clark's argu- 
ment that all but two of those cases were inapposite because service 
had been achieved, pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7), by state long-arm 
statute,463 Judge Friendly proceeded to overrule the alternate ground 
in J a f t e ~ . ~ ~  First, he noted that no federal statute or federal rule 
provided an express or implied amenability standard.465 Despite Erie, 
he recognized the authority of Congress to establish such a standard 
but found "no federal policy that should lead federal courts in diver- 
sity cases to override valid state laws as to the subjection of foreign 
corporations to suit, in the absence of direction by federal statute 
or rule. "466 The court, moreover, found little relevancy of Byrd because 
it was "aware of no federal policy of similar strength or constitu- 
tional basis [to that at issue in Byrd] that would justify disregard 
of state laws as to when a foreign corporation may be held to answer 
in a suit like the present."467 
In a lengthy and comprehensive dissenting opinion, Judge Clark 
reiterated and elaborated on his arguments in J a f t e ~ . ~ ~ ~  He criticized 
the majority for incorrectly applying Erie to require application of 
state law to questions such as "how the federal courts shall be 
organized and how one is brought before them."46g He continued, 
"[Ilndeed to put this in the hands of the states would be to destroy 
all reason for having a federal tribunal (in which the litigant has more 
confidence ) enforce a litigant's rights accorded by state law."470 Judge 
Clark argued that Erie would be satisfied in either case because the 
ultimate issues of the libel action would be determined according to 
462. Id. at  222-23. 
463. Id. at  224. 
464. Id. at 224-25. 
465. Id. at 225. Judge Friendly therefore rejected implication of any federal amenability 
standard from a federal statute or  rule. This rejection served the purposes of his major theme, 
that federal courts sitting in diversity should apply state amenability standards. His rejection, 
however, provided a problem in federal question cases in which process is served pursuant 
to a federal statute authorizing extraterritorial service of process. He found no stated or im- 
plicit amenability standards in such statutes yet he admitted that in federal question cases "the 
considerations favoring the overriding of state policy would be far more persuasive than in 
an ordinary diversity suit." Id. a t  228 n.9. Perhaps the material result of Judge Friendly's 
remarks are that he found no federal amenability standard but considered it not inappropriate 
to establish-create-devise-formulate such a standard for federal question cases. 
466. Id. at 226. One inference from this statement might be that Judge Friendly assumed 
that federal amenability standards properly incorporated in federal statutes or  rules would 
supersede state amenability standards, even in diversity cases. Byrd-balancing, see supra notes 
430-33 and accompanying text, however, would still require a balancing of state and federal 
policies favoring application of their respective rules or statutes. But see infra text at  note 467. 
467. Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at  230. See also supra notes 430-33 and accompanying text. . 
468. 320 F.2d at  234-44. 
469. Id. at  235. 
470. Id. 
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Vermont law.*" He again found historical support for a federal stan- 
dard of corporate amenability,472 which standard was "quite well 
known and reasonably precise."473 He noted that state law might easily 
apply in cases in which service of process had been achieved under 
Rule 4(d)(7),474 but that in a case like the one before the court, where 
service had been made through a wholly federal method, a federal 
standard would be appr~priate.."~ Avoiding any real articulation of 
the "quite well known and reasonably precise" federal standard, Judge 
Clark settled on the following formulation: 
[TJhe federal law is shaped by statutory enactment based on easily 
understood principles, which reflect still important and widely held 
views of common sense and fairness that a person should not be 
forced into litigation at a distance from his home.476 
One commentator has called this articulation "little more than a 
paraphrase of International Shoe. "477 
Although many commentators have been in sympathy with Judge 
Clark's position,478 federal courts sitting in diversity have followed 
A r r o ~ s m i t h * ~ ~  overwhelmingly, and the Supreme Court, in its majority 
- - 
471. Id. 
472. Id. at 238-39. 
473. Id. at 239.' 
474. Id. 
475. Id. Because process had been served in this case pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), which pro- 
vides for a wholly federal method of service of process upon a foreign corporation, the Ar- 
ro~vsmith decision might be interpreted as necessarily grounded on Erie. If application of a 
state standard is justifiable merely as an incorporation into federal law of the state standard 
pertaining to the state statute under which service is made, such an argument would apply 
only to cases in which service had been made pursuant to a state rule or statute. Arro~wlitlr 
was not such a case. 
476. Arro~vsmith, 320 F.2d at 238. 
477. Note, supra note 388, at 321. 
478. See, e.g., Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40 TEX. L. REV. 
509, 619, 635-38 (1962) (federal courts should control own organization and procedure); Carr- 
ington, supra note 2, at 318-21 (same); Green, supra note 191, at 979 (same); Smith, arprn 
note 430 (same). 
479. See, e.g., Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, S.A. Paris, 707 F.2d 395, 396 
(9th Cir. 1983); Chatanooga Corp. v. Klinger, 704 F.2d 903, 905-06 (6th Cir. 1983); Pearrovi 
v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 703 F.2d 1067, 1068 (8th Cir. 1983); Talbot Tractor 
Co., Inc. v. Henomoto Tractor Sales, USA, 703 F.2d 143, 144-47 (5th Cir. 1983); Kendall 
v. Overseas Dev. Corp., 700 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1983); Hahn v. Vermont Law School, 
698 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1983); Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust 
Co., 695 F.2d 289, 291-92 (7th Cir. 1982); Adden v. Middlebrooks, 688 F.2d 1147, 1155-56 
(7th Cir. 1982); Brown v. Flowers Indus., Inc., 688 F.2d 328, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1982); Wyatt 
v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 1982); Mississippi Interstate Express, Inc. v. Transpo, 
Inc., 681 F.2d 1003, 1006 (5th Cir. 1982); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State 
Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 600 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Southern 
Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 377-78 (6th Cir. 1968); Pujol v. U.S. 
Life Ins. Co., 396 F.2d 430, 431-32 (1st Cir. 1968); Tetco Metal Prods., Inc. v. Langham, 
387 F.2d 721, 723 (5th Cir. 1968); Drapulse Corp. of America v. Birtcher Corp., 362 F.2d 
736, 740 (2d Cir. 1966); Edwards v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. Co., 361 F.2d 946, 956-57 
(7th Cir. 1966); Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847, 852-54 (5th 
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opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux- 
ites de Guinee,"$* recently adopted by implication the Arrowsmith 
resultJ8' while Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, expressly 
adopted that position.482 Federal courts sitting in diversity, therefore, 
will apply state amenability standards, at least to corporate defen- 
dants, unless or until Congress enacts a statute or rule creating a federal 
amenability standard. 
Unfortunately, for almost twenty years after Arrowsmith, the 
Supreme Court refused to address the issue of amenability standards 
in diversity cases and now the Court seems to adopt the result without 
analysis.483 Many issues raised in Jaftex and Arrowsmith could stand 
closer examination. For example, as one commentator argues, why 
did Judge Friendly base his argument on the lack of a federal stan- 
dard rather than focusing on whether such a standard is req~ired?"~ 
If a federal standard would be required, such a standard could always 
be devised. Since Judge Friendly admitted the possibility of federal 
case law that would supervene state amenability standards, then why 
did he concentrate so stolidly on the absence of affirmative Congres- 
sional authority? Moreover, although he based his decision on Erie, 
Judge Friendly cited Pulson with approval, a case that was not 
Cir. 1966); Aftansa v. Economy Boiler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 189 (8th Cir. 1965); Mechanical 
Contractors Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of N. Cal., Inc., 342 
F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1965); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 319, (2d 
Cir. 1964); Velandra v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 294 (6th Cir. 1964); 
Simpkins v. Council Mfg. Corp., 332 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 1964); Cook v. Bostitch, 328 
F.2d 1, 2-3 (2d Cir. 1964); Japan Air Lines Co., Ltd. v. Tarnowski, No. 82 Civ. 1815 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 23, 1983); Maiocca v. Walt Disney World Co., Slip Op. Civ. Act. No. 80-958-S (D. 
Mass. Apr. 22, 1983); V.I.P. Personal Systems Int'l v. Luce & Co., No. 82 Civ. 7550 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 21, 1983); Robb Container Corp. v. Sho-Me Co., No. 82 Civ. 6313 (N.D. Ill. 1983); 
Kass, Goodkind, Wechsler & Labaton v. Finkel & Martwick, P.C., No. 83 Civ. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983); Bromfield Systems Corp. v. Schuler & Assoc., Inc., No. 82 Civ. 1174-75 (D. Mass. 
1983); Pederson Fisheries, Inc. v. Patti Indus., Inc., 563 F. Supp 72 (W.D. Wash. 1983); Empire 
Kosher Poultry, Inc. v. Hebrew Nat'l Kosher Foods, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 917, 919 (E.D. Pa. 
1983); Trafalgar Capital Corp. v. Oil Producers Equip. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta, 553 F. Supp. 328, 
331 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Gianna Enterprises v. Miss World (Jersey) Ltd., 551 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Lacovara v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 
601, 603-04 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Western Union Tel. Co. v. T.S.I., Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 329, 332-36 
(D.N.J. 1982); Carter Oil Co., Inc. v. Apex Towing Co., 532 F. Supp. 364, 367-68 (E.D. 
Ark. 1951); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. 
Supp. 887, 903-05 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Cf. Cotvan v. Ford Motor Co., 694 F.2d 104, 105-06 
(5th Cir. 1982) (court states that "[iln a diversity action, the reach of federal jurisdiction over 
persons is measured by the law of the forum state subject, however, to Federal Due Process 
claims" and applies, to the Due Process issue, only cases involving state court exercise of its 
personal jurisdiction). 
480. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). See supra notes 156-85 and accompanying text. 
481. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 702-03. 
482. Id. at 711-12. 
483. See supra note 481 and accompanying text. 
484. Note, supra note 388, at 322. 
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necessarily based on Erie at Further Judge Friendly admitted 
that Erie, under the Byrd refinements, would permit federal law of 
some form to control. Factors that preclude application of a uniform 
federal standard, like service pursuant to a federal rule that incor- 
porates state amenability standards, might lead to such a result. In 
Arrowsmith, where process was served by a wholly federal method, 
Judge Friendly could not have relied on any incorporation theory but 
had to rely on Erie for his analysis. 
One must also ask to what extent the result in Arrowsmith and 
subsequent cases can be explained by the absence of a genuine federal 
amenability standard.486 Judge Friendly found no federal standard, 
thus preordaining his resulting application of state law if only from 
lack of choice. Moreover, Judge Clark, for all his enthusiastic asser- 
tions, seemed ill put to describe a standard.487 
In sum, despite Arrowsmith and Insurance Corp. of Ireland, little 
reason exists to apply state amenability standards in diversity cases, 
particularly where process is served by a wholly federal method. The 
absence of an articulable federal standard is hardly a compelling ground 
for adoption of a policy which leads to nonuniformnity among the 
federal courts. Several commentators have suggested that a uniform 
federal standard be developed and that is applicability be determined 
by the Byrd balancing technique.488 When the state has substantial 
policy reasons for limiting personal jurisdiction, such as some policy 
on corporate then federal courts might be required to respect 
that policy. When, however, state limitations seem designed only to 
reduce court congestionJg0 or to preclude suits in which the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens might be raised,49' federal courts should 
be free to implement important federal concerns, such as federal court 
uniformity and protection of out-of-staters, by employing its own 
amenability standard. In Byrd, the Supreme Court rejected the view 
that a federal court sitting in diversity is just another state court.492 
Moreover, federal courts sitting in diversity can employ special federal 
amenability standards in specific situations in which implementation 
of strong federal policy so requires. No compelling reason, therefore, 
485. See supra notes 420-24 and accompanying text. 
486. See supra notes 476-77 and accompanying text. 
487. See id: 
488. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 191, at 96-97 n.76; Comment, supra note 214, at 702-09; 
Note. sums note 188, at '1147-48; Note, supra note 385, at 562-63; 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 119, 
. - 
121-22 (i964). 
489. See Comment, supra note 214, at 704. 
490. Id. 
491. Id. at 704-05. 
492. Byrd, 356 U.S. 525. See Comment, supra note 214, at 703. 
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precludes development of a general federal standard when appropriate 
under a Byrd analysis. 
ii. Federal Question Cases 
The applicable amenability standard in cases in which federal sub- 
ject matter jurisdiction is not based entirely on diversity of citizen- 
ship-for purposes of this article, federal question case~~~~-should 
not be determined according to the Arrowsmith doctrine. That stan- 
dard necessarily followed from the interpretation of the Second Cir- 
cuit of the requirements of Erie R.R: v. T ~ m p k i n s ; ~ ~ ~  the decision 
in Erie applies only to diversity cases.495 Even Judge Friendly admit- 
ted in Arrowsmith that "the considerations favoring the overriding 
of state policy would be far more persuasive [in a federal question 
case] than in an ordinary diversity Innumerable courts497 and 
493. See supra notes 19 and 195. 
494. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See supra notes 415-77 and accompanying text. 
495. See, e.g., HoIt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D. Mich. 1973); 
Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 232, 236 n.34 (D.N.J. 1966). 
See also Foster, supra note 191, at 96-97 n.76. Cf. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 
4, 91075, at  302-06 (personal jurisdiction question no problem in federal question cases; Erie 
creates problems in diversity cases). 
496. Arrowsmith, 320 F.2d at  228 n.9. 
497. The majority of courts making an unconditional statement to this effect have been 
deciding nondiversity cases in which process was served pursuant to a federal statute authoriz- 
ing nationwide or  worldwide service of process under the circumstances of the case. See, e.g., 
Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (service pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue 
Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), see supra note 248) (application of "Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment [to] limit the exercise of congressional power to provide for nation- 
wide in personam jurisdiction") (Stewart, J., dissenting); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Jim Walter 
Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1981) (service pursuant to Section 9 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 215 U.S.C. 949) (court recognizes fifth amendment standard to determine 
amenability); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 
313-14 n.36 (2d Cir. 1981) (service pursuant to $1608 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. $1608, see supra note 250) (court implies that the due process standard 
to be satisfied is that of the fifth amendment); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 
1978) (service pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), see 
supra note 248) ("Congress is, of course, limited in the actions it can take by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . ."); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 
1974) (service pursuant to Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa, 
see supra note 249) ("Congress in providing for nationwide service of process, remains subject 
to the constraints of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Leasco Data Process- 
ing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972) (service pursuant to  both 
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa, see supra note 249, and 
the New York State long-arm statute, N.Y. Clv. PRAC. LAW §§301 and 302(a)(l), (2) and (3)) 
("it is reasonable to infer that Congress meant to assert personal jurisdiction over foreigners 
not present in the United States to  but, of course, not beyond the bounds permitted by the 
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 391 (D.R.I. 
1977). aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978) (service 
pursuant to the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. 91391(e), see supra note 248) 
("the due process limitation on national service of process is found by . . . an inquiry man- 
dated by the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause"); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating 
Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-205 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (service pursuant to Section 27 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78aa, see supra note 249) (after reviewing various authorities, 
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commentators498 have expressed the position that "whatever the view 
court concluded that fifth amendment due process clause limits congressional grant of nation- 
wide service of process and that those limitations are not necessarily coextensive with the Inter- 
national Shoe test); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1972) 
(service pursuant to Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S78aa, see 
supra note 249) ("Citizens of foreign countries are entitled to . . . protection under the Fifth 
Amendment"); Securities and Exch. Comm. v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 748 (D. Md. 1968) 
(service pursuant to Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. $806-14) 
("the assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents by the district courts considering federal ques- 
tions is limited by the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment"). See also Engineering 
Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706, 709 & n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (service of complaint 
pursuant to Rule B(1) of the SUPPLEMENTAL RULES FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME 
CLAIMS to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by attachment) ("Rule B(l) grants us power to render 
a judgment binding on the parties to the extent of [the] value of the attached property [and 
t]he constitutionality of the Act of Congress must be tested under the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment"). Even where service of process was not made pursuant to a federal 
statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of process, some federal courts have asserted 
that the Fifth Amendment should govern amenability in their particular federal question cases. 
See, e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 
200, 203 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (trademark infringement action; service, under Rule 4(e), pur- 
suant to District of Columbia long-arm statute) ("the outer boundaries of a court's authority 
to proceed against a particular person or  entity is set for federal tribunals by the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment"); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 
1143 (7th Cir. 1975) (patent infringement action; service, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to Illinois 
long-arm statute) ("[iln this litigation . . . a federally created right is at issue, and due process 
is properly a matter for examination in light of the fifth amendment"); Vest v. Waring, 1983-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 7 65,419 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (antitrust action; service, under former Rule 4(d)(7) 
and Rule 4(e), pursuant to Georgia long-arm statute) ("[wlhen this court's subject matter jurisdic- 
tion is predicated . . . upon the presence of a federal question . . . , a nonresident defendant's 
amenability to personal jurisdiction is a matter of federal law . . .[;I 'the appropriate inquiry 
lies with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,"' quoting Laplyrouse v. Texaco, 
Inc. 693 F.2d 581, 585 (5th Cir. 1982)); Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418 F. 
Supp. 915, 920 n.6 (N.D. Oh 1976) (patent infringement action; service, under Rule 4(e), pur- 
suant to Ohio long-arm statute) ("[slince this case presents a federal question in a federal court, 
technically it is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth . . . Amendment that requires construc- 
tion"); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 356-57 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (admiralty 
action; service, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to Michigan long-arm statute) ("the court must ex- 
amine the facts in light of the constitutional proscriptions of the due process clause of the 
Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment"). See also Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson 
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 232 (D.N.J. 1966) (declaratory judgment action for patent invalidity 
and nonenfringement; service, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to New Jersey Rule 4:4-4(d)) ("[ilnsofar 
as due process is concerned, this Court's power to assert jurisdiction in a Federal question 
matter is tested, technically speaking, under the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
In cases in which federal process was served, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to the long-arm 
statute of the state in which the court was sitting, some federal courts have taken the position 
that, while a federal standard should, as a general matter, govern federal court personal jurisdie- 
tion in federal question cases, use of state long-arm statutes requires a fourteenth amendment 
rather than a fifth amendment analysis. See, e-g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 
654 F.2d 280, 282, 284 (3d Cir. 1981) (admiralty action; service, under Rule 4(e), pursuant 
to New Jersey long-arm statute) ('In any event, even in nondiversity cases, if service of pro- 
cess must be made pursuant to a state long-arm statute . . . , the defendant's amenability 
to suit in federal district court is limited by that statute . . . [since in] enacting its long-arm 
rule, . . . New Jersey is limited by the due process constraints of the fourteenth amendment. 
Therefore, we believe that [the defepdant's] amenability to suit in the District of New Jersey 
must be judged by fourteenth amendment standards.") See also Hartley v. Sioux City & New 
Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1967) (admiralty action; service, under 
Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to Pennsylvania long-arm statute) (fifth amendment analysis only ap- 
propriate for federal means of service of process). 
498. See, e.g., supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
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one takes toward diversity, . . . Fifth Amendment considerations would 
appear to be the appropriate ones for testing amenability where sub- 
ject matter jurisdiction rests on a federal question or other head of 
federal jurisdiction."4gg While this position seems uniform, various 
judicial and scholarly responses or attempts to "practice what they 
preach" have been disconcertingly nonuniform in practice and in 
rationale.s00 One stumbling block has been, of course, the absence 
of an articulable fifth amendment standard that has been accepted 
generally.50' Partially or wholly inseparable from this problem- 
perhaps, one might say, "inextricably intertwined" with this problem 
of definition-are the difficulties entailed by the various ways in which 
a federal court is authorized to serve process on individual and/or 
corporate defendants.'02 The result has been nonuniform treatment 
of cases, both intercategory and intra~ategory.'~~ 
Before embarking on a detailed consideration of lower federal court 
and scholarly treatment of the issue of federal court personal jurisdic- 
tion in federal question cases, this would be an appropriate point at 
which to consider Supreme Court treatment of this question. That 
any federal amenability standard or limitation in federal question cases 
springs from the fifth amendment due process clause generally is 
accepted.504 The Court, moreover, consistently has acknowledged in 
dictum the authority of Congress to authorize nationwide service of 
process for all federal courts in all matters over which those courts 
would have subject matter jurisdi~tion.~~' No court or commentator 
has taken serious issue with the proposition that the Constitution would 
not preclude Congress from so extending the process of federal courts. 
Some courts and commentators have gone further, accepting this dic- 
tum as established law,506 and others even have given this dictum such 
expansive reading as to establish the capacity of Congress not only 
to authorize "extraterritorial" reach for federal process, but also to 
render defendants served, pursuant to such statutes, amenable to the 
personal jurisdiction of the federal court serving process.'07 These 
499. Foster, supra note 191, at 96-97 n.75. 
500. See infra notes 573-1355 and accompanying text. 
501. See supra notes 476-77 and accompanying text. 
502. See supra notes 273-94 and accompanying text and infra notes 561-72 and accom- 
panying text. 
503. See infra notes 573-1355 and accompanying text. 
504. See supra notes 329 and 497 and accompanying text. 
505. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
506. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191, at 320-21. 
507. See, e.g., Hilgeman v. National Ins. Co. of N. Am., 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(infra notes 602-08 and accompanying text); Sohns v. DahI, 392 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Va. 
1975) (infra notes 592-601 and accompanying text); Arpet, Ltd. v. Homans, 390 F. Supp. 908 
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (infra notes 587-91 and accompanying text). 
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authorities go too far. The Supreme Court has never equated authority 
to serve process with amenability to suit. In fact, in his concurring 
opinion in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Baux- 
ites de G~inee ,~O~ Justice Powell painstakingly distinguished between 
authority to serve process and authority to assert jurisdiction over 
the defendant so served.'Og While both are limited by either a fifth 
or fourteenth amendment due process clause, service of process is 
a technical procedure necessary to apprise the defendant of the penden- 
cy of litigation against him5I0 and due process requires that process 
be served in the manner calculated to maximize the possibility that 
the defendant will have actual notice of the suit.5" Proper service 
of process is thus necessary to "trigger" the personal jurisdiction of 
a court over a defendant if the court properly may assert jurisdiction 
over such defendant. Proper service of process, however, does not 
render the defendant amenable to suit; a separate amenability basis, 
such as presence, must exist. Justice Powell observed that because 
personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted without proper service of pro- 
cess, commentators and judges often incorporate amenability into 
servi~e."~ Amenability, however, is a separate requirement. Therefore, 
even if the prior Supreme Court cases definitely established the con- 
stitutional power of Congress to authorize federal district court pro- 
cess to run nationwide, or even worldwide, some additional inquiry 
as to whether due process standards were satisfied would be required. 
In some federal cases the question of whether a corporation will 
be amenable to the personal jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in 
a particular state depends on whether the defendant corporation is 
508. 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
509. Justice Powell stated: 
Jurisdiction over the person generally is dealt with by Rule 4, governing the methods 
of service through which personal jurisdiction may be obtained. Although Rule 4 
deals expressly only with service of process, not with the underlying jurisdictional 
prerequisites, jurisdiction may not be obtained unless process is served in compliance 
with applicable law. . . . For this reason Rule 4 frequently has been characterized 
as a jurisdictional provision. . . . 
Id. at  715 n.6 (citation omitted). 
510. As one court stated: 
Personal jurisdiction refers to the Court's ability to assert judicial power over the 
parties and bind them by its adjudication. Service of process is the corollary require- 
ment which sets the Court's personal jurisdiction in gear. That is, someone amenable 
to the assertion of jurisdiction cannot be subject to its exercise until he has been 
properly served. Both that assertion of power and the subsequent service must be 
statutorily and constitutionally permissible. 
Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 224 (D.N.J. 1966). 
511. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
512. See supra note 509. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 104 1984-1985 
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
"doing business" in the state.*13 Arrowsmith and its progeny establish- 
ed that in diversity cases the question of whether a corporation is 
doing business for purposes of personal jurisdiction is to be deter- 
mined by the law of the state in which the federal court sits.''" The 
Supreme Court, however, has not addressed any question of a federal 
standard to be pursued in federal question cases. 
In United States v. Scophony Corporation of America,"' a suit 
in which process had been served pursuant to Section 12 of the Clayton 
Act,'I6 the Court determined that the defendant corporation had 
"transact[ed] business" within the Southern District of New York as 
required by the venue provision of Section 12 and had been "found" 
within that district as required by the service of process provision 
of Section 12."' The Court, however, declined to rule as to the cir- 
cumstances under which a defendant corporation that had been 
properly served pursuant to Section 12 would be amendable to suit. 
The Court stated: 
We deal here with a problem of statutory construction, not one of 
constitutional import. Nor do we have any question of the exercise 
of Congress' power to its farthest limit. The issue is simply how 
far Congress meant to go, and specifically whether it intended to 
create venue and liability to service of process through occurrence 
within a district of the kinds of acts done here on Scophony7s 
behalf.5'8 
In a footnote, the Court refused to apply International Shoe to the 
case, not because it found the standard inappropriate, but because 
"[Tlhere [was] no necessity for doing When provided with 
the opportunity to establish a federal amenability standard, the 
Supreme Court declined to do so. 
A very recent Supreme Court case, Verlinden v. Central Bank of 
513. See, e.g., United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); Arrowsmith, 
320 F.2d 219; Jaftex, 282 F.2d 508. 
514. See supra notes 434-87 and accompanying text. 
515. 333 U.S. 795 (1948). 
516. Id. at 796. For the text of Section 12 of the Clayton Act, see supra note 248. 
517. Scophony, 333 U.S. at  818. 
518. Id. at  804. 
519. Id. at 804 11.13. The court stated: 
Appellee makes no suggestion of a constitutional issue. The Government, however, 
suggests that, in view of our recent decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, which was concerned with the jurisdiction of a state over a foreign 
corporation for purposes of suit and service of process, and in view of aspects of 
similarity between that problem and the one now presented, we extend to this case 
and to 5 12 the criteria there formulated and applied. There is no necessity for doing 
so. The facts of the two cases are considerably different and, as we have said, we 
are not concerned here with finding the utmost reach of Congress' power. 
Id. 
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Nigeria,52o provided a limited context in which to address this issue. 
The decision, however, has contributed little to the question, at least 
little that is not susceptible of differing interpretations. Verlinden, 
a Dutch Corporation, instituted suit in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York against the Central Bank of 
Nigeria, "an instrumentality of Nigeria," for anticipatory breach of 
a letter of credit.52' The only connection between the parties, the matter 
in litigation, and the Southern District of New York was that in con- 
nection with a contract with Verlinden to deliver cement to Nigeria, 
- the Central Bank of Nigeria "improperly established an unconfirmed 
letter of credit payable through Morgan Guaranty Trust Company 
in New Y ~ r k . " ~ ~ ~  Both subject matter and personal jurisdiction were 
asserted under $2 of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
(FSIA).523 This section provides that district courts shall have subject 
matter jurisdiction over any nonjury civil suit against a foreign state 
that is not entitled to immunity under certain sections of the FSIA 
or "under any applicable international agreement" and shall have per- 
sonal jurisdiction over the foreign state so sued so long as the court 
has subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA and "service has been 
made under section 1608 of this title.'7524 Section 1608 of Title 28 
of the United States Code prescribes methods of serving process "upon 
a foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state" or "upon 
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."525 If properly served 
pursuant to section 1608, therefore, "a foreign state is subject to 
district court in personam jurisdiction only in those instances where 
it is not entitled to sovereign immunity as specified in sections 
1605-1607 of the Act."526 Central Bank moved to dismiss the action, 
inter alia, "for (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; [and] (2) lack 
of personal jurisdiction over Central Bank based upon sovereign im- 
munity and the act of state doctrine."527 According to the district 
520. 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). 
521. Id. at 1965-66 (1983). The district court opinion appears at 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
522. 103 S. Ct. at 1966. 
523. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. $5 1330; 1332(a)(2)-(a)(.I); 
1391(f); 1441(d); and 1602-1611 (1976)). For further discussion of the history and provisions 
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), see generally Kane, Sfring Foreign 
Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385 (1982); Note, Minimum Contacts 
Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 12 GA. J .  INT'L & COLIP. L. 211 
(1982). See also Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 252-53 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (brief discussion of development of FSIA). 
524. 28 U.S.C. $1330 (1976). For the text of this statutory provision, see supra note 250. 
525. 28 U.S.C. $$1608(a), (b), and (c) (Supp. 1983). 
526. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1293. 
527. Id. a t  1288. 
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court, Central Bank did not challenge personal jurisdiction because 
of any constitutional defect but merely because Central Bank did not 
come within the statutory grounds for assertion of personal jurisdic- 
tion under the FSIA. The court of appeals characterized this as a 
motion to dismiss "for lack of jurisdiction under FSIA."528 This makes 
analysis of the opinions difficult because the court makes no distinc- 
tion between lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a nonwaivable defect 
in the power of the court over the particular matter before it,529 and 
lack of personal jurisdiction, a waivable defect in the authority of 
the court to render a decision binding on the defendant.530 While the 
FSIA ties together subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdic- 
tion in an unprecedented manner, the structure of section 2 of the 
FSIA should require that the initial procedural inquiry be into sub- 
ject matter jurisdiction. If subject matter jurisdiction exists, then, ac- 
cording to the FSIA, personal jurisdiction also will exist so long as 
process is served in the appropriate manner. 
Central Bank first argued that a district court could not assert 
authority, under the FSIA, over a "dispute between foreign entities" 
involving a nonfederal question, an objection to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the court.53' The district court, the court of appeals, 
and the Supreme Court each ruled that the FSIA by its language was 
not limited to suits initiated by U.S. citizens or corporations.532 The 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that such an interpretation would 
turn federal district courts into "small international courts of claims," 
noting that sovereign' immunity from suits on commercial matters 
would be granted to the defendant foreign state by the FSIA unless 
the defendant had "some form of substantial contact with the United 
States."s33 
The district court determined that article I11 of the Constitution 
528. Verlinden, 647 F.2d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1981). 
529. See supra notes 3, 18 and 19. 
530. See supra note 3. 
531. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at  1288. The court of appeals framed the issue in the follow- 
ing way: 
This case, one of seven decided today involving the FSIA, presents a sharp issue 
under the Act: may a foreign plaintiff sue a foreign state in a federal court for breach 
of an agreement not governed by federal law? 
647 F.2d at 322 (footnotes omitted). 
532. 488 F. Supp. at  1292; 647 F.2d at  324; 103 S. Ct. a t  1969-70. The district court 
had noted that such broad reading of the language of the FSIA was necessary to effectuate 
"the Congressional purpose of concentrating litigation against sovereign states in the federal 
courts in order to aid the development of a uniform body of federal law governing assertions 
of sovereign immunity." 488 F. Supp. at  1292. 
533. 103 S. Ct. a t  1969-70. 
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would authorize subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by a foreign 
or alien corporation against a foreign state,534 but, relying on its in- 
terpretation of the FSIA, found that the matter before it did not come 
within one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity provided by the 
statute; the Court, therefore, dismissed the complaint "for lack of 
personal jur i sd ic t i~n."~~~ The Supreme Court noted, in a footnote, 
that conclusion by the district court also included a finding that the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction: 
Under the Act . . . both statutory subject matter jurisdiction (other- 
wise known as "competence") and personal jurisdiction turn on ap- 
plication of the substantive provisions of the Act. . . . [I]f none 
of the exceptions to sovereign immunity set forth in the Act applies, 
the District Court lacks both statutory subject matter jurisdiction 
and personal jurisdiction. The District Court's conclusion that none 
of the exceptions to the Act applied therefore signified an absence 
of both competence and personal jurisdi~tion.~'~ 
The court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether the defen- 
dant came within one of the stated exceptions of the FSIA to sovereign 
immunity. Instead, after "concluding that both plaintiff and defen- 
dant are within the class of parties contemplated by" the FSIA,537 
the court of appeals addressed the question of whether the subject 
matter jurisdiction granted district courts by the language of the FSIA 
over suits by foreign (alien) plaintiffs against foreign states came within 
the authority granted to lower federal courts by Article 111 of the 
Con~titution.'~~ The court of appeals considered and quickly dismissed 
the possibility of constitutional authority under the diversity grant 
of article 111: "The phrase nowhere mentions a case between two 
aliens."539 After a more detailed analysis, the court of appeals con- 
cluded that such authority also was not available under 28 U.S.C. 
$133ls4O or the more broad "arising under" language of article III.'" 
Therefore, "find[ing] federal courts to be without power to hear suits 
such as the one before us," the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal 
of Verlinden's complaint, but on a different ground-''that the court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy.77542 
534. 488 F. Supp. at 1292. 
535. Id. at 1302: 
536. 103 S. Ct. at 1967 n.5. 
537. 647 F.2d at 324. 
538. Id. at 324-30. 
539. Id. at 325. 
540. Id. at 327. 
541. Id. at 329. 
542. Id. at 330. 
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The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that "the grant of jurisdic- 
tion in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is consistent with the 
Con~t i tu t ion , "~~~  and remanded to the court of appeals for its deter- 
mination of whether the action fell within any of the exceptions to 
sovereign immunity spelled out in the FSIA.544 If the court of ap- 
peals would agree with the district court that no exception applied, 
the case would not come within the congressional grant of the sub- 
ject matter jurisdiction in Section 2 of the FSIA and would be 
dismissed.s45 The Supreme Court concluded: "If, on the other hand, 
the Court of Appeals concludes that jurisdiction does not exist under 
the statute, the action may then be .remanded to the District Court 
for further  proceeding^."'^^ 
The treatment by the Supreme Court of this case leaves in doubt 
its position on the question of amenability standards in federal ques- 
tion cases in general, of amenability standards in cases in which a 
federal statute authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of process, 
or even the amenability standards in cases arising under the FSIA,s47 
an unusual federal statute purporting to prescribe circumstances in 
which a federal court will have personal jurisdiction-satisfaction of 
the requirements for subject matter jurisdiction plus proper service 
of process pursuant to a particular federal statute.s48 Lower federal 
courts have required that if the FSIA criteria for personal jurisdic- 
tion are satisfied, a separate due process analysis must be conducted 
to determine the defendant's amenability to suit, therefore regarding 
the FSIA criteria much as courts have regarded state long arm 
statutes.s49 This additional analysis, as stated in one oft-cited Second 
543. 103 S. Ct. at 1973. 
544. Id. 
545. Id. at 1974. 
546. Id. 
547. As one commentator noted in 1982: "The Court has not had the opportunity to ad- 
dress the role of minimum contacts in international disputes under the FSIA. That task has 
been left to the lower federal courts." Note, supra note 523, at 224. Verlinden provided the 
Court with the opportunity, but the Court chose not to employ it. 
548. See supra notes 524-26 and accompanying text. 
549. See, e.g., Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 
1094, 1105 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("a finding of FSIA personal jurisdiction, which would rest 
in part on a finding of non-immunity, must comport with the demands of due process"); Har- 
ris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982) (in 
determining personal jurisdiction under the FSIA, "we must assess the exercise of authority 
against the standards of due process"); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic 
of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 1981) ("the [FSIA] cannot create personal jurisdiction 
where the constitution forbids it"); Gibbons v. Udaras ne Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1116-17 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("statutory aspects of the Court's analysis of defendants' personal jurisdiction 
argument are controlled by the FSIA. . . .[;I the Court must still determine whether an exercise 
of the personal jurisdiction conferred by the FSIA is permissible under the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment").See also Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
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Circuit opinion, is based on the premise that "the Act cannot create 
506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. 111. 1980) (court examined contacts of the defendant with the forum, 
concluding such contacts were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction under the FSIA). 
Evidence also exists in the House Reports that accompanied the FSIA that Congress intended 
judicial reliance on some sort of contacts analysis in determining personal jurisdiction ques- 
tions under the FSIA: 
For personal jurisdiction to exist under section 1330(b), the claim must first of all 
be one over which the district courts have original jurisdiction under section 1330(a), 
meaning a claim for which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. . . . These 
immunity provisions, therefore, prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist before 
our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction. 
H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 6604, 6612. The immunity provisions referred to in the Congressional Report include 
sections 1605(a)(2) and (3) of the FSIA, which provide, in pertinent part: 
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United 
States or  of the States in any case - 
. . . . 
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connec- 
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside 
the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States; 
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue 
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United 
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by 
the foreign state; or  that property or  any property exchanged for such property is 
owned or operated by an agency or  instrumentality of the foreign state and that 
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States. . . . 
28 U.S.C. §§1605(a)(2), (3) (1976). 
At least one court has taken the position that the above-quoted Congressional statement 
did not "mean that the statutory standard for determining non-immunity is coextensive with 
the due process standard governing personal jurisdiction, see World- Wide Volks~~~agen Corp. 
v. Woodson . . . ; International Shoe v. Washington. . . ." Maritime Int'l Nominees Establish- 
ment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). The 
court continued, in a footnote: 
Of course, a finding of FSIA personal jurisdiction, which would rest in part on a 
finding of non-immunity, must comport with the demands of due process, and Con- 
gress intended that the Act satisfy those demands. . . . But the immunity determina- 
tion involves considerations distinct from the issue of personal jurisdiction, and the 
FSIA's interlocking provisions are most profitably analyzed when these distinctions 
are kept in mind. 
Id. at 1105 11-18 (citations omitted). On the other hand, the district court in Verlinden found 
that the "substantive criteria [of the immunities provisions] were intended to embody the con- 
stitutional requirements of due process, which may only be satisfied if there are sufficient con- 
tacts between the litigant and the forum state." 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
Neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court made any reference to this aspect of the 
district court opinion. 
The legislative history is subject to at  least twq other interpretations. One might argue that 
the FSIA includes not only statutory authority for service of process but also an amenability 
standard built into the immunity provisions, sufficient contacts with the United States. Or, 
on the other hand, the immunity provisions might be read as, in effect, a special long-arm 
statute that prescribes those circumstances in which the government has authorized extrater- 
ritorial service of process, and the validity of application of that statute to any particular defendant 
still would be analyzed in terms of its constitutional validity under the fifth amendment due 
process clause. If the last interpretation were accepted, one might argue that the immunity 
provisions indicate the entity with regard to which any due process minimum contacts type 
analysis would be conducted-the United States as a whole rather than any particular federal 
district or  the particular state in which the federal court is sitting. 
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personal jurisdiction where the Constitution forbids it."550 In deter- 
mining whether such due process requirements are satisfied, some 
courts have examined the defendant's contact with the United Statesss' 
while others have required sufficient contacts with the state in which 
the federal court is sittingsSZ or even actual "presence" of the defen- 
dant in the United  state^."^ One court of appeals established a four 
step approach to determine amenability: first, to what extent did the 
defendant avail itself of the benefits and privileges of American laws; 
second, to what extent could the defendant have foreseen the instiga- 
tion of litigation in the United States; third, how inconvenient would 
it be for the defendant to litigate in the United States; and fourth, 
what interests would the United States have in hearing the case.ss4 
The Supreme Court opinion in Verlinden, as well as the opinions 
of the district court and the court of appeals, were silent on the ques- 
tion of whether a separate due process analysis would be required 
if, on remand, the court of appeals found that the defendant was 
550. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d 
Cir. 1981). In its analysis of the FSIA, the court of appeals noted: 
In structure, the F.S.I.A. is a marvel of compression. . . . [I]t purports to provide 
answers to three crucial questions in a suit against a foreign state: the availability 
of sovereign immunity as a defense, the presence of subject matter jurisdiction over 
the claim, and the propriety of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. . . . This 
economy of decision has come, however, at the price of considerable confusion in 
the district courts. 
Id. at 306. See also supra note 549. 
551. See, e.g., Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1352-53 
(1 1 th Cir. 1982) (court applied International Shoe- World- Wide Volkslvagen minimum con- 
tacts analysis, but evaluated the defendant's contacts with the United States); Texas Trading, 
647 F.2d at  314 (established four-step test for amenability, which test focused on the relation- 
ship of the defendant to the United States, see infra note 554 and accompanying text); Gibbons 
v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court announced that fifth 
amendment applied, cited International Shoe for "minimum contacts" test, used the Texas 
Trading four-step inquiry as a "guide [to] the Court's application of International Shoe's 
minimum contacts test", and evaluated the defendant's contacts with the United States). See 
also Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1105-06 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (court implied, in dictum, that in a due process analysis it would consider 
the defendants' contacts with the United States). 
552. See, e.g., Thomas P. Gozales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Production de Costa 
Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980) (using California long-arm statute, court found defen- 
dants' contacts with California insufficient to "qualify as purposeful activity invoking the benefits 
and protections of the state"); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Americas, Inc. v. Banco Na- 
cional de Fomento Cooperatino, 485 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (using Wisconsin long-arm 
statute to support its holding, court denied jurisdiction where the defendant's direct contact 
with the forum state amounted to a single inspection visit by bank officers). 
553. See, e.g., East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v. Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 387-88 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (no personal jurisdiction because no continuous and systematic relationship 
with the forum and no physical presence within the forum); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 453 
F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (only contact with forum was oil shipments to the United 
States and court ruled that embargo of shipments was not a sufficient contact). 
554. Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at  314. 
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not entitled to sovereign immunity and that, therefore, federal sub- 
ject matter jurisdiction existed under the FSIA. The Supreme Court 
also gave no clue as to the appropriate standard under which such 
analysis would be conducted. The silence of the Court is surprising 
particularly in light of the substantial number of lower federal court 
cases in which some sort of separate due process analysis has been 
empl~yed;"~ its opinion could have provided an appropriate vehicle 
for guiding the subsequent determinations of the lower courts. Perhaps, 
however, the Court was reluctant to provide guidance on an issue 
that might not arise. 
In view of the silence by the Court on this issue, several inferences 
are possible. First, one might conclude that the Supreme Court felt 
that no due process inquiry would be required if the defendants 
satisfied the statutory criteria for personal j~r isd ic t ion .~~~ Or, one might 
hypothesize that the Court, always seemingly reluctant to address the 
issue of amenability standards in federal courts,557 declined to raise 
the issue and resolve it because the decision on remand might eliminate 
the need to decide that issue.558 Finally, one might argue, from its 
references to the "United States contacts" requirements necessary for 
exclusion from sovereign immunity,559 that the Supreme Court con- 
sidered that some "minimum contacts" analysis had been programmed 
into the statute regarding the subject matter jurisdiction question.'60 
In sum, however, in its most recent opportunity to address the issue, 
the Supreme Court seems to studiously have avoided any line of discus- 
sion that might raise the question of federal amenability standards 
in federal question cases. 
555. See supra note 549. 
556. The Court gave no directions to the district court in regard to this contingency, and 
the opinion might be read as implying that satisfaction of statutory criteria was sufficienl, 
especially in circumstances in which the statute provided express authorization for assertion 
of personal jurisdiction upon the satisfaction of certain criteria. The Court never has ruled 
on the question of whether a separate amenability inquiry must be conducted in federal ques- 
tion cases beyond the inquiry of whether process has been served properly. See supra notes 
295-96 and accompanying text. The Court has, however, albeit impliedly, adopted an amenability 
standard and analysis for diversity cases. See supra notes 480-81 and accompanying text. Those 
cases, however, involved state rather than federal statues, and therefore, the fact that a special 
due process analysis was required in such cases does not imply that such an analysis would 
be essential in federal question cases in which service of process was made pursuant to a special 
federal statute. 
557. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text. 
558. See supra notes 543-46 and accompanying text. 
559. See supra note 549 and accompanying text. 
560. See supra note 549. In fact, one might- view the FSIA as a legislative attempt to 
codify all procedural aspects of a particular type of litigation, including the constitutional re- 
quirement that the defendant be afforded due process of law. 
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A. Categorization of Federal Question Cases 
To facilitate analysis of personal jurisdiction standards in federal 
question cases, federal question cases may be categorized according 
to the manner in which process is served. Service may be made: pur- 
suant to the federal statute that authorizes nationwide or even 
worldwide service of process as authorized by Rule 4(e);561 pursuant 
to the wholly federal procedures authorized by Rules 4(d)(l) and 
4(d)(3)562 and new Rule 4(~)(2)(C)(ii);~~~ "pursuant to the law of the 
State in which the district court is held" as authorized by new Rule 
4(~)(2)(C)(i);'~~ "in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in 
which the district court is held" as authorized by former Rule 4(d)(7);565 
and, upon a party not found within a state, "under the circumstances 
and in the manner prescribed in [a long-arm statute]" of the state 
in which the district court is held, as authorized by Rule 4(e).566 Even 
if a general uniform approach to the question of amenability stan- 
dards in federal question cases would not be possible because of the 
wide range of methods by which proper service of process may be 
accomplished, one would hypothesize that a uniform approach would 
have developed within each of the above-described categories of cases. 
This, however, has not come to pass.567 The best way to become 
familiar with the problem of nonuniformity and lack of definite stan- 
dards and with the various approaches that courts have taken is to 
consider separately each category of cases. Some federal question cases 
do not fit neatly into this structured analysis, either because the method 
of service utilized never is noted by the court or because the court 
discusses more than one method for service; each of the former will 
be considered in regard to the category into which the case would 
most likely fit, and each of the latter will be considered in regard 
to one category and noted in regard to the other category or categories 
mentioned in the opinion. 
561. See supra note 287 and accompanying text and infra notes 573-74 and accompanying 
test. 
562. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text and infra notes 799-809 and accom- 
panying text. 
563. See supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
564. See supra note 278 and accompanying text and infra notes 900-02 and accompanying 
fext. 
565. See supra notes 279-86 and accompanying text and infra notes 893-913 and accompa- 
nying test. 
566. See supra note 288 and accompanying text and infra notes 1107-70 and accompany- 
ing text. 
567. See, e.g., infra notes 579-784, 810-87, 920-1038, and 1123-13 16 and accompanying text. 
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In the consideration of the question of personal jurisdiction in federal 
question cases, several often conflicting realities must be kept in mind. 
These realities must, to some extent, dictate result and rationale: (1) 
federal district courts have always been organized territorially around 
the territorial boundaries of the states in which the district courts were 
held and any authorization for a federal district court to reach beyond 
these territorial limitations has been viewed as an exceptional act re- 
quiring some congressional authorization by statute or federal rule;56* 
(2) the notions of sovereignty that early required such territorial restric- 
tions on state courts cannot be applied sensibly to federal courts sitting 
in federal question cases;569 (3) Congress, consistent with the Con- 
stitution, could have authorized nationwide service of process for all 
federal district courts;570 (4) Congress has not done so;57' (5) Con- 
gress, in statutes and the Federal Rules, has prescribed methods for 
service of process in particular circumstances but has never explicitly 
addressed the question of federal court amenability standards.572 
B. Analysis of Federal Question Cases Arising in the Various 
Categories 
I .  Amenability Standards in Federal Question Cases in which 
Special Federal Statutes Authorize Nationwide Service of Process 
In areas of particular federal concern, Congress has enacted scores 
of statutes that authorize that federal district court process reach 
nationwide or even Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure authorizes service upon a party not found or domiciled 
in the state under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed 
by a federal statute.574 Among these statutes, the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 is unique in purporting to lay down those 
circumstances in which the federal court will have personal jurisdic- 
tion over the defendant;575 the other federal statutes that authorize 
extraterritorial service of process are silent on the question of per- 
sonal jurisdiction. A few courts have asserted personal jurisdiction 
over defendants solely on the authority of the federal statutes.576 Most 
See supra notes 196-294 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 4 and 73 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
See supra note 524 and accompanying text. 
See infra notes 579-682 and accompanying text. 
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courts, as in the FSIA cases discussed above,577 have ruled that the 
federal statute may be utilized to obtain personal jurisdiction over 
a nonpresent, nonconsenting defendant served pursuant to the statute 
only if this would not violate some constitutional limitation on federal 
court exercises of personal jurisdiction.578 Most courts agree that the 
due process standard for federal question cases in which process is 
served by the wholly federal means of a federal statute authorizing 
nationwide or worldwide service of process should be the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment. The greatest divergence occurs in this 
area in the formulation and application of that standard. 
Cases in Which Courts Have Not Required Separate 
Amenability Analysis-Physical Power or Sovereignty Doctrine 
Review of these various cases should begin with those in which 
federal courts did not articulate or attempt to apply any genuine 
amenability standards except, in some cases, presence or domicile 
within the United States. In one pre-International Shoe opinion, 
Eastman Kodak Company of New York v. Southern Photo Materials 
Co., 5 7 9  the Supreme Court faced the question of personal jurisdiction 
of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 
over a defendant New York corporation that had been served with 
process in New York pursuant to the service of process provisions 
of Section 12 of the Clayton The plaintiff, Southern Photo 
Materials Co., had alleged that the defendant, Eastman Kodak Com- 
pany, in violation of antitrust laws, "had engaged in a combination 
to monopolize the interstate trade in the United States in photographic 
materials and supplies, and had monopolized the greater part of such 
interstate trade."581 One issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was 
"whether there was local jurisdiction or venue in the District Court. 
. . . 'y582 under Section 12 of the Clayton Act. This section provided 
that "any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against 
a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof 
it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found 
577. See supra notes 549-54 and accompanying text. 
578. See infra notes 687-784 and accompanying text. 
579. 273 U.S. 359 (1926). For discussion of the International Shoe case and its progeny, 
see supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text. Clearly, a case decided prior to International 
Shoe would not include any reference to a "minimum contacts" test of amenability, many 
variations of which have been tested by federal courts in later cases involving nationwide or 
worldwide service of process statutes. See infra notes 687-784 and accompanying text. 
580. Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 367. 
581. Id. at 368. 
582. Id. at 369-70. 
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or transacts business, and all process in such cases may be served 
in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be 
After stating that the issue of "[wlhether or not the jurisdic- 
tion of the District Court was rightly sustained. . .resolves itself into 
a question whether the venue of the suit was properly laid in that 
the Supreme Court analyzed the facts of the case in light 
of the elements necessary to establish venue. The Court concluded 
that the defendant "was transacting business in that district, within 
the meaning of Section 12 of the Clayton Act, in such sense as pro- 
perly established the venue of the suit."s8s Without further analysis, 
the Court held that the defendant "was duly brought before the court 
by the service of process in the New York district. . .and that its 
jurisdictional defenses were rightly overruled."s86 The Supreme Court 
therefore found that if venue was satisfied and process had been served 
properly, personal jurisdiction would be established. In other words, 
personal jurisdiction flowed directly from the statute without the re- 
quirement of any additional amenability analysis. 
The result reached by the Supreme Court, of course, could be 
ascribed to the fact that the case predated International Shoe. Subse- 
quent to International Shoe, however, some federal courts have ap- 
plied the Eastman Kodak approach to cases involving nationwide ser- 
vice of process statutes. 
Arpet, Ltd. v. HomansS8' was a suit brought by an alien corpora- 
tion to recover damages from several defendants under the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter refer- 
red to as Securities Acts). The plaintiff entered into settlement 
agreements with all but two individual defendants. These defendants 
moved to dismiss the complaint, inter alia, for lack of venue and 
personal jurisdiction.588 Suit had been initiated in the Western District 
of Pennsylvania, although both defendants were residents of New York 
and each previously had little or no contact with Pennsyl~ania. '~~ The 
defendants alleged that the District Court for the Western District 
of Pennsylvania lacked venue under the Securities Acts and, thus, 
the statutory authority for service of process "in any other district 
of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant 
583. Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 512, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 522 (1982)). 
584. Eastman Kodak, 273 U.S. at 370. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that if 
the requirements of venue mere satisfied, personal jurisdiction could be obtained by the method 
employed by the Georgia district court. 
585. Id. at 374. 
586. Id. 
587. 390 F .  Supp. 908 (W.D. Pa. 1975). 
588. Id. at 910. 
589. Id. 
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may be found"sg0 could not be utilized. Finding that venue was proper 
under the 1934 Act, the court concluded: 
Given the finding that venue properly lies in this district, the court 
has personal jurisdiction over defendants. . .who were served pur- 
suant to the nationwide service of process provisions of. . .the 
Securities Act of 1933 and. . .the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.59' 
The court did not indulge in any amenability analysis, apparently con- 
cluding that the statute itself conferred personal jurisdiction. 
Sohns v. Dah1,592 a case instituted in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Virginia and decided shortly after Arpet, 
was similar to Arpet in several regards. In Sohns, the plaintiff brought 
suit against the defendants, alleging violation of the Securities Acts, 
common law fraud and deceit. The district court asserted subject matter 
jurisdiction over the state law claims on a theory of pendent jurisdic- 
tion. The defendants moved to dismiss, inter alia, on the grounds 
of improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction because both in- 
dividual defendants resided in Florida, not the Western District of 
Virginia, and one defendant alleged that he had no contacts with the 
Western District of Virginia.593 The court reviewed the law of federal 
court venue, concluding that if venue could be established "under 
the broader venue provision of the 1934 Act,"594 venue also would 
be established for the claims arising under the 1933 Act and for the 
590. 15 U.S.C. $ 7 7 ~  (1982) (Section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. $78aa 
(1982) (Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Service of process pursuant to 
these provisions is contingent upon proper venue being laid. 
591. Arpet, 390 F. Supp. at  912. Two different conclusions might be drawn from this 
judicial statement. The first would be that the defendants had based their motion to  dismiss 
on lack of venue and that their allegation of lack of personal jurisdiction was based solely 
on the ground that the special service of process provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts would 
be unavailable unless the venue provisions of those statutes had been satisfied. Thus, if the 
court found venue proper, the defendants' personal jurisdiction objections had been resolved. 
Such an interpretation is supported by the description by the court of the defendants' motions 
to dismiss: "Defendants . . . have filed motions to dismiss claiming that venue does not pro- 
perly lie in the Western District of Pennsylvania and, therefore, this court lacks in personam 
jurisdiction." Id. at 910 (emphasis added). 
On the other hand, the language of the court in denying the motions to dismiss might 
be interpreted as presenting the conclusion of the court that venue permits service and proper 
service establishes personal jurisdiction. This writer favors the second interpretation because 
both the parties and the court apparently thought personal jurisdiction an automatic result 
of proper application of the statute. 
592. 392 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Va. 1975). 
593. According to the opinion, while both defendants had moved to  dismiss for lack of 
venue and for failure to state claim upon which relief could be granted, as well as to  transfer 
to a more convenient venue, only one defendant had moved to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. Id. at 1212. Later in the opinion, however, the Court stated: "Defendants have 
also filed a motion to quash service of process because of lack of in personam jurisdiction. 
. . ." Id. at 1217. Finally, the conclusion of the court in respect of personal jurisdiction in- 
cluded both defendants. Id. at  1218. 
594. Id. at 1214. 
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pendent claims.595 Accepting the plaintiff's concession that the defen- 
dants were not "found" or "transacting business" in the Western 
District of Virginia,596 the court found "that the acts and transactions 
that plaintiff has alleged to have occurred in the Western District have 
substantial relation to these alleged violations" of the Securities Acts,J97 
thus coming within the venue requirements of Section 27 of the 1934 
In response to the defendants' "motion to quash service of 
process because of lack of in personam jur i~dic t ion ,"~~~ the court 
quoted the portion of Section 27 of the 1934 Act that permits, in 
cases of proper venue, service of process "in any. . .district of which 
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be 
found."600 The court concluded: "Since venue properly lies in this 
district, this Court has in personam jurisdiction over the defendants 
with the power to serve them properly outside the forum."601 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed 
a similar conclusory analysis in Hilgeman v. National Insurance Com- 
pany of North decided two years after Arpet and Sohns. 
The suit again involved alleged violations of federal securities acts 
and process had been served, pursuant to Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 
on two defendants who resided within the United States but outside 
of Alabama, the state in which the suit was initiated and in which 
the federal district court was sitting. The district court had found 
service insufficient because neither defendant was "found or [was] 
an inhabitant or transacts business in Alabama nor is the suit based 
upon an offer or sale that took place in Alabama."603 The court of 
appeals disagreed on the grounds that "[slervice of process under the 
595. Id. 
596. Id. at 1215. see infra note 607. 
597. 392 F. Supp. at  1216. 
598. 15 U.S.C. $78aa (1976). See supra note 247. 
599. 392 F. Supp. at  1217. See supra note 593. 
600. 15 U.S.C. $78aa (1976). See supra note 247. 
601. 392 F. Supp. a t  1218. The court then found that this in personam jurisdiction also 
extended to  the pendent state law claims. Id. 
602. 547 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1977). See also Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919, 921 
(2d Cir. 1979) (court decided that Section 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 
U.S.C. $1391(e), did not apply in this case and never reached the issue "whether section 1391(e) 
provides a district court with . . . nationwide in personam jurisdiction"); D.H . Blair & Co. 
v. Art Emporium, Inc., [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $99,152 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) (court did not decide personal jurisdiction issue because case transferred to a more con- 
venient forum in which all but one of the defendants were residents and to which the nonresi- 
dent defendant had moved to  transfer, but court implied, in Part I11 of its opinion, that per- 
sonal jurisdiction over defendants served under Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 flowed directly from the statute); Bertozzi v. King Louie International, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 
1166, 1171 (D.R.I. 1976) (court found "jurisdiction and venue are properly laid in this district 
. . . under $27" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and thus did not need to consider 
questions as to whether defendants transacted business in the forum). 
603. Hilgeman, 547 F.2d at  301 (quoting the district court opinion). 
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1933 and 1934 Acts is nationwide. . ."604 and that "personal jurisdic- 
tion. . .[is] governed by Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. . ."605 The court found that the defendants had satisfied 
the requirements of Section 27 and concluded that "jurisdiction and 
venue are proper."606 Like the district courts in Arpet and Sohns, 
the court of appeals in Hilgeman apparently concluded that the authori- 
ty for nationwide service of process on a defendant also included the 
power to extend personal jurisdiction over that defendant without any 
consideration of constitutional requirements. Perhaps the judges found 
that the defendant contacts required for a finding of venue were suf- 
ficient to satisfy some defendant-contact due process requirement for 
personal jurisdiction607 and, therefore, since a case could not be heard 
in the absence of venue, establishing venue also would satisfy any 
contacts requirement.608 If the courts did come to such conclusions, 
however, they did not explicate these determinations or illuminate their 
cryptic findings of personal jurisdiction. 
Kramer v. Scientific Control C ~ r p . , ~ ~ ~  a class action suit against 
multiple corporate and individual defendants alleging violations of the 
Securities Acts, rules and regulations under the 1934 Act, as well as 
common law fraud, was instituted in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and decided two years earlier 
than Arpet and Sohns. Various defendants moved to dismiss on several 
grounds including improper venue and lack of personal jurisdiction. 
As to venue, the district court found that the more restrictive venue 
requirements of Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act were satisfied with regard 
to the objecting defendants and therefore venue was satisfied with 
respect to all claims.610 The defendants who objected to personal 
604. Id. 
605. Id. (emphasis added). - 
606. Id. at  302. 
607. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 establishes venue for any suit under 
the Act in any federal district "wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occur- 
red . . . or in the district wherein the defendant is found or  is an inhabitant or transacts 
business." 15 U.S.C. S78aa (1976). Thus, a suit can be instituted properly only in federal districts 
in which the defendants' conduct violating the securities laws actually occurred or  had some 
impact. This requirement would function to protect defendants from suits in federal districts 
with which they had no contacts. 
608. The problem with such an interpretation is that the traditional purpose served by 
venue provisions is to establish a convenient place of trial in terms of evidence and the like. 
In the case of special federal statutes such as the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the broad venue provi- 
sions serve to ensure that the suit can be brought in a single forum. The venue provisions 
might function as protections for the defendant from suits in inconvenient fora, but these pro- 
visions were not designed to protect due process rights. Thus, if the court wanted to rely on 
the protections built into the venue provisions, it would have to resolve the difficult question 
of whether constitutional rights can be protected by effect rather than by intent. 
609. 365 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
610. Id. at 786-87. 
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jurisdiction had been "'served' with process beyond the borders of 
Penn~ylvania."~~~ The court rejected all objections based on (1) a 
defendant's nonresidence in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, (2) 
a defendant's failure to "purposefully avail. . .himself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within Pennsylvania," and (3) a defendant's 
failure to be found in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or to have 
consented to service in that district. It declared that "[slince none 
of the objecting defendants has asserted that he was neither an in- 
habitant nor found in the district in which he was eventually 'served' 
with process, this Court does not lack jurisdiction over the person 
of any defendant on the basis of either grounds 1, 2, or 3."612 Regar- 
ding the assertions by some defendants that they lacked "sufficient 
minimum contacts with this district and, consequently, the maintenance 
of the action. . .here will offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice,"613 the court noted that since the United States 
is a single jurisdiction, "Congress has the power to provide for the 
reach of service of process to the outer limits of the reach of its 
legislative power which, of course, is anywhere in the United States 
or its territorie~."~'~ Since Section 22(a) of the 1933 Act and Section 
27 of the 1934 Act authorize nationwide service of process, the court 
concluded that "[tlhe issue here is not one of constitutional due pro- 
cess. . . ."615 Again, a district court faced with the nationwide ser- 
vice provisions of the Securities Acts found that proper service pro- 
vided the basis for personal jurisdiction without any additional 
amenability tests. This court, however, unlike those in Arpet, Sohns, 
and Hilgeman, dealt with the question of a minimum contacts 
amenability standard, finding such standard inappropriate, essential- 
ly for reasons of territorial sovereignty of the federal system. 
The argument made in Kramer had been advanced by another district 
court two years earlier in Stern v. G ~ b e l o f f , ~ ' ~  a suit brought in the 
District of Maryland for violations of the Securities Acts. Defendants, 
residents of New York served in New York pursuant to the nation- 
wide service of process provisions of the Securities Acts, moved to 
dismiss for lack of venue and personal jurisdiction. The court first 
611. Id. at 787. 
612. Id. 
613. Id. 
614. Id. 
615. Id. The court found instead that the issue was "one of compliance with the statute 
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. The court apparently was referring to the pro- 
vision in Rule 4(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for service pursuant to a federal statute 
in cases in which the defendant is not domiciled nor found in the state in which the federal 
court is sitting. 
616. 332 F. Supp. 909 (D. Md. 1971). 
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noted a "fundamental principle of the Anglo-American law of jurisdic- 
tion [that] a sovereignty has personal jurisdiction upon any defen- 
dant within its territorial limits, and that it may exercise that jurisdic- 
tion by any of its courts able to obtain service over the defenda~~t."~" 
The United States, it continued, was such a sovereign. In response 
to the defendants' argument that they lacked sufficient "minimum 
contacts with [the district of Maryland] such that the maintenance 
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substan- 
tial justice,"618 the court noted that the International Shoe approach 
dealt only with state court power over nonpresent, nonconsenting 
defendants "served out-of-state pursuant to a state long-arm statute" 
while this "case. . .in no way deals with [such] power. . . . 7 7 6 1 9  ~h~ 
court went on to distinguish cases in which service was made outside 
the territorial United States, and concluded: 
Absent the fairness considerations inherent in requiring a non-resident 
foreigner to defend suits in the federal courts of the United States, 
the weight of authority sustains the in personam jurisdiction of the 
forum district where, venue requirements having been satisfied, 
service is made in distant districts of which defendants are inhabitants 
or where they are 
Finally, as an afterthought, or as an amulet against reversal, the court 
noted that, "[ilf the due process tests of International Shoe Com- 
pany v. Washington are applicable to the case at bar," the defen- 
dants had sufficient contacts with the District of Maryland to satisfy 
those criteria.621 
A position similar to that in Stern and Kramer was taken by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the oft- 
cited case of Mariash v. M0rri11,~~~ another suit in which the plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant had violated the provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. Mariash was decided in 1974, before Arpet 
and Sohns but after Kramer. Suit had been initiated in a federal district 
court sitting in New York. The district court had dismissed for lack 
617. Id. at 912 (quoting First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 
736 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)). 
618. 332 F. Supp. at 910. 
619. Id. at 912-13. 
620. Id. at  913. 
621. Id. at 914. Thus, even though the court could have rested its decision on the ground 
that the defendants satisfied a more strict standard, "minimum contacts with the federal district" 
asserting jurisdiction, the court chose to rely on its sovereignty argument. Id. 
622. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). See S-G Securities, Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. 
Supp. 1114, 1122 (D. Mass. 1978) (in securities suit involving service on the defendants' at- 
torney in the federal district seeking to assert jurisdiction, the court rejected the defendants' 
argument that they lacked "minimum contacts" with the district, citing Mariash for the pro- 
position that Section 27 provides for nationwide service of process). 
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of personal jurisdiction over defendants who had been served in 
Massachusetts, allegedly pursuant to Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 
stating: 
Section 27 is no more than a grant of subject matter jurisdiction 
to the federal district courts-competence to hear a suit arising under 
the Act-and a statement of the venue requirements to be followed 
when such suits are brought. It does not deal with jurisdiction of 
the persons named as defendants in a given case.623 
The court of appeals rejected this interpretation of Section 27 of the 
1934 Act. The court recognized that "Congress, in providing for 
nationwide service of process, remains subject to the constraints of 
the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment,"624 but found that 
the constitutional requirement would be satisfied so long as "the ser- 
vice authorized by statute [is] reasonably calculated to inform the 
defendant of the pendency of the proceedings in order that he may 
take advantage of the opportunity to be heard in his defense."625 In 
response to the defendants' argument that due process also requires 
that the defendants have certain "'minimal contacts' with the State 
which would exercise its jurisdiction,"626 the court of appeals asserted: 
Mere statement of this contention reveals its fatal flaw: It is not 
the State of New York but the United States "which would exercise 
its jurisdiction. . . ." Here, the defendants reside within the ter- 
ritorial boundaries of the United States, the "minimal contacts" re- 
quired to justify the federal government's exercise of power over 
[the defendants] are present. Indeed, the "minimal contacts" prin- 
ciple does not, in our view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating 
the constitutionality of in personam jurisdiction based on nation- 
wide, but not extraterritorial, service of process. It is only the lat- 
ter, quite simply, which even raises a question of the forum's power 
to assert control over the defendant.627 
In a footnote, the court of appeals distinguished .situations in which 
a federal statute authorizes "worldwide" service of process and in 
623. Mariash, 496 F.2d a t  1142 (quoting district court opinion). 
624. Id. at  1143. 
625. Id. In other words, so long as service of process supplied notice that satisfied the 
requirements established by the Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co., 399 U.S. 306 (1950), see supra note 511 and accompanying text, due process requirements 
would be met. While adequate notice to the defendant of the pendency of the suit and an 
opportunity to be heard in that suit are both essentials of the process due a defendant under 
either the fourteenth or the fifth amendment, courts usually have required more before a court 
constitutionally could assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Perhaps the "more" is 
supplied here by the defendant's presence or domicile within the United States. See supra notes 
4-5 and accompanying text. 
626. Mariash, 496 F.2d at 1143 (quoting Appellees' Brief) (emphasis in quotation). 
627. Id. 
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which service, pursuant to the statute, is made outside the territory 
of the United States. In those circumstances, the court recognized 
that some minimum contacts analysis might be appropriate because 
the forum, the United States, was seeking to assert authority over 
a defendant located outside its territory.628 On the basis of territorial 
sovereignty, therefore, the Second Circuit found that the nationwide 
service of process provision of Section 27 of the 1934 Act provided 
valid personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant provided he 
was served according to the statute, in a manner calculated to notify 
him of the pending litigation. No additional amenability test was re- 
quired and the minimum contacts test specifically was rejected. Perhaps 
an amenability standard is implicit in this analysis: presence or domicile 
within the territory of the sovereign, the United Statesfiz9 Such an 
analysis, however, leads to the conclusion that any statute authoriz- 
ing nationwide service of process carries with it a grant of personal 
jurisdiction because service can be made only if the defendant is pre- 
sent or an inhabitant of the district in which process is served. 
A result similar to that in Mariash was reached, in a case decided 
five years later, by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in 
Fitzsimmons v. Barton.fi30 In Fitzsimmons, an action for alleged viola- 
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, process had been served 
on defendant in Oklahoma pursuant to the nationwide service of pro- 
cess provisions of Section 27 of the 1934 Act. The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois had dismissed the case for 
lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that the defendant lacked 
sufficient contacts with the state of Illinois to justify use of the Illinois 
long-arm statute.fi31 The court of appeals considered Illinois law in- 
appropriate in light of the special service provisions of the 1934 
628. Id. at 1143 n.9. 
629. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text and note 625. At least one commentator 
has suggested construing Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as "providing for 
presence as an amenability basis." Berger, supra note 191, at  291. 
630. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Jim Walker Corp., 651 
F.2d 251, 255-57 (5th Cir. 1981) (rejecting International Shoe analysis because "the district 
court's jurisdiction is always potentially, and, in this case, actually co-extensive with the boun- 
daries of the United States;" minimum contacts with the United States is required but service 
within the United States satisfied that requirement). 
631. 589 F.2d at  331-32. 
632. Id. at  332. The court of appeals noted: 
The district court apparently dismissed Barton from this suit in reliance on the 
part of Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring that if no statute 
of the United States provides for the manner of service, service is governed by the 
law of the state in which the district court sits. Reference to  Illinois law, however, 
was inappropriate in this case. . . . Given the existence of [Section 27's] Congres- 
sional authorization of nationwide service of process, Rule 4(e) provides that this 
method of service is sufficient. 
Id. 
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The court noted substantial authority for the proposition that the 
United States Constitution does not forbid Congress from enacting 
nationwide service of process statutes with regard to particular classes 
or types of cases.633 In responding to the defendant's objections that 
he lacked sufficient contacts with the state of Illinois to satisfy the 
fairness requirements of due process, the court argued that any fairness 
standard "relates to the fairness of the exercise of power by a par- 
ticular sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigating 
in a distant The court concluded: 
Here the sovereign is the United States, and there can be no ques- 
tion but that the defendant, a resident citizen of the United States, 
has sufficient contacts with the United States to support the fairness 
of the exercise of jurisdiction over him by a United States court.635 
The court refused to apply any "fairness test" that considered factors 
such as "inconvenience to the defendant."636 
Fitzsimmons was cited as support by the dissenting Supreme Court 
justices in Leroy v. Greot Western United Corp. 637 In Leroy, an action 
alleging certain violations of federal securities law by state officials, 
the dissenters argued that "[olnce it is determined that 5 27 con- 
templates venue. . .in the Northern District of Texas, the federal court 
in that District also had personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defen- 
dants, they having been served in a 'district. . .wher[e]. . .found,' 
there being no objections to the manner of service of process, and 
there being no restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the exer- 
633. Id. at  333 n.3. 
634. Id. at 333. 
635. Id. 
636. Id. at 334. The court described the five factor "fairness" test developed in Oxford 
First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974), see itfro notes 
769-84 and accompanying text, but declined, on the following grounds, to adopt it: 
the "fairness" measured by these factors does not relate to the fairness of the exer- 
cise of power by a particular sovereign-the central concern of Shaffer and its 
predecessors-but instead to the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigation on 
a particular forum. As such, these factors are more appropriately used in applying 
28 U.S.C. §1404(a), which embodies the non-jurisdictional doctrine of forttrtr non 
conveniens, and we therefore decline to import them into determination of the con- 
stitutionality of exercises of personal jurisdiction. 
Fitzsimrnons, 589 F.2d at 334 (footnote omitted). 
637. 443 U.S. 173, 187-92 (1979) (White, J. dissenting). Leroy involved a declaratory judg- 
ment suit brought by a Texas-based corporation, Great Western United Corporation, against 
certain Idaho officials charged with enforcing the Idaho corporate takeover law because the 
officials had interfered with an attempted tender offer by Great Western to purchase shares 
of stock in a company having substantial assets in Idaho. The plaintiff had sought a declara- 
tion that the state law was invalid irlsofar as it purported to apply to interstate tender offers 
to purchase stocks traded on a national exchange. The defendant Idaho officials resisted suit 
on several grounds, including the grounds that the District Court for the Northern District 
of Texas lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and that venue could not be properly 
laid in that court. Id. 
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cise of jurisdiction by the United States over its residents. . . . ,1638 
But for the citation of Fitzsimmons, this position might be interpreted 
as a restatement of the approach in Arpet, Sohns or Hilgeman.639 
Instead, the dissent seemed to be approving the "presence in the United 
States as sufficient contacts" test of Fitzsimmons. Leroy did not, 
however, present any conclusive Supreme Court decision on the issue 
of persona1 jurisdiction in federal question cases in which process is 
served, pursuant to a federal nationwide service of process statute, 
on a nonresident defendant found within the United States. The ma- 
jority determined that venue could not be obtained under Section 27 
and never reached the question of personal jurisdiction.640 
Fitzsimmons, therefore, would validate all exercises of personal 
jurisdiction by federal courts in cases in which service is made in the 
United States on a resident or citizen of the United States pursuant 
to a federal statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of 
process. Although the Fitzsimmons court used a "contacts" analysis 
to justify this result, the result flows directly from the statutory 
authority to serve process within the United States. Whenever the ser- 
vice of process requirements are properly met, the required contacts 
would exist. In short, Fitzsimmons might be viewed as supporting 
the proposition that when process is served in the United States pur- 
suant to a statute such as Section 27 of the 1934 Act, the only separate 
amenability standard required would be presence or domicile of the 
defendant in the United States. As in the above discussion of Mariash, 
however, such analysis results in automatic amenability or amena- 
bility from the statute itself, because proper service would require 
finding the defendant or his domicile in the place in which process 
is served. 
The final cases to be considered in this group, Driver v. Helmsb4' 
and Briggs v. GoodwinYb4* are particularly significant because they 
culminated in a decision of the Supreme Court, Stafford v. B r i g g ~ . ~ ~ ~  
In Driver, a class action suit against twenty-five present or former 
United States government officials in which the plaintiffs sought 
damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of certain con- 
stitutional rights, process had been served on defendants pursuant to 
638. Id. at 191-92 (White, J.  dissenting) (emphasis added). 
639. See supra notes 587-608 and accompanying text. 
640. 443 U.S. at 182. In Colby v. Driver, 444 U.S. 527 (1980), see infra notes 665-74 
and accompanying text, the Supreme Court again did not rule on this question, although the 
dissent again utilized the Mariash and Fitzsimmons analysis. 
641. 74 F.R.D. 382 (D. R.I. 1977). 
642. 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D. D.C. 1974). 
643. 444 U.S. 527 (1980). 
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Section 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. Sec- 
tion 1391(e). This section provides that if the venue requirements of 
Section 1391(e) are satisfied, "delivery of the summons and complaint 
. . . .may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of 
the district in which the action is Suit was instituted in 
the federal district court for the district of Rhode Island, although 
"none of the appellants reside[d] in or [had] substantial contacts with 
Rhode Island."645 The defendants asserted, inter alia, that the district 
court lacked personal jurisdiction because "[Section] 1391(e) speaks 
only to service of process, not to the exercise of personal 
jur isdi~t ion,"~~~ and exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case would 
be unconstitutional because of the defendants' lack of contacts with 
Rhode Island.647 The district court disagreed, citing Mariash and find- 
ing that the applicable due process test was whether the manner of 
process provided "notice calculated to inform the defendant of the 
pendency of the The district court recognized that "[elxtrater- 
ritorial service of process must be based on necessary minimum con- 
tacts to satisfy due but based its analysis on its conclu- 
sion that "nation wide service of process, when authorized by Con- 
gress, is not extra-territorial at Since service within the ter- 
ritory of the United States was not extraterritorial, such service was 
analogous to state court service within a state. State court service re- 
quired only satisfaction of an adequate notice requirement in order 
to subject the defendant to the personal jurisdiction of the court.651 
The court of appeals concurred in the conclusion of the district 
court that, at least in the case of 28 U.S.C. 5 1391(e), when a federal 
statute authorized nationwide service of process and such service had 
adequately apprised the defendant of the pendency of the suit, no 
additional test need be satisfied for the court to assert personal jurisdic- 
tion over the defendant.652 In response to the appellants' arguments 
that the broadened venue provisions of Section 1391(e) should apply 
"only if the district in which the suit is brought can establish per- 
sonal jurisdiction by some other me~hanism"~" or that "even if [Sec- 
tion] 1391(e) broadens personal jurisdiction, it would be unconstitu- 
See supra note 248. 
Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 149 (1st Cir. 1978). 
74 F.R.D. at 389. 
Id. at 390. 
Id. at 391. 
Id. at 391 n.6. 
Id. at 391. 
Id. (citing Mariash). 
577 F.2d at 154-57. 
Id. at 154. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 126 1984-1985 
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
tional to apply it to individuals who lacked the minimum contacts 
with the state in which the court sits that are required by International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington. . .and its progeny,"654 the court of appeals 
concluded that Congress had created nationwide service of process 
which did not depend on the ability of the forum district to establish 
personal jurisdiction. Moreover, any limitation on the exercise of per- 
sonal jurisdiction in these cases "is not related to state b~undaries."~" 
Like the district court, the court of appeals rejected any minimum 
contacts test relating to state boundaries because "[tlhe circumspec- 
tion of state court jurisdiction is a product of boundaries to states' 
sovereignty [while t]he United States. . .does not lose its sovereignty 
when a state's border is crossed."656 The appellate court ruled that 
the defendants were protected from the unfairness of having to de- 
fend suits in federal districts "with which they have had no connec- 
tion" by the transfer of venue provisions of Section 1404(a) of Title 
28 of the United States Code.657 The court, moreover, noted that "of- 
ficers of the federal government are different from private defendants 
because they can anticipate that their official acts may affect people 
in every part of the United States."658 Finally, the court recognized 
that Congress is limited, by the fifth amendment due process clause, 
in its authorizations of nationwide service of process, but only in terms 
of whether the manner of service is "reasonably calculated to inform 
the defendant of the pendency of the proceedings." Because "[sluch 
service is not extraterritorial for a court of the United States; therefore, 
the minimum contacts analysis is not relevant."659 Alternatively, the 
court suggested, in a footnote, that the United States as a sovereign 
would have authority over anyone found within its borders and that 
"even if we were to say that minimum contacts had to be establish- 
ed, anyone found and served within the United States would have 
sufficient contacts with the United States."660 The court of appeals, - 
therefore, adopted the analysis in Mariash and Fitzsimmons. 
The court of appeals tied together the positions of the courts in 
some of the opinions discussed above and bolstered its own conclu- 
sions by arguing facts peculiar to Driver. In short, the court of ap- 
peals concluded that no separate amenability analysis was required: 
(1) it rejected minimum contacts with the state of Rhode Island as 
654. Id. at 154-55. 
655. Id. at 157. 
656. Id. at 156. 
657. Id. at 157. 
658. Id. 
659. Id. 
660. Id. at 156 n.25. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 127 1984-1985 
Paciflc Law Journal / Vol. 16 
inappropriate in a federal context;66' (2) it rejected any fairness analysis 
with respect to the particular federal district because of the protec- 
tion inherent in the change of venue provision and the particular 
character of the defendants to be served with process;662 (3) while 
refusing to require a minimum contacts test, it found the defendants' 
"presence" in the United States sufficient to satisfy any such 
thus, in effect, equating any authorization for nation- 
wide service with satisfaction of any due process requirement and 
making the authorization for service alone sufficient to give the federal 
court personal jurisdiction; and (4) it determined that the only real 
due process question was whether the manner of service would satisfy 
notice requirements,664 therefore accepting service that was procedurally 
sufficient as satisfying due process. In other words, the court found 
that if service properly was made pursuant to Section 1391(e), a federal 
court would have personal jurisdiction over the defendant so served, 
irrespective of the defendant's contacts with the federal district in which 
the suit was instituted or his contacts with the state in which the federal 
court was sitting. Service under the federal statute authorizing nation- 
wide service of process in suits against federal officials gave the court 
personal jurisdiction over those officials. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari under the name Colby v. 
DriveP5 and heard this case with a companion case, Stafford v. Briggs, 
styled as Briggs v. Goodwin in the district courP6 and in the court 
of appeals.667 In Briggs, the plaintiffs had brought suit in the federal 
district court for the District of Columbia against three Department 
of Justice attorneys and an FBI agent, seeking declaratory relief and 
damages for alleged violations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 
Plaintiffs again relied on 28 U.S.C. $ 1391(e), Section 2 of the Man- 
damus and Venue Act of 1962. The district court ruled that venue 
was improper and that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over some 
of the defendants, residents of Florida.668 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding venue 
proper because one of the defendant-appellees resided in the District 
of Columbia. Moreover, the court of appeals found that Section 
1391(e) provided personal jurisdiction without the requirement of 
661. Id. at 156-57. 
662. Id. at 157. 
663. Id. at 156 n.25. 
664. Id. at 157. 
665. 444 U.S. 527 (1980). 
666. 384 F. Supp. 1228 (D.D.C. 1974). 
667. 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
668. Driver, 444 U.S. at 531. 
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applying the International Shoe minimum contacts test or any require- 
ment that the defendants have contacts with the federal district in 
which the district court was sitting.669 
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court never reached the ques- 
tion of amenability standards for personal jurisdiction. The Court 
concluded that Section 1391(e) did not apply to actions for money 
damages brought against government officials in their individual 
capacities.670 In dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Brennan, 
concluded that "[Section] 1391(e) means what it says; and that it thus 
applies. . .to a suit for damages against a federal officer for his own 
~rongdoing."~~' Justice Stewart then discussed "the petitioner's posi- 
tion that a serious due process problem arises when the provisions 
of 9 1391(e) are taken to mean what they say, so as to permit a federal 
district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a federal officer 
who lacks sufficient 'minimum contacts' with the State or district in 
which the federal court sits."672 First, Justice Stewart asserted that 
Section 1391(e) not only governed venue and service of process, but 
also conferred personal jurisdiction on the court. He argued "that, 
as a general rule, service of process is the means by which a court 
obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and. . .the petitioners 
have failed to demonstrate that there was any defect in the means 
by which service of process was effected."673 Then, Justice Stewart 
found that such exercises of personal jurisdiction under Section 1391(e) 
would not be unconstitutional: 
[DJue process requires only certain minimum contacts between the 
defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. . . .The issue 
is not whether it is unfair to require a defendant to assume the 
burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether 
the court of a particular sovereign has power to exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a named defendant. The .cases before us involve 
suits against residents of the United States in the courts of the United 
States. No due process problem exists.674 
In sum, Justice Stewart found that proper service pursuant to Sec- 
tion 1391(e) conferred personal jurisdiction that was appropriate con- 
stitutionally so long as notice requirements were met. No separate 
due process analysis would be required on any case by case basis; 
the statute always would operate to pass constitutional muster. 
669. Id. at 532. 
670. Id. at 543-45. 
671. Id. at 545-46. 
672. Id. at 553. 
673. Id. at 553 n.5. 
674. Id. at 554. 
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In these two cases, therefore, lower federal courts had concluded, 
on essentially a sovereignty or power theory, that Section 1391(e), 
which authorized nationwide service of process, gave a federal court 
personal jurisdiction that was consistent with constitutional mandates 
without any separate test of amenability by minimum contacts or 
another standard. Moreover, the majority opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court in Briggs did not take issue with that conclusion and 
the dissenting opinion provided strong support for that position. No 
recent Supreme Court decision, including the case of Verlinden v. 
Central Bank of has expressed a view contrary to that of 
Justice Stewart in Briggs. 
A few federal courts merely have cited the existence of a federal 
statute authorizing nationwide, or worldwide, service of process plus 
proper service pursuant to the statute as providing the federal court 
with personal jurisdiction over the defendant so served.676 Most federal 
courts that have rejected or ignored any "fairness" analysis as an 
additional requirement for assertion of personal jurisdiction, however, 
have justified the result on the basis of sovereignty.677 The United 
States, as a single jurisdiction acting through its federal courts, con- 
stitutionally can assert jurisdiction over any defendant present or 
domiciled within its borders if proper service, including adequate notice, 
is made upon that defendant. The special federal statutes authorizing 
nationwide service of process provide the vehicles by which this 
authority is triggered. Some of these courts have labelled this as a 
"contacts" analysis,67s because presence or domicile within the United 
States is surely sufficient contact with the sovereign territory to satisfy 
any fifth amendment due process requirement. The inevitable result 
of the analysis, however, is the conclusion that proper service pur- 
suant to such statutes renders the defendant amenable to jurisdiction 
in the federal district in which the suit is brought. 
None of these cases have involved service on aliens outside the 
borders of the United States. Amenability in those circumstances, 
according to the court of appeals in Mar i a~h ,~ '~  could not be justified 
on the territorial sovereignty theory because it would be extraterritorial 
and comparable to state court service on a defendant located and 
domiciled in other states. The Supreme Court has not made a specific 
ruling on this issue, either in regard to service within the United States 
675. 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). See supra notes 520-60 and accompanying text. 
676. See supra notes 587-608 and accompanying text. 
677. See supra notes 609-75 and accompanying text. 
678. See supra notes 622-36 and accompanying text. 
679. See supra notes 622-29 and accompanying text. 
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or to service in a foreign country. The approach in cases such as 
Fitzsimmons and Mariash relies on a power theory of personal jurisdic- 
tion, a theory that has been rejected increasingly by commentators 
and the The result, however, makes sense in light of the 
federal policy behind nationwide or worldwide service of process 
statutes: to provide a federal forum, convenient to the plaintiff, in 
which all defendants in the case can be joined.681 Such statutes have 
been enacted by Congress in areas of particular federal concern and 
reveal the abiding interest of the federal government in providing a 
forum for resolution of these matters.682 Whether the result of these 
cases, assertion of personal jurisdiction by a federal court over any 
defendant properly served within the territory of the United States 
pursuant to a federal nationwide or worldwide service of process 
statute, can be incorporated into a practically sensible and doctrinally 
sound personal jurisdiction theory for the federal courts in federal 
question cases, will be discussed at the conclusion of the next section 
of this article. 
Cases in Which Courts Have Required Separate Amenability 
Analysis-Variations on International Shoe in a National Context 
While some federal question cases in which process was served pur- 
suant to a federal statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide ser- 
vice of process and in which courts have engaged in a separate 
amenability analysis have involved nonalien defendants served within 
the United States,683 the majority have involved alien defendants served 
outside the United States.684 These results may flow from the analysis 
680. See generally von Mehren, supra note 2, at 1178-79. 
681. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. of New York v. Southern Photo Mat'l Co., 273 U.S. 
359, 373-74 (1926) (Section 12 of the Clayton Act "supplements the remedial provision of the 
Anti-Trust Act . . . by relieving the injured person from the necessity of resorting for the 
redress of wrongs committed by a non-resident corporation, to a district, however distant, in 
which it resides or may be found . . . and enabling him to institute suit in a district, frequently 
that of his own residence, in which the corporation in fact transacts business. . . ."); Texas 
Trading v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 315 (2d Cu. 1981) (quoting House Judiciary 
Committee, Jurisdiction of United States in Suits Against Foreign States, H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6605) ("Con- 
gress has passed the [Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] specifically to provide 'access to the 
courts' "); Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 388 (D.R.I. 1977) (purpose of Congress in enac- 
ting Section 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 was to eliminate obstacles to litigation 
against federal officials and "to enable citizens to obtain relief against official wrongdoing 
effectively, conveniently, economically, and fairly"); Clapp v. Stearns & Co., 229 F. Supp. 
305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (policy of Section 27 of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 was 
"to provide a forum for suits involving multi-state frauds, no matter of how many states the 
defendants are citizens"). 
682. See supra notes 247-50 and accompanying text. 
683. See infra notes 754-84 and accompanying text. 
684. See infra notes 687-753 and accompanying text. 
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in Mariash that service outside the United States is extraterritorial 
and, therefore, analagous to service of process by a state court, pur- 
suant to a state long-arm statute, beyond the borders of the state. 
Some due process-amenability test, therefore, must be applied to deter- 
mine whether such extension of power by the sovereign, the United 
States, violates a defendant's due process rights.685 Generally, when 
process is served in a wholly federal manner, the due process clause 
that must be satisfied is that of the fifth amendment.686 How this 
requirement is satisfied, however, has varied significantly from court 
to court. 
Several federal courts have analogized to the International Shoe 
test, examining the defendant's contacts with the United States as a 
whole to determine whether those contacts were sufficient to be 
"minimum." In Alco Standard Corporation v. Bet~alal,~~'  for exam- 
ple, an action brought in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania against certain alien individuals and 
corporations for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission and for com- 
mon law misrepresentation, the defendants had been served with pro- 
cess outside the territory of the United States pursuant to the worldwide 
service of process provisions of Section 27 of the 1934 In 
response to the defendants' attack on personal jurisdiction of the 
district court, the court stated that under the fifth amendment, "citizens 
of foreign countries are entitled to [the minimum contacts] standard 
of protection" established in International Shoe, but that "[flor pur- 
poses of jurisdiction . . . under the Securities and Exchange Act, 
the relevant question asks what acts they have committed anywhere 
in the United States since that Act is national in scope."689 The court 
concluded that the defendants "clearly had sufficient contacts with 
the United States to satisfy the requirement of due process."690 The 
district court, therefore, treated Section 27 of the 1934 Act as a federal 
long-arm statute and measured the constitutionality of its application 
to the alien defendants in question by weighing their contacts with 
the United States as a whole. This analysis is similar to International 
685. See supra notes 624-29 and accompanying text. 
686. See supra notes 329 and 497 and accompanying text. 
687. 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
688. Id. at 19. For the text of the service of process provision of Section 27, see supra 
note 249. 
689. 345 F. Supp. at 24-25. 
690. Id. at 25. The court made the quoted statement in regard to one particular set of 
defendants. As to all defendants challenging personal jurisdiction, the court concluded: "[Wle 
believe that all of these defendants have done sufficient acts in this Country so as to fall out- 
side of. . . .[the Fifth Amendment's] protective limitations." Id. 
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Shoe, which requires weighing of a defendant's contacts with the state 
seeking to assert its jurisdiction over him.691 Some courts and com- 
mentators have referred to such a jurisdictional test, which requires 
weighing the defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole, 
as a "national contacts" test or an "aggregation of national con- 
tacts" test.692 Apparently, under the analysis by the court, the suit 
could have been instituted in any federal district; the court, however, 
did not consider inconvenience to the defendant in litigating in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania rather than another federal district. 
Perhaps some limitation on the district might have been required if 
the transaction had no relationship to the Eastern District of Penn- 
sylvania, although the possibility of finding venue in such a district 
\vould be remote. Some courts have suggested that any unfairness 
caused by the plaintiff's choice of a federal forum inconvenient to 
the defendant could be cured by a change of venue to a more conve- 
nient forum.693 Moreover, under the venue restrictions of many of 
the special federal statutes, a federal court in which venue lay would 
not be highly inconvenient for the defendant.694 
691. See supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text. See also Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders 
Corp., f33 F.2d 1229, 1237-39 (court recognized that some jurisdictions had adopted a "minimum 
contacts with the United States" test when, as here, the defendant was an alien served pur- 
suant to a worldwide service of process statute, but refused to adopt or reject the test because 
 lai in tiff had "failed to establish that [defendants had1 sufficient contacts with the United States 
as a \vhole"). 
692. Courts: See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237-38 (6th Cir. 
1981) ("[tlhis 'national contacts' or 'aggregate contacts' concept is based on the proposition 
that a court's jurisdictional power . . . on federal questions must be examined in light of 
the due process clause of the Fifth . . . ~mendment"); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo 
Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 (9th Cir. 1977) ("plaintiffs argue that where . . . the court 
is to determine whether it has jurisdiction over an alien defendant who is being sued on a 
claim arising under federal law, it may appropriately consider . . . the aggregate contacts of 
the alien with the United States as a whole"); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mamesmann, 
A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659, 663 (D.N.H. 1977) ("[tlhis 'national contacts' theory has been con- 
sidered by other courts"); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 
728 (D. Utah 1973) ("the court . . . may consider the aggregate presence of the defendants' 
apparatus in the Untied States as a whole"). Commentators: See, e.g., Comment, National 
Contacts, supra note 186, at 687 ("federal courts should be permitted to aggregate the national 
contacts of alien defendants to determine in personam jurisdiction in federal question suits"); 
Note, supra note 21, at 475 ("inability of the current jurisdictional scheme to effectively ad- 
dress [certain] situations . . . has motivated some courts to consider the aggregate contacts test"). 
693. See, e.g., supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354 and 657 and accompanying text and infra 
note 880 and accompanying text. 
694. Under section 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, for example, venue 
is laid in any federal district "wherein any act or transaction constituting the violation occur- 
red. . . .or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business." 
15 U.S.C. 578aa (1976). Thus, the defendant would not be able to argue unfair inconvenience 
since the venue requirements relate to his contacts with the forum. Only in the case in which 
venue is laid solely on the ground that the defendant had been "found" within the district 
and the defendant's presence was transitory and unrelated to the claim might unfair inconve- 
nience be alleged. No court, state or federal, has yet ruled that personal jurisdiction based 
on even the most transitory presence is unconstitutional. 
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Subsequent to the district court opinion in Alco, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit apparently followed a similar 
analysis in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. 
a suit brought against various defendants, including aliens, for viola- 
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lob-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Commission. Alien defendants had been served 
outside the territorial limits of the United States pursuant to the 
worldwide service of process provisions of Section 27 of the 1934 
The plaintiffs had asserted, as an alternative source of per- 
sonal jurisdiction over some of the defendants, various provisions of 
the New York long-arm statute. The court of appeals, however, refused 
to apply the New York statutes: 
Since we hold that Congress meant 8 27 to extend personal jurisdic- 
tion to the full reach permitted by the due process clause, it is un- 
necessary to discuss the applicability of the New York statutes, which 
could reach no further.697 
The court found that Congress had intended, by Section 27 of the 
1934 Act, "to authorize service on a defendant who can be 'found' 
only in a foreign country, and &though the section does not deal 
specifically with in personam jurisdiction, it is reasonable to infer that 
Congress meant to assert personal jurisdiction over foreigners not pre- 
sent in the United States to but, of course, not beyond the bounds 
permitted by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."698 The 
court then cited Hanson and McGee as authority for the proposition 
that a state can assert jurisdiction over nonpresent, nonresident defen- 
dants only if they have contacts with the state.699 The Second Circuit 
examined the defendants' contacts with the Untied States to deter- 
mine whether the federal court had personal jurisdiction.700 Although 
the court never explicitly announced a test of "minimum contacts 
with the United States," such a test actually was applied. 
In several cases in which subject matter jurisdiction was based on 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) and service was 
made on the defendants, foreign countries or instrumentalities of 
foreign countries, outside the territory of the United States,'O1 federal 
695. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express 
Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) (dictum) ("aggregation of an alien's American contacts 
may . . . be proper when a federal statute authorizes worldwide service of process . . . and, 
therefore, the only constraint is fifth amendment due process rather than statutory authorization"). 
696. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1339. 
697. Id. at 1339. 
698. Id. at 1340. 
699. Id. at 1340-41. 
700. Id. at 1341-44. 
701. See supra notes 520-55 and accompanying text. 
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courts have engaged in a "minimum contacts with the United States" 
due process analysis. This analysis is undertaken even though the FSIA 
purports to provide for personal jurisdiction whenever subject matter 
jurisdiction exists under the Act and process is served properly pur- 
suant to Section 1608 of Title 28 of the United States Code.702 Prob- 
ably the most well-known case adopting this position was Texas 
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,?03 a suit in- 
itiated in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York alleging that the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its 
central bank had breached a contract with the plaintiff for delivery 
of cement. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit determined 
that the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the FSIA had been 
satisfied and that the defendants had been served properly under Sec- 
tion 1608, thus satisfying the FSIA criteria for assertion of personal 
The Court continued, however, to analyze separately 
the constitutionality, under the fifth amendment due process clause, 
of asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendants.705 The court 
engaged in a traditional International Shoe analysis, as modified by 
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. W o o ~ 3 o n , ~ ~ ~  using the United States 
as a whole as "the relevant area in delineating contracts"707 and deter- 
mining that "maintenance of the suit [would not] offend 'traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice'."708 After determining 
that the defendants had contacts with the United States, the Second 
Circuit decided whether these contacts were sufficient enough to be 
"minimum" by making the "four separate inquiries" required by its 
reading of World- Wide.709 The court resolved all inquiries in favor 
of litigating in the United States and concluded that assertion of per- 
sonal jurisdiction over the defendants would be constit~tional.~'~ Each 
inquiry in its minimum contacts analysis focused only on the United 
States and not on the particular federal district in which suit had 
been brought. 
The Texas Trading analysis for personal jurisdiction was applied 
in a more recent FSIA decision, Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaelta~hta,~" 
702. See supra notes 549-55 and accompanying text. 
703. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). See also supra note 554 and accompanying text. 
704. See supra note 550 and accompanying text. 
705. 647 F.2d at 313-15. 
706. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text. 
- ~ -  
707. 647 ~ . 2 d  at 314. 
708. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 quoting, in 
turn, Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463). 
709. Texas ~ r a d i n ~ ,  647 F.2d at 314. 
710. Id. at 315. 
711. 549 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 135 1984-1985 
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16 
by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. After concluding that the FSIA requirements for personal 
jurisdiction had been satisfied, the court noted that it "must still deter- 
mine whether an exercise of the personal jurisdiction conferred by 
the FSIA is permissible under the due process clause of the Fifth 
A~nendment . "~~~  As in Texas Trading, the "four inquiry" test was 
applied to find sufficient contacts with the United States to satisfy 
an International Shoe standard, and any factors that related to the 
particular federal district in which the suit had been initiated were 
not considered. 
In another recent FSIA case, Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio 
and T e l e ~ i s i o n , ~ ~ ~  the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit also followed Texas Trading by requiring a separate due pro- 
cess analysis on the issue of personal jurisdiction and by applying 
a minimum contacts with the United States analysis.715 Apparently, 
the trend in the lower federal courts in FSIA cases is to require not 
only that the specific statutory requirements of the FSIA for personal 
jurisdiction be met but that the assertion of jurisdiction be determined 
constitutionally appropriate by an examination of the defendant's ag- 
gregate contacts with the United States. As noted above,'16 however, 
the Supreme Court has expressed no view on this issue although it 
had the opportunity to do so. 
In other cases in which defendant aliens were served pursuant to 
special federal statutes, the federal courts seem to conduct a separate 
fifth amendment due process analysis by applying the International 
Shoe minimum contacts test to the defendant's contacts with the United 
States, but the opinions are not as clear as those in Alcs and Texas 
Trading. In a recent case involving the service in the United States 
by an Internal Revenue Service summons on an agent of the defen- 
dant alien company, United States v. Toyota Motor C ~ r p . , ~ ' ~  the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California found 
that it constitutionally could assert personal jurisdiction over the defen- 
dant. The court required a two-step analysis, determining first whether 
the defendant came within the language of the federal statute authoriz- 
712. Id. at 1117. 
713. Id. at 1117-18. 
714. 691 F.2d 1344 (11th Cir. 1982). 
715. Id. at 1352-53. 
716. See supra notes 547-48 and accompanying text. 
717. 561 F. Supp. 354 (C.D. Calif. 1983). The federal statute provided, in pertinent part: 
"If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, . . .the United States 
district court for the district in which such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction 
by appropriate process to compel such attendance. . . ." 26 U.S.C. §7604(a) (1976) (emphasis 
added). 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 136 1984-1985 
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
ing service of the summons and then it determined whether fifth 
amendment constitutional limitations are respected by such an asser- 
tion of personal jurisdiction.718 The court went on to examine the 
relationship of defendant corporation with the forum "citing World- 
Wide Volkswagen as well as several lower federal court opinions that 
had adopted the "minimum contacts with the United States" 
Whether "the forum" refers to the state of California, 
the central district of California (where the defendant's subsidiary cor- 
poration was located), or the United States as a whole cannot be deter- 
mined from the language of the court. The facts of the case create 
the inference that the defendant would have sufficient contacts with 
California or the Central District of California to satisfy any require- 
ment of contacts with those territories.720 Therefore, the defendant's 
contacts also would satisfy any requirement of contacts with the United 
- 
States as a whole since the contacts merely were centered in one part 
of the country. The court, moreover, referred to the defendant's 
activities as being "the sale of Toyota Japan's products to United 
States consumers" by its California subsidiary721 and, in a footnote, 
referred to "aggregation of Toyota Japan's American contacts [as] 
proper in this case,"722 thereby indicating that the court viewed the 
United States as "the forum." 
In other cases involving alien defendants served pursuant to 
worldwide service of process statutes, federal courts have considered 
similar tests in finding personal jurisdiction to be lacking. In Kramer 
Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd.,723 a suit for violation of the 
antitrust laws in which service was made pursuant to the worldwide 
service of process provisions of Section 22 of the Clayton Act, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that "we 
recognize . . . that when a federal statute . . . authorizes worldwide 
service of process, it may be proper to consider whether an alien defen- 
dant's contacts with the entire United States provide adequate grounds 
for asserting personal jurisdiction consistent with due process."724 The 
718. 561 F. Supp. at 356. 
719. Id. at 359-  
720. In a footnote, the court "noted that Toyota Japan enjoys significant benefits from 
sales in California. . . .[and] virtually all sales of Toyota Japan's products in the United States 
are facilitated through Toyota U.S.A., which is headquartered in the Central District of Califor- 
nia." Id. at 360 n.lO. 
721. Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
722. Id. at 360 n.10 (emphasis added). In the footnote the court went on to establish 
a basis for jurisdiction arising from the defendant's contacts with the state or federal district 
"if an aggregation theory is not applied." Id. See supra note 720 and accompanying text. 
723. 628 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1980). 
724. Id. at 1177. 
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court, however, did not adopt the "aggregation of contacts" approach, 
finding that even under such a test the defendant's contacts would 
have been insufficient to satisfy due Thus, while the Ninth 
Circuit recognized the possibility that such a test might be appropriate 
in some circumstances, it chose not to make any decision in this case 
because insufficient grounds for assertion of personal jurisdiction 
existed, even under what would be considered the most liberal test, 
"minimum contacts with the United States." 
In Wagman v. A ~ t l e , ~ ~ ~  a suit against three Canadian defendants 
for alleged violations of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 by 
stock transactions which took place in Canada, the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York found that it 
did not have personal jurisdiction over the alien defendants. Even 
though the defendants had been served in Canada pursuant to the 
worldwide service of process provisions of Section 27 of the 1934 Act, 
personal jurisdiction could not be obtained because "to assert jurisdic- 
tion over them in this case would violate due process."727 The court 
concluded that the personal service in Canada had been invalid because 
such service would lead to an unconstitutional assertion of personal 
In finding the exercise of personal jurisdiction un- 
constitutional, the court cited Hanson, McGee and International Shoe 
as outlining "[tlhe general boundaries of due process in connection 
with and derived from those cases "a requirement of 
some minimal connection between the defendant and the state en- 
forcing liability, . . .such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not 
offend traditional notions of justice and fair play."730 Here, the court 
apparently concluded, the entity "enforcing liability" would be the 
United States, for the court noted that "[slince . . . the defendants 
did not come within or do business in the United States, the basis 
for personal jurisdiction must be the effects within the United States 
of their acts in Canada."73' The court determined that the acts had 
"no actual effect" in the United States and that it therefore could 
not assert jurisdiction over the defendants without violating due 
In Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of 
Id. at 1178. 
380 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
Id. at 499. 
Id. at 502. 
Id. at 499-500. 
Id. at 500. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Id. at 502. 
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Guinea,733 an FSIA case, the court found that the subject matter 
jurisdiction requirements of the FSIA had not been satisfied.734 The 
court, therefore, could not reach the personal jurisdiction issue because 
the statutory prerequisites for personal jurisdiction, subject matter 
jurisdiction coupled with proper service of process,735 had not been 
established. The court cited Texas Trading and noted, however, "the 
well-established principle that, in assessing personal jurisdiction under 
either a constitutional due process standard or a statutory standard, 
courts may look to the contacts between the forum and agents of 
the defendant."736 It discussed, moreover, the relationship between 
the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the FSIA that protect, 
by sovereign immunity, those defendants who lack sufficient contacts 
with the United States and the personal jurisdiction requirements that 
the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum.737 The court 
continued: "[Wle do not understand this . . . to mean that the 
statutory standard for determining non-immunity is coextensive with 
the due process standard governing personal jurisdiction, see World- 
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. . . ; International Shoe Co. 
v. Washington. . . ."738 The court, therefore, seemed to recognize 
that if subject matter jurisdiction had been found, a separate due 
process analysis that examined the contacts of the defendant with the 
United States would have been required. 
Some federal courts facing the question of assertion of personal 
jurisdiction over alien defendants served pursuant to federal statutes 
authorizing worldwide service of process have applied more stringent 
requirements than merely sufficient contacts with the United States 
as a whole. Several courts that have upheld personal jurisdiction have 
based their decisions on the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts 
with the federal district in which the court is sitting or even, in at 
least one case, on the defendant's contacts with the state in which 
the federal court is sitting. In Travis v. Anthes Imperial Limited,739 
a suit alleging violations of the securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
some of the defendants served were Canadians who had been served 
in Canada under the authorization for worldwide service of process 
of Section 27. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit found that the intent of Congress in enacting Section 27 was 
733. 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
734. Id. at 1112. 
735. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
736. 693 F.2d at 1105. 
737. Id. 
738. Id. 
739. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). 
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"to extend personal jurisdiction to the full reach permitted by the 
Due Process Clause [of the Fifth Amendment]."740 The Court stated 
the following as its due process "test": "[Plersonal jurisdiction can 
be acquired over the defendants who have acted within the district 
or sufficiently caused foreseeable consequences there, by service of 
process on them in Canada. See McGee v. International Life Ins. 
Co.. . . ."741 Thus, the Eighth Circuit settled on a form of Inter- 
national Shoe test that required contacts with the federal district seeking 
to assert jurisdiction. The facts of this case clearly would satisfy the 
"minimum contacts with the United States" test, and the court might 
have decided to apply the more restrictive state test because the faces 
also could satisfy that test.742 No indication of such an analysis exists, 
however, and the approach of the court gives no justification for the 
decision to examine the defendant's contacts with the federal district 
rather than with some other jurisdictional unit. 
A similar result was reached by the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Ohio in the recent case of Jordan v. 
Global Natural Resources, Inc. ,743 a class action suit brought against 
an alien corporation for alleged violations of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Rule lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission. 
Service had been made on a subsidiary of the defendant located in 
New Jersey under the service provisions of Section 27 of the 1934 
In response to the defendant's argument that the court lacked 
personal jurisdiction, the court noted: 
Personal jurisdiction under [Section 271 extends to the full reach per- 
mitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 
Thus, jurisdiction can be obtained over any defendant who has 
minimum contacts with the forum such that maintenance of a suit 
in that district does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.745 
From this statement, whether the due process standard to be applied 
is that of the fifth or that of the fourteenth amendment is unclear. 
Apparently, however, "the forum" discussed is "the federal district" 
in which the suit is brought. That conclusion partially is borne out 
740. Id. at 529. 
741. Id. 
742. In some cases, courts adopt the most restrictive test that still will permit assertion 
of personal jurisdiction, thus remaining far removed from the limits of due process. 
743. [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 99,179 (S.D. Ohio 1983). See 
also Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 749 (D. Md. 1968) (service 
on alien defendants pursuant to Section 214 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, I5 U.S.C. 
§Sob-14 (1982); court considers defendants' contacts with the "country and with this district"). 
744. [1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 99,179. 
745. Id. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 140 1984-1985 
I984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
by application of a minimum contacts test to the facts of the case: 
We find that defendant has the minimum contacts necessary for this 
Court to exercise its jurisdiction in this case. Not only did defen- 
dant solicit proxy voters by letter and by advertisement in this district, 
shares of defendant's stock are bought and sold in this district, from 
which defendant derives substantial revenue. The alleged fraud in 
this case was perpetrated almost entirely through the use of the mails 
and the advertisements in national newspapers. We do not think it 
is unfair or offends the notions of substantial justice to require defen- 
dant to appear in this jurisdiction to answer the charges against it.746 
While discussion of the mails and national newspapers as the vehicles 
by which the defendant's alleged fraud was perpetrated does not 
necessarily refer to a contact with the Southern District of Ohio, the 
rest of the holding of the Court rests on contacts with the district. 
In sum, the court clearly required a separate due process analysis and 
strongly suggested by the language of its opinion that an examina- 
tion of the defendant's contacts ,with the federal district in which the 
suit had been brought must be made to determine whether those con- 
tacts were sufficient to be "minimum contacts with the forum." Again, 
perhaps the facts of the case suggested the analysis: since the defen- 
dant had sufficient contacts with the federal district, why resort to 
any "contacts with the United States" analysis?747 
The final case to be examined involving alien defendants, Securities 
& Exchange Commission v. VTR, I ~ C . , ~ ~ ~  was an action against a 
foreign bank and its sales agent for violations of the Securities Act 
of 1933. Service had been made on the defendants outside the United 
States pursuant to Section 22(a) of the 1933 The defendants 
objected to the mode of service as well as to personal jurisdiction. 
The court found that the defendants had been properly served and 
went on to decide whether "it is fair to assume jurisdiction."750 Citing 
Hanson, McGee, and International Shoe as establishing a test based 
on "traditional notions of fair play,"751 the court concluded that asser- 
tion of jurisdiction over the defendants was fair since "there clearly 
was business transacted by the defendants within this state."752 The 
court, therefore, seemed to be applying the fourteenth amendment 
standard developed in the cases cited. This approach would tie in with 
746. Id. (emphasis added). 
747. See supra note 742 and accompanying text. 
748. 39 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
749. Id. at 20-21. 
750. Id. at 21. For discussion of another "fairness" test, see infra notes 769-84 and 
accompanying text. 
751. 39 F.R.D. a t  21. 
752. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
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the rule that the authority of a federal court generally runs to the 
borders of the state in which it is sitting.753 If contacts are to be con- 
sidered, therefore, then the area of contacts should at least be co- 
extenstive with the ordinary process power of the court. Neither Travis, 
Jordan, nor VTR considered this distinction and the use in VTR of 
"state" as opposed to "district" was probably inadvertent. Clearly, 
none of the courts that have applied a sub-united States minimum 
contacts approach have provided explanations for their choices of 
measuring fora or their reasons for not applying broader tests. 
As noted above,754 many courts have dealt with the question of 
personal service pursuant to a federal statute authorizing nationwide, 
or worldwide, service of process upon a nonalien defendant served 
in the United States as essentially a sovereignty question. A sovereign 
can assert jurisdiction over anyone "found" within its borders and, 
in these cases, the United States is the sovereign. Other courts have 
employed a separate due process analysis based on a minimum con- 
tacts test, but have not examined the defendant's contacts with the 
United States, which would possibly lead directly into the sovereignty- 
power argument, but instead have considered his contacts with the 
federal district in which the federal court is held. This test is prob- 
ably a less defensible approach because it is really the same type of 
test which would be applied under the fourteenth amendment to a 
state seeking to assert jurisdiction in the same c i rc~mstances .~~~ On 
the other hand, this approach eliminates arguments that the chosen 
courtroom is substantially inconvenient to the defendant.756 In Indian 
Head Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit C ~ r p o r a t i o n , ~ ~ ~  an antitrust action 
was initiated in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York against a Massachusetts corporation that had 
been served in Massachusetts under the worldwide service of process 
provision of Section 12 of the Clayton After a lengthy con- 
sideration of the venue provision of Section 12, the district court moved 
to the question of whether exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant 
"is consistent with the principles of due process."75g The court con- 
753. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
754. See supra notes 573-682 and accompanying text. 
755. Thus, a federal court hearing a federal question case would be reduced to deciding 
when and if to open its doors in regard to a particular defendant by employing the same test 
used by state courts but on a territorially smaller scale because not all federal districts are 
coextensive with the borders of the states in which the federal courts sit. See supra note 341 
and accompanying text. 
756. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
757. 560 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
758. Id. at 730-31. 
759. Id. at 733. 
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cluded that the requirements of the Constitution had been satisfied: 
[The defendant's] substantial and continuous activities within this 
district are sufficient to support the conclusion that it has purposeful- 
ly availed itself of the privilege of conducting its business within 
this district, and has every reasonable basis to believe that it is sub- 
ject to suit here, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 
. . . ; Hanson v. Denckla. . . ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 
. . ; even with respect to actions which may not arise out of the 
business which it has transacted in this 
Clearly the analysis by this court requires some concentration of con- 
tacts in the federal district in which suit is brought, while the analyses in 
cases like AIco and Texas Trading do not. Moreover, any standard 
of minimum contacts with the United States would have been satisfied 
by the facts of this case. What is interesting, however, is the applica- 
tion by the court of its test without any real explanation and with 
citation to cases involving state court extraterritorial assertions of 
jurisdiction. Perhaps the explanation lies in the nature of the litiga- 
tion, a suit against a nonalien corporation served with process within 
the United States. Any analogy between state long-arm statutes and 
federal statutes authorizing extraterritorial service breaks down because, 
in regard to the United States, service in Massachusetts is service within 
the territory of the sovereign. Clearly, no state needs to invoke its 
long-arm statute if it can serve the defendant within its borders. If 
a federal court chooses not to rely on a Mariash sovereignty analysis,761 
then it must choose some territory to be "the forum" in a minimum 
contacts analysis, and the federal district is one possible choice. On 
the other hand, the court merely might have found that the defen- 
dant had substantial contacts with the federal district and, therefore, 
that no contacts analysis on a grander scale would be required.762 
As noted above, because no accepted federal fifth amendment stan- 
dard exists,763 circumstances often seem to dictate the test upon which 
a court bases its analysis. 
Another variation of the "contacts with the federal district" analysis 
of Indian Head appeared in I.A.M. National Pension Fund, Benefit 
Plan A v. Wakefield Industries, Incorporated, Division of Capehart 
C ~ r p . , ~ ~ ~  a suit brought to compel compliance with a Trust Agree- 
ment executed pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Service 
had been made on the defendant corporation and on its president 
760. Id. 
761. See supra notes 622-29 and accompanying text. 
- ~ -  
762. See supra notes 742-47 and accompanying text. 
763. See supra notes 446-47 and accompanying text. 
764. 699 F.2d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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in the Southern District of New York pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 
1132(e)(2), ERISA. This statute provides: 
Where an action under this subchapter is brought in a district court 
of the United States, it may be brought in the district where the 
plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defen- 
dant resides or may be found, and process may be served in any 
other district where a defendant resides or may be found.76s 
The suit had been initiated in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia because the Trust Agreement was administered there. The 
defendant president argued that the federal court lacked jurisdiction 
over him and that the corporation had been served "well outside the 
territorial limits of a federal district court sitting in the District of 
C0lurnbia."~4~ The district court based its resolution of statutory in- 
terpretation of Section 1132(e)(2) on a determination of whether asser- 
tion of jurisdiction would violate "due process," without distinguishing 
between the fourteenth amendment and fifth amendment due process 
clauses: "for service of process on a corporation to be valid under 
Section 1132(e)(2) corporate contacts with the district of service must 
meet the International Shoe test."767 According to the district court, 
therefore, for the defendant corporation to be "found" in New York 
for purposes of service of process, the corporation must have suffi- 
cient contacts with the federal district in which process is served. While 
the court relied on International Shoe, it did not consider anything 
but the propriety of service, essentially ignoring the issue of the pro- 
priety of the defendant being haled into court in the District of the 
District of Columbia. This court seemed to misapprehend the due 
process problem raised by the defendant. Even though the court relied 
on International Shoe and a "contacts" analysis, the result only can 
be justified, under the court analysis, on a power theory:768 personal 
jurisdiction in the District of Columbia was proper if the federal district 
in which service was made had power over the defendant, i.e., if the 
defendant was "present" in that jurisdiction. The authority, thus, 
for suit to be brought in the District of Columbia flows directly from 
the statute. This case aptly illustrates the confusion that exists in the 
area of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases. The court tries 
to use a "contacts" analysis to bring the defendant within the statute 
in the first place rather than to justify assertion of jurisdiction over 
the defendant by a federal district different from the one in which 
the defendant was served. 
765. 29 U.S.C. §1132(e)(2). 
766. 699 F.2d at 1256. 
767. Id. at 1258 (emphasis added). 
768. See supra notes 579 to 682 and accompanying text. 
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The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, in Oxford First Corporation v. PNC Liquidating 
C ~ r p . , ~ ~ ~  purported to devise a special "fairness" test to determine 
whether service of process on nonresident, nonalien shareholders of 
a Philadelphia-based corporation pursuant to the nationwide service 
of process provisions of Section 27 of the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 violated the defendants7 fifth amendment due process 
rights.770 After rejecting the defendants' arguments that venue and 
service of process had been improper, the court extensively analyzed 
the question of due process limitations on Congressional grants of 
nationwide or worldwide service of process. The court examined all 
relevant a~thority'~' and "reject[ed] the notion that there are no limita- 
tions upon extraterritorial service of process under federal statutes 
such as the securities acts" on the ground that "the existence of the 
Fifth Amendment would indicate otherwise."772 In the course of its 
discussion, the court noted the "anomaly" of applying International 
Shoe standards to situations like that before the court: 
The anomaly here lies not only in overlooking the principle that the 
United States may exercise personal jurisdiction over any defendant 
within the United States, but also in limiting federal action by a 
constitutional provision applicable only to state action.773 
The court, however, decided not to base its amenability test upon 
notions of territoriality on one hand or applications of state stan- 
dards on the other; it chose to formulate a special federal test based 
on notions of "fairness." In devising this fairness test, the court noted: 
[Plractical considerations emanating from the realities of contem- 
porary litigation . . . are . . . persuasive justification for upholding 
the view that any constitutional due process limitations upon a federal 
extraterritorial (nationwide) service of process statute must be broadly 
defined.774 
In its test, the court decided "to include the traditional procedural 
due process notions as a part of a judicial fairness test, rather than 
impose the International Shoe mandate of due process on federal 
nationwide service of process statutes."775 The fairness test con- 
templated by the court would include the following: 
769. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
770. Id. at 203-05. 
771. Id. at 198-201. 
772. Id. at 201. 
773. Id. at 199-200 (quoting First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 
730. 737 E D .  Tenn. 1962)). 
774. oxford, 372 F. siipp. at 201. 
775. Id. at 203 (emphasis in original). 
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First, a court should determine the extent of the defendant's con- 
tacts with the place where the action was brought; i.e., the Inter- 
national Shoe type criteria. Second, a court should weigh the in- 
convenience to the defendant of having to defend in a jurisdiction 
other than that of his residence or place of business. . . . Third, 
the matter of judicial economy should be evaluated . . . . Fourth, 
a court should consider the probable situs of the discovery pro- 
ceedings in the case and the extent to which the discovery proceedings 
will, in any event, take place outside the state of defendant's residence 
or business. . . .Fiffh, a court should examine the nature . . . and 
the extent of impact that defendant's activities have beyond the 
borders of his state of residence or business.776 
Upon application of this fifth amendment test, the court found that 
"the fairness balance . . . point[s] strongly to upholding jurisdiction 
here."777 
The "fairness" test devised by the Oxford court is significant in 
several regards. First, while the court recognized that federal exer- 
cises of jurisdiction pursuant to federal service of process statutes 
should be measured differently from state court exercises of jurisdic- 
tion, the court seemed to  key its test on the "state of the defendant's 
residence or place of business"; it referred to "state" in factors four 
and five of its above-quoted test while otherwise generally referring 
to "the place where the action was brought" or "jurisdicton." The 
court did not, on one hand, rely on federal districts in its analysis 
or, on the other hand, on the United States as a whole. In many 
ways, moreover, the Oxford test resembles the "balancing of the con- 
veniences" test that many state courts employed in deciding whether 
the International Shoe minimum contacts test had been sati~fied,?'~ 
at  least prior to the Supreme Court decision in World-Wide 
W o l k ~ w a g e n ~ ~ ~  decided subsequent to Oxford. In World-Wide 
Volkswagen, the Supreme Court ruled that before any type of balan- 
cing of factors might be employed, the court had to establish that 
the defendant had some contacts with the forum state. The fifth fac- 
tor, "nature of the regulated activity . . . and . . . extent of impact 
. . . beyond the borders of [the] state," seems geared to the special 
federal purpose in authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of pro- 
cess in regard to  certain disputes arising out of that acti~ity.'~" This 
factor is comparable to  discussions as to  whether the state long-arm 
776. Id. 203-04 (emphasis in original). 
777. Id. at 204. 
778. See supra notes 106-44 and accompanying text. 
779. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. 
780. See supra note 573 and accompanying text. 
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statute that authorized the extraterritorial service of process was in- 
tended to reach certain types of acts having consequences in the forum 
state. A strong argument can be made that the Oxford court, in at- 
tempting to formalize its fairness test, merely listed factors that many 
state courts had included in International Shoe analyses.7s1 Further, 
Oxford may have anticipated the World-Wide "two-step" test for state 
courts: (1) some defendant contacts with the forum state, and (2) balan- 
cing conveniences to determine whether those contacts were sufficient 
to be "minimum" for International Shoe purposes.782 This interpreta- 
tion finds support in the following statement by the Oxford Court: 
It is a close question whether these facts and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom would meet the International Shoe standards of due pro- 
cess, if that was the sole test. However, in view of the foregoing 
discussion, we need not answer the question on International Shoe 
terms alone. On this record we find that there were sufficient contacts 
between the St. Claire defendants and this jurisdiction to support 
the first criterion of the multifaceted fairness test that justifies in 
personam jurisdiction here.783 
Finally, the Oxford court has devised a test applicable only to nonalien 
defendants. The court gave no clue as to how the test would change 
if the defendant had no state of residence or business. One conclu- 
sion might be that the "fairnessyy test of Oxford is no different in 
effect from the "minimum contacts with the state in which the federal 
court is sitting" test of VTR, except that VTR applied the test to 
alien defendants. In short, Oxford, which at first glance appears to 
create a new, fully federal test for personal jurisdiction in these federal 
statute cases, in reality seems to apply International Shoe almost 
without regard to the federal context.784 
Summary and Analysis 
Federal courts have varied greatly in treatment of the question of 
amenability standards in federal question cases in which process has 
been served pursuant to a federal statute authorizing nationwide or 
worldwide service of process. Some courts, in effect, have determined 
that when service is made within the United States, personal jurisdic- 
tion flows automatically from the statute on a sovereignty theory.785 
781. See supra notes 106-44 and accompanying text. 
782. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
783. 372 F. Supp. at 204 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted). 
784. At least, the test is only useful in circumstances such as those posed by the case. 
What Oxford offers is a well-written and reasoned alternative to  the Mariash power approach, 
see supra notes 622-29 and accompanying text, in regard to nonalien defendants. 
785. See supra notes 573-682 and accompanying text. 
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Other courts have required a separate due process analysis in similar 
cases, applying some form of the International Shoe test-"minimum 
contacts with the federal or "minimum contacts with the 
state in which the federal court is sitting."787 In cases in which the 
defendant is an alien served outside the United States, all courts ad- 
dressing this issue have required a separate amenability analysis, again 
applying some form of the International Shoe test-"minimum con- 
tacts with the United States as a whole," a "national contacts" 
approach,788 "minimum contacts with the federal district in which 
the suit is brought,"7sg or "minimum contacts with the state in which 
the federal court is sitting."7g0 
Other approaches also have been suggested. One commentator has 
noted that satisfaction of the venue requirements of certain federal 
statutes authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of process 
automatically would serve personal jurisdiction purposes because those 
venue provisions require defendant-contact with the federal district 
in which the court is sitting.79' Other commentators have suggested 
786. See supra notes 754-68 and accompanying text. 
787. See supra notes 769-84 and accompanying text. 
788. See supra notes 687-716 and accompanying text. See also notes 717-38 and accom- 
panying text; Engineering & Equipment Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(in rem jurisdiction as authorized by Rule B(l) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty 
and Maritime Claims is constitutional when the defendants whose property was being attachcd 
had sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole). 
789. See supra notes 739-47 and accompanying text. 
790. See supra notes 748-53 and accompanying text. In some cases in which nationwide 
or  worldwide service of process might be authorized by statute, federal courts have not con- 
sidered amenability under the particular statute but, instead, have applied state long-arm statutes 
as authorized by former Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or  Rule 4(e) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) (although court could have utilized nationwide service provisions of Section 12 of the 
Clayton Act, the court applied the New York long-arm statute, finding personal jurisdiction 
over the Florida defendants on the basis of the sufficiency of their contacts with the state 
of New York); Hitt v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (court 
discussed Section 12 of the Clayton Act only in regard to the question of venue; court used 
Florida long-arm statute to  find defendant amenable to suit). While Federal Rule 4 permits 
a party to  select among the approved methods of service so long as the factual requirements 
of the particular method are satisfied, to  rely on a state long-arm statute does not seem sensi- 
ble except in cases in which state standards under the long-arm statute clearly are satisfied, 
thus making the long-arm analysis uncomplicated. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
observed, in Hilgeman v. National Ins. Co. of Am., 547 F.2d 298, 301 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977): 
We have been given no explanation of why, given the liberal nationwide service of 
process provisions of the federal Securities Acts, particularly $27 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, . . .the plaintiff made use of the Alabama insurance statute 
to effect service of process when the whole thrust of his action was that he held 
a security rather than an insurance policy. Plaintiff obtained service of process on 
the two non-corporate defendants under the federal statute. 
Id. 
791. Comment, Civil Procedure-Service of Process- "Fairnesr" Test Applied to Service 
Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Despite Broad Authorization of Section 27, 15 U.S.C. 
$78aa (1970). Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974), 
7 RUTGERS-CM. L. J. 158, 166 (1975). 
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that federal courts should have worldwide service of process, with 
the location of suit being controlled, by venue and forum nonconve- 
nienskransfer provisions, to preclude unfairness to the defendant 
caused by inconvenient location of 
Clearly, no uniform approach has been adopted, even in this least 
complicated federal question area in which service is made pursuant 
to a special federal statute. To this writer, the only unifying test possi- 
ble would be one of "minimum contacts with the United States," 
barring, of course, the legislative or judicial establishment of some 
different wholly federal fifth amendment standard. In cases involv- 
ing service within the United States, the defendant's presence in the 
country would be a sufficient contact, especially since the purpose 
envisioned by Congress in enacting these special statutes was to max- 
imize the potential for providing federal fora for the vindication of 
certain federally-created rights, fora which would be convenient to 
the plaintiff involved.793 This doctrine, however, would not be-based 
on some notion of sovereignty, which has been rejected frequently 
as a ground for personal jurisdiction in the state context, but rather 
on a balancing test in which presence within the United States would 
be such a heavy factor that only the most extreme hardship to the 
defendant in litigating in the United States might outweigh the presence 
factor. In the state court context, no factor has yet outweighed 
presence, no matter how transitory, as a constitutionally proper basis 
of personal jurisdiction.794 Any intra-United States inconvenience could 
be mitigated by transfer of venue provisions, but only when such 
transfer would not undermine the Congressional purpose in enacting 
the special service of process statute. Thus, in cases involving service 
within the United States, the outer limits of due process would be 
satisfied by presence in the country, and any more rigorous contacts 
analysis generally would not be required. 
In regard to defendants served outside the United States pursuant 
to a federal statute authorizing worldwide service of process, 
"minimum contacts with the country" again would satisfy any fifth 
amendment requirement. To require sufficient contacts with either the 
state in which the federal court is sitting or the particular federal 
district seeking to assert personal jurisdiction is not required constitu- 
tionally nor is it sound doctrinally. The former, the International Shoe 
test, would create the admittedly anomalous situation of subjecting 
792. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts $2374, 
& 437-41 mem. (1969). 
793. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
794. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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federal court personal jurisdiction in cases in which process is served 
in a wholly federal manner to the same standard applied to state courts 
under the fourteenth amendment.795 Moreover, because each state might 
have its own interpretation of what is sufficient to satisfy due pro- 
cess subject to Supreme Court decisions, the federal courts also would 
have to decide whether to apply the standards of the particular states 
in which they were sitting or apply some uniform federal test. The 
"minimum contacts with the state" standard also would be subject 
to further criticism. Since states vary greatly in size, one defendant, 
who had acted in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Rhode 
Island but had not acted sufficiently in any state to have minimum 
contacts therewith, could not be brought to justice in a federal court. 
However, another defendant who had committed these same acts at 
the most remote corners of Alaska, a greater land area, would be 
subject to suit in a federal court because the accumulation of acts 
would be sufficient to be minimum. Finally, a defendant might not 
have sufficient contacts with any state to satisfy a minimum contacts 
test, and, yet, he might have acted sufficiently to have minimum con- 
tacts with the United States.796 Clearly, in these cases, the purpose 
of the federal statute authorizing worldwide service of process would 
be undermined if suit could not be maintained in any federal court 
because the defendant's activities were scattered too thinly throughout 
the country. 
Some of the same criticisms could be levelled at the "minimum 
contacts with the federal district" test. Again, a defendant whose 
activities were spread thinly would not be amenable to suit although 
he might have caused substantial effects in the United States. Moreover, 
federal districts are never larger than the states in which the federal 
courts are sitting, and they are often smaller. Thus, a "federal district 
contacts" requirement would be, in some cases, more strict than that 
required by straight application of the International Shoe "contacts 
with the state" test, a result making no sense at all, especially since 
Congress has authorized that federal process run at least to the borders 
of the states in which the federal courts are held.797 A federal court 
hearing purely federal business should not be more restricted than 
a state court hearing the same matter. 
795. Even in diversity cases, courts and commentators have noted this anomaly with ten- 
sion. See supra note 488 and accompanying text. In the federal question context, many more 
authorities have been disturbed by the doctrinal disharmony created. See, e.g., infra notes 878, 
968, and 1132 and accompanying text. 
796. Several courts and commentators have noted this possibility. See, e.g., i n h  notes 1030, 
1083, 1267 and 1281 and accompanying text. 
797. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
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Apparently, no reason exists why the fifth amendment would not 
be satisfied by a requirement of minimum contacts with the United 
States. An examination of the cases in which personal jurisdiction 
was upheld upon application of other amenability tests probably would 
reveal that the defendant's contacts had been concentrated sufficient- 
ly as to satisfy the more restrictive test of contacts with a particular 
state or district. Therefore, the more liberal test of "minimum con- 
tacts with the United States," or "national contacts," also would have 
been satisfied. On the other hand, in cases in which personal jurisdic- 
tion was denied upon application of other amenability standards, the 
defendant's contacts, such as they were, probably had been concen- 
trated in only one state or federal district, and, thus, the more liberal 
test of "national contacts" also would not have been satisfied because 
no other contacts could have been added to the insufficient local con- 
tacts. In other words, a federal court might apply a localized con- 
tacts analysis, not because the test established the outer limits of due 
process, but because, on the facts of the case, local contacts were 
determinative. That does not mean, however, that a uniform stan- 
dard of minimum contacts with the United States should not be 
developed. A more sensible analytic approach would be to begin with 
an established standard, rather than selecting the standard by the facts 
of the particular case. As noted above,798 moreover, any abuse by 
plaintiffs of a "contacts with the United States" test by bringing suit 
in a very remote or inconvenient federal district could be precluded, 
by the venue requirements included in the federal statutes authoriz- 
ing nationwide or worldwide service of process, by liberal change of 
venue statutes, or by the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
2. Amenability Standards in Federal Question Cases in which 
Process is Served in a Wholly Federal Manner Pursuant to Rules 
4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Federal Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) provide methods of service upon 
individuals and corporations and other business entities, respectively.799 
Rule 4(d)(l) permits service by delivery to the defendant or by "leaving 
copies . . . at his dwelling house or usual place of abode," a wholly 
federal method of serving an individual defendant present within or 
a resident of the state in which the federal court is sitting.800 Federal 
process ordinarily runs to the borders of the state in which the federal 
798. See supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354, 657 and 693 and accompanying text. 
799. See supra notes 273-74 and accompanying text. 
800. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
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court is sitting.*O1 Rule 4(d)(3) permits service upon a business entity 
by delivery, within the state, "to an officer . . . or to any other 
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of pro- 
cess," a wholly federal method of serving a defendant corporation 
whose agent is present within the state in which the federal court 
is sitting.s02 This provision presupposes that in most cases such an 
agent will not be authorized to receive service of process unless the 
defendant business entity has some relationship to the state in which 
the federal court is sitting.s03 
Unlike the methods of service permitted by the special federal statutes 
discussed above, the more general methods of 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) may 
be utilized in any federal question case so long as the factual re- 
quirements of the Federal Rule are satisfied. Service is more limited 
in territorial scope, however, because Congress has not chosen to grant 
federal courts across-the-board nationwide, or worldwide, service of 
process, although such a statute would not be uncon~ti tut ional .~~~ In- 
stead, Congress has decided to limit such statutory grants to areas 
of particular federal concern.805 
Federal Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) speak only to the manner of serving 
process and not to the question of whether such service will lead to 
801. Rule 4(f) provides, in pertinent part: 
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits 
of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute 
of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(f). AS described above, dozens of federal statutes authorize more extensive 
service of process. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. Rule 4(f) itself authorizes a 
limited service beyond the borders of the state, within 100 miles of the federal courthouse, 
for "persons. . . .brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional parties to a 
pending action or  a counterclaim or  crossclaim therein pursuant to Rule 19." FED. R. CIV. 
P. 4(f). Rule 4, moreover, authorizes service pursuant to  state long-arm statutes in some cir- 
cumstances. See infra notes 897 and 1103-08 and accompanying text. Such service, therefore, 
also would be "authorized . . . by these rules." 
802. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
803. Such service still will be scrutinized as to due process requirements. See ittfra notes 
806-87 and accompanying text. If the corporation has no contacts with the state in which the 
federal court is sitting, the suit probably could not be maintained because of lack of personal 
jurisdiction. See infra notes 823-71 and accompanying text. Or, if the court applies a "minimum 
contacts with the United States" due process test for personal jurisdiction, as in First Flight 
Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), the suit probably 
would fail for lack of venue. See infra notes 872-87 and accompanying text. 
804. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
805. See supra notes 205-50 and accompanying text. In somi. circumstances, courts have 
found that Congress implicitly has authorized nationwide or  worldwide service of process. See, 
e.g., F.T.C. v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (third paragraph of section 9 of Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. $49 (1976). impliedly authorized nationwide service of pro- 
cess in proceedings to  enforce investigative subpoena issued by F.T.C.). Cf. United States V. 
Hill, 694 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court finds that section 645 of Department of Energy 
Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. $7255 (Supp. IV 1980) does not confer power of extraterritorial 
service of process in Department of Energy subpoena enforcement proceedings). 
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a constitutionally permissible assertion of personal jurisdiction.806 Since 
the method of service in these cases would be wholly federal, the 
appropriate amenability standard should be the due process clause 
of the fifth amendment.807 Any reliance on state standards, except, 
perhaps, by analogy, seems wholly misplaced.808 Federal question cases 
must be examined to determine how federal courts actually have dealt 
with this issue, not a simple task because federal courts often do not 
indicate clearly the subsection of Federal Rule 4.under which process 
was served. This omission is indicative of the absence of uniform treat- 
ment of the personal jurisdiction question; no formula has been 
806. Unlike those cases in which service is made pursuant to a federal statute authorizing 
nationwide and/or worldwide service and in which the courts have not engaged in any separate 
amenability analysis either because the court felt that no separate analysis would be required 
or the court felt that the standard had been "built into" the statute, see supra notes 579-652 
and accompanying text, federal courts seem to  assume that service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3) 
cannot trigger federal court personal jurisdiction unless such assertion of jurisdiction would 
satisfy the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See infra notes 817-87 and accompany- 
ing text. When service is made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(l), a separate due process analysis prob- 
ably would not be employed because of the obvious sufficiency of the defendant's presence 
and/or residence as a constitutionally appropriate basis for assertion of personal jurisdiction. 
See infra notes 810-16 and accompanying text. 
807. See supra notes 329 and 497 and accompanying text. One federal court has noted: 
Comparatively recent decisions have held that federal courts considering questions 
arising under the Constitution of the United States or  federal statutes properly may 
exercise jurisdiction limited only by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
. . .But in [those] . . . cases, the manner of serving process was provided for by 
both federal rule and by state law. I t  was possible, therefore, to  use Rule 4(d)(3) 
to the exclusion of any procedures under state statutes, and to  disregard their limita- 
tions. . . .It is obvious that although a federal court may have a foreign corporation 
within its territorial jurisdiction, the court may not have procedure available under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to  bring the corporation into court. Where no 
agent is served in fact a federal court must look to  the state statutory procedure. ' 
A federal court is authorized to do this under Rule 4(d)(7). It  follows that the ade- 
quacy of service of process must be determined by that rule. 
Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1967). 
The problems created when process is served by some state method, as authorized by Rule 
4(e) and (possibly) by former Rule 4(d)(7), will be discussed below. See infra notes 915-1038 
and 1123-1316 and accompanying text. 
808. See supra note 795 and accompanying text. 
809. Many cases have been devoted to the development of a technique for determining 
whether a state court properly can assert jurisdiction over a defendant. See supra notes 60-185 
and accompanying text. The resulting test might be summarized in the following format: (1) 
Was process served properly pursuant to  the statute providing for service of process? (2) If 
yes, did such service give the defendant adequate notice of the pendency of the suit against 
him and has the defendant been afforded the opportunity to  be heard in his own defense? 
(3) If yes, did the state have the authority, under its long-arm statute, to  serve process on 
the defendant? (4) If yes, would assertion of personal jurisdiction over this defendant offend 
his rights under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, i.e., (a) did the defendant 
have any contacts with the state seeking to assert jurisdiction over the defendant, and (b) if 
yes, were the defendant's contacts with the state sufficient to  be considered "minimum con- 
tacts" within the meaning of International Shoe and its progeny? No such basic structure of 
analysis has been developed in federal court cases, although most federal courts follow the 
state-developed analysis in regard to  diversity cases, regardless of the manner in which process 
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Very few amenability issues arise regarding service pursuant to Rule 
4(d)(l). The explanation for this paucity of discussion is simple: ser- 
vice under Rule 4(d)(l) is limited, at the time of service, to individuals 
residing in or present in the state in which the federal court is sitting, 
and, since no state court would be denied personal jurisdiction over 
a defendant so served as long as the other procedural aspects of due 
process-adequate notice and opportunity to be heard-had been 
satisfied,s10 a federal court surely would not be denied personal jurisdic- 
tion. This is because a federal court is subject only to the restrictions 
of the due process clause of the fifth rather than the fourteenth amend- 
ment, restrictions that could not be more limiting than those on state 
courts. In other words, presence and residence in a state always have 
been considered sufficient bases for assertion of personal jurisdiction, 
and federal courts should be entitled to assert jurisdiction on the basis 
of presence or residence in the state in which the court is sitting.811 
Even if some sort of "minimum contacts" analysis were applied, 
presence or residence always would be sufficient contacts.8L2 In re 
Arthur Treacher's Franchise LitigationBL3 was one federal question case 
in which a defendant, personally served in the state of Pennsylvania 
in regard to a suit instituted in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, presumably pursuant to Rule 
4(d)(l), resisted the exercise of court authority over him. Defendant 
claimed he was immune from service of process because "[hlis sole 
was served. See supra notes 376-492 and accompanying text. Perhaps this absence of technique 
can be explained partly by the variety of options available for federal court service of process. 
The mole likely explanation, however, is that no series of cases has developed any fifth amend- 
ment standard, resulting in an analytical "catch as catch can": use whatever analysis makes 
sense in light of the facts of the case and the result that seems reasonable-minimum contacts 
with the federal district, with the state, with the United States as a whole, or some new and 
unique test. Most federal courts end up using some analogue of the Infernational Shoe test, 
probably because that test is already well-established in doctrine and practice and at  this point, 
the probability that the Supreme Court will step up and require some new and unique test 
that does not require some sort of minimum contacts analysis seems unlikely. Even when a 
court purports to be establishing such a test, the test can be folded neatly into the Infernationul 
Shoe mold. See supra notes 769-84 and accompanying text. 
810. See supra note 511 and accompanying text. 
Sll. Congress has elected to relegate the arms of the federal system, the federal district 
courts, to federal districts that are either territorially coextensive with the states in which the 
federal courts are sitting, or  are subsumed within the states with two or more federal districts 
combining together to  be territorially coextensive with one state. Congress further has provided 
that the process of each federal district court reaches at least to the borders of the state in 
which the federal court is sitting. See supra note 801 and accompanying text. Thus, the ordinary 
service of process power of the federal court is coextensive with that of a state court and 
any amenability analysis could be analogous to  that regarding a state court serving a defendant 
who is present in or a resident of the state. 
812. See supra note 115 (discussing the traditional bases of personal jurisdiction-presence, 
domicile, and residence-as contacts with the forum state). 
813. 92 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 154 1984-1985 
I984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
purpose for being in [Pennsylvania] (when he was hand-served with 
process) was to testify in [a related] action."814 The defendant and 
the court both assumed that if the immunity from process were not 
granted, the defendant would be amenable to suit in the federal court 
even though "at all times subsequent to the filing of the complaint 
in this particular action. . . . , (defendant) has neither resided in nor 
conducted business in Penn~ylvania."~~~ His transitory presence at the 
time of service would have been sufficient to subject him to the 
authority of the federal court.816 
In cases in which process is served on a corporation or other business 
entity pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), more difficult amenability questions 
have arisen. These questions stem in large measure, from the fact 
that a corporation, unlike an individual, lacks the capacity to be 
"physically present" in a juri~diction.~" Thus, since Rule 4(d)(3) 
prescribes only a method for triggering the power of a federal court 
when service is made on some corporate agent located within the state 
in which the federal court is sitting, the court must decide whether 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the corporation would violate 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. In First Flight Com- 
pany v. National Carloading Corp. ,818 the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Tennessee described various judicial 
responses to this problem: 
There is . . . a great deal of confusion as to just what the federal 
law is in this regard. Aside from cases which purport to limit federal 
court jurisdiction by state law [by the minimum contacts witli the 
state test under the fourteenth amendment], other cases are to be 
814. Id. at  404. 
815. Id. 
816. The court noted that "[dlefendant's argument relates solely to  the sufficiency of ser- 
vice of process and it is not premised on any asserted lack of personal jurisdiction." Id. at  
405. The court ultimately refused to grant the defendant the desired immunity "because service 
could have been made upon him by certified mail pursuant to  Pennsylvania's long-arm statute 
and pursuant to  Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7)." Id. at  404 (quoting Plaintiff's Memorandum). The 
court noted: 
The rationale underlying this particular rule of immunity is to ensure the efficient 
administration of justice by encouraging the voluntary attendance of witnesses who 
might othenvise be dissuaded from appearing in a jurisdiction for fear of being served 
with process in an  unrelated action. 
Id. Since the defendant could have been served validly by another means, the court concluded 
that the purpose of the doctrine would not be achieved by grant of immunity. Id. a t  405. 
The court recognized that an effective alternative method of service would be available, 
although that method would depend, to some extent, on state law. In regard to  other defen- 
dants, the court analyzed their jurisdictional objections in terms of due process standards ap- 
plicable to state long-arm statutes. See infra nates 1172-77 and accompanying text. 
817. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing "presence" problem in regard 
of state court jurisdiction). 
815. 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). 
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found which require as a prerequisite to the personal jurisdiction 
of a federal court over a foreign corporation that the defendant be 
"doing business" within the district in which the court is held because 
the Fourteenth Amendment requires it, or because the Fifth Amend- 
ment requires it, or because venue statutes require it, or because 
the Court merely assumes that something requires it. Other courts 
require "doing business" not within the district but within the state 
in which the federal court sits, for equally diverse 
As described below,820 the First Flight court, by "reference to fun- 
damental principles and authorities," found "a rational and consis- 
tent explanation of federal court personal jurisdiction" when process 
is served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3).82' The court developed a require- 
ment of "minimum contacts with the United States" to satisfy the 
fifth amendment due process clause.822 
Before considering First Flight and its comprehensive treatment of 
the question of federal court personal jurisdiction when process is 
served, pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), by a wholly federal method, some 
other federal question cases that consider this issue should be examined 
for comparison purposes. In FraIey v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway 
C O . , ~ ~ ~  a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) suit instituted in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn- 
sylvania, service had been made on defendant Virginia corporation, 
under Rule 4(d)(3), at an office maintained by the defendant in the 
Western District of Pennsylvania. The district court had dismissed 
the action on the ground that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant because the defendant was not "doing business" in the 
Western District of P e n n s y l ~ a n i a . ~ ~ ~  The United States Court of Ap- 
peals reversed and remanded on the following ground: 
[Tlhe District Court erred in refusing to direct defendant to answer 
plaintiff's interrogatories designed to elicit the range of operations 
of defendant's offices in Pennsylvania. . . .[because t]he range of 
activities of defendant's offices was critical to ascertaining whether 
they were of sufficient dimension to constitute "minimum contacts" 
or "doing business" in Pennsylvania, with consequential establish- 
ment of in personam jurisdiction in the Western District of 
P e n n s y l ~ a n i a . ~ ~ ~  
The court of appeals asserted that it was relying on federal law "in 
819. Id. at 736. 
820. See infra notes 872-84 and accompanying text. 
821. 209 F. Supp. at 736. 
822. Id. at 736-40. See infra notes 872-84 and accompanying text. 
823. 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968). 
824. Id. at 2. 
825. Id. at 3. 
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determining the issue of in personam jurisdiction where the complaint 
. . . asserts a federal right, and personal service . . . was made in 
accordance with . . . Rule 4(d)(3)."826 In this circumstance, however, 
the court apparently found .that "federal law" would be "minimum 
contacts with the state," the same test that would apply to Penn- 
sylvania state court assertions of jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations.827 While its conclusion was based, in part, on an 
erroneous understanding of the derivation of the International Shoe 
standard,828 the court also grounded its test on "basic principles of 
fairness."829 The test in Fraley is clearly no different from the test . 
for a state court and creates the anomaly of opening the doors of 
a federal court in a federal question case in which service is made 
in a wholly federal manner only to the extent that a state court in 
similar circumstances would be permitted to open its doors.830 The 
result, moreover, cannot be explained on the ground that "minimum 
contacts with the state" is an acceptable test because its application 
necessarily will result in the assertion of personal jurisdicti~n.~~' The 
facts of Fraley might not satisfy the state standard but clearly might 
satisfy a "minimum contacts with the United States" standard.832 The 
case may be explained on the ground that because the plaintiff himself 
826. Id. at 4. Thus, the court limited its approach to  cases in which service had been 
made by some wholly federal manner. 
827. The question before the court of appeals was whether the district court had erred 
in refusing to require the defendant to answer interrogatories in regard to  "the range of opera- 
tions of defendant's offices in Pennsylvania" and the court of appeals noted that the scope 
of these activities "was critical to ascertaining . . . 'minimum contacts' . . . in Pennsylvania." 
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Thus, although the court of appeals quoted a test of minimum 
contacts with the forum, it seemed to  regard the State of Pennsylvania as the critical area 
of concern. Id. Moreover, the court cited International Shoe as the source of its test. Id. 
828. After citing International Shoe as the source of the "minimum contacts" test, the 
court stated: "It must be noted that while the principles stated were announced by the Supreme 
Court in diversity jurisdiction cases they are now generally regarded as applicable in cases 
grounded on a federal claim." Id. at  3. International Shoe and its progeny were not diversity 
cases but state court cases. See supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text. This error in regard 
of the International Shoe test has been made by several other federal courts. See, e.g., De- 
James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Arthur Treacher's 
Franchisee Litig., 92 F.R.D. 398, 408 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Superior Coal Co. v. Ruhrkohle, 
A.G., 83 F.R.D. 414,418 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Such a misconception provides further demonstra- 
tion of the confusion in this area of the law. 
829. Fraley, 397 F.2d at  3 (quoting Lone Star Package Car Co., Inc. v. Baltimore & O.R. 
Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954). 
830. See supra note 795 and accompanying text and infra notes 878, 968 and 1132 and 
accompanying text. 
831. See supra notes 742, 747 and 762 and accompanying text. 
832. The defendant maintained some offices in Pennsylvania "for the purpose of soliciting 
business," Fraley, 397 F.2d at  3 (quoting affidavit of defendant's corporate secretary), but 
asserted that it had "no railroad lines or  tracks nor [did] it  operate any trains . . . in, on 
or across the State of Pennsylvania." Id. Clearly, the defendant railroad company operated 
trains and maintained railroad lines in other states; the plaintiff had been injured in West 
Virginia where the defendant maintained railroad lines. 
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sought to establish "minimum contacts with Pennsylvania," the court 
keyed on that request. Again, as in many of the cases discussed above, 
the circumstances of the case seemed to dictate the test applied because 
no general federal approach had been devised.833 
In Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. R ~ h l s e n , ~ ' ~  a federal ques- 
tion action instituted in the United States District Court for the District 
of Puerto Rico under the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court 
service had been made on the defendant Mexican Corporation, under 
Rule 4(d)(3), by serving process on the manager of a Puerto Rican 
franchise of the defendant.836 In response to the defendant's objec- 
tion to personal jurisdiction, the court observed that federal court 
assertions of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases were to 
be "tested . . . by reference to the standards developed under the 
[fifth amendment due process] clause"837 and proceeded to examine 
the defendant's contacts with Puerto Rico, citing International Shoe 
as the source of "[tlhe basic standard."838 While the court, therefore, 
gave lip service to the need to apply federal standards, it applied the 
same analysis that a state court would use. Again, the federal stan- 
dard, when applied, looks, acts, tastes, and smells just like the state 
standard. 
In another federal question suit, service was made, apparently pur- 
suant to Rule 4(d)(3),839 on a defendant alien corporation by personal 
service on a wholly-owned subsidiary located in the Southern District 
of New York. In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, 840 
the district court examined the defendant's relationship with the federal 
district and concluded that "requiring [defendant] to defend here will 
[not] work such an inconvenience as to result in a denial of due 
The court cited International Shoe as the source of the 
test applied to the defendant: "[The defendant] has taken advantage 
of the opportunities offered here for its corporate activities; it has 
received the benefit of the laws of the United States; it must expect 
833. See supra notes 742, 747 and 762 and accompanying text. 
834. 360 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1966). 
835. 15 U.S.C. $81221-1225 (1982). 
836. 360 F.2d at 439. 
837. Id. at 440 n.3. 
838. Id. at 440. 
839. The court did not cite the source of authority for serving the defendant corporation 
by delivery to an "agent" located in the state in which the federal court was sitting, but also 
did not cite any state rule or state long-arm statute. Thus, one can infer from the facts of 
the case, which are consistent with the requirements of Rule 4(d)(3), that service was made 
in the wholly federal fashion permitted thereby. 
840. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
841. Id. at 511. 
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to be required to answer for their breach."842 While the court did 
not use specifically the term "minimum contacts," it clearly relied 
on a state court test, but applied the test even more narrowly by 
examining only the defendant's contacts with the federal district in 
which the suit had been In both Chemical Industries and 
Rohlsen the courts may have applied the least broad standard necessary 
to find personal jurisdiction; in each case the defendant's contacts 
with the smaller entity were sufficient to support personal 
j~ r i sd i c t i on .~~~  Rohlsen and Chemical Industries differ, however, 
because the former court purported to be applying some federal stan- 
dard while the latter did not. 
In a patent infringement suit, Honeywell, Inc. v. Met i  
Appara te~erke ,~~ '  the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois pursued two alternative analyses to determine 
whether it had obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendant alien 
corporation. Process was served, within Illinois, on the branch manager 
of the defendant's exclusive American distributor of the defendant's 
allegedly infringing devices, and a copy of the summons and com- 
plaint was mailed to the defendant in Germany.846 The plaintiff first 
asserted that personal jurisdiction had been obtained by service under 
Rule 4(d)(3) on the defendant's agent.847 In a confusing opinion, the 
court reversed the ordinary order of analysis, ruling that if the 
distributor served was an agent of the defendant, then due process 
would be satisfied because the defendant would have "sufficient 
minimum contacts with Illinois so as to warrant in personam 
jurisdi~t ion."~~~ If, however, the distributor served were "an indepen- 
dent purchaser" of the defendant's product, then due process would 
not be satisfied and service on the distributor would be insufficient.849 
According to the district court, therefore, if satisfaction of the re- 
842. Id. 
843. This case was decided only 6 years after International Shoe and before subsequent 
cases "filled out" the International Shoe doctrine. Thus, the court understandably purported 
to follow International Shoe but did not employ the talismanic phrase "minimum contacts". 
This case is probably most significant because it demonstrates that federal courts were using 
International Shoe, soon after it was decided, as a constitutional barometer, not only of the 
fourteenth amendment, but of the fifth as well. 
844. In Chemical Industries, the defendant's subsidiary was incorporated in the state and 
maintained its office and conducted substantial activities in the federal district. 100 F. Supp. 
at 511. In Rohlsen, the defendant's franchisee maintained its office and conducted its activities 
in Puerto Rico. 360 F.2d at 440-41. 
845. 353 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. 111. 1972), rev'd, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975). 
846. 353 F. Supp. at  494. 
847. Id. at  494-95. 
848. Id. at  494. 
849. Id. 
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quisites of Rule 4(d)(3) could be established, due process would be 
satisfied.850 Although the court seemed to say that an International 
Shoe test had been programmed into Rule 4(d)(3), the court might 
have been careless in stating the issue. In this case, the distributor's 
activities within Illinois were so substantial that the only determinative 
question was whether the distributor was actually an agent of the defen- 
dant. The court concluded that the distributor was not an agent of 
the defendant and that the defendant therefore did "not have suffi- 
cient minimum contacts with the State of Illinois to warrant this Court 
exercising in personam jurisdiction over it."s51 Clearly, the court did 
not conclude that any special amenability standards should be applied 
in federal question cases; the court employed the International Shoe 
test directly to the circumstances before it. 
On the alternative basis asserted for personal jurisdiction, amenability 
to service under the Illinois state long-arm statute as authorized by 
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules, the court found that the requirements 
of the Illinois statute were not satisfied.ss2 The appellate court 
decision,853 which will be discussed below,854 considered only the Rule 
4(e) prong of the district court decision. The court of appeals found 
that the state statutory requirements had been met and that exercise 
of personal jurisdiction would not offend the defendant's fifth amend- 
ment due process rights.855 
Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. ,f156 
a federal question case, involved the question of whether a United 
States District Court sitting in Texas had personal jurisdiction over 
a third party defendant, Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. (B. & O.), 
a Maryland Corporation that had no permit to do business in Texas 
and that did no business in Texas but maintained offices in Dallas 
850. In Edwards v. Gulf Miss. Marine Corp., 449 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Tex. 1978), the 
district court found that because service had been made on some defendants pursuant to Rule 
4(d)(3) no need existed to  resort to  the Texas long-arm statute in regard to those defendants. 
As in Honeywell, the court seemed to  find some due process standard built into Rule 4(d)(3): 
In order for service to be effective under Rule 4(d)(3) in this case, the agent served must meet 
the tests of a "managing agent." Id. at  1365-66. See infra note 1109 and accompanying text 
(discussing service on one defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)). See also Wells Fargo & Co. v. 
Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 424 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[gliven the legislative authoriza- 
tion [of Rule 4(d)(3)], and if plaintiffs can establish that [defendant] was carrying on 'con- 
tinuous and systematic' activities in Nevada through [the entity served] as [the defendant's] 
'general agent', we see no reason why [the defendant] itself should not be said to have been 
present there and served at  the time [the entity served] was served"). 
851. 353 F. Supp. at  494. 
852. Id. at  495. 
853. 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975). 
854. See infra notes 1202-12 and accompanying text. 
855. 509 F.2d at  1141-45. 
856. 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954). 
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and Houston. These offices were manned by B. & 0. freight represen- 
tatives on whom personal service had been made. The district court 
had dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over B. & 0. because 
of the insufficiency of its contacts with the State of Texas and the 
federal Much like the district court in Honeywell, the court 
of appeals in Lone Star stated the following as its jurisdictional rule 
in 4(d)(3) cases: 
If a corporation's business is so substantial as to render the cor- 
poration amenable to suit in that state, its principal agent in charge 
of activities within the state meets the test of a "managing agent". 
. . .Hence, with the indicated assumption, service was authorized 
under Rule 4(d)(3).858 
The court then determined that the appropriate test of amenability 
in a federal question case was not the test applied by the district court, 
which might be determinative in diversity cases,859 but was one of 
"basic principles of fairness."s60 The court cited several cases, in- 
cluding International Shoe, recognizing that "in most of the cases 
. . . the question has arisen as to constitutional limitations imposed 
upon the states."861 The court argued, however, that "the broad 
statements of policy expressed, particularly in International Shoe 
. . . seem to us to be extended also to cases where the jurisdiction 
of the federal court depends upon federal Without analysis 
as to how the "fairness test" should be applied in general, or how 
it would be applied to the case at hand, the court concluded: "EU]nder 
the tests of fairness elaborated in the foregoing cases, the facts of 
this case require that the district court exercise jurisdiction over the 
B . & O . .  . . ,9863 
Earlier in its opinion, the court carefully had examined the scope of 
857. The district court had ruled: 
this Court does not have jurisdiction over [the B. & 0.1. . . , a foreign corporation, 
[because] it is not a resident or inhabitant of the State of Texas nor of this judicial 
district, nor is it doing business in either said state or district of such nature as to 
subject it to the jurisdiction of this Court in the instant case. 
Id. at 149 (quoting district court opinion). 
858. Id. at 152 (citation omitted). 
859. Id. at 153. 
860. Id. at 155. The failure of the court to use the term "minimum contacts" might come 
from the fact that this case was decided only nine years after International Shoe and before 
the International Shoe test had been explained in subsequent Supreme Court cases. See supra 
notes 106-55 and accompanying text. 
861. 212 F.2d at 155. 
862. Id. The court, therefore, rejected the approach followed in diversity cases. See supra 
text at note 859. The court settled on the test from which the diversity approach arose, seem- 
ingly coming full circle, albeit sub silentio, to the "minimum contacts with the state" test 
of International Shoe. 
863. 212 F.2d at 155. 
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the activities of the B. & 0. Texas freight  representative^,^^^ but the 
court did not, in its conclusion, refer back to those facts particularly 
as establishing a "fair" basis for personal jurisdiction. Thus, whether 
the "fairness" of the exercise rested on the scope of the agent's 
activities in Texas or in the particular federal district is unclear from 
the opinion. What does seem clear, however, is that the court was 
not adopting any national contacts approach: (1) it only examined 
the defendant's activities in Texas, and (2) its analysis-amenability 
to suit in state renders instate agent a "managing agent" for pur- 
poses of service under Rule 4(d)(3)-leads to the conclusion that only 
instate activities are significant. Although this case goes farther than 
Honeywell by labelling its amenability standard as a "fairness test," 
the effect of the analyses in each case is really the same. To be sub- 
ject to service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), a corporation must carry on 
sufficient activities in a state to be amenable to suit there. The court, 
therefore, really is applying a "minimum contacts with the state" or 
"federal district" test.865 
Unlike Lone Star, the question in Goldberg v. Mutual Readers 
League, I ~ C . , ~ ~ ~  a federal question case, was whether the defendant 
corporation had sufficient control over the business of the person 
served, arguably not an employee of the defendant, to make him a 
"managing agent" for purposes of service of process.867 Moreover, 
the court separated, at least partially, the question of the amenability 
to suit of the corporation from the question of the status of the in- 
dividual served. In its conclusion, the court stated: "[Wle think [the 
business of the person served] is sufficiently controlled by [the defen- 
dant] and sufficiently necessary to [the defendant's] operations to 
enable us to conclude that [the person served] is [the defendant's] 
agent in Pennsylvania for the purpose of service of process on [the 
defendant] and of exercising our jurisdiction over [the defendant]."868 
864. Id. at 149-51. 
865. Thus, in cases like Honeywell, see supra notes 845-55 and accompanying text, Ag- 
Tronic, see infra note 879, and Lone Star, which have made the question of propriety of ser- 
vice under Rule 4(d)(3) depend on amenability in the state, this analysis has limited Rule 4(d)(3) 
in an unintended way. Whether or  not a defendant's agent is servable under 4(d)(3) should 
depend on the agent's status in the defendant corporation and not the amenability to suit of 
the corporation. 
866. 195 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1961). 
867. Id. at  780. In this case, the defendant had argued that the person served was an 
"independent contractor" rather than a "managing agent". Id. Clearly, the person served was 
not directly in the employ of the defendant corporation as were the persons served in Lone Star. 
868. Id. at  783 (emphasis added). After the court had found that the defendant's contacts 
with Pennsylvania, through its "agent", were sufficient to make the defendant amenable to 
suit in the federal court, the court ruled that, because the agent was "in charge of the local 
business of a foreign corporation," he was a "&anaging agent" for purposes of Rule 4(d)(3). 
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As to due process, the court purported to  adopt the position that 
a federal standard should be employed869 and to follow Lone Star 
in establishing that standard.*'O But the test that it devised was 
articulated more completely than was that in Lone Star. The court 
ruled: 
We hold . . . that the limits of our jurisdiction in this case are to 
be determined by looking to the "contacts" which [the defendant] 
has with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; if they are substan- 
tial enough to require [the defendant] to defend this lawsuit here 
without violating traditional concepts of fairness and substantial 
justice, me have the power to render a judgment for or against [the 
defendant] .87' 
Id. Unlike Lone Star, the court, therefore, did not base the agent's status for Rule 4(d)(3) 
purposes on the corporate defendant's amenability to suit in the state. Instead, that determina- 
tion was based on the agent's status in regard to the business of the defendant corporation 
and conducted a separate due process analysis in regard to amenability. 
869. Id. at 781. The court stated: 
All counsel agree that the question of jurisdiction presented by the present motion 
is a question to be determined by "Federal law." It has been previously stated that 
the Court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action depends upon the Fair 
Labor Standards Act; and the questions presented by the suit are questions arising 
under a Federal statute. Therefore, we believe that Pennsylvania statutory law and 
case law on the issue of the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts over foreign corpora- 
tions have no bearing on this case. State law has been followed by Federal Courts 
in diversity cases to determine the jurisdiction of the Federal Court over a foreign 
corporation. Apparently, the Circuit Courts of Appeal are not in accord as to whether 
state law should be determinative of a Federal Court's jurisdiction even in diversity 
cases. However, it seems clear that "Federal law" should control the question of 
our jurisdiction in this case. It is not so clear just what Federal law exists to guide 
our determination. 
Id. (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). 
870. Id. at 782-83 and n.lO. 
871. Id. at 783. Before reaching this conclusion, the court summarized the "Federal law" 
on the question of personal jurisdiction, see supra note 869, in the following way: 
We noted earlier that Federal cases applying state laws to resolve jurisdictional ques- 
tions provide us with no Federal law. Technically, neither do the cases of Interna- 
tional Shoe or McGee. Those cases set forth the limits to which a state could go 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in exercising jurisdic- 
tion over foreign corporations. Obviously, the Fourteenth Amendment has no effect 
on the jurisdiction of Federal District Courts in cases arising under Federal law. The 
Fifth Amendment contains a Due Process Clause, but its limitation on the jurisdic- 
tion of the Federal District Courts over foreign corporations has never been clearly 
stated. The result is that we are left at best with an anomalous body of "Federal 
law" from which to discern the principles applicable to this case. 
195 F. Supp. at 782 (footnotes omitted). After noting that the Federal Rules only provide 
the manner in which service may be made and the geographical area within which such service 
will be effective, the court continued: 
In spite of the doubtful applicability of the formula of the International Shoe case 
to questions of Federal jurisdiction, some Federal Courts have applied that formula 
to cases where the jurisdiction of the Federal Court depended upon Federal law. 
Although we have found no case decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit which deals with this problem, we think the reasoning of the Court 
in the Lone Star Package Car Co. case is correct. . . . 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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As its "federal standard," therefore, the court adopted a "minimum 
contacts with the stateyy test, examining the activities of the defen- 
dant's agent in the state in making that evaluation. 
Finally, the discussion returns to  the well-reasoned district court 
opinion in First Flight Co. v. National Carloading C ~ r p . , ~ ~ ~  a federal 
question suit brought in the Eastern District of Tennessee under various 
sections of the Interstate Commerce Acts7' for alleged damage to a 
shipment of golf clubs. The defendant-carrier had filed a third-party 
complaint against three other carriers. One of the third-party defen- 
dants, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company (Santa Fe), 
moved to  quash the service of process and dismiss the third-party 
action as to  itself upon the ground that "Santa Fe does no business 
in Tennessee, and therefore is not subject to the jurisdiction of [the 
district] Santa Fe, a Kansas corporation that did not operate 
or own any railroad lines in Tennessee, was not licensed to do business 
in Tennessee, and did no business in Tennessee except to maintain 
a single office staffed by two employees whose function was to solicit 
business but to make no contracts,s75 had been served with process, 
under Rule 4(d)(3), by service upon one of its two Tennessee 
employees.876 In response to the argument by Santa Fe that under 
Tennessee law, Santa Fe would not be amenable to suit, the court 
stated: " 
Federal law defines the extent to which the states may go, under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in exercising 
personal jurisdiction over foreign persons and corporations. But the 
states need not go-and frequently do not go-as far as the Con- 
stitution permits in authorizing their courts to exercise such 
jurisdiction. 
* * *  
[Tlhe extent of the personal jurisdiction of the federal courts and 
the sufficiency of service of process under 4(d)(3) is a matter governed 
solely by federal rather than stat el at^.^^^ 
The court then considered the question of what would be an ap- 
propriate federal standard: 
One fundamental principle of the Anglo-American law of jurisdic- 
tion is that a sovereignty has personal jurisdiction over any defen- 
dant within its territorial limits, and that it may exercise that jurisdic- 
tion by any of its courts able to obtain service upon the defendant. 
872. 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). 
873. 49 U.S.C. $0 20(11), (12) (1976). 
874. 209 F. Supp. at 733. 
875. Id. 
876. Id. 
877. Id. at 734, 736. 
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This principle has long been applied to the states under the due pro- 
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the case of corpora- 
tions, the requirement of "presence" has given way to other stan- 
dards such as consent to being sued within the state, "doing 
business" within the state, and finally to the having of such 
"minimum contacts with the state that the exercise of jurisdiction 
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.' " The basic principle, however, has remained unchanged. 
What has frequently been overlooked is that this same basic prin- 
ciple has long been applied to the United States itself, so that the 
United States is deemed to have personal jurisdiction over any defen- 
dant within the United States. Because of this oversight, and by 
analogy to the application of the basic principle to the states, there 
is a line of cases apparently denying the validity of an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by a federal court over a defendant present 
within the United States unless the defendant is also present (or 
"doing business," etc.) within the district in which the court is held. 
In other words, the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment upon 
state jurisdiction have been applied by these cases to federal jurisdic- 
tion. The anomaly here lies not only in overlooking the principle 
that the United States may exercise personal jurisdiction over any 
defendant within the United States, but also in limiting federal ac- 
tion by a constitutional provision applicable only to state action.878 
The court then discussed, with approval, the "conclusion" of Pro- 
fessor Thomas F. Green, Jr. "that the test of United States jurisdic- 
tion should be to the effect that the United States may exercise per- 
sonal jurisdiction over a corporation if the latter has such minimum 
contacts with the United States that the exercise of jurisdiction does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."879 
878. Id. at 736-37. 
879. Id. at 738 (citing Green, supra note 191). In DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 
654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981), a federal question case involving a suit by a longshoreman against 
the Japanese corporation that had converted the vessel on which he was working at the time 
of his injury, service had been made on the defendant corporation by the state long-arm statute 
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e). See infra notes 1123-41 and accompanying text (discussing 
service pursuant to Rule 4(e)). In the course of its opinion, the court stated, in dictum: 
We will accept for purposes of this appeal DeJames' position that if service can be 
made by wholly federal means all of [defendant's] contacts with the United States 
may be aggregated to support jurisdiction in the District of New Jersey, even if these 
contacts are limited exclusively to Hawaii, to Alaska, or to a few states on the west 
coast. As we noted earlier, the Fraley court stated that the fourteenth amendment 
standards of due process announced in International Shoe and its progeny also apply 
to cases grounded on a federal claim, which is governed by fifth amendment stan- 
dards. . . .Even if this statement is not read to limit the jurisdictional inquiry to 
contacts with the forum state, we are not sure that some geographic limit short of 
the entire United States might not be incorporated into the "fairness" component 
of the fifth amendment. 
654 F.2d at 286 n.3 (citation omitted). The court found. however, that service had not been 
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The court noted the various methods by which exercise of federal 
court jurisdiction is restricted so as not to subject defendant corpora- 
tions to the "inconvenience in defending federal court suits far from 
their home offices and places of business:"880 the limitation in Rule 
4(f) that, as a general matter, effective federal court service of pro- 
cess is limited to the boundaries of the state in which the court is 
sitting;881 venue statutes that restrict, on convenience grounds, the 
places in which a federal suit might be heard;882 and the change of 
venue statute that permits the defendant to seek transfer of the suit 
to a more convenient location.883 Applying the test, the court examined 
the contacts of Santa Fe with the United States as a whole and found 
those contacts sufficient to permit constitutional exercise of personal 
jurisdiction by the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Tennessee.884 
First Flight was probably the first federal decision in which the court 
discussed a national contacts approach, even in the context of service 
pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3), and certainly was one of the few decisions 
in which the court actually applied such a test. Subsequent decisions, 
many involving service according to different methods available to federal 
courts, have mentioned or discussed the national contacts approach,885 
made by a wholly federal means under Rule 4(d)(3). Id. at  286-90. 
In Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976), a federal ques- 
tion suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant's patent was invalid or  that it was 
not infringed by the plaintiff's product, the court rejected a national contacts test of amenability 
when service had been made in accordance with the Nebraska long-arm statute pursuant to 
former Rule 4(d)(7) or Rule 4(e). In reaching its conclusion, the court found that in this case, 
"plaintiff's reliance upon contacts with the United States alone is misplaced." Id. at 400. The 
court reasoned: 
While it is true that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not 
apply to federal action and the due process clause of the fifth amendment does, 
the same minimal contacts test applicable under the fourteenth amendment is ap- 
plicable under the fifth amendment, although national contacts may properly be con- 
sidered under the fifth amendment. Sufficiency of service of process under Rule 4(d)(3) 
is a matter governed solely by federal rather than state law. . . .[U]nless Congress 
has provided for nationwide service of process, when the defendant is a foreign cor- 
poration it must have an agent within the territorial limits of the State in which 
the court sits, unless substituted service or extra-state service can be made. . . .when 
a state statute so authorizes. . . .Under Nebraska's long-arm statute, plaintiff must 
prove that defendant transacts business in the state. 
Id. The court, therefore, recognized that a national contacts approach might be appropriate 
in a Rule 4(d)(3) case but would not be appropriate in a former Rule 4(d)(7) case or a Rule 
4(e) case. See infra notes 985-99 and accompanying text (discussing court treatment of the question 
of service pursuant to former Rule 4(d)(7)). 
880. 209 F. Supp. at  739. 
881. Id. 
882. Id. at  739-40. 
883. Id. at 740. 
884. Id. 
885. See, e.g., supra cases discussed at notes 687-716 and infra cases discussed at notes 
956-62, 973-1038, 1138-41, 1202-12, and 1244-1316. 
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some even with Few, however, actually have relied on 
the test. Most courts prefer to rest on some more restrictive test under 
which jurisdiction also could be approved.887 
Summary and Analysis 
In the context of service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(l) or Rule 4(d)(3), 
service in a wholly federal manner, only the national contacts ap- 
proach makes any sense as a general test for federal court personal 
jurisdiction. Cases under Rule 4(d)(l) will not be troublesome; if the 
factual requirements that permit service are satisfied, then any 
amenability standard would be satisfied and no serious inconvenience 
that could not be remedied by a change of venue would occur. Cases 
under Rule 4(d)(3) all could be resolved satisfactorily by the national 
contacts approach outlined by the district court in First Flight.888 Any 
other "minimum contacts" approach, such as "minimum contacts 
with the state" or "with the federal district" would suffer from the 
defects described above:ssg federal court jurisdiction over purely federal 
matters in which process had been served in a wholly federal manner 
would be limited by the same standards, or more narrow ones, ap- 
plicable in similar state cases, thus rendering irrelevant the argument 
that federal courts are limited by the fifth amendment while state 
courts are limited by the fourteenth amendment. Since federal district 
boundaries, in the federal context, do not separate one sovereign from 
anotherYsg0 and Congress has not indicated any desire to limit the 
federal system to state lines, to limit federal court exercises of per- 
sonal jurisdiction by standards developed for the states makes no sense. 
So long as the defendant is served properly and has sufficient con- 
tacts with the United States as a whole so that he fairly may be re- 
quired to defend in the United States, any unfair interdistrict inconve- 
nience can be remedied by change of venue.89' This approach would 
provide a standardized context for determining personal jurisdiction 
questions, at least when federal methods for service of process are 
employed, and would permit federal courts to hear all of the cases 
described above, as well as those cases in which the defendant's con- 
tacts are scattered too thinly throughout the United States to satisfy 
a "minimum contacts with the state" or "with the federal district" 
886. See, e.g., supra cases discussed at notes 687-716 and infra cases discussed at notes 
956-62, 973-1038, and 1244-1316. 
887. See, e.g., infra cases discussed at notes 956-62, 973-1038, 1202-12, and 1244-68. 
888. See supra notes 872-84 and accompanying text. 
889. See supra notes 795-97 and accompanying text. 
890. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
891. See supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354, 657, 693, and 880 and accompanying text. 
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approach.892 The primary factor in favor of this approach would be 
the standardization of federal question cases. Analysis would be dic- 
tated by the standard rather than by the facts of the case. 
3. Amenability standards in federal question cases in which 
process was served "'in the manner prescribed by the law of the 
state in which the district court is held" pursuant to former 
Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and new 
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) 
Although the Constitution does not preclude Congress from pro- 
viding that the process of federal district courts reach nationwide or 
worldwide in all or, at least, in all federal question cases, 
Congress has elected to exercise this authority only in limited cir- 
cumstances by enacting particular statutes for that purpose.894 In other 
cases, federal process is limited by Rule 4(f) to the territorial boun- 
daries of the state in which the federal court sits, subject to certain 
limited exceptions,895 unless some federal rule permits a more exten- 
sive Many courts had read former Rule 4(d)(7) as supply- 
ing authorization for service beyond state lines by providing, in per- 
tinent part, that as to any individual or business entity defendant, 
in addition to the power provided by Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) and 
that authorized by federal statutes, "it is also sufficient if the sum- 
mons and complaint are served . . . in the manner prescribed by the 
law of the state in which the district court is held."897 Under the 
1983 amendments to Rule 4, Rule 4(d)(7) was eliminated; it apparently 
was replaced, in part, by present Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), which provides 
that service may be made on any individual or business entity "pur- 
suant to the law of the state in which the district court is held."898 
892. See supra notes 796 and accompanying text and infra notes 1030, 1083, 1267 and 
1281 and accompanying text. 
893. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text. 
894. See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text. 
895. Rule 4(f) permits service on "persons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 
14, or  as additional parties to a pending action or  a counterclaim or cross-claim therein pur- 
suant to Rule 19 . . . at  all places outside the state but within the United States that are 
not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced. . . ." FED. R. 
CN. P. 4(f). 
896. Rule 4(f) provides that "when authorized by a statute of the United States or by 
these rules, [process may be served] beyond the territorial limits of [the] state." FED. R. CIV. 
P. 4(f). 
897. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7). See stipra notes 278-83 and accompanying text; irlfra notes 
898-911 and 1039-1102 and accompanying text (discussing former Rule 4(d)(7)); see also infra 
notes 915-1038 and accompanying text (discussing federal question cases in which service was 
made pursuant to former Rule 4(d)(7)). 
898. FED. R. Cxv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i); see supra notes 278-86 and accompanying test and in- 
fra notes 1062-66 and 1094-1102 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i)). 
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No cases yet have arisen under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), but many have been 
decided under former Rule 4(d)(7),s99 which had been interpreted to 
authorize federal courts to utilize the service of process statutes, in- 
cluding long-arm statutes, of the states in which the federal courts 
were sitting.900 The possible significance of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) in regard 
to the present rules of federal court personal jurisdiction, as well as 
the significance of new Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), which provides a special 
federal service by mail procedure for those defendants coming within 
the classes referred to in Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3),90' will be discussed 
below.902 
Rule 4(e) also authorizes federal courts to make service pursuant 
to any state statute or rule providing for "service . . . upon a party 
not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district 
court is held."903 Such service may be made, according to Rule 4(e), 
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute 
or rule.904 Although this authorization to use state long-arm statutes 
arguably was subsumed in the broader authority of former Rule 4(d)(7) 
(as interpreted by some courts), Rule 4(e) differs from former Rule 
4(d)(7) in that under Rule 4(e), service must be made "under the cir- 
cumstances and in the manner pres~ribed"~~' in the state statute or 
rule whereas under the language of former Rule 4(d)(7) service was 
to be made merely "in the manner prescribed by the law of the 
state."906 Some have argued that this distinction is significant, in- 
dicating that former Rule 4(d)(7) merely contemplated incorporation 
into the federal court of the technique employed by state courts whereas 
Rule 4(e) contemplates (and contemplated) incorporation into the 
federal courts of both the technique and amenability standards im- 
posed on state courts.907 Moreover, arguments can be made, after 
the adoption of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii), which arguably have the 
effect of providing alternative methods for serving defendants who 
might come within Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) by using state methods 
or service by mail, that former Rule 4(d)(7) was not intended to govern 
899. See infra notes 915-1038 and accompanying text. 
900. See infra note 909 and accompanying text. 
901. See supra note 275 and accompanying text (discussing new Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)). 
902. See infra notes 1065-66 and accompanying text. 
903. FED. R. CN. P. 4(e), see supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text and infra notes 
904-13 and 1061-71 and accompanying text (comparing Rule 4(e) with former Rule 4(d)(7)). 
904. FED. R. CN. P. 4(e). 
905. Id.; see supra notes 284-88 and accompanying text and infra notes 1328-50 and ac- 
companying text (discussing possible significance of this language). 
906. FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). 
907. See, e.g., Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1982); Black 
v. Acme Markets, Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 685 n.5 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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circumstances in which a state long-arm statute would be employed. 
Since Rule 4(e) speaks specifically to that issue, former Rule 4(d)(7) 
may have applied only where a defendant already could be served 
by a Rule 4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3) method.908 In other words, one very plausi- 
ble interpretation is that former Rule 4(d)(7), and present Rule 
4(c)(2)(C)(i), provided only that if a defendant could be served under 
Rule 4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3), and if the state provided an alternative techni- 
que for achieving such service, then former Rule 4(d)(7), and present 
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), allowed the state alternative to be used. Many federal 
courts that have purported to use former Rule 4(d)(7) in regard to 
service have not so interpreted the Rule; rather, they have cited former 
Rule 4(d)(7) as authorizing service, pursuant to state long-arm statutes, 
on parties "not an inhabitant of or found within the state."909 To 
understand the amenability standards developed in cases arising under 
former Rule 4(d)(7), cases involving that rule must be discussed. These 
cases will demonstrate the confusion occasioned by the juxtaposition 
of Rules 4(d)(7) and 4(e)910 as well as the confusion concerning 
amenability standards.g11 After evaluating former Rule 4(d)(7) cases, 
this article will return to some of the particular interpretational ques- 
tions mentioned above912 and then turn to Rule 4(e) cases.913 
Clearly, when a federal court is adopting state law for a particular 
purpose, a question arises as to what exactly "comes with" the state 
law and must be used by the adopting court in order for the use 
of the state law to be appropriate. In other words, is the federal court 
908. Stanley v. Local 926 of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs of the AFL-CIO, 354 
F. Supp. 1267, 1269-70 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See infra notes 123840 and accompanying test (discuss- 
ing this aspect of Stanley). See also infra notes 1052-66 and accompanying test (arguing in 
favor of narrow interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7)). 
909. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express, 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(see infra notes 974-84 and accompanying text); Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 
A.G., 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977) (see infra notes 1011-38 and accompanying test); Am- 
burn v. Harold Forster Indus., Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (see infra notes 
1000-11 and accompanying text); Ag-Tronic Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. 
Neb. 1976) (see infra notes 985-99 and accompanying test); Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 
690 (5th Cir. 1966) (see infra notes 920-28 and accompanying text); Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 
342 F. Supp. 546 (4th Cir. 1965) (see infra notes 964-71 and accompanying text); Finance Co. 
of America v. Bankamerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md. 1980) (see infra notes 956-62 
and accompanying text); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.N. 
1975) (see infra note 929-35 and accompanying text); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, 
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974) (see infra notes 944-55 and accompanying test); Keller 
v. Clark Equip. Co., 367 F. Supp. 1350 (D. N. Dak. 1973) (see infra notes 93643 and accom- 
panying text); Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollack, 148 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Calif. 1957) (see 
infra notes 915-19 and accompanying text). 
910. See infra note 937 and notes 921, 975, 989, 1069 and 1164 and accompanying text 
(discussing federal courts' confusion as to proper authority for use of state long-arm statutes). 
911. See infra notes 920-1083 and accompanying text. 
912. See infra notes 1039-71 and accompanying text. 
913. See infra notes 1103-1355 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 170 1984-1985 
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
authorized to "pick and choose" the parts useful to it and discard 
other facts, state interpretations and standards associated with the 
law, or must the federal court adopt the state law "whole cloth"? 
This is different from the question arising in diversity cases where 
the majority of federal courts have ruled that even if a wholly federal 
method of service of process is employed, exercises of personal jurisdic- 
tion are to be measured by fourteenth amendment due process stan- 
dards because the federal courts are functioning as state courts in 
deciding state law questions.914 
In an early federal question case involving an action for copyright 
and trademark infringement and unfair competition, Bar's Leaks 
Western, Inc. v. Pollock,g15 the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California considered the question of amenability 
standards when process is served, under Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to the 
state long-arm statute.g16 The court noted: 
It is not disputed that Rule 4(d)(7) . . . sanctions service on a foreign 
corporation by the method prescribed by the forum state law. There 
is, however, no such unanimity of opinion on the question of whether 
amenability to process is to be determined by applying state stan- 
dards as they are limited by concepts of due process [under the four- 
teenth amendment], or by applying federal "general law" concepts. 
* * * 
[Wlhere jurisdiction is based on "federal question" grounds 
. . . there appears to be no justification for an acquiescence to state 
standards and Fourteenth Amendment due process for the purposes 
of deciding the issue of amenability of the foreign corporation to 
process. . . . 917 
After posing the dilemma facing federal courts, however, the court 
hedged in stating any amenability test918 and refused to decide the 
jurisdictional issue because it found that venue requirements would 
914. See supra notes 376-492 and accompanying text (discussing amenability standards in 
diversity cases). 
915. 148 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1957). 
916. See supra note 3 (discussing California long-arm statute). 
917. 148 F. Supp. at  712-13. 
918. The court stated the jurisdictional issue as "whether a foreign corporation selling 
its products to an independent distributor within a state and designating on the product label 
that the independent distributor is a 'branch plant' has made itself available to process in the 
federal court in that state." 148 F. Supp. at  713. The court did not describe any amenability 
standard at  all other than, in passing, a test of "substantial fairness," because it found no 
need to resolve the personal jurisdiction question. The court concluded: 
Although it might be consistent with considerations of substantial fairness and the 
attendant safeguards of notice and opportunity to be heard, to hold that [defendant] 
is amenable to the process of this Court, the question of jurisdiction becomes academic 
when merged in the larger question of proper venue. . . . 
Id. 
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not be sa t i~ f i ed .~ '~  The case, however, serves as a good starting point 
for this discussion because it states the issue-whether state or federal 
amenability standards apply in federal question cases in which ser- 
vice is made, under Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to a state long-arm statute- 
and presents the conclusion of one court that state standards should 
not apply. 
Most courts that have considered this question have applied state 
standards, minimum contacts with the state in which the federal court 
is sitting, for a number of reasons: (1) the state long-arm statute car- 
ries with it state amenability standards; (2) while a federal standard 
should be devised, none exists so the state standard must be applied 
in absence of a federal test; (3) the state standard is applied by analogy; 
(4) the state standard is applied because no federal statute authorizes 
application of a different standard; (5) the state standard is applied 
with apologies in regard to the anomaly created by basing federal 
court authority on state court standards; and (6)  the state standard 
is applied without apology or explanation. 
In Time, Inc. v. Manning,920 an action by a Louisiana citizen against 
a New York corporation for damages arising from the defendant cor- 
poration's publication of a copyrighted picture, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined the defendant's contacts 
with Louisiana to determine whether the defendant corporation, which 
had been served under the Louisiana long-arm statute as authorized 
by Rule 4(d)(7),921 was amenable to suit in a federal district court 
held in Louisiana.922 While the court recognized that "the propriety 
of service issuing from a federal court need not necessarily be tested 
by the same yardstick as is the constitutional limitation upon service 
of process from a state the court argued that the state stan- 
dard "provides a helpful and often-used g~ide-l ine."~~~ While the court 
gave lip-service to the possibility of a separate federal standard, it 
919. Id. a t  713-14. The court dismissed the action against the defendant for lack of venue, 
thereby side-stepping the amenability standards question which it had posed earlier in the opinion. 
920. 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966). 
921. Id. at  693. The court cited Rule 4(e) as alternative authority for use of the state 
long-arm statute. The language quoted by the court, however, only included the reference to 
"the manner" of service under state law, which language appears in both 4(d)(7) and 4(e), 
and omitted reference to "the circumstances" of service under state law, which language ap- 
pears only in 4(e) and is a primary distinguishing feature between the provisions. Id. 
922. The court cited the follorving as the two requirements for amenability under Rule 
4(d)(7): "First, service must conform to state statutory standards. . . .Second, the foreign cor- 
poration must have sufficient contacts with the state so that application of the state statute 
will not offend due process. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington. . . ." 366 F.2d 
at  693 (citations omitted). 
923. 366 F.2d at  694. 
924. Id. 
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chose to rely on the time-honored International Shoe test. The result 
in this case may have been precipitated by the fact that the court 
never resolved the question whether the case was a federal question 
case or a pure diversity the court thus followed a personal 
jurisdiction analysis which would be appropriate in a diversity case.926 
The court, moreover, noted that the narrow test of International Shoe 
was satisfied by the facts of the case,927 thus possibly indicating an 
expediency approach: if the narrow test was satisfied, why seek a dif- 
ferent federal standard, especially where a finding of diversity jurisdic- 
tion might require the more narrow analysis?92s 
In Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of America, Inc.,929 a federal ques- 
tion suit instituted in the United States District Court for the District 
of New Hampshire alleging violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 
the Clayton Act, and the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act, 
the defendant foreign corporation had been served with process, as 
authorized by Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to the New Hampshire long- 
arm statute.930 Except for its observation that Rule 4(d)(7) "authorizes 
extraterritorial service under state law even when the claim arises under 
federal la\v,"931 the court treated the jurisdictional question exactly 
as \vould a New Hampshire court. First, the court noted that accord- 
ing to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire 
statute "is to be interpreted to the fullest extent permissible under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."932 Next, the 
court applied two state-created principles, which apparently derived 
from International Shoe, in guiding its assessment of the "jurisdic- 
tional facts" and "jurisdictional contacts"933 and concluded that on 
925. The plaintiff had asserted that his claim was one arising under the laws of Louisiana 
while the defendant "insist[ed] that the action [was] for infringement of the plaintiff's copyright. 
. . ." 366 F.2d at 693. The court did not decide this issue, stating that "[ulnder either view, 
the district court has jurisdiction over the subjecf matter of the action." Id. (emphasis in original). 
See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing distinction between diversity and federal 
question subject matter jurisdiction). 
926. See supra notes 376-492 and accompanying text (discussing development of amenability 
standard for diversity cases). 
927. 366 F.2d at 695. 
928. See supra notes 742, 747, 762, and 831 and accompanying text (discussing practice 
of basing jurisdictional standard adopted on the facts of the particular case). 
929. 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.H. 1975). 
930. Id. at 126, 133-34. 
931. Id. at 133. The court did not address any amenability considerations which might 
be peculiar to the federal courts; in the remainder of its analysis the court treated the case 
exactly as if the case had arisen under state law. 
932. Id. at 133. 
933. The court quoted Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 2%, 319 A.2d 626, 628 (1974) 
as providing the following guiding principles: "First, the exercise of jurisdiction has to be 
reasonable from the standpoint of New Hampshire's interest in the litigation. Second, it has 
to be consistent with principles of fair play and substantial justice." 403 F. Supp. at  134 (quoting 
Leeper v. Leeper). 
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the facts of this case, assertion of jurisdiction over other defendant 
would not violate "judicial notions of fair play and substantial 
justice."934 Although the court never used the term "minimum con- 
tacts," it followed the balancing procedure that a state court in 1975 
,would have followed to determine whether the defendant's contacts 
with the state were sufficient to satisfy the fourteenth amendment."j5 
The court never dealt with the possibility of a separate fifth amend- 
ment standard governing federal court assertions of personal jurisdic- 
tion and seemed to assume that the state due process analysis was 
part and parcel of the right of a federal court to serve process accord- 
ing to state law. 
KeIler v. Clark Equipment C O . , ~ ~ ~  a federal question suit against 
an alien defendant corporation instituted in the United States District 
Court for the District of North Dakota, was another Rule 4(d)(7) 
suit in which the federal court dealt with the case exactly as if it 
had arisen in state court, apparently finding that service pursuant to 
state statute carried with it a state amenability test.937 Keller was com- 
plicated by some preliminary procedural maneuverings irrelevant to 
the issue under The defendant alien corporation also 
934. 403 F. Supp. at  134. 
935. The court balanced a number of factors including the interest of New Hampshire 
in the suit, see supra note 933, the reasonableness that the defendant should have anticipated 
causing an effect in New Hampshire, 403 F. Supp. at  134, as well as "the right of New Hamp- 
shire citizens to institute local suit in quest of injuries committed here," id., finding that such 
a factor "is given heavy weight when contacts are weighted [sic] on the jurisdictional scale." 
Id. (citation omitted). This type of balancing procedure, which focused less on the interests 
of the defendant than on other factors, was rejected by the Supreme Court in World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), wherein the court stressed that a defendant 
must have some contacts with the state seeking to assert jurisdiction before any minimum con- 
tacts test could be satisfied. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text (discussing World- 
Wide Volkswagen). 
936. 367 F. Supp. 1350 (D. N.D. 1973). 
937. See also United States Dental Institute v. American Association of Orthodontists, 
396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. 111. 1975). In United States Dental Institute, a federal question suit 
brought under the antitrust laws, the court treated the case exactly as if it had arisen under 
state law, determining whether the defendants' conduct came within the lllinois long-arm statute 
and applying a "minimum contact with the state" analysis on the due process issue. 397 F. 
Supp. at  569-73. As authority for making service on the defendants by means of the Illinois 
long-arm statute, the federal court cited and quoted both former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(c), 
making no further reference to federal law. 396 F. Supp. at  569-70. The failure of the court 
to distinguish between Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e), or rather, its reliance on both without deter- 
mining whether one might be the more appropriate authority in the circumstances of this case 
again underlines the basic uncertainty of courts as to the differences between the two rulcs. 
See supra notes 910 and 921 and accompanying text and infra notes 989, 1069 and 1164 and 
accompanying text. 
938. As noted in the opinion: 
On August 20, 1973, [the parent corporation and the defendant] moved this court to 
stay the . . . action pending the outcome of a declaratory judgment action . . . filed in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, or alternatively 
to transfer the above action to  the Michigan court for consolidation. 
The defendants' motion to stay or  transfer has been rendered moot by an order 
of the Michigan Court dated August 23, 1973. . . .Judge Engle determined that the 
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had been served with process by service, in North Dakota, on the 
defendant's parent corporation that was doing business in the state.939 
The defendant argued that the North Dakota long-arm statute was 
irrelevant because service had been made within North Dakota.940 The 
court, however, seemed to consider service within the state on an 
"agent" of the defendant for purposes of service under North Dakota 
law to be permissible under Federal Rule 4(d)(7) (the federal court 
was adopting the state equivalent of Rule 4(d)(3) for purposes of ser- 
vice of process)941 while it still considered the North Dakota long- 
arm statute in determining whether the defendant corporation was 
amenable.to suit in the District of North Dakota.942 The court did 
not mention the possibility of any separate amenability standard, ruling 
that amenability was to be measured by the International Shoe test 
of "minimum contacts" and examining the facts to determine "whether 
[defendant's] acts . . . in North Dakota were 'minimum contacts.' "943 
It concluded that jurisdiction existed over the defendant corporation. 
In Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, I ~ C . , ~ ~ ~  a federal ques- 
tion suit instituted in the District of Delaware for trademark infr- 
ingement and unfair competition, the defendant, a Pennsylvania cor- 
poration which had its principal place of business in Colorado but 
which marketed its product nationwide, had been served with federal 
process pursuant to the Delaware long-arm statute as authorized by 
Rule 4(d)(7).945 In responding to the defendant's motion to dismiss 
significant contacts rested in North Dakota, whereupon the Michigan case was ordered 
transferred to the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota, 
Western Division. Subsequent to the transfer to North Dakota, the Plaintiffs . . . 
moved . . . for a change of venue from the Southwestern Division of North Dakota 
to the Southeastern Division. This motion was granted on November 6, 1973, and 
both cases are now venued with this Court. 
367 F. Supp. at  1351-52. 
939. Id. at 1352. 
940. Id. at 1353. 
941. Id. This analysis supports the author's suggestion that former Rule 4(d)(7) was not 
intended to incorporate state long-arm statutes, but rather all state statutes regarding only the 
manner of service of process in Rule 4(d)(l) and Rule 4(d)(3) circumstances. See supra note 
908 and accompanying text and infra notes 1052-66 and accompanying text. 
942. 367 F. Supp. at  1353-54. 
943. Id. 
944. 374 F .  Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974). 
945. According to  the court: 
Defendant has no office, warehouse or manufacturing facility in the State of 
Delaware. Its principal place of business is located in Denver, Colorado, where it 
manufactures and directs the marketing of its home cleaning products. . . .Defen- 
dant markets its products nationally, both through its employees who solicit orders 
from national chain stores and through commission brokers who solicit orders from 
smaller, independent retailers. Through these marketing channels defendant's pro- 
ducts are made readily available to  consumers throughout Delaware. 
No employee of defendant has entered Delaware to solicit sales. However, as a 
result of employees' sales to large retailers defendant has shipped its products directly 
into this state. . . . 
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for lack of personal jurisdiction, the court stated, "Even though this 
action arises u n d e ~  the laws of the United States, since service was 
effected under Rule 4(d)(7). . . , amenability to service presents a 
question of state law."946 In a footnote, the court distinguished cer- 
tain cases that had held that federal common law should be applicable 
in federal question cases, noting that those cases had involved service 
under Rule 4(d)(3).947 The court concluded, "[aln obviously different 
situation obtains when, as here, service is made pursuant to a state 
statute adopted under the terms of either Rule 4(d)(7) or 4(e)."w8 
After establishing that the defendant's conduct had come within the 
provisions of the Delaware long-arm statute, the court turned to the 
"constitutional issue" of "whether assertion by this Court of in per- 
sonam jurisdiction over the defendant violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth A~nendment ."~~~ Such characterization of this issue seems 
curious in view of the insistence by the court that state law would 
govern amenability and the fact that state law requires that the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment not be violated.950 
Moreover, while the court proposed a minimum contacts test based 
on International Shoe and M C G ~ ~ , ~ "  it felt the need to justify reliance 
on the state-created test: 
While the Supreme Court cases articulating the "minimum con- 
tacts" test dealt with the reach of state court jurisdiction over the 
person, the test has been held to be applicable to the district court 
where jurisdiction is premised on a federal question.gs2 
In order to stimulate a demand for its products in Delaware and elsewhere, defen- 
dant has advertised . . . extensively. This advertising program includes advertisements 
on national television, in magazines of national circulation and in newspapers with 
a substantial Delaware circulation. It is undisputed that many thousands of these 
commercial messages were intended to be and were received in Delaware. 
Id. at  185-86 (footnote omitted). 
946. Id. at  186-87. 
947. Id. at  187 n.3. See also Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 
379 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1967) (court noted that recent decisions which indicate that "[elven 
where the procedure for exercising . . . jurisdiction is prescribed by state law, these courts 
need not be bound by restrictions found in the state law" were all cases in which service was 
made by a wholly federal method, Rule 4(d)(3)); First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 
209 F. Supp. 730, 735 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (while a national contacts approach was appropriate 
in a Rule 4(d)(3) case when there was a "wholly federal method of service," court suggested, 
but refused to decide, that when service was made under Rule 4(d)(7) which "adopts local 
methods to some extent," the defendant "might argue that the validity of service made under 
a state statute pursuant to  Rule 4(d)(7) would be governed by state law"). See also supra notes 
799-897 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4(d)(3) cases). 
948. 374 F. Supp. at  187 n.3. 
949. Id. at  188. 
950. See supra notes 60-185 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional standards in 
state cases). 
951. 374 F. Supp. at 188. 
952. Id. at 188 n.4 (citing Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968), 
see also supra notes 823-33 and accompanying text). 
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This assertion is quite startling, not only because it seems to con- 
tradict the earlier statement by the court that state law should apply 
directly to the amenability question, but also because, as authority 
for the assertion, the court cited a case that it had earlier rejected 
as inapplicable to the case at hand because service therein had been 
made under Rule 4(d)(3).9s3 The court resolved the "constitutional 
issue" by assessing the defendant's contacts with the State of Delaware 
and pronouncing these contacts "sufficient to meet [the] fundamen- 
tal fairness standard" of International Shoe.gs4 In sum, the court 
seemed confused as to whether the fourteenth amendment Interna- 
tional Shoe test applied directly to amenability questions in Rule 4(d)(7) 
cases or whether a fifth amendment standard would be appropriate 
but that the fourteenth amendment test had been adopted as the fifth 
amendment ~tandard.~" In any event, while the court applied an In- 
ternational Shoe analysis to the facts of the case, it seemed to sug- 
gest that a 4(d)(7) case was not exactly the same as a state court case. 
Other federal courts that have adopted a state-created standard for 
amenability in Rule 4(d)(7) cases have done so after analysis that con- 
sidered the possibility of a separate federal standard. In Finance Com- 
pany of America v. Bankamerica C o r p o r a t i ~ n , ~ ~ ~  a federal question 
suit alleging violation of the Lanham Act, which suit had been in- 
itiated in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, 
the moving defendants had been served pursuant to the Maryland 
long-arm statute as authorized by Rule 4(d)(7). The court reviewed 
various positions on the question of amenability standards,957 noting 
that while adoption of a state standard might make sense in diversity 
cases because of " ' the policy underlying the doctrine of intra-state 
953. Compare 374 F. Supp. at  188 n.4 with 374 F. Supp. at  187 n.3. 
954. Id. at  189. 
955. See infra notes 956-62 and 1000-10 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting 
the former position) and notes 973-99 and accompanying text (discussing cases adopting the 
latter position). 
956. 493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md. 1980). 
957. The court stated: 
The parties have assumed that state law governs the personal jurisdiction inquiry. 
Although this appears to  be the rule in this Circuit, . . .it has not received universal 
endorsements and therefore warrants some reexamination. 
Congress has not provided for nationwide service of process. Rather, in cases 
in which a defendant does not have an  agent within the state, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7) 
authorizes service of process in any manner authorized by the law of the state in 
which the district court is located. But, as noted in an early case also arising under 
the Lanham Act, the rule "sanctions service on a foreign corporation by the method 
prescribed by the forum state law. There is, however, no such unanimity of opinion 
on the question of whether amenabiIity to process is to  be determined by applying 
state standards as they are limited by concepts of due process, or by applying federal 
'general law' concepts. . . ." 
Id. at  898 (citations omitted). 
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uniformity,'. . . .this policy is absent in federal question cases"958 
and observing that "application of state standards in such cases 
engenders the anomalous result 'that the jurisdiction of federal courts 
dealing with federal questions will vary from state to state'."959 After 
citing cases in which a state standard had been "applied" and cases 
in which a federal standard had been "adopted,"960 the court con- 
cluded that "it would appear that . . . a federal standard would be 
more sensible [; t]he venue statute would seem to provide adequate 
safeguards against vexatious la~vsuits."~~' Reluctantly, however, the 
court felt compelled to follow precedent in the fourth circuit by 
applying state law962 and applied the International Shoe test to find 
that the defendant's contacts with the state of Maryland were suffi- 
cient to satisfy due process. Clearly, facts which satisfy International 
Shoe also would satisfy any fifth amendment standard. 
The case cited in Finance Company of America as binding fourth 
circuit precedent for application of a state standard in Rule 4(d)(7) 
was Gkiafis v. Steamship Y i o s ~ n a s , ~ ~ ~  a federal question case 
arising in admiralty. The defendant alien corporation, which had been 
served under the "substituted service provisions" of the Maryland 
long-arm statute, moved to quash service. In its opinion, the court 
of appeals noted: 
The jurisdiction of a court over a defendant foreign corporation 
is tested in the federal courts by a motion attacking the service of 
process. This indirect approach to questions of jurisdiction is 
understandable in the federal courts since there is no statutory pro- 
vision which informs the courts when foreign corporations "are 
amenable to process so that in personam jurisdiction may be had 
over them in diversity and most non-diversity suits." . . . Conse- 
quently, federal judges attempting to fill this statutory void have 
held that a federal court can obtain jurisdiction over a foreign cor- 
poration only when it is constitutionally and statutorily permissible 
to serve the corporation.965 
958. Id. See also supra notes 376-492 and accompanying text (discussing amenability stan- 
dards in diversity cases). 
959. 493 F. Supp. at  898-99 (citations omitted). 
960. Id. at  899. The different terminology used by the court-"applied" in the case of 
state standards and "adopted" in the case of federal standards-may indicate judicial recogni- 
tion that state standards were applicable because already well-developed whereas federal stan- 
dards could only be "adopted" because no such standard had yet been developed. See supra 
notes 476-77 and accompanying text (discussing lack of a genuine federal standard). 
961. 493 F. Supp. a t  899. See also supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354, 657, 693, 880, and 
891 and accompanying text (discussing venue restrictions as a possible check under a national 
contacts approach to federal court jurisdiction in federal question cases). 
962. 493 F. Supp. at  899. 
963. See supra note 962 and accompanying text. 
964. 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965). 
965. Id. at  548-49. 
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The court noted the various problems attendant on using a state 
method for service of process such as the difficulty of finding an 
appropriate amenability standard and the anomalous result that, 
because of differences among long-arm statutes, "[slome plaintiffs 
will be unable to obtain service on foreign corporations while such 
service would be available to similarly situated plaintiffs in federal 
courts sitting in other states."966 The court did not resolve this 
anomaly, however, because it found that the defendant came within 
the Maryland long-arm statute.967 In determining the constitutional 
question of amenability, the court faced "another anomaly-the Four- 
teenth Amendment could operate to limit the jurisdiction of a federal 
court deciding a federal question."968 Again, however, the court was 
spared from dealing with this problem; it found that "assertion of 
jurisdiction by Maryland over the respondent would be well within 
the state's constitutional power"969 because the defendant satisfied the 
International Shoe requirement .of minimum contacts with the state 
of Maryland.970 While noting some of the conceptual difficulties 
occasioned by applying a state test to federal courts in federal ques- 
tion cases, the court refused to consider the possibility of a special 
federal standard because the state standard, which would be more 
strict than a federal standard, had been satisfied.971 This was the 
rationale establishing the rule that the Finance Company of America 
court felt compelled to follow.972 
Several recent federal cases have considered the propriety of a "na- 
tional contacts" test for amenability even when service is made, as 
authorized by Rule 4(d)(7), pursuant to a state long-arm statute.973 
In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co. ,974 a trademark 
infringement action in which the court of appeals considered whether 
966. Id. at 549. See also Hartley v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., 379 
F.2d 354, 356 and n.2 (3d Cir. 1967) (court noted the anomaly but found that did not need 
to resolve because the defendant's conduct did not come within the language of the Penn- 
sylvania long-arm statute). 
967. 342 F.2d at 549. 
968. Id. at 554. See also supra notes 795 and 878 and accompanying text and infra note 
1132 and accompanying text (discussing "anomaly" of limiting federal court jurisdiction by 
standards applicable to state courts). 
969. 342 F.2d at 554. 
970. Id. at 554-58. 
971. See supra notes 742, 747, 762, 831 and 928 and accompanying text (discussing selec- 
tion of standards according to the facts of the case). 
972. See supra note 962 and accompanying text. 
973. See infra notes 974-1038 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 785, 798, 888-92 
and accompanying text and infra notes 1039-1102 and 1320-58 and accompanying text (discuss- 
ing, in other contexts, a national contacts test for assertion of personal jurisdiction). 
974. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977). See also supra note 850 (discussing analysis by Wells 
Fargo court of standards applicable when service is made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3)). 
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the defendant corporation had been served properly, pursuant to Rules 
4(d)(7) and 4(e)975 and the Nevada long-arm statute, the plaintiff had 
asserted several grounds on which such service would be permissible 
con~titutionally.~'~ WhiIe the court recognized that the fifth amend- 
ment applies to federal question cases, it found no case suggesting 
a distinction between the fifth and fourteenth amendments in regard 
to amenability.977 The court approved a test based on the defendant's 
contacts with the state of Nevada,978 but rejected any test based on 
the aggregation of the defendant's United States contacts.979 On the 
facts of this particular case, in which the defendant was a Liechtenstein- 
based corporation and the federal forum would be either a district 
court in California (where most contacts occurred) or a district court 
in Nevada,980 the court of appeals noted that "[ilt might very well 
be neither unfair nor unreasonable as a matter of due process to ag- 
gregate the nonforum  contact^."^^' The court continued, "What plain- 
tiffs overlook, however, is that, not only must the requirements of 
due process be met before a court can properly assert in personam 
jurisdiction, but the exercise of jurisdiction must also be affirmatively 
authorized by the legislature."9s2 Finding no federal legislative authori- 
ty permitting aggregation of a defendant's contacts with the United 
975. The court quoted pertinent parts of former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e) and then stated: 
"Thus, the federal district court of Nevada may, reading Rules 4(d)(7) & 4(e) together, also 
service out-of-state defendants by availing itself of the in personam jurisdictional statutes of 
Nevada." 556 F.2d at  414. The court did not, in any way, establish why it thought Rule 4(d)(7) 
and 4(e) should be read together; most courts have used one o r  the other rule or have con- 
sidered either sufficient to support federal court use of state long arm statutes. Again, this 
statement indicates understandable judicial confusion as to the ways in vrhich the two rules 
differ, if a t  all; and the circumstances in which one should be used as opposed to the other. 
See supra note 937 and notes 910 and 921 and accompanying text and infra notes 995, 989, 
1069 and 1164 and accompanying text. 
976. The plaintiffs had asserted that the defendant alien corporation was amenable to suit 
in the district court sitting in Nevada because (1) the defendant had "minimum contacts" with 
the State of Nevada, (2) the defendant had "minimum contacts" with the United States as 
a whole, (3) the defendant, through its agent, had sufficient contacts with regard to eithcr 
of the above-described territories, and (4) the defendant was present in Nevada because its 
agent was present in Nevada. 556 F.2d a t  415-16. 
977. Id. at  416 n.7. The court went on "to note that, in any event, International Shoe 
and its progeny point the way" in regard to amenability. Id. 
978. Id. a t  415-16. The court was not deciding the jurisdictional question itself, but was 
establishing guidelines by which the district court, on remand, vrould resolve the issue. 
979. Id. at  416-19. 
980. The defendant corporation had made two loans in California, which, if aggregated 
with the defendant's Nevada contacts, would make the contacts being considered more substantial. 
Id. at  416. Moreover, it appears that the plaintiffs were attempting to establish the right to 
sue on the California-based matters in the Nevada district court. Id. In this way, an aggrega- 
tion of national contacts test might also lead to the desirable result of avoiding multiple lawsuits 
involving the same parties. 
981. Id. 
982. Id. 
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States as a the court refused to adopt a national contacts 
approach, at least in 4(d)(7) cases.984 
The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, in 
Ag-Tronic v. Frank Paviour Ltd. also refused to adopt a national 
contacts test in a federal question suit in which service had been made 
pursuant to a state long-arm statute.986 The district court had refused 
to assert jurisdiction over the defendant because it found that the 
defendant had no contacts with the State of Nebraska and, therefore, 
was not amenable to suit in a district court sitting in that state.987 
The plaintiff then urged the district court to reconsider the issue and 
find amenability on the basis of the defendant's aggregate contacts 
with the United States.988 In response, the court first noted that the 
983. The court noted: 
If policy considerations do  indeed dicate that an  alien defendant's contacts with the 
entire United States should be aggregated, and if the Constitution does not forbid 
such a practice-at least where the plaintiff is suing in federal court on a federal 
cause of action, the Federal Rules should be amended to authorize such a practice. 
Such a step is, however, not ours to  take. 
Id. at 418 (citations omitted). 
984. The court admitted that aggregation of national contacts might be proper where "a 
federal statute authorizes world-wide service of process . . . and, therefore, the only relevant 
constraint is the fifth amendment due process clause rather than statutory authorization." Id. 
985. 70 F.R.D. 393 @. Neb. 1976). See supra note 879 (discussing court's position when 
service is made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3). 
986. The plaintiff, a Nebraska corporation, had instituted this suit against the defendant, 
a New Zealand partnership, for a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, noninfringement, 
or both. See 70 F.R.D. a t  395. 
987. The court stated: 
In addition, the Court must dismiss this case for the reason that the defendant 
Authority is not amenable to service of process under the Nebraska Long Arm Statute. 
. . .  
The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows: . 
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly 
or  by an agent, as to  a cause of action arising from the person's: 
(a) Transacting any business in this state; 
Amenability to extra-territorial personal jurisdiction is a question of due process. 
A defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice."' . . . This Court has previously held that Nebraska's Long Arm Statute 
is as broad as the constitutional standard of due process. 
[Pllaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the Authority 
derived sufficient revenue from sales in Nebraska to  justify its amenability to service 
of process in this jurisdiction. 
Id. at 398, 399 (citations omitted). Even though this statute has been interpreted as going to 
the limits of due process, this decision, which was framed in terms of amenability, could also 
be described as resting on simple statutory interpretation: the defendant's conduct did not come 
within the language of the statute, so no due process analysis really was required. See infra 
note 1010 and accompanying text. On the other hand, one might argue that whether or  not 
a defendant is found to be "transacting business" within the meaning of the statute depends 
entirely upon whether such contacts satisfy a due process standard-here, minimum contacts 
with the state in which the federal court is sitting. 
988. 70 F.R.D. at  399-401 (Supplemental Memorandum). The plaintiff had argued "that 
the aggregate contacts of defendant . . . with the United States as a whole are sufficient to 
satisfy the fifth amendment and hence personal jurisdiction is present." Id. at  399-400. 
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defendant had been "served with process pursuant to [Rule 4(d)(7)], . 
Rule 4(e) and the Nebraska long-arm statute."g89 Agreeing with the 
plaintiff "that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 
does not apply to federal action and the due process clause of the 
fifth amendment does,"990 the court ruled, however, that "the same 
minimal contacts test applicable under the fourteenth amendment is 
applicable under the fifth amendment, although national contacts may 
properly be considered under the fifth amendment."991 The court went 
on to note circumstances in which sufficiency of service of process 
"is a matter governed solely by federal rather than state law," such 
as where Congress has provided for nationwide service of process or 
process is served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3).992 In this case, however, 
no special federal authorization pertained; federal process therefore 
was limited by Rule 4(f) to the borders of the State of Nebraska unless 
extended, under Rule 4(d)(7), by some state statute.993 Finding that 
service could only be made properly under the Nebraska statute if 
the defendant had been transacting business in Nebraska,994 the court 
refused to assert jurisdiction. The court noted, moreover, that "[tlhis 
requirement inheres whether the due process limitations are imposed 
by the fourteenth amendment or the fifth amendment, as Rule 4(e) 
requires service 'made under the circumstances . . . prescribed in the 
[state] statute or rule'."995 While this case has been cited as rejecting 
a national contacts analysis in Rule 4(d)(7) cases, it can be read, in- 
Apparently, the plaintiff assumed that if due process were satisfied, then service on the defen- 
dant would be appropriate. 
989. Id. at 400. Again a court found difficulty in choosing between Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 
4(e). Later in its opinion, however, the court impliedly seemed to  distinguish between 4(d)(7) 
and 4(e), citing 4(d)(7) as supporting circumstances when "substituted service or extra-state 
service can be made . . . when a state statute so authorizes," while citing 4(e) in connection 
with fifth amendment limitations. Id. See supra note 937 and notes 910, 921 and 975 and 
accompanying text and infra notes 1069 and 1164 and accompanying text (discussing problems 
of distinguishing between the two statutory provisions). 
990. 70 F.R.D. at 400. 
991. Id. 
992. Id. Apparently, the court considered these circumstances to be appropriate for the 
use of a national contacts approach. 
993. Id. 
994. Id. 
995. Id. (quoting Rule 4(e)). The court seemed to be saying that, even if some fifth amend- 
ment standard would be satisfied by aggregating the defendant's national contacts, there is 
no statutory authority for such exercise: the state long-arm was limited to defendants who 
transact business in Nebraska (and defendant did not) and no federal statute applied in this 
case. The court also seemed to  imply that Rule 4(e) incorporated not only the state procedure 
for service of process but also the state limitations on the use of those procedures (transacts 
business in the state) by using the language "in the circumstances." Cf. Rule 4(d)(7), which 
only requires that service be made "in the manner" prescribed by the state statute or rule. 
See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying text and infra notes 904-13, 1061-71 and accom- 
panying text (discussing possible distinctions between the two rules and the jurisdictional stan- 
dards applicable thereto). 
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stead, as simply holding that a defendant's conduct must come within 
the language of the state long-arm statute before any amenability 
analysis would be appropriate.996 Indeed, the decision in Wells Fargogg7 
can be read similarly: before the court sought statutory authority for 
aggregation of national contacts, it already had concluded that no 
state statute or rule would authorize such a procedure.998 While both 
courts thus refused to aggregate the defendant's national contacts, 
neither based its ultimate holding on that refusal. Ag-Tronic is signifi- 
cant, moreover, for analysis that seems to associate Rule 4(e) with 
the fifth amendment while implying that Rule 4(e) incorporates not 
only the manner of service permissible under the state statute but also 
the circumstances in which such service could be made by a state 
The question of applicability of a national contacts test of 
amenability in a 4(d)(7) case was squarely presented in Amburn v. 
Harold Forster Industries, Ltd. ,looO a patent infringement and unfair 
competition suit instituted in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs did not allege, nor did 
any proof exist, that the defendants had any contacts with the state 
of Michigan.lo0' Instead, the plaintiffs contended: 
[Slince [the plaintiffs] are Michigan residents and citizens and have 
been damaged by reason of defendants' sale or delivery of the in- 
fringing products in [other] states . . . and . . . since plaintiffs' 
infringement claim is a federally created cause of action, Fifth 
Amendment due process requirements can be met by aggregating 
defendants' contacts in all 50 states and service of process may be 
made under the Michigan long-arm statute. . . . 1002 
In a well-reasoned opinion, the court concluded that, in federal ques- 
tion cases, "the aggregate contacts test would seem the correct one;"'003 
no unfairness would result from the sovereign, the United States, assert- 
ing power over defendants, each of which had sufficient contacts within 
the United States.'Oo4 The court, however, refused to assert personal 
996. See infra note 1005 and accompanying text. 
997. See supra notes 974-84 and accompanying text. 
998. Wells Fargo & Co. v. \Veils Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 417 (9th Cir. 1977). 
The court found that the Nevada long-arm statute did not include the California loans, thus 
providing no statutory authority for considering those contacts. Without those contacts, the 
defendant's acts in Nevada were insufficient to come within the Nevada long-arm statute. Id. 
999. See'supra note 995 and accompanying text. 
1000. 423 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
1001. Id. at 1303. 
1002. Id. 
1003. Id. at 1304. 
1004. Id. 
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jurisdiction over the defendants because there existed no statutory 
"vehicle to serve defendants who have no contacts with the State of 
Mi~higan."'~~' According to the court, the state long-arm statute can 
be used only within the limitations of the fourteenth amendment, and 
the fourteenth amendment requires that the defendant have at least 
one contact with the state.Ioo6 Despite the authorization in Rule 4(d)(7) 
for a federal court to use the Michigan long-arm statute, the court 
noted: 
It remains, however, a state statute and the power of the State of 
Michigan is limited by the due process requirements of the Four- 
teenth Amendment. There must be some contact of a defendant with 
Michigan. It must have invoked the benefits or protection of the 
laws of the State of Michigan, if not directly at least indirectly 
through an agent. . . . 1007 
After rejecting the plaintiffs' arguments that other factors besides the 
defendants' contacts with the State of Michigan could satisfy the four- 
teenth amendment due process clause,'008 the court concluded: "The 
due process principles of International Shoe and its progeny control 
' the validity of service of process under a state's long-arm statute."1009 
Finding no contacts with the State of Michigan, the court determined 
that service of process had not been valid. The court ruled, therefore, 
that after a defendant in a federal question case had been served 
validly, the constitutional propriety of a federal court asserting per- 
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant was subject to the due process 
restrictions of the fifth amendment. Since this merely would require 
satisfaction of a national contacts test, the service itself, if made pur- 
suant to a state long-arm statute, would be valid only if fourteenth 
amendment limitations on the application of the statute were satisfied. 
This leads to the conclusion that service must satisfy the stricter 
"minimum contacts with the state" standard, and therefore any defen- 
dant on whom service is properly made also will be amenable to suit 
under a fifth amendment standard.I0l0 
1005. Id. at  1309. 
1006. Id. at 1305, 1308. 
1007. Id. at  1305. 
1008. Id. 
1009. Id. at  1308. 
1010. Once the fourteenth amendment has been satisfied in regard to validity of service, 
any less strict standard already has been satisfied and is, therefore, irrelevant. As in U'ells 
Fargo and Ag-Tronic, one might argue that the decision was again one of statutory interpreta- 
tion: if the defendants had no contacts with the state, they could not come within the language 
of the state long-arm statute. On the other hand, in state court cases such as World-Wide 
Volkswagen, a state court thought that the defendant came within the state long-arm statute 
and yet the court found that the defendant had no contacts with the state for purposes of 
a fourteenth amendment due process analysis. "Contacts" can have different meanings de- 
pending on whether the questions is due process or statutory interpretation. 
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In Centronics Data Computer Corporation v. Mannesmann, 
A.G.,lO" suit was instituted in the United States District Court for 
the District of New Hampshire by a Delaware corporation with its 
sole place of business in New Hampshire against a multinational alien 
conglomerate headquartered in Germany. The case might be cited as 
a federal question case in which the court, under former Rule 4(d)7), 
adopted national contacts as the appropriate fifth amendment 
amenability standard, at least in cases involving an alien corporate 
defendant.1°12 The decision in this case, which involved alleged viola- 
tions of the antitrust laws, interference with advantageous contrac- 
tual relations, misappropriation of trade secrets, and defamation, can- 
not be read, however, as a clear adoption of a national contacts ap- 
proach. The court vascillates between discussion of requirements for 
service of process under the New Hampshire long-arm provisions, 
which involve constitutional analysis because they purportedly go to 
the limits of due process under the fourteenth amendment,1°13 and 
discussion of amenability standards applicable to a federal court in 
the circumstances of this case. As noted both above1°14 and below,101s 
determination of personal jurisdiction involves two distinct inquiries: 
(1) whether the defendant's conduct comes within the statute which 
purportedly authorizes service of process, and (2) if so, whether asser- 
tion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant would violate his due 
process rights under either the fifth or fourteenth amendments. When 
consideration of these separate and separable issues is combined or 
not distinguished by the court, the opinion can become quite confus- 
ing and will lack the clarity to be of important precedential value. 
In deciding whether it had jurisdiction over the defendant Man- 
nesmann, the court first noted that "[tlhe have availed 
themselves of Rule 4(d)(3) and (7) by using the service provisions of 
New Hampshire's long arm statutes."1016 Next, the court quoted the 
1011. 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977). 
1012. See Note, supra note 21, at  472 n.10. 
1013. After quoting one of The New Hampshire long-arm provisions, the court noted that, 
according to the interpretation of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, "[tlhis statute is 
meant to extend jurisdiction to  . . . the full constitutional limit." 432 F. Supp. at  661 (citation . 
omitted). The "full constitutional limit" for a state long-arm statute would be the limit of 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A federal court, therefore, might have 
to esamine the outer limits of the fourteenth amendment to determine if a state long-arm statute 
applies to a defendant served pursuant to former Rule 4(d)(7) o r  Rule 4(e). (The former rule 
has been reenacted, in part, as Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). See supra notes 278-86 and accompanying 
test.) See infra notes 1076-93 and 1341-49 and accompanying text (discussing this possibility 
in greater detail). 
1014. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
1015. See infra notes 1079-93 and 1341-49 and accompanying text. 
1016. 432 F. Supp. at  661 (emphasis added). The reference of the court to Rule 4(d)(3) 
is not for the purpose of discussing some alleged service, within the State of New Hampshire, 
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New Hampshire "foreign corporation long-arm statute,"1017 which, 
according to  the court, "is meant to extend jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations to  the full constitutional limit."1018 Then the court went 
on to set out its "game plan" for analysis of the personal jurisdic- 
tion issue: 
In my analysis of jurisdictional facts as they relate to the New 
Hampshire statute, I am guided by two principles. 
First, the exercise of jurisdiction has to be reasonable from the 
standpoint of New Hampshire's interest in the litigation. Second, 
it has to be consistent with principles of fair play and substantial 
justice. . . . 
In addition, the reach of the long arm statute may not be 
extended beyond what is permitted by the Constitution of the United 
 state^.'^'^ 
The court seemed to establish a test that included not only con- 
siderations of the requirements of the long-arm statute that purportedly 
goes to the limits of the fourteenth amendment but also of an 
amenability requirement established by the Constitution. After set- 
ting out this test and without specifically addressing the applicability 
of the long-arm statute to the facts before it, the court seemed to 
consider immediately constitutional questions. It did not distinguish 
between the fifth and fourteenth amendments, nor did it determine 
under which amendment federal court amenability standards were 
measured. Instead, without explanation, the court lumped the two 
amendments together: 
The factors to be weighed in determining whether the contacts in 
a given case are sufficient to meet the requirements of fair play called 
for by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend- 
ments include the quantity of contacts, the nature of the contacts, 
and the connection of the cause of action with those contacts. . . .In 
addition, I must consider New Hampshire's interest in protecting its 
citizens and whether that interest has been invoked here. . . . 1020 
upon an agent of the defendant as authorized by Rule 4(d)(3), but because former Rule 4(d)(7) 
was applicable in regard to defendants "of any class referred to in . . . [Rule 4(d)(3)]," FED. 
R. CN. P. 4(d)(7) (1963), and Mannesmann, as a business entity, would be a Rule 4(d)(3) 
defendant. See supra notes 802-03 and accompanying text. 
1017. 432 F. Supp. at  661. 
1018. Id; see supra note 1013 and accompanying text. 
1019. 432 F. Supp. at  661-62 (quoting Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 403 F. 
Supp. 123, 134 (D.N.H. 1975), which, in turn, quoted Leeper v. Leeper, 114 N.H. 294, 296, 
319 A.2d 626, 628 (1974)). 
1020. 432 F. Supp. at  662 (citations omitted). The court's "constitutional stew" analysis 
is particular disheartening because this is a recent case that should be clarifying or establishing 
important standards rather than obfuscating established doctrines. This opinion, moreover, has 
been criticized because of the decision by the court to "toss in" a local concern factor, the 
state "interest in protecting its citizens," in a case involving the vindication of an important 
federal interest, violation of antitrust laws. See Note, supra note 121, at 471 n.lO. 
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The court went on to describe the "usual test" of the the "due pro- 
cess requirements of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as set 
out in International Shoe . . . and its progeny"'021 as "the state must 
have 'sufficient contacts' so that the maintenance of a suit locally 
would not offend the 'traditional conception of fair play and substan- 
tial justice.' The court, which apparently through that this "con- 
tacts of the state test" applied to both the fifth and fourteenth amend- 
ments, examined "the sufficiency of the defendants' contacts with 
the State"1023 and concluded that the defendants' "physical contacts" 
with the state-three visits 6y the defendants' agents at the request 
of the plaintiff-"[did] not, in and of themselves, constitute suffi- 
cient contacts with the State of New Hampshire on which to base 
These contacts were held "not sufficient to meet the 
fairness requirement"1025 and the court concluded that, "[ilf state con- 
tacts were the sole consideration, I would hold that they were not 
sufficient to ground jurisdiction."1026 What the court actually was say- 
ing remains unclear. It may have held that the defendants did not 
come within the New Hampshire long-arm statute because some four- 
teenth amendment fairness requirement had not been satisfied; alter- 
natively, the court may have held that even if the defendants could 
be served, the fifth amendment due process limitation on federal courts 
would not be satisfied if measured by a test of "contacts with the 
state." The remainder of the opinion is difficult to follow because 
the significance of the holding is in doubt. 
Next, without clarifying the significance of this consideration, the 
court dealt with the plaintiff's contention "that, since the defendants 
are alien, it is not their contacts with the State that should control, 
but that their contacts with the country as a whole must be 
1021. 432 F. Supp. at  662 (citation omitted). Nowhere in its opinion did'the court explain 
or  support its implied assertion that International Shoe established a fifth amendment test of 
due process. Moreover, in light of the description by the court of these standards as requiring 
certain contacts with the state, see infra notes 1022-23 and accompanying text, the court would 
seem to have lost any constitutional justification for its subsequent consideration of a "national 
contacts" test. If the court thought that the fifth amendment standard was contacts with the 
state and finds that the standard is not satisfied, how could it argue "national contacts?" 
Perhaps this observation explains the refusal of the court to characterize "national contacts" 
as a constitutional standard or, indeed, as anything more than a factor to  be weighed in a 
personal jurisdiction analysis. See infra notes 1027-28, 1033, and 1038 and accompanying text. 
1022. 432 F. Supp. at  662 (quoting International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 
(1945) (emphasis added)). The court does not make clear with what entity the state must have 
had contacts. Probably, in light of the consideration by the court of the defendant's contacts 
with the state of New Hampshire, see infra notes 1023-26 and accompanying text, the court 
merely misstated the rule. 
1023. 432 F. Supp. at  662. 
1024. Id. 
1025. Id. 
1026. Id. at  663. 
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c~nsidered."'~~' Still silent as to how a national contacts test would 
be applied, the court then cited cases in which other federal courts 
had discussed "national contacts" as a possible amenability standard 
in federal question cases.'028 The court provided two reasons for adop- 
tion of this approach: (1) if the defendant is an alien, the defendant 
would be "no more inconvenienced by a trip to one state than 
another;"loZ9 and (2) if an alien has substantial contacts with the United 
States as a whole but doesn't have "sufficient contacts with any state 
so as to give that state jurisdiction," the defendant would escape suit 
unless a federal court were allowed to base jurisdiction on an ag- 
gregation of the defendant's contacts with the nation.'030 After 
acknowledging that a national contacts test had "not yet been generally 
accepted"1031 and that while Congress could have enacted "a statute 
stating that jurisdiction over aliens will be based on their contacts 
with the nation as a whole," it had not done so,t032 the court 
concluded: 
But in this age of multinational conglomerates doing business on 
an internationd scale, plaintiff's position has merit, and I specifically 
rule that where an alien defendant is sued by an American plaintiff, 
and where there is no particular inconvenience due to the specific 
forum state, the fact that the defendant is an alien and that there 
is no other forum in which to litigate the claim should be taken 
into consideration for purposes of determining whether a finding 
of jurisdiction meets the requisite constitutional standards of fair 
play.1033 
Assuming that the court, in its discussion of "national contacts," 
was considering a federal amenability standard for fifth amendment 
1027. Id. 
1028. Id. (citing Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1 I43 n.2 (7th 
Cir. 1975) (supra notes 845-55 and accompanying text; infra notes 1202-12 and accompanying 
text); Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp Prods., Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (infra 
notes 1244-50 and accompanying text); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 
(D. Conn. 1975) (infra notes 1269-83 and accompanying test); Gerber Scientific Instrument 
v. Barr & Stroud, Ltd., 383 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Conn. 1973); Engineered Sports Prods. v. 
Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (infra notes 1264-68 and accompanying 
text); Holt v. KIosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich 1973) (infra notes 1310-16 
and accompanying text); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benala, 345 F. Supp. 14, 24.25 (E.D. Pa. 
1972) (supra notes 687-94 and accompanying text); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire 
& Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967)(infra notes 1251-63 and accompany- 
ing text); First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736-37 (E.D. Tenn. 
1962) (supra notes 872-84 and accompanying text); Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 
70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976) (supra notes 985-99 and accompanying text)). 
1029. 432 F. Supp. at 663. 
1030. Id. a t  664. 
1031. Id. 
1032. Id. 
1033. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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purposes, it did not adopt or approve such a standard. Rather, the 
court merely agreed, in certain very limited circumstances, to "take 
. . . into consideration" defendants' national contacts. 
The court then discussed another basis on which jurisdiction is 
claimed for New Hampshire.1034 Personal jurisdiction might be found 
under another New Hampshire long-arm provision that provided "[ilf 
a foreign corporation commits a tort . . . in New Hampshire, such 
acts shall be deemed doing business in New Hampshire. . . . 791035  
The court found that the defendants' alleged conspiracy to interfere 
with the plaintiff's New Hampshire business, if proved, would be a 
tortious act committed in New Hampshire even though "the defen- 
dants did not set foot in the State in order to commit the alleged 
tort"'036 and forcefully argued that "[tlhe traditional notions of justice 
and fair play should not be used to extend a cloak of immunity over 
deliberate torts merely because the defendant is an alien 
corporation."'037 Instead of arguing that the defendants could be served 
with process under the "tortious act" long-arm statute, and instead 
of considering the constitutionality of that assertion of jurisdiction 
by a federal court, however, the court abruptly concluded: 
Based on the defendants' physical contacts with the State, their 
substantial contacts with the country as a whole, and New Hamp- 
shire's interest in protecting its corporate citizens injured as a result 
of torts such as those alleged here, I find that this court has 
jurisdiction. '03* 
The court accepted that national contacts might play some part in 
assertion of personal jurisdiction by a federal court but only as 
something to add flavor to the jurisdictional stewpot. This tortuous 
opinion cannot serve as precedent or persuasive authority for adop- 
tion of national contacts as a federal amenability standard. 
Summary and Analysis 
The lack of any genuine analysis is probably the strongest unifying 
factor in these cases in which courts have dealt with the question 
of amenability standards when service is made, pursuant to former 
Rule 4(d)(7), according to statute or rule of the state in which the 
federal court is sitting. In each case, the court seemed to find in former 
4(d)(7) the authority to invoke a state long-arm statute rather than, 
1034. Id. 
1035. Id. at 665 n.2 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 300:14). 
1036. Id. at 665-67. 
1037. Id. at 668. 
1038. Id. 
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as suggested by this author,1039 merely the authority to invoke a state 
statute for service of process on defendants already "present" in the 
state. Some courts applied an amenability test of minimum contacts 
with the state whose statute was being invoked without any justifica- 
tion for such application.1040 Other courts recognized that a separate 
federal standard might exist, but decided that it would not be applicable 
when service is made pursuant to state statuteIo4l or decided that in 
the context of the case such a determination was not necessary since 
the narrower fourteenth amendment standard had been satisfied.1042 
Some courts went farther and agreed that a federal standard would 
be required, but concluded that International Shoe "points the way" 
to that standard.I0" Still other courts concluded that a federal stan- 
dard, such as minimum contacts with the United States, might be 
an appropriatestandard, but only if some statutory provision authoriz- 
ed such aggregation. In other words, if a federal long-arm statute 
existed that permitted service on any defendant having minimum con- 
tacts with the United States, then a determination of the reach of 
the fifth amendment would be made by considering whether the defen- 
dant's contacts with the United States were sufficient so that "tradi- 
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice" would not be 
offended.1044 This might be considered a "practical result." If a defen- 
dant does not have sufficient contacts with the state in which the 
federal court is sitting to satisfy a test of "minimum contacts with 
the state," even though he has substantial contacts with the United 
States as a whole, then the state long-arm statute cannot be employed 
because that statute was drafted in contemplation of making service 
upon defendants who had some relationship to the state. Most long- 
1039. See supra note 1004 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 994-1014 and 
accompanying text (arguing in favor of narrow interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7)). 
1040. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of Am., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 123 (D.N.H. 1975) 
(see supra notes 929-35 and accompanying text); Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 367 F. Supp. 
1350 (D.N.D. 1973) (see supra notes 936-43 and accompanying text). 
1041. See, e-g., Finance Co. of Am. v. Bankamerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895 (D. Md. 
1980) (see supra notes 956-62 and accompanying text); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, 
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974) (see supra notes 944-55 and accompanying text). 
1042. Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1965) (see supra notes 964-71 
and accompanying text). See also Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollack, 148 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. 
Cal. 1957) (refused to resolve questions as to federal amenability standard because venue not 
satisfied) (see supra notes 915-19 and accompanying text). 
1043. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966) (see supra notes 920-28 
and accompanying text). 
1044. See, e.g. Wells Fargo & Co., v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 566 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 
1977) (see supra notes 974-84 and accompanying text); Amburn v.,Harold Forster Indus., Ltd., 
423 F. Supp. 1302 (ED. Mich. 1976) (see supra notes 1000-10 and accompanying text); Ag- 
Tronic v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976) (see supra notes 985-99 and 
accompanying text). 
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arm statutes, by their terms, only allow service in situations where 
the fourteenth amendment would not be violated by such service. In 
other words, when states drafted long-arm statutes, they tried to limit 
service of process to circumstances in which due process would not 
be ~ i o l a t e d . ' ~ ~ W o  state long-arm statute, therefore, provides that ser- 
vice may be made on a defendant who has had no contacts with the 
state. When a federal court, however, is asked to assert personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant who has sufficient "national contacts" 
but insufficient "state contacts" to satisfy the fifth amendment and 
fourteenth amendment due process clauses, respectively, the courts 
argue that the state long-arm statute cannot be used because the fac- 
tual prerequisites for using the statute cannot be satisfied. If these 
prerequisites were satisfied, the defendant would have some contact 
with the state. Courts, therefore, are left with a perfectly satisfactory 
fifth amendment amenability standard, but with no way to use it 
because service cannot be made pursuant to a state long-arm statute 
if the factual prerequisites of the statute are not met. The result is, 
according to the courts, a lack of statutory authority to serve 
process.loJ6 The lack of authority, however, comes from failure to 
satisfy the prerequisites of the state statute being adopted and not 
from absence of federal authorization. Analysis of these former Rule 
4(d)(7) cases makes clear that each federal court considering the 
amenability standard has applied, for one of several reasons, the test 
of "minimum contacts with the state" in which the federal court is 
sitting. The Centronics court merely threw in a national contacts 
element to its consideration but did not rely on national contacts as 
a test.lo4' 
After reviewing all of the arguments presented, this writer concludes 
that a separate federal amenability standard should have applied in 
former Rule 4(d)(7) cases and that the appropriate fifth amendment 
due process standard would be "minimum contacts with the United 
Such a standard would preclude the anomaly of deter- 
mining federal court jurisdiction in federal question cases by a test 
applicable to the state court system.'049 This conclusion can be justified 
1045. See supra notes 119 to 126 and accompanying text. 
1046. See cases cited supra note 1044. 
1047. Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977) 
(see supra notes 101 1-38 and accompanying text). 
1048. See supra notes 348-51 and 367-74 and accompanying text (discussing development 
of national contacts approach); notes 793-98 and 888-92 and accompanying text (discussing 
applicability of national contacts approach where service is made by wholly federal methods). 
1049. See supra notes 795, 878, 961, and 1132 and accompanying text (discussing this anoma- 
ly). See also supra note 488 and accompanying text (discussing this anomaly in the context 
of diversity cases). 
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whether former Rule 4(d)(7) is interpreted narrowly, as urged by this 
writer, as merely-an authorization to use state methods of service in 
cases involving defendants who also could be served pursuant to Rules 
4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3),'OS0 or broadly, as interpreted by the courts, as an 
authorization to use state long-arm statutes for service on defendants 
who could not be reached under Rule 4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3).lo5' 
Persuasive arguments can be made in support of the position that 
former Rule 4(d)(7) merely authorized a federal. court to employ a 
state method of service in lieu of the federal methods prescribed by 
Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3). First, a person to be served under former 
Rule 4(d)(7) was described as "a defendant of any class referred to 
in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subdivision of this rule."1052 Those 
paragraphs define authorized methods for making service upon in- 
dividuals present or residing in the state in which the federal district 
court is sitting (4(d)(1))Ios3 or upon business entities that have agents, 
for service of process, located within the state in which the federal 
district court is held (4(d)(3)).Ios4 The methods provided in Rules 4(d)(l) 
and 4(d)(3) only could be utilized on defendants present, residing, 
or doing some sort of business within the state. The reference in former 
Rule 4(d)(7) to defendants "of any class referred to in paragraphs 
(1) or (3)" therefore can be read sensibly as limiting former Rule 
4(d)(7) to defendants who might be served under Rules 4(d)(l) and 
4(d)(3). Such an interpretation is reasonable in view of the specific 
language in Rule 4(e) making that provision applicable to "service 
. . . upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state 
in which the district court is held."10s5 If Rule 4(e) covers situations 
in which a defendant is not present, residing, or doing some sort of 
business within the state, or defendants not servable by the methods 
of 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3), then one could logically conclude that former 
Rule 4(d)(7) was not intended to cover the same sorts of defendants 
covered by Rule 4(e).'OS6 
The language in former Rule 4(d)(7) that authorized service "in 
the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the 
1050. See infra notes 1067-68 and accompanying test. 
1051. See infra notes 1076-90 and accompanying text. 
1052. FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). 
1053. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(l). See supra notes 810-16 and accompanying test (discussing 
Rule 4(d)(l) and cases arising thereunder). 
1054. FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(3). See supra notes 817-87 and accompanying text (discussing 
Rule 4(d)(3) and cases arising thereunder). 
1055. FED. R. CN. P. 4(e). See infra notes 1103-12 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 
4(e)) and 1113-1285 and accompanying text (discussing cases arising under Rule 4(e)). 
1056. Two provisions of the same rule usually do not overlap, especially when one of the 
provisions, Rule 4(e), specifically deals with a particular type of case. 
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manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court 
is held for service of process . . . upon any such defendant"1057 also 
supports a narrow interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7). The difference 
in scope between former Rule 4(d)(7), which authorizes service "in 
the manner prescribed by" state or federal statutes, and Rule 4(e), 
which provides for service "under the circumstances and in the man- 
ner prescribed by" state or federal statutes, indicates both a recogni- 
tion of the distinction between acceptable techniques of service (e.g., 
time, place and manner) and factual situations in which such techni- 
ques might be employed ("circumstances"). The difference also reflects 
a deliberate decision to limit former Rule 4(d)(7) merely to adoption 
of techniques that are alternatives to those provided by Rules 4(d)(l) 
and 4(d)(3).loS8 Congress should be credited with not only recogniz- 
ing the difference between "manner" and "circumstances and man- 
ner" but also with using each phrase deliberately, not inadvertently. 
Since former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e) followed one another spatially, 
Congress probably knew and deliberately intended the differences be- 
tween the two provisions. 
One might argue that reading former Rule 4(d)(7) as merely prescrib- 
ing methods of service of process as alternatives to those already pro- 
vided in Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) would leave a statutory provision 
with no real usefulness unless the methods of service were coupled 
with circumstances in which those methods could be employed. Under 
this argument, former Rule 4(d)(7) must have been intended to in- 
clude factual circumstances tied to the state statutes, including state 
long-arm statutes. This argument, however, can be countered. Former 
Rule 4(d)(7) did include a description of the circumstances in which 
the state and other federal methods were to be employed, circumstances 
in which, under Rules 4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3), defendants were present, 
residing, or doing some sort of business within the state in which 
the federal court was sitting.'059 Such an interpretation also is sup- 
ported by the concluding language of former Rule 4(d)(7) that the 
state manner of service adopted would be that prescribed "for the 
service . . . upon any such defendant in an action brought in the 
courts of general jurisdiction of that state."'060 Again, the cir- 
cumstances in which the rule could operate effectively would be those 
that involved particular defendants who also could be served under 
4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3). 
1057. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). 
1058. See supra notes 273-75 and 799-809 and accompanying text (discussing Rules 4(d)(l) 
and 4(d)(3)). 
1059. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text. 
1060. FED. R. CN. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). 
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A final argument in support of the narrow interpretation of former 
Rule 4(d)(7) is that since Rule 4(e) effectively and specifically, by its 
terms, deals with adoption of state and federal statutes in regard to 
service on defendants outside the state in which the federal court is 
sitting, both as to manner and circumstances of service, former Rule 
4(d)(7) must have dealt with something else. That "something else" 
would be providing an alternative method for serving defendants pre- 
sent, residing, or doing some sort of business within the state; methods 
provided in state and federal service of process statutes. Former Rule 
4(d)(7), therefore, did not adopt, for federal court use, state long- 
arm statutes and should not have been used in so many cases as 
justification for federal courts using state long-arm statutes.1061 
Present Rule 4(d)(2)(C)(i), which replaced, in part, former Rule 
4(d)(7),Io6* also can be narrowly interpreted as prescribing methods 
of service in 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) circumstances and as supporting a 
narrow interpretation of both former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 
4(c)(2)(C)(i). Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) permits a federal court to serve pro- 
cess "upon a defendant of any class referred to in [4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3)] 
. . . pursuant to the law of the State. . . . "Iofi3 While this provision 
does not refer specifically to "manner of service," the references to 
4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) defendants again could be interpreted as limita- 
tions on the circumstances in which the rule could be employed.1o64 
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), moreover, provides for an alternative federal method 
of service on 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) defendants, service by first class 
mail.1065 Finally, Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii), which, together, apparently 
have replaced Rule 4(d)(7), appear in a subsection of Rule 4 dealing 
only with methods of service of process.1066 
1061. See supra cases cited in note 1044. 
1062. Compare FED. R. CN. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i) with FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). See supra 
notes 269 and 267 (providing texts of these provisions). Former Rule 4(d)(7) authorized service, 
on 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) defendants, "in the manner" provided in any federal statute or statute 
of the state in which the federal court was held. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) authorizes service, on 4(d)(l) 
and 4(d)(3) defendants, "pursuant to" any statute of the state in which the federal court is 
held. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), which authorizes an alternative federal method of service by mail, 
see supra note 269 (providing text of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)), apparently has replaced that part 
of former Rule 4(d)(7) that authorized use of other federal service of process statutes. The 
only real differences between former Rule 4(d)(7) and present Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii) appear 
to  be: (1) a change in the position of the provision so that it now appears in that part of 
Rule 4 devoted to techniques of service, (2) replacement of the authorization in Rule 4(d)(7) 
to use federal statutory methods of service other than those provided in 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) 
with a specific alternative federal method for service, and (3) a change in the language of 
Rule 4(d)(7), which authorized service "in the manner" prescribed by state statute or rule, 
to the language of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), which, more ambiguously, authorizes service "pursuant 
to" state statute or  rule. 
1063. FED. R. CN. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). 
1064. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(7) (1963). See supra notes 1059-60 and accompanying text. 
1065. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). See supra note 269 (providing text of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)). 
1066. Former Rule 4(d)(7) appeared in subsection 4(d) of Rule 4, which subsection was 
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In former Rule 4(d)(7) is interpreted in this narrow sense, then a 
federal due process standard of "minimum contacts with the United 
States" would be appropriate. The argument in favor of such a stan- 
dard would be the same as in 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) cases'067 because 
the only difference between former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rules 4(d)(l) and 
4(d)(3) is that a different method of service is being employed, a 
method that must comport with due process by being reasonably 
calculated to give the defendant actual notice of the pendency of suit 
against him.'068 Amenability questions, however, which depend on the 
factual circumstances triggering the assertion by the court of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant, should not differ from 4(d)(l) and 
4(d)(3) cases. 
Courts, however, while troubled by a juxtaposition of former Rule 
4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e),1069 have cited former Rule 4(d)(7) as authority 
for federal court use of state long-arm statutes.1070 That result can 
be reached by reading the limitation to defendants "of any class refer- 
red to" in Rules 4(d)(l) or 4(d)(3) as meaning only individuals (4(d)(l)) 
or business entities (4(d)(3)) and not including the circumstances in 
which 4(d)(l) (presence or residence in the state) or 4(d)(3) (agent in 
the state for service of process) are appli~ab1e.I~~~ While such an in- 
terpretation of the words "of any class" is sensible, it does not resolve 
other problems like the former Rule 4(d)(7) use of "manner" as 
entitled "Summons: Personal Service." Rules 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and (ii) appear in subsection 4(c) 
of Rule 4, which subsection is entitled "Service." In the 1983 amendments to Rule 4, subsec- 
tion 4(d) has been given a new title, "Summons and Complaint: Person to be Served," in- 
dicating that subsection 4(d) now is devoted to defining who can be served (including the cir- 
cumstances in which he must find himself in order to be served) while subsection 4(c) is devoted 
to methods for accomplishing this service. Subsection 4(e), which has the title "Summons: Ser- 
vice Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State," seems to be devoted to describing 
the situations in which a nonpresent, nonconsenting defendant may be served with process. 
1067. See supra notes !88-92 and accompanying text (discussing national contacts test in 
4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) cases). 
1068. See supra note 511 and accompanying text. 
1069. Many courts have resolved their confusion as to which Rule authorizes use of state 
long arm statutes by citing both former Rule 4(d)(7) and 4(e) and leaving it up to the reader 
to decide on which provision the court is or should be relying. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. 
v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 414 (9th Cir. 1977) (see supra note 975 and accom- 
panying text); Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 693 (5th Cir. 1966) (supra note 921); 
Ag-Tronic v. Frank Paviour Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393, 400 (D. Neb. 1976) (supra note 989 and 
accompanying text); Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497, 500-01 (D. Minn. 
1975) (infra note 1164 and accompanying text); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n 
of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 569-70 (N.D. 111. 1975) (supra note 937); Scott Paper Co. 
v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184, 188 (D. Del. 1974) (supra text accompanying 
note 949); Japan Gas Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 231 (D.N.J. 1966) 
(infra note 1184). But see Stanley v. Local 926 of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs of 
the AFL-CIO, 354 F. Supp. 1267, 1269-70 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (distinguishing between former 
Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e)) (infra notes 1238-40 and accompanying text). 
1070. See supra cases cited in note 909. 
1071. See supra notes 273-75 and accompanying text. 
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opposed to the Rule 4(e) use of "circumstances and manner," and 
the existence of two apparently overlapping provisions, a statutory 
wastage quite uncharacteristic of legislative bodies. 
Because so many federal courts used former Rule 4(d)(7) to adopt 
state long-arm statutes for service on defendants not present, residing, 
or doing business within the states in which the federal courts were 
however, a determination must be made as to whether a 
broader interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7) precludes application 
of a uniform federal amenability standard in federal question cases. 
This discussion, moreover, necessarily will include examination of Rule 
4(c)(2)(C)(i), to determine whether a uniform federal test can survive 
in cases arising under this new rule that authorizes service "pursuant 
to" state law, perhaps a more ambiguous grant than that of service 
"in the manner" of state law as prescribed in former Rule 4(d)(7).'073 
This writer agrees with those courts and commentators who find 
an anomaly in measuring federal court personal jurisdiction in federal 
question cases by fourteenth amendment due process standards ap- 
plicable to state courts.'074 Although a federal standard could be derived 
from, analogous to, or even identical with the standard applicable 
to state courts, some separate federal fifth amendment due process 
standard should be applicable to all federal question cases. The 
development of such a standard would not eliminate the anomaly 
caused by the nonuniformity of possible assertions of federal per- 
sonal jurisdiction because state long-arm statutes are not uniform. 
For example, a federal court sitting in a state with a liberal long-arm 
statute might be able to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who, in 
similar circumstances, might escape the personal jurisdiction of a 
federal court sitting in a state with a less liberal long-arm statute.'07s 
Nonuniformity will exist so long as federal courts rely on state statutes 
for "permission" to serve process. The problem at which this discus- 
sion is aimed is not procedural-uniformity of "permission" to serve 
process is not the goal. Rather, if a federal court has obtained "per- 
mission" to serve process because a particular defendant's conduct 
comes within the state's long-arm statute, then the problem is whether 
assertion by the court of personal jurisdiction will be measured by 
some uniform fifth amendment amenability standard or whether the 
assertion of jurisdiction will be subject to a fourteenth amendment 
due process standard developed for state courts. 
~~p ~-~ 
1072. See supra cases cited in note 909. 
1073. See supra note 1062 (discussing changes from Rule 4(d)(7) to Rules 4(c)(2)C)(i) and (ii)). 
1074. See supra notes 795, 878, 968 and 1132 and accompanying text. 
1075. See supra note 966 and accompanying text. 
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A separate fifth amendment standard clearly should be developed. 
A broad standard that would not violate the fifth amendment would 
be a "minimum contacts with the United States" standard, aggrega- 
tion of the defendant's national contacts.1076 This test derives from 
the fourteenth amendment standard of "minimum contacts with the 
which standard has been defined and developed carefully 
over a number of years by a tremendous number of courts and 
 commentator^.'^^^ An application of this test would require a federal 
court wishing to serve a defendant with process by using a state long- 
arm statute under former Rule 4(d)(7) to engage in the same type 
of two step analysis that any court must use to determine whether 
it could assert jurisdiction over the defendant:1079 (1) Does a statute 
authorize service on this defendant, i.e., does this defendant come 
within the language of the statute authorizing service of process? (2) 
Would assertion of jurisdiction over this defendant violate the defen- 
dant's due process rights (here, his rights under the fifth amendment)? 
In a former Rule 4(d)(7) case, these two enquiries could have been 
kept entirely separate. The court first would have decided whether 
the defendant to be served was one who came within the state long- 
arm statute. If the potential defendant had an insufficient relation- 
ship with the state to come within its long-arm statute, no matter 
how narrow that statute might be, then jurisdiction could not be 
asserted because service on the defendant would not be authorized 
by statute.1080 Thus, all of the courts that refused to apply a national 
contacts test to federal question cases because no statutory authority 
existed really were faced with circumstances in which the defendant 
could not be served with process since he was outside the scope of 
the applicable state long-arm statute.'08' The courts should not have 
reached the question of amenability because service of process had 
not been authorized in these cases. 
Once it were established that the defendant's conduct came within 
the scope of the long arm statute, then the federal court, according 
to former Rule 4(d)(7), would have been authorized to serve that defen- 
dant "in the manner" prescribed by that state statute. Only then would 
1076. See supra notes 793-98 and 888-92 and infra notes 1324-55 and accompanying text 
(discussing national contacts test in various contexts). 
1077. See supra notes 348-51 and 367-74 and accompanying text (discussing derivation of 
national contacts test). 
1078. See supra notes 70-185 and accompanying text (discussing historical development of 
International Shoe test). 
1079. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing proper analysis in long-arm cases). 
1080. See supra note 120. 
1081. See supra notes 977-1010 and accompanying text. 
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the court turn to the question of amenability, applying the "minimum 
contacts with the United States" test. In most cases either the facts 
would satisfy the International Shoe test of "minimum contacts with 
the state" or service could not be had at all; that is, most state long- 
arm statutes require some substantial contact with the state before 
the defendant would come within the scope of the statute, and, if 
that conduct were established, a minimum contacts with the state test 
also would be satisfied. This does not mean, however, that the nar- 
rower International Shoe test should apply. Expediency should not 
dictate the standard employed; the standard, instead, should define 
the outer limits of personal jurisdiction. Any facts that satisfy the 
International Shoe test also would satisfy the broader national con- 
tacts test and some cases would arise in which the defendant had 
done something that triggered the state long-arm statute but that would 
not be a substantial enough contact with the state to satisfy the four- 
teenth amendment.'082 Then, the court, properly having served the 
defendant "in the manner" of the state long-arm statute, could have 
aggregated the defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole 
to determine whether assertion of personal jurisdiction over this defen- 
dant would violate his fifth amendment rights. Such a test would allow 
a federal court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose 
substantial contacts were scattered so thinly throughout the United 
States that no state court constitutionally could obtain personal jurisdic- 
tion over him.loe3 
Use of a national contacts test in former Rule 4(d)(7) cases would 
not only have been sensible, but would have allowed federal courts 
to apply an amenability standard of their own to the facts of a par- 
ticular case; courts would not have been forced to examine and ex- 
trapolate from the facts a test satisfactory to the particular case.Ioe4 
In most circumstances, a defendant would not have been sued in a 
1082. In cases in which the defendant's contacts within the United States were substantial 
but his contacts with any particular state were small, such contact might trigger the use of 
the long-arm statute without making such contacts sufficient to satisfy the fourteenth amend- 
ment. Often a state court has purported to assert jurisdiction over a defendant served pursuant 
to the state long-arm statute and a higher court has determined that the assertion of jurisdic- 
tion would not be consistent with due process. The court then did not backtrack and say that 
the defendant did not come within the long-arm statute because due process was not satisfied. 
On the other hand, a long-arm statute arguably cannot be applied unless its application would 
be constitutional. This would require that the constitutional analysis be conducted first to deter- 
mine whether the long-arm statute could be used, or that the statutory interpretation be con- 
ducted first with applicability of the statute being revoked by a subsequent judicial decision 
that due process would not be satisfied. 
1083. See supra note 1030 and accompanying text and infra notes 1267 and 1282 and 
accompanying text (suggesting such a consideration). 
1084. See supra notes 742, 747, 762, 831, 928, and 971 and accompanying text. 
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highly inconvenient forum; the state long-arm statute would not have 
permitted service on a defendant who had nothing to do with the 
state.'08' Venue restrictions also would have operated to limit the situs 
of the suit10s6 and change of venue provisions could have been utiliz- 
ed in rare cases in which a defendant would have been highly in- 
convenienced by the plaintiff's choice of forum.'087 
If this approach had been adopted, some cases seemingly would 
have required a federal court to engage in two separate due process 
analyses. In those states like California and Rhode Island in which 
the state long-arm statutes do not specify circumstances in which ser- 
vice can be made on nonresident, nonpresent, nonconsenting defen- 
dants but rather authorize service whenever the defendant has suffi- 
cient contacts with the state so that the fourteenth amendment due 
process clause would not be violated,'0ss the first step for a federal 
court would entail determining whether the defendant had sufficient 
contacts with the state so that the International Shoe test would have 
been satisfied.'0sg If that test had been satisfied, then the court should 
have determined amenability under the fifth amendment national con- 
tacts approach. Since the fifth amendment test would be satisfied if 
the fourteenth amendment test were satisfied,logO however, the second 
part of the analysis would not be necessary. This would create the 
odd result that in cases in which the state long-arm statute is open- 
ended and only limited by the constitution, the only cases a federal 
court using the state long-arm could hear would be those that a state 
court also could hear. Again, however, this would not be a reason 
to reject a broad federal amenability standard for all federal ques- 
tion cases. This only demonstrates that when a federal court must 
serve process by a state long-arm staute, the state and federal stan- 
dards usually would be satisfied. 
On the other hand, a strong argument can be made that a dif- 
ferent two-step analysis would have been required. The first question 
would be whether the defendant could have been served under the 
1085. The broadest long-arm statutes permit state courts to assert jurisdiction to the limits 
of the constitution as defined by the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 3 (discussing such 
long-arm statutes). The fourteenth amendment requires, however, that the defendant have suf- 
ficient contacts with the state to satisfy "minimum contacts." - 
1086. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
1087. See supra notes 188 and 693 and accompanying text and infra notes 1310-16 and 
accompanying text (discussing Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973)). 
1088. See supra note 3 .  
1089. In a state court case, the question of applicability of the statute and amenability 
to service collapse into a single inquiry because the statute only authorizes service when due 
process is satisfied. 
1090. See supra text following note 797. 
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statute and the second would be whether assertion of personal jurisdic- 
tion would have been constitutional by whatever standard applied to 
the particular cocrt, the fourteenth amendment to state courts deciding 
state questions and the fifth amendment to federal courts deciding 
federal questions. If the state had a long-arm statute that was written 
to reach the limits of the Constitution, those limits would depend 
on the court, the fourteenth amendment limitation on state courts, 
and the fifth amendment limitation on federal courts.1091 Even though 
the analysis would collapse into a single question, the question would 
be whether the particula; limitations of that court have been exceed- 
ed. Under this possible analysis, federal courts would have broader 
jurisdictional powers than state courts. The argument would be more 
difficult to sustain in cases in which long-arm service is made under 
Rule 4(e) because 4(e) is limited to service 'under the circumstances" 
as well as "in the manner" of the state long-arm statute. Some federal 
courts have read this additional language to mean that the federal 
court cannot use the state long-arm statute unless the state could con- 
stitutionally do so.1092 This question will be discussed be10w.I~~~ 
Before moving to the final major group of cases to be examined, 
those arising under Rule 4(e),Iog4 this writer would like to examine 
former Rule 4(d)(7) and compare it with the netv rule, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) 
as well as with Rule 4(e), to determine whether a national contacts 
test of amenability in federal courts will make sense under the new 
rule. First, a significant distinction between former Rule 4(d)(7) and 
Rule 4(e) must be emphasized. Former Rule 4(d)(7) authorized ser- 
vice "in the manner" prescribed by state law while Rule 4(e) authorizes 
service "under the circumstances and in the manner" prescribed by 
state latv.Iog5 Some have argued that because of the additional re- 
quirement in Rule 4(e), Rule 4(e) adopts not only the state long-arm 
statute for purposes of service of process but also the state amenability 
standard because the state long-arm statute cannot be used by a state 
court in circumstances in which the state amenability standard is not 
satisfied.1096 Under the narrow interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7), 
which this writer suggested above,'Og7 one might conclude, on the other 
hand, that "under the circumstances" in Rule 4(e) refers only to fac- 
tual circumstances of the case that tvould bring the defendant within 
1091. See supra notes 329 and 497 and accompanying text. 
1092. See, e.g., cases discussed infra at notes 1123-33, 1142-62, 1172-77, and 1190-1201. 
1093. See infra notes 1329-49 and accompanying text. 
1094. See infra notes 1103-1283 and accompanying text. 
1095. See supra notes 903-07 and accompanying text. 
1096. See, e.g., cases discussed infra at notes 1123-33, 1142-62, 1172-77, and 1190-1201. 
1097. See supra notes 1052-61 and accompanying text. 
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the long-arm statute.log8 Under either interpretation, however, former 
Rule 4(d)(7) only referred to "manner" of service, thus permitting 
a strong argument that the drafters of the federal rules did not in- 
tend that former Rule 4(d)(7) incorporate any more into federal pro- 
cedure than the techniques of service embodied in state long-arm 
statutes and the factual requisites for application of those statutes. 
New Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) is a little more ambiguous; it permits a federal 
court to serve 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) defendants "pursuant to the law 
of the State. . . . "log9 Some evidence, however, points to an inter- 
pretation of Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) as a recodification of former Rule 4(d)(7) 
as to using state methods for service of process. First, Rule 4(e) still 
includes references to both the "circumstances and manner" of 
service.1100 Second, Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) is included in subsection (c) of 
Rule 4, which subsection is entitled "Service," thereby indicating that 
subdivisions of that subsection all deal with methods for service.1101 
All subdivisions of subsection 4(c), moreover, deal with technical re- 
quirements for federal service of process and 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), the parallel 
clause to 4(c)(2)(C)(i), describes a new federal method (by mail) for 
serving process on 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) defendants.l1O2 Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) 
seemingly was intended to replace the portion of Rule 4(d)(7) that 
authorized federal courts to use state law for service of process; no 
substantial changes were intended. In fact, the section was moved 
to a subsection dealing only with methods for service of process, 
possibly to clarify that former Rule 4(d)(7) also dealt only with tech- 
niques. Therefore, any amenability standard, like national contacts, 
which makes sense in light of former Rule 4(d)(7) and the cases aris- 
ing thereunder, will be equally sensible when the authorization for 
use of the state statute is Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). 
In conclusion, this writer perceives nothing that recommends adop- 
tion of state amenability standards as part and parcel of state statutes 
for service of process under former Rule 4(d)(7) and present Rule 
4(c)(2)(C)(i). Federal courts should determine and apply a uniform 
amenability standard, if possible. The policy behind permitting federal 
courts to use state long-arm statutes and state methods of service prob- 
ably was to allow federal courts to do at least what courts of the 
states in which they were sitting could do. One should not infer a 
congressional desire, and, indeed, none has been documented, to limit 
1098. See infra notes 1328-40 and accompanying text. 
1099. FED. R. C N .  P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). See supra note 1062. 
1100. See FED. R. C N .  P. 4(e). 
1101. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(i). See also supra note 1062. 
1102. See FED. R. C N .  P. 4(~)(2)(C)(ii).  See also supra note 1062. 
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federal courts to only what state courts could do under similar 
circumstances. 
4. Amenability standards in federal question cases in which pro- 
cess was served, "upon a party not an inhabitant of or found 
within the state in which the district court is held, . . .under the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by the law of the 
state in which the district court is held pursuant to Rule 4(e) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Like the broader interpretation of former Rule 4(d)(7) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,1103 Rule 4(e) allows a federal court to serve 
process beyond the borders of the state in which the federal court 
is sitting. According to its heading, Rule 4(e) provides authorized 
methods for "service . . . upon a party not an inhabitant of or found 
within the state in which the district court is held."1104 One method, 
discussed above,11o5 is service according to "a statute of the Untied 
States [which] provides for service . . . upon a party not an inhabi- 
tant of or found within the state,"1106 that is, service pursuant to 
a federal statute that authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of 
process. Another method, considered below,1107 is service "under the 
circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by a state statute that 
"provides for service . . . upon a party not an inhabitant of or found 
within the state."1108 Thus, Rule 4(e) authorizes a federal court fo 
adopt state-long-arm statutes in certain circumstances. 
A major issue arising in Rule 4(e) federal question cases, when the 
federal court serves process under the long-arm statute of the state 
in which it is sitting, is whether the amenability of a defendant to 
federal court personal jurisdiction is measured by the fourteenth 
amendment standard of minimum contacts with the state or by some 
fifth amendment standard like minimum contacts with the nation. 
Some courts and commentators argue that the provisions that service 
be "under the circumstances . . . prescribed in the statute" requires 
a fourteenth amendment amenability standard because the only cir- 
cumstances under which a state court might serve a defendant validly 
under its long-arm statute would be circumstances in which a four- 
1103. See supra cases cited in note 909; see also supra notes 893-913 and accompanying text. 
1104. FED. R. CN. P. 4(e). 
1105. See supra notes 683-798 and accompanying text. 
1106. FED. R. CN. P. 4(e). 
1107. See infra notes 1123-1283 and accompanying text. 
1108. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(e). 
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teenth amendment due process test is satisfied.llOg On the other hand, 
the limitation to "the circumstances . . . prescribed in the statute" 
might refer only to those factual circumstances that must be satisfied 
in order for the defendant to come within the language of the state 
long-arm statute;I1l0 amenability would be a separate issue to be deter- 
mined by some fifth amendment standard. Other courts do not con- 
sider the specific language of Rule 4(e), applying instead a fourteenth 
amendment standard as something that "comes with" the adopted 
state long-arm statute.l1I1 But for the fourteenth amendment re- 
quirements, this long-arm staiute might have been drafted different- 
ly. Still other courts, finding no statutory authority to support con- 
sideration of the defendant's "national contacts," apply the Interna- 
tional Shoe standard as "the only game in town.""I2 
While most courts that have considered the question have rejected 
any national contacts test,l1I3 many have referred to the possibility 
of applying national contacts in other federal question contexts.1114 
The Rule 4(e) cases discussed below have been divided, roughly, into 
three categories: (1) those courts that applied a fourteenth amend- 
ment minimum contacts test and found the defendant's contacts with 
the state insufficient to support jurisdiction;1115 (2) those courts that 
applied a fourteenth amendment minimum contacts with the state test 
and found the defendant's state contacts sufficient to support 
1109. See infra cases cited at note 1318. See also Edwards v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Co., 
449 F. Supp. 1363, 1367-68 and n.2 (one defendant served pursuant to state long-arm statute 
as authorized by Rule 4(e); court applies fourteenth amendment test to find personal jurisdic- 
tion but suggests it might not have to consider limitations on state courts if service had been 
under former Rule 4(d)(7) which doesn't include "under the circumstances" language). See 
supra note 850 (discussing another aspect of Edwards case). 
1110. See infra notes 1328-36 and accompanying text. 
111 1. See infra cases cited at note 1320. 
1112. See infra cases cited at note 1319. 
1113. See infra notes 1155-58, 1180-82, 1189, 1210, and 1215 and accompanying text. 
1114. See, e.g., Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 1982); Illinois 
v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 156 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979); Brotherhood Cia Naviera S.A. 
v. Zapata Marine Service, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688, 691 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
1115. See infra notes 1123-82 and accompanying text. In many federal question cases in 
which service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute and an International Shoe test is 
applied to find that the defendants had insufficient contacts with the state to support personal 
jurisdiction, the courts do not cite any statute or rule authorizing service by the state long-arm. 
See, e.g., Land-0-Nod Co. v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 708 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1981); Grevas v. 
M/V Olympic Pegasus, 557 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1977); Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pac. RR Co., 
566 F. Supp. 846 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Chattanooga Corp. v. Klinger, 528 F. Supp. 372 (E.D. 
Tenn. 1981); In re Mid-Atl. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1981) (as * 
to some defendants); Harem-Christensen Corp. v. M.S. Frigo Harmony, 477 F. Supp. 694 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See also Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 
1515 (9th Cir. 1983) (court finds insufficient contacts between defendant and state but never 
examines any long-arm statute); Gerber Scientific Inst. Co. v. Barr & Strould Ltd., 383 F. 
Supp. 1238 (D. Conn. 1973) (same). 
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juri~diction;"'~ and (3) those courts which have applied some 
amenability test other than minimum contacts with the state."" The 
first category of cases may include two types of cases: those in which 
the defendant's contacts with the United States were no greater than 
its contacts with the state in which the federal court was sitting, cases 
which might turn on an argument that the court need not decide 
whether a different federal amenability standard would be appropriate 
because such standard also would not be satisfied;"18 and those in 
which the defendant's contacts with the United States were greater 
than its contacts with the state in which the federal court was sitting, 
cases in which the court deliberately has decided to apply the nar- 
rower state standard of amenability."'9 The second category includes 
cases in which some federal amenability standard would have been 
satisfied but in which the court applied the state standard, either 
because it believed the state standard was requiredYHt0 or because, 
since the state standard was satisfied, it did not have to consider any 
broader federal standardu2' (if contacts with one state were sufficient, 
then contacts with the United States would also be sufficient). The 
third category includes only cases in which a federal court has adopted, 
for use, a federal amenability standard like national contacts."22 
Category I. DeJames v. M a g n i f i c e n c e  Carriers, I ~ C . " ~ '  was an ad- 
miralty action for personal injuries sustained by a longshoreman while 
working in a New Jersey port on board a vessel that had been con- 
verted by the defendant Japanese corporation, Hitachi Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Co., Ltd. DeJames often is cited'lt4 because of the 
1116. See infra notes 1183-1268 and accompanying text. In many federal question cases 
in which service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute and an International Sltoe test 
is applied to find the defendants had sufficient contacts with the state to support jurisdiction, 
the courts do not cite any statute or  rule authorizing service by the state long-arm. See, e.g., 
Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1982); Taubler v. Giraud, 655 F.2d 991 
(9th Cir. 1981); Martin v. Steubner, 652 F.2d 652 (6th Cir. 1981); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur 
Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distributors Party Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Greater 
Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Public Service Company of New Hampshire, No. 83-0066 
(D. Mass. May 25, 1983); Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Mid-Atl. 
Toyota Antitrust Litig., 525 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1981) (some defendants); Holt v. Nissan 
Motor Co., 399 F. Supp. 838 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Vergaro v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390 
F. Supp. 1266 (D. Neb. 1975); Honda Assoc., Inc. v. Nozawa Trading Co., 374 F. Supp. 
886 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); H.K. Corp. v. Lauter, 336 F. Supp. 79 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Scott v. Middle 
East Airlines Co., S.A. 240 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
11 17. See infra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text. 
11 18. See, e.g., infra notes 1150-52 and accompanying text. 
1119. See, e.g., infra notes 1176-77 and 1181-82 and accompanying text. 
1120. See, e.g., infra notes 1190-95 and 1213 and 1215 and accompanying text. 
1121. See, e.g., infra notes 1209-11 and 1244-47 and accompanying text. 
1122. See infra notes 1269-1316 and accompanying text. 
1123. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981). 
1124. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 186, at 687 n.lO; Note, supra note 121, at 476 n.30, 
478. 
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discussions of a national contacts amenability standard that occur in 
the majority1125 and the dissenting1126 opinions. Service had been made, 
under Rule 4(e), pursuant to the New Jersey long-arm statute. The 
majority, in considering whether the federal court had personal jurisdic- 
tion over Hitachi, noted the applicability of the fifth amendment to 
this question."27 The court stated, however, that "the principle an- 
nounced in diversity cases such as International Shoe . . . and its 
progeny is also applicable to nondiversity cases."112s Since the court 
erroneously characterized International Shoe and its progeny as "diver- 
sity cases" rather than state court cases,1129 its reliance on Interna- 
tional Shoe might derive from a desire to create uniformity among 
federal court cases rather than a desire to adopt a test developed for 
state court cases. This point was clarified, in part, when the court 
expressed doubt as to whether, under a prior third circuit case, "the 
fifth amendment requires a defendant to have minimum contacts with 
the forum state, or whether . . . the International Shoe test be applied 
by analogy, so that a defendant need only have minimum contacts 
with the United States as a whole."1130 The court, therefore, was not 
striving for federal uniformity but for some sensible fifth amendment 
amenability standard. Finally, the court further limited its specula- 
tion by noting: 
In any event, even in nondiversity cases, if service of process 
must be made pursuant to a state long-arm statute or rule 
of court, the defendant's amenability to suit in federal district 
court is limited by that statute or rule.l131 
While recognizing the appropriateness of measuring amenability by 
some fifth amendment standard, the court concluded that use of the 
state long-arm statute could limit amenability according to that statute. 
The character of this limitation, as determined by this court, care- 
fully was described and explained in the following paragraph: 
The New Jersey long-arm rule is intended to extend as far as is 
constitutionally permissible. In enacting its long-arm rule, the state 
of New Jersey is limited by the due process constraints of the four- 
1125. 654 F.2d at 283; see also 654 F.2d at 287-90 (discussing possibility of a national 
contacts test if it could be established that the defendant had been validly served pursuant 
to some federal law authorizing worldwide service of process). . 
1126. 654 F.2d at 292-93 (Gibbons, J.  dissenting). 
1127. Id. at 283. 
1128. Id. (emphasis added). 
1129. See supra notes 106-55 and accompanying text (discussing International Shoe and its 
progeny). See also supra note 828 and accompanying text (citing other cases in which the same 
erroneous statement was made). 
1130. 654 F.2d at 283. 
1131. Id. 
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teenth amendment. Therefore, we believe that Hitachi's amenability 
to suit in the District of New Jersey must be judged by fourteenth 
amendment standards. We recognize that this creates an anomalous 
situation because it results in a federal court in a nondiversity case 
being limited by the due process restrictions imposed on the states 
by the fourteenth amendment as opposed to those imposed on the 
federal government by the fifth amendment. However, it would be 
equally anomalous to utilize a state long-arm rule to authorize ser- 
vice of process on a defendant in a manner that the state body 
enacting the rule could not constitutionally authorize. The anomaly 
of a federal court being limited by the requirements of the four- 
teenth amendment in a nondiversity case where service must be made 
pursuant to a state long-arm rule could be easily rectified by con- 
gressional authorization of nationwide service of process for admiralty 
cases. It is not within our province to create such authorization.1132 
After considering the defendant's contacts with New Jersey and the 
requirements of the New Jersey long-arm statute, which had been deter- 
mined to reach the limits of due process, the court concluded that 
Hitachi's contacts with New Jersey were "insufficient to support the 
assertion of jurisdiction over Hitachi under the New Jersey long-arm 
rule."1133 
Judge Gibbons disagreed, finding in dissent that "Hitachi's rela- 
tion to New Jersey satisfies the fourteenth amendment due process 
concerns the Supreme Court enunciated in World- Wide Volkswagen 
. . . ."1134 The dissent, moreover, took issue with the conclusion by 
the majority that the fourteenth amendment should govern amenability 
to suit in this ~ i tua t ion . "~~  The dissent argued: 
The fourteenth amendment due process clause does not properly 
apply in all its aspects to federal question claims. In International 
Shoe. . . , the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test to detes- 
mine the constitutionality of a state's assertion of personal jurisdic- 
tion over an out-of-state defendant. A state's exercise of jurisdic- 
tion must comport with traditional notions of fundamental fairness, 
and it must be consistent with the values of federalism embodied 
in the fourteenth amendment. . . .When a court asserts personal 
1132. Id. at 284 (emphasis added). 
1133. Id. at 286. See also Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(court remands for decision as to whether plaintiff's claim, which would come within the state 
long-arm statute, had been asserted in good faith; court poses the question as to whether, 
if court adopts long-arm through Rule 4(e), it also adopts statutory limitations on scope of 
long arm). 
1134. 654 F.2d at 290 (citation omitted). 
1135. Id. at 292. Judge Gibbons recognized that because of his conviction that fourteenth 
amendment standards had been satisfied by the defendant's contacts with New Jersey, his con- 
clusion as to the appropriate amenability test was "not crucial to the disposition of this case." Id. 
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jurisdiction over a foreign defendant on the basis of a state law claim, 
it must ensure that the forum state does not unduly encroach on 
a sister state's interests. When a court, state or federal, adjudicates 
a federal claim, the federalism issue is of no relevance, for the court 
determines the parties' rights and liabilities under uniform, national 
law. No state intrudes on another's interests. The only relevant in- 
terest is the national one. Thus the applicable constitutional due pro- 
cess provision should not be the fourteenth amendment, but the fifth 
amendment. u36 
The dissent to this point had not parted company with the majority 
opinion, which had recognized that "the fifth amendment determines 
whether the district court has personal jurisdiction over Hita~hi.""~' 
Next, the dissent described, as an appropriate fifth amendment test, 
aggregation of the defendant's contacts with the United States."3s In 
meeting the position of the majority that a federal court, using a 
state statute for service of process, should'be limited in the same way 
that a state court using that statute would be limited, the dissent 
argued: 
[Wlere a state court adjudicating a federal claim, the relevant due 
process standard should remain the fifth amendment. The nature 
of the claim, not the identity of the court, should determine the 
appropriate due process test. New Jersey has enacted a "constitu- 
tional" long arm; its courts may assert personal jurisdiction to the 
limits of the relevant due process clause. A federal court in a federal 
question case referred under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) 
to the New Jersey long arm thus must ask two questions: Would 
assertion of personal jurisdiction violate the fifth amendment? and, 
Has New Jersey placed any restriction on the constitutionally exer- 
cisable scope of jurisdiction? The answer to the second question is 
1136. Id. (citations omitted). 
1137. Id. at 283. 
1138. Judge Gibbons stated: 
The fifth amendment requires only that the forum be a fair and reasonable place 
at  which to compel defendant's appearance, and that he have had notice and a 
reasonable opportunity to be heard. . . .A defendant's national contacts enter into 
the fifth amendment fairness analysis, for it would be unreasonable to subject to 
suit in the United States a foreign national defendant who had but one fleeting con- 
nection with this country. But it is not necessary, under the fifth amendment due 
process clause, that that defendant's contacts relate primarily to the particular United 
States location in which the claim arose. Thus, for example, it would not be unfair 
under the fifth amendment to subject a foreign national shipper to suit in New Jersey 
on the basis of an admiralty claim that arose in that state, even if the offending 
ship was the only one ever to dock in New Jersey, and all of defendant's other ships 
land in Texas. The hypothetical defendant has sufficient contacts with the United 
States, and the availability of witnesses points to the District of New Jersey as the 
most convenient forum for the litigation . . . . 
Id. at  292 (citations omitted). 
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no, and therefore when addressing a federal claim, the federal court, 
or for that matter, a New Jersey court, need consider only the issue 
of fifth amendment fairness in determining whether to assert per- 
sonal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.1139 
Judge Gibbons concluded: 
[Wlhile Rule 4(e) has the effect of converting a federal court into 
a state court for purposes of determining personal jurisdiction, the 
rule does not automatically make the fourteenth amendment the 
guiding due process provision.1140 
Judge Gibbons's rather unique approach-consideration of the 
amenability question, under whichever due process clause is applicable, 
fifth or fourteenth, followed by examination of the long-arm statute 
to determine whether it goes to the limits of due process has some 
appeal and would work in cases in which a state has given its courts 
all power permitted by the .Constitution. The general applicability of 
this approach will be discussed below in the materials following the 
discussion of particular cases."41 
Other circuit courts also have reached the conclusion advanced by 
the majority in DeJames-that the amenability standard in 4(e) federal 
question cases involving use of state long-arm statutes would be 
"minimum contacts with the state" in which the federal court is held. 
In Kransco Manufacturing, Inc. v. mark wit^,"^^ a declaratory judg- 
ment action to have a patent declared invalid or not infringed by 
plaintiff's device, the Ninth Circuit considered the question of whether 
a district court sitting in California had acquired personal jurisdic- 
tion over the defendant, a West German citizen and resident, by ser- 
vice outside the State of California. The court noted that the California 
long-arm statute was coextensive with whatever would be consistent 
under the fourteenth amendment,"43 and, without discussing the possi- 
ble applicability of the fifth amendment, examined the defendant's 
contacts with California to determine whether the district court had 
obtained jurisdiction over the defendant."44 The court concluded that 
the defendant's "forum contacts'' were insufficient to permit asser- 
tion of personal ju r i sd ic t i~n .~ '~~  Although the court did not define 
1139. Id. at 292-93. 
1140. Id. at 293. 
1141. See infra notes 1351-52 and accompanying text. 
1142. 656 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981). 
1143. 656 F.2d at 1377. See supra note 3 (discussing California long-arm statute). See also 
infra notes 1346-49 and accompanying text (discussing a suggested fifth amendment analysis 
in cases involving a California-type long arm). 
1144. 656 F.2d at 1378. 
1145. Id. at 1380. The court concluded that the International Shoe test of "fair play and 
substantial justice" would be offended by "requir[ing] him to submit to the court's jurisdic- 
tion." Id. 
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"forum" as the State of California, inquiry was "limited to deter- 
mining whether, consistent with due process, Markwitz's personal con- 
tacts with California [were] sufficient to support an exercise of 
. . . juri~diction.""~~ The opinion does not reveal whether the defen- 
dant had any contacts with other parts of the United States. 
The Sixth Circuit faced a similar issue of personal jurisdiction in 
a federal question case in which service had been made on the defen- 
dant, pursuant to Rule 4(e), by use of the Michigan long-arm statute. 
In Clzrysler Corp. v. Fedders C~rp . , "~ '  an action for violation of 
antitrust laws, an alternative ground advanced by the plaintiff in sup- 
port of personal jurisdiction was that the Michigan long-arm statute 
gave the court authority over an alien defendant served outside of 
Mi~h igan . "~~  In considering this question, the court noted the re- 
quirements of the Michigan long-arm statute, judicial interpretations 
that the long-arm went to the limits permitted by the fourteenth amend- 
ment, and the due process requirement of "minimum contacts with 
the forum state."1149 The court did not distinguish between applicability 
of the statute to the defendant and amenability standards, nor did 
it mention the possibility of applying the fifth amendment. Instead, 
the court examined the defendant's contacts with Michigan and con- 
cluded that these were insufficient "contacts with Michigan to justify 
an exercise of personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] by the District 
Court."115o Although the court did recognize that a fifth amendment 
standard might apply in federal question cases, it did so only while 
discussing the alternative basis for personal jurisdiction-service under 
Section 12 of the Clayton Act.lls1 In the Section 12 portion of the 
opinion, the court expressly found that if a national contacts test were 
applied, the plaintiff had "failed to establish that [the defendant had] 
sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole.""52 Apparently, 
the facts of this case would require the same result even if this court 
had applied some fifth amendment standard while reviewing the ade- 
quacy of service pursuant to the state long-arm statute. 
In Burstein v. State Bar of California,11s3 a recent suit instituted 
in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 
1146. Id. at 1379. 
1147. 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981). See also supra notes 691-92 and accompanying text 
(discussing court's analysis of personal jurisdiction under $12 of the Clayton Act). 
1148. 643 F.2d at 1236-37. 
1149. Id. at 1236. The court cited International Shoe as the source of this list. 
1150. Id. at 1237. 
1151. Id. at 1237-40. 
1152. Id. at 1239. 
1153. 693 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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a Louisiana resident who had failed the California bar examination 
alleged that the State Bar of California had violated her constitu- 
tional rights. The analysis by the Fifth Circuit of personal jurisdic- 
tion over defendant Bar Association proceeded from its conclusion that 
[tlhe clear import of the 'under the circumstances' language [in Rule 
4(e)], at least where the assertion of jurisdiction [as under 4(e)] and 
not just the service of process depends on the state statute, is that 
a federal court, even in a federal question case, can use a state long- 
arm statute only to reach those parties whom a court of the state 
could also reach under it.llS4 
The Fifth Circuit distinguished some cases in which a national con- 
tacts approach had been suggested, because service had been made 
under Rule 4(d)(3) in a wholly federal manner1155 under the first 
sentence of Rule 4(e) pursuant to a federal statute authorizing na- 
tionwide or worldwide service of process,"56 or under Rule 4(d)(7) 
as instate service by a state method (since Rule 4(d)(7) did not have 
any "under the circumstances" language).1157 The court concluded that 
in this, a 4(e) case in which no federal statute authorized nationwide 
or worldwide service of process, "personal jurisdiction over the Bar 
. . . is proper only if a Louisiana court could have asserted it."1158 
The court examined the circumstances of this case in light of four- 
teenth amendment limitations on state court jurisdiction11s9 and con- 
cluded "that the alleged actions of the Bar . . . have insufficient 
relation to Louisiana to  support the personal jurisdiction of a Loui- 
siana state court."1160 A federal court serving process according to 
the state long-arm statute, therefore, also would lack personal 
j~risdiction."~' In a footnote, the court limited its holding: 
We stress that our holding is a statutory one. The analysis of the 
statute, rule 4(e), requires us to apply the fourteenth amendment 
restrictions on state court jurisdiction to this case. Absent the statute, 
however, the only relevant constitutional provision would have been 
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, since this case in- 
volves a federal claim in federal court."62 
1154. Id. at 514. See also infra notes 1328-45 and accompanying text (discussing the 
significance of the "under the circumstances" language). 
1155. 693 F.2d at 515 (discussing Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1954); see supra notes 856-65 and accompanying text). 
1156. 693 F.2d at 515-16 (discussing Federal Trade Comm. v. Jim Walker Corp., 651 F.2d 
251 (5th Cir. 1981), see supra note 597). 
1157. 693 F.2d at 516 (discussing Terry v. Raymond Int'l, Inc., 658 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982)). 
1158. 693 F.2d at 517. 
1159. Id. at 517-23. 
1160. Id. at 523. 
1161. Id. 
1162. Id. n.16. 
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The court did not, however, describe that fifth amendment standard. 
The district courts also have denied jurisdiction in 4(e) cases on 
the basis of the insufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the state 
whose long-arm statute was used. In Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, 
S.A.,L163 a federal question suit for a declaratory judgment instituted 
in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, the 
defendant alien corporation had been served, outside the United States, 
pursuant to the Minnesota long-arm statute. After noting that such 
a procedure was authorized under Rule 4(e) and (former) Rule 
4(d)(7),L164 the court stated that "constitutional limitations aside, the 
reach of State long-arm statutes is a question of State law, to be 
decided by the highest court of the State."LL65 According to state law, 
the Minnesota long-arm statute, which was written in such a way as 
to describe circumstances in which a Minnesota court would be 
authorized to assert juri~diction,"~~ was intended to go to the limits 
of the cons t i t~ t ion .~~~ '  One ground on which the plaintiff asserted 
that the defendants were subject to the Minnesota long-arm statute 
was that the defendant had "transacted business" in Minnesota within 
the meaning of the statute.Il6* The court found that the defendant's 
conduct would not come within the Minnesota long-arm statute but 
that even if it did, "the due process clause would prohibit . . . ap- 
plication" of the state long-arm statute because the requirements of 
International Shoe could not be The court never returned 
to the "constitutional limitations" that it had set aside, unless incor- 
poration of the fourteenth amendment analysis into the statutory scope 
discussion was intended to resolve amenability issues. The court ap- 
parently never reached any question of federal court amenability 
because the court decided that under the restrictions of the fourteenth 
1163. 404 F. Supp. 497 (D. Minn. 1975). 
1164. Id. at 500-01. As noted above, if former Rule 4(d)(7) is interpreted as permitting 
federal courts to utilize state long arm statutes, federal courts become confused, between 4(d)(7) 
and 4(e), as to the source of authority for this procedure. In such cases, the courts tend to 
cite both provisions, without further explanation. See supra note 937 and notes 910, 921, 975, 
989, and 1069 and accompanying text. 
1165. 404 F. Supp. at  501 (emphasis added). 
1166. Unlike the long-arm statutes of California, see supra note 3, and Pennsylvania, see 
infra note 1173 and accompanying text, long-arm statutes that broadly authorize their courts 
to do  "everything not unconstitutional," states like Minnesota and New York, see supra note 
3, have enacted statutes that specify the type of conduct, e.g., "commits a tortious act within 
the state," which can be reached under the statute. When a state court provides that such 
a statute "goes to the limits of the Constitution," it is not converting the statute into a California- 
type authorization, but rather is saying that the statute is to be given broad interpretation 
so that, within the particular categories of conduct reached by the statute, only the Constitu- 
tion limits that reach. 
1167. 404 F. Supp. at 501; see supra note 1166. 
1168. 404 F. Supp. at  504-05. 
1169. Id. at 504. 
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amendment, a state court could not have used the long-arm statute 
in the circumstances of this case. A federal court, therefore, also could 
not use the provision under Rule 4(e).Il7O The result of this analysis, 
however, is that a fourteenth amendment due process standard operates 
to preclude a federal court from asserting personal juri~diction."~' 
In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise L i t i g a t i ~ n , " ~ ~  a federal question 
suit brought in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania by a franchisor, involved an alleged conspiracy to 
violate antitrust laws and a breach of a franchise agreement. Some 
of the defendants, nonresidents of Pennsylvania, had been served with 
process outside the state pursuant to the Pennsylvania long-arm statute 
as authorized by Rule 4(e). Again, the long-arm statute purported 
to go to the limits of the fourteenth Without 
distinguishing between constitutional standards necessary to determine 
the scope of the long-arm statute and those applicable to amenability 
questions, the court said, in a footnote, that "the constitutional stan- 
dards to be applied when examining questions of personal jurisdic- 
tion are the same for the state and federal The court 
framed its analysis and conclusion in terms of the defendant's con- 
tacts with "the forum," finding insufficient contact to satisfy the Inter- 
national Shoe fairness doctrine."75 The court, however, clearly was 
applying the standard developed for state court cases, minimum con- 
tact with the state: the court outlined the development of the Inter- 
national Shoe test"76 and then examined only Pennsylvania contacts 
under circumstances in which it was obvious that the defendants had 
substantial contacts with other parts of the United 
In a more recent federal question case, Brotherhood Cia Naviera 
S.A. v. Zapata Marine Service, Inc. the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania again faced the question of 
1170. See infra notes 1328-45 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the 
"under the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e)). 
1171. If the long arm cannot be used unless the fourteenth amendment is satisfied, then 
a fourteenth amendment threshold test must be satisfied and would limit the federal court. 
1172. 92 F.R.D. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1981); see also supra notes 813-16 and accompanying test 
(discussing this case in regard to personal jurisdiction, under Rule 4(d)(I), over different 
defendants). 
1173. 92 F.R.D. at  408. The court noted, "Pennsylvania's long-arm statute . . . provides 
for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over non-residents 'to the fullest extent allowed 
under the Constitution of the United States' and may be based on the most minimum contact 
with the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] allowed under the Constitution of the United States." 
Id. (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S5322(b) (Purdon 1981)). 
1174. 92 F.R.D. at 408 n.6. 
1175. Id. a t  410. 
1176. Id. at 408-09. 
1177. Some of the defendants were large corporations incorporated in the United States 
and doing business in other areas of the United States. See id. at 407 (describing defendants). 
1178. 547 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
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personal jurisdiction in a case in which the defendants, Texas and 
Panamanian corporations, had been served with process, as authorized 
by Rule 4(e), pursuant to the Pennsylvania long-arm ~tatute."'~ In 
a footnote, the court recognized the existence of a "national contacts 
approach" to federal court personal jurisdiction but cited DeJames 
as rejecting that approach "in the absence of express Congressional 
a~thorization. ' '~ '~~ Consequently, although the defendants had substan- 
tial contacts with other areas of the United  state^,"^' the court used 
the fourteenth amendment test and, based on the defendants' con- 
tacts with the state of Pennsylvania, found that the court lacked per- 
sonal jur isdict i~n."~~ 
Category 2.  In Japan Gas Lighter Association v. Ronson 
C~rpora t ion , "~~  a federal question suit for declaratory judgment that 
the defendants' patent was invalid or that the plaintiff's device did 
not infringe the defendants' patent, one -of the defendants, an alien 
corporation that had been served, pursuant to Rule 4(e),"84 under 
the New Jersey long-arm statute, moved to dismiss for lack of per- 
sonal jurisdiction. The district court found that service under the state 
long-arm rule "was proper as long as the State rule may constitu- 
tionally be applied to the facts.""85 On this issue the court noted 
that "[ilnsofar as due process is concerned, this Court's power to 
assert jurisdiction in a Federal question matter is tested, technically 
speaking, under the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.""86 
The court, however, asserted that "the clearest guidance on when such 
jurisdiction is permissible is found in the Supreme Court's pro- 
nouncements on the corresponding power of State tribunals."1187 After 
discussing International Shoe, Hanson, and McGee, the court con- 
cluded that the alien defendants' contacts with New Jersey were suf- 
ficient to satisfy the tests established in those state court 
1179. 547 F. Supp. at  688-90. 
1180. 547 F. Supp. at 691 n.3; see supra notes 1123-41 and accompanying text (discussing 
the DeJames case). 
1181. 547 F. Supp. at  691 n.3. 
1182. Id. at  690-92. The court did not dismiss the case but transferred it, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. 1404(a), to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Id. 
1183. 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966). 
1184. The court noted that "Federal Rules 4(e) and [former] 4(f) authorize service outside 
the State in which the District Court sits in any manner prescribed by State law." Id. This 
is another example of a court, confused by the juxtaposition of two rules that seemed to it 
to provide the same authority, citing both without deciding which actually authorizes use of 
state law. See supra note 937, 910, 975, 989, 1069 and 1164 and accompanying text (discussing 
other cases in which courts reacted in this manner). See also supra notes 1052-61 and accom- 
panying t a t  (suggesting an important distinction in the way these rules were intended to operate). 
1185. 257 F. Supp. at 231. 
1186. Id. at  232. 
1187. Id. 
1188. Id. at 232-36. 
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In a footnote, however, the court questioned whether, "in a Federal 
action such as this, the relevant 'affiliating circumstances' may not 
include the ties which [the defendant] has with the United States 
Federal system as a whole. . . . "1189 Since the court found sufficient 
contacts with the state, it did not pursue this line of reasoning. 
In Horne v. Adolph Coors CO.,"~O a recent federal question case 
involving a claim for patent infringement brought in the District of 
New Jersey against a Colorado corporation, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied International Shoe to the 
question of the personal jurisdiction of the federal court. Service had 
been made on the defendant, as authorized by Rule 4(e), pursuant 
to the New Jersey long-arm statute.11g1 The court noted that the statute 
had been interpreted as going to the limits of due process1192 and 
concluded that its "inquiry present[ed] the question whether due pro- 
cess [would] permit . . . the district court to exercise personal jurisdic- 
tion over [the defendant]."llg3 The court seemed to include a con- 
stitutional element in its consideration of the applicability of the New 
Jersey statute.lIg4 In other cases, this approach has led inexorably to 
the application of the fourteenth amendment "minimum contacts with 
the state" approach first announced in International Shoe.llg5 
After posing the question of whether the Supreme Court, in In- 
surance Corp. of Ireland,1196 had abandoned any sovereignty rationale 
for limitation of state court jur i sd i~t ion ,~~~ '  the court observed that 
this "intriguing question . . . need not be answered in this case" 
because the case involved a federal question exclusively reserved to 
federal courts.1198 Moreover, the court said that "[tlhe only constitu- 
tional limitation on Congressional power to provide a forum is 
whatever fairness to the defendant is required by the fifth 
1189. Id. at 236 n.34. The ties to which the court referred were the defendant's patents. 
The court continued, "Those ties, of course, do involve the interest of the Federal system 
in vindicating its substantial law policies in this area." Id. 
Japan Gas Lighter arose four years after the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Tennessee in First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Co., formulated and adopted 
a national contacts approach in a 4(d)(3) case. See 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); supra 
notes 872-87 and accompanying test. Japan Gas Lighter, which did not cite First Flight, was 
one of the earlier cases to recognize the possibility of some national contacts approach to 
amenability in federal question cases. 
1190. 684 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982). 
1191. Id. at  257. 
1192. Id. 
1193. Id. 
1194. See supra notes 1076-93 and infra notes 1328-49 and accompanying text (discussing 
the possibility of such a threshold requirement). 
1195. See supra notes 1123-33, 1142-52 and 1172-77 and accompanying test. 
1196. See supra notes 156-77 and accompanying text. 
1197. 684 F.2d a t  259. 
1198. Id.; see also supra note 19 (discussing subject matter areas in which federal courts 
have been given exclusive subject matter jurisdiction). 
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amendment."llg9 No "fifth amendment fairness" test, however, was 
formulated. The court held instead that when the defendant placed 
its allegedly infringing product "in the stream of interstate commerce" 
under circumstances in which the defendant should have known that 
the plaintiff patent owner would be injured wherever he lived (New 
Jersey) and, when some of the products actually reached New Jersey, 
then "it cannot be said that requiring the alleged infringer to defend 
in the forum chosen by the patent owner, which also happens to be 
the patent owner's residence, so offends traditional notions of fairness 
as to be a violation of due process and therefore unconstitutional."1200 
The court, therefore, ambiguously stated, in the context of the long- 
arm requirements, that "due process" would determine personal 
jurisdiction and then asserted that a fifth amendment fairness stan- 
dard should govern in federal question cases that only arise in federal 
courts. The court did not clarify whether this was the "due process" 
by which to judge the applicability of the New Jersey long-arm statute 
or a separate amenability standard to be applied after statutory ap- 
plicability had been established. Next, however, the court considered 
fairness to the defendant under the circumstances of this case, an 
analysis which did not look any different from an examination of 
the defendant's contacts with the State of New Jersey. (The court 
examined the defendant's action outside New Jersey which caused in- 
jury to the plaintiff within New Jersey.) This approach, then, 'really 
was an application of the fourteenth amendment standard. Clearly, 
the court did not weigh in its analysis the defendant's other substan- 
tial contacts with the United States.Izo1 
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz A p p a r a t e ~ e r k e ' ~ ~ ~  was another patent in- 
fringement suit against an alien corporation. The United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois examined two alternative 
bases for asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant: (1) ser- 
vice in Illinois on an agent of the corporation under Rule 4(d)(3) 
(discussed above)1203 and (2) service outside Illinois pursuant to the 
Illinois long-arm statute. The district court confused the two ques- 
tions, deciding that 4(d)(3) did not apply because defendant did "not 
have sufficient minimum contacts with the State . . . to warrant 
. . . exercising in personam jurisdiction. . . . "lZo4 Second, the court 
1199. 654 F.2d at  259. 
1200. Id. at 260. 
1201. The court almost seemed to be interpreting a statute to decide whether the defendant 
had "done enough" to come within the New Jersey long-arm statute. The court did not more 
than a state court would have done if a state court had been authorized to hear such a case. 
1202. 353 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. 111. 1972). See also supra notes 845-55 and accompanying text. 
1203. See supra notes 845-55 and accompanying text. 
1204. 353 F. Supp. at  495. 
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found that the defendant's conduct did not come within the language 
of the Illinois long-arm statute.t205 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
reversed.1206 The appellate court held that the defendant's conduct 
did fall within the Illinois long-arm statute,t207 finding that the 
"activities engaged in by [the defendant] were sufficient to establish 
minimum contacts with the state. . . , and that exercise of personal 
jurisdiction pursuant to the . . . Illinois long-arm statute . . . would 
not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment."'208 The 
court of appeals never considered the applicability of Rule 4(d)(3). 
The court of appeals distinguished between the statutory interpreta- 
tion of the Illinois long-arm statute and the due process limitations 
concerning the constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction. The 
court did not include any constitutional analysis or references in its 
consideration of the first issue. When deciding the second issue, 
amenability, the Seventh Circuit did not find, as have courts that have 
programmed a fourteenth amendment constitutional requirement in- 
to the statutory interpretation question, that the amenability question 
was moot. 
The court recognized that International Shoe and its progeny 
established restraints, under the fourteenth amendment, on "state 
power." The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that "[iln this litiga- 
tion . . . a federally created right is at issue, and due process is prop- 
erly a matter for examination in light of the Fifth Amendment rather 
than the Fourteenth Amendment."1209 The court said, in a footnote, 
that some courts had applied national contacts as the fifth amend- 
ment due process standard but observed that "[wle need not reach 
such a broad conclusion here."t2t0 This statement probably arose from 
the determination by the court that a narrower test, minimum con- 
tacts with the state, had been satisfied. The International Shoe test 
was adopted based upon the following reasoning: 
[Tlhe International Shoe line of cases is [not] irrelevant to our 
inquiry here. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is essen- 
tially a recognition of the principles of justice and fundamental 
fairness in a given set of circumstances . . . and, so viewed, on 
the facts of this case, we can perceive no operative difference be- 
tween the concept of due process as applied to the states and as 
1205. Id. 
1206. Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975). 
1207. Id. at 1141-43. 
1208. Id. at 1145. 
1209. Id. at 1143. 
1210. Id. n.2. 
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applied to the federal government. This and other courts have reached 
this result, explicitly or tacitly, and have applied the "minimum con- 
tacts" standard to federal question cases in which in personam 
jurisdiction was at issue, and we deem it appropriate to do so here.12" 
The court then examined the circumstances of the case under the In- 
ternational Shoe standard as it had then been interpretedI2l2 and deter- 
mined that assertion of personal jurisdiction would be constitutional. 
In People of State of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,I2l3 a recent 
suit brought under the federal common law of nuisance in which ser- 
vice was made, under Rule 4(e), pursuant to the Illinois long-arm 
statute, the Seventh Circuit again applied a current fourteenth amend- 
ment test and concluded that defendant's contacts with the state of 
Illinois made it fair and reasonable for the court to assert personal 
juri~diction.'~'" Again, the court divided the analysis into statutory 
construction and amenability, and again the court kept constitutional 
issues separate from its interpretation of the long-arm statute. In a 
footnote, the court observed: 
If Congress had chosen to authorize nationwide service of process, 
no minimum contacts issue would be raised. . . .Congress has not 
done so and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) makes jurisdiction dependent on 
the long-arm statute or rule of court of the state in which the district 
court is held; therefore we are required to determine whether defen- 
dants' contacts with Illinois are sufficient to support the exercise 
of in personam jurisdi~tion.'~'~ 
While the court seemed incorrect in stating that no minimum con- 
tacts issue would be raised (at least, amenability would still be an 
issue),I2l6 the Seventh Circuit clearly will continue to apply the four- 
teenth amendment, in the absence of Congressional action, in 4(e) 
cases involving use of state long-arm statutes. 
In a more recent case, In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off Coast 
of France on March 16, 1978,1217 the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its 
1211. Id. at 1143 (citations and footnote omitted). 
1212. The factors to be considered by a court in determining whether International Shoe 
has been satisfied have changed as the doctrine developed. See supra notes 106-85 and accom- 
panying test (discussing the historical development of the International Shoe test). 
1213. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979). 
1214. Id. at 156. 
1215. Id. n.3 (citations omitted). 
1216. In cases like Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), see supra notes 
630-36 and accompanying test, and Mariash v. Morill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974), see supra 
notes 622-29 and accompanying text, where service is made pursuant to a nationwide service 
of process statute, the only amenability standard might be "presence" where served. See supra 
note 793 and accompanying text. However, a "contacts" analysis still is possible. See supra 
note 794 and accompanying text. Moreover, service outside the Untied States pursuant to such 
a statute clearly requires amenability analysis. See supra notes 795-96 and accompanying test. 
1217. 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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approach to the question of amenability standards in federal ques- 
tion cases in which service is made, pursuant to Rule 4(e), by the 
long-arm statute of the state in which the federal court is sitting. This 
case involved a suit by French citizens, for damage caused by the 
breakup of a supertanker off the coast of France, against, inter alia, 
the builder of the ship, a Spanish company that had built the ship 
in Spain.1218 The court again divided the analysis into two parts, 
statutory and constitutional. First, it found that the defendant's con- 
duct came within one of the provisions of the Illinois long-arm 
statute.1219 Then, it turned to the question of "whether the Illinois 
statute, so interpreted, violates due process.771220 The court applied 
Supreme Court cases involving fourteenth amendment limitations on 
state courts,122' finding that the defendant "had . . . a sufficient 
presence within Illinois to satisfy the territorial notions that Volkswagen 
brought back into due process analysis of personal jur i sd ic t i~n." '~~~ 
Although the Supreme Court has, subsequent to World-Wide 
Volkswagen, disavowed any intention to reintroduce notions of 
sovereignty or territoriality into state due process analysis,1223 this 
Seventh Circuit opinion is important because the court was applying, 
to federal court amenability, the test it perceived as applicable to state 
courts under the fourteenth amendment. The Seventh Circuit did not 
mention the possibility that a standard different from that which had 
developed under the fourteenth amendment should apply in federal 
courts, nor did it discuss any other standard. 
Federal district courts also have relied on standards established for 
state courts and have applied variations on the International Shoe 
test to federal question cases in which service was made outside the 
state in which the federal court is held, as authorized by Rule 4(e), 
1218. The defendant, Astilleros Espanoles, S.A., had contacts with the State of Illinois 
in regard of the problem before the court. The court stated the following facts: "The contract 
to build the Amoco Cadiz [the supertanker], was signed in Chicago in 1970 after extensive 
negotiations, in Chicago and Spain, between Astilleros and Amoco. . . .The real purchaser 
of the Amoco Cadiz was Standard Oil Company (Indiana), whose headquarters is in Chicago. 
. . ." Id. at  914. 
1219. Id. at  914-15. 
1220. Id. at  915. 
1221. Id. at 915-16. The court discussed International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310 (1945) (see supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text), Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235 (1958) (see supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text), and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (see supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text). 
1222. 699 F.2d at  916. See supra note 148 accompanying text (discussing federalism and 
sovereignty analysis in World-Wide). But see supra note 167 and 174-75 and accompanying 
text (discussing effect of Insurance Corp. of Ireland on federalism basis of fourteenth amend- 
ment standard). 
1223. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 
694, 702 n.10 (1982). See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text. 
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by using the state long-arm statute. In Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kop- 
parsbergs Bergslags AB,lZz4 a patent infringement action initiated in 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 
the defendant alien corporation, which "maintain[ed] no established 
place of business in Pennsylvania,"'225 had been served outside Penn- 
sylvania "in the precise manner required by the Pennsylvania [Long- 
Arm] Statute. . . . "'226 The court noted that "the sole question 
presented . . . is whether, in these circumstances, proper service of 
process under the Pennsylvania Statute subjects the defendant to the 
in personam jurisdiction of this The court recited the ap- 
plicable provisions of the long-arm statute,'228 noted that "the Penn- 
sylvania Legislature clearly expressed its intention to extend in per- 
sonam jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the fullest measure 
permitted by federal due process standards,"1229 and observed that 
"[ulnder familiar doctrine, those constitutional standards are satisfied 
by finding that the defendant corporation has certain 'minimum con- 
tacts' with the Commonwealth [of P e n n s y l ~ a n i a ] , " ~ ~ ~ ~  the Interna- 
tional Shoe test. The court did not clarify whether it included this 
fourteenth amendment test as part of the statutory interpretation, i.e., 
the statute cannot be used unless a state court could use it constitu- 
tionally, or whether this was the amenability standard to be applied 
in federal courts. Finding the defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania 
sufficient, the court asserted personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant.lZ3' 
In another recent case, Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetic Distributors, 
I ~ C . , ' ~ ~ ~  the United States District Court for the District of Puerto 
Rico applied the International Shoe doctrine to resolve a question 
of personal jurisdiction in a federal question case. Under Rule 4(e), 
the Puerto Rico long-arm statute was held to apply.'233 The court 
did not discuss constitutional doctrine; rather, it merely cited Inter- 
1224. 403 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1975). 
1225. Id. at 10. 
1226. Id. 
1227. Id. 
1228. Id. at 11. 
1229. Id. 
1230. Id. 
1231. The opinion reveals that the defendant had contacts with other parts of the United 
States. Id. at 11-13. The court did not have to consider any test other than "minimum contacts 
with the state" (and it did not consider any) because the narrow International Shoe test had 
been satisfied. 
1232. 531 F. Supp. 1070 (D.P.R. 1982). 
1233. Id. at 1073. The court argued that since the federal statute under which the suit had 
been brought did "not provide an independent basis for personal jurisdiction, we must look 
to the law of the state in which the action was brought. Rule 4(e) FRCP." Id. 
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national Shoe and World- Wide Volkswagen and examined the defen- 
dant's contacts with Puerto R i ~ o , ' ~ ~ ~  finding them sufficient to sup- 
port jurisdi~tion.'~~' The defendant objecting to personal jurisdiction, 
a New York-based corporation,1236 clearly had substantial contacts with 
other parts of the United States. The court, however, seemed content 
to consider only local contacts. 
In Stanley v. Local 926 of the International Union of Operating 
Engineers of the AFL-CI0,lz3' a civil rights class action brought against 
an international union located in Washington, D.C., the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia distinguished be- 
tween the incorporation of state law that was permissible under former 
Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e). While Rule 4(d)(7) "incorporates all state 
methods" of service upon 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) defendants, the court 
argued that 4(d)(7) was limited, by Rule 4(f), "to the territorial limits 
of the state in which the district court is held, unless some federal 
statute or rule authorizes extra-territorial service."1238 Rule 4(e) is such 
a rule, permitting extra-territorial service by state long arm statute 
or rule.'239 The court, therefore, concluded that since no federal statute 
authorized service outside Georgia, then it must consider the Georgia 
long-arm statute as incorporated into the Federal Rules by Rule 4(e).lZ4O 
The Georgia statute would apply, the court found, "if the assertion 
of personal jurisdiction over the International was constitutionally 
permi~sible."~~~' The court went on to apply the traditional fourteenth 
amendment "minimum contacts with the state" approach and found 
that the test had been satisfied.'242 It did not specify whether con- 
sideration of the constitutional issue was for purposes of applying 
the statute or for purposes of establishing federal court amenability. 
In a footnote, however, the court seemed to indicate that it was ap- 
plying an amenability standard. The existence of a national contacts 
approach for federal question cases was recognized but rejected on 
the ground "that the terms of Rule 4(e) dictate a test based on minimal 
contacts with the forum state."'243 
1234. Id. at 1073-74. 
1235. Id. at 1073-76. 
1236. Id. at 1072. 
1237. 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973). 
1238. Id. at 1269-70. See also supra notes 1052-66 and accompanying text (discussing 
possibility of limiting former Rule 4(d)(7) to service within the state). 
1239. 354 F. Supp. at 1270. 
1240. Id. 
1241. Id. at 1271. 
1242. Id. 
1243. Id. at 1271 n.3. 
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Some district courts in Rule 4(e) cases have been more sympathetic 
to a national contacts test, but have declined to adopt the standard, 
finding such action unnecessary on the facts of their particular cases. 
In Graham Engineering Corp. v. Kemp Products Ltd.,'244 for exam- 
ple, a patent litigation brought in the Northern District of Ohio by 
a Pennsylvania corporation against, inter alia, a Canadian corpora- 
tion, the court acknowledged that a national contacts test had been 
applied to amenability in federal question cases.'245 The court expressed 
doubt as to the applicability of such a standard without some statutory 
authority therefor,l2j6 but declined to resolve the question because 
"it is clear that . . . jurisdiction is available [under state law]."'247 
Instead, the doing-business-inl~hio provision of the Ohio long-arm 
statute, which supposedly was limited only by the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment, was applied. The court admitted that 
"technically it is the Due Process Clause of the Fifth . . . Amend- 
ment that requires construction" in this federal question case'248 but 
resolved this difficulty by noting that those courts holding that "federal 
law should govern the area . . . have opined that the Fifth Amend- 
ment standard is more liberal."'249 The conclusion by the court, 
therefore, that the defendant had sufficient contacts with Ohio to 
satisfy the fourteenth amendment'250 also would satisfy any fifth 
amendment standard. 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 
considered a national contacts test for federal court personal jurisdic- 
tion in federal question cases in Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General 
Tire & Rubber C O , ' ~ ~ '  an antitrust action against, inter alia, an alien 
manufacturer. Service had not been made on the defendant pursuant 
to a federal statute authorizing worldwide service of process but "pur- 
suant to Rule 4(d)(7) and (e) . . . which provides that summons may 
be served upon a foreign corporation in the manner prescribed by 
the law of the state in which the district court sits."'252 The court 
seemed reluctant to choose between former Rule 4(d)(7) and Rule 4(e) 
as authority for use of the Ohio long-arm statute;'253 moreover, the 
- ~ 
1244. 418 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
1245. Id. at 919 n.3. 
1246. Id. 
1247. Id. 
1248. Id. at 920 n.6. 
1249. Id. 
1250. Id. at 920-22. 
1251. 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967). 
1252. Id. at 387 (emphasis added). 
1253. See also supra notes 937, 910, 921, 975, 989, 1069, 1166, and 1186 and accompany- 
ing text (discussing judicial difficulty in distinguishing between the functions of former Rule 
4(d)(7) and those of Rule 4(e)). 
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court used the words "in the manner" which appear in both former 
4(d)(7) and 4(e).lZs4 In a later portion of the opinion, however, the 
court relied on Rule 4(e) and its particular "under the circumstances" 
language in refusing to apply what it considered to be the proper 
test for federal court personal jurisdiction-contacts with the United 
States as a whole.'255 This writer, therefore, has read Edward J. 
Moriarty as a Rule 4(e) case because the purported limiting language 
in Rule 4(e) provided a pivot01 point in the court's analysis. 
The court made a strong argument for a separate federal amenability 
test, stating that in other federal question cases which purported to 
apply a " 'federal' test of jurisdiction . . . the Court invariably winds 
up looking at the contacts of the foreign corporation with the state, 
rather than with the United States. . . . ,a misconception of the 
'federal' test as we appl[y] it. . . . " I z s 6  The court began analysis by 
positing that a federal standard shduld apply in cases like the one 
at bar: 
It is our opinion that a federal district court may acquire jurisdic- 
tion over the person of a defendant incorporated under the laws 
of a foreign country without regard to contacts of the corporation 
with the state where the court sits. This is especially true in a case 
where the cause of action rests upon a federally-created right, such 
as this one, and where national uniformity in enforcing that right 
should be the true guideline.'257 
Making an argument that appeared in cases involving federal statutes 
authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of process, the court 
continued: 
[I]n our view, the judicial jurisdiction over the person of the defen- 
dant does not relate to the geographical power of the particular court 
which is hearing the controversy, but to the power of the unit of 
government of which that court is a part. The limitations of the 
concept of personal jurisdiction are a consequence of territorial 
limitations on the power of the respective forums. Thus, as applied 
to the states, the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction involves 
a determination as to whether the defendant has certain minimal 
contacts with the forum state, such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice. . . . 
1254. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text (discussing former Rule 4(d)(7) and 
notes 287-88 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4(e)). On the other hand, this might be 
interpreted as selection of former Rule 4(d)(7), which included only the "in the manner" language, 
rather than Rule 4(e), which included the entire phrase "under the circumstances and in the 
manner." 
1255. 289 F. Supp. at 390. 
1256. Id. at 390 n.2. 
1257. Id. at 389. 
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By the same token, we feel that the appropriate inquiry to be made 
in a federal court where the suit is based upon a federally created 
right is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the 
United States, so as to satisfy due process requirements under the 
Fifth Amendment. lZs8 
After arguing in favor of a fifth amendment federal standard, 
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, the court never- 
theless declined to apply that standard; "this course has not been 
left open to us by the federal rules or statutes. . . .[because] neither 
Congress nor the Supreme Court has provided statute or rule whereby 
substituted service may be made upon an alien corporation having 
certain minimum contacts with the United States."1259 The court in- 
terpreted the "under the circumstances" language of Rule 4(e) "to 
mean that when service is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute, 
it is only proper when the corporation served meets the qualifications 
for service set out in .the statute."1260 This construction also would 
not seem to require application of a fourteenth amendment test,lZ6' 
After examining not only the question of whether the defendant's 
conduct came within the meaning of the Ohio long-arm statute but 
also the sufficiency of those contacts with the state of Ohio, the court - 
concluded that those standards had been satisfied.'262 Clearly preferr- 
ing a national contacts approach, the court felt constrained to use 
the "contacts with the state" test. "[Tlhe lack of means to pursue 
the proper course leaves room for no other result,"1263 the court noted. 
Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp.,12" a patent infr- 
ingement suit in which the defendant alien corporation had been served 
with process, as authorized by Rule 4(e), under the Utah long-arm 
statute, is often cited as a case favorable to the national contacts 
approach.1265 First, the court concluded that the defendants were sub- 
ject to suit under the Utah long-arm statute because each had suffi- 
cient contacts with Utah to satisfy the fourteenth amendment limita- 
1258. Id. at 390. 
1259. Id. 
1260. Id. 
1261. But see supra note 1 109 and accompanying text and infra notes 1341-50 and accom- 
panying test (discussing interpretation that "under the circumstances" language limits federal 
court use of the state long-arm statute to only those circumstances in which a state court could 
constitutionally use the long-arm statute). - 
1262. 289 F. Supp. at  390-91. 
1263. Id. at 390 n.2. 
1264. 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973). 
1265. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416-17 (9th 
Cir. 1977) (supra notes 974-84 and accompanying text); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 
397 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D. Conn. 1975) (infra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text); Note, 
supra note 121, at  476. 
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tion on that provision.'266 Next, the court approved, in the cir- 
cumstances of this case, evaluation of the defendant's national contacts: 
[Wlhere, as here, suit is brought against alien defendants, the court 
properly may consider the aggregate presence of the defendants' ap- 
paratus in the United States as a whole. Due process or traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice should not immunize an 
alien defendant from suit in the United States simply because each 
state makes up only a fraction of the substantial nationwide market 
for the offending 
The conclusion by the court, however, did not mention the fifth 
amendment or national contacts: 
The court has carefully reviewed each of the arguments and 
materials presented and concludes that the present suit is encom- 
passed by Utah's long-arm statute and is not offensive to the Four- 
teenth Amendment. 
Whether the court "threw in" national contacts to bolster its four- 
teenth amendment analysis or whether it saw a fifth amendment 
national contacts approach as an alternative holding remains unclear. 
The concluding paragraph, however, clearly robs this case of any bin- 
ding precedential value in favor of national contacts as a general federal 
amenability standard. 
Category 3. This category really includes only one federal question 
case in which service was made, pursuant to Rule 4(e), under a state 
long-arm statute: Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Limited,'269 a patent 
action by a Connecticut corporation against a Great Britain corpora- 
tion. The defendant did not "contest [plaintiff's] claim that the Con- 
necticut corporate long-arm statute . . . provides a basis for service 
of process on it"'270 under Rule 4(e) and Rule 4(i)(l)(D), which pro- 
vides methods of service outside the United s t a t e ~ , ' ~ ~ '  but only that 
"the application of the statute to it is uncon~titutional."'~~~ Whether 
the defendant was arguing that the statute could not be applied to 
it because the fourteenth amendment would not permit a state court 
to assert jurisdiction over the defendant,I2" or whether the defen- 
dant was arguing that some fifth amendment amenability standard 
imposed on federal courts had not been satisfied is ~nc1ear . l~ '~ The 
362 F. Supp. at 725-28. 
Id. at 728. 
Id. at 729. 
397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975). 
Id. at 288. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 4(i); see supra note 269 (text of Rule 4(i)). 
397 F. Supp. at 288. 
See infra note 1321 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of 4(e) cases). 
See infra note 1322 and accompanying text. 
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defendant did argue that its contacts with Connecticut were insuffi- 
cient to satisfy the International Shoe test,1275 but this argument might 
have furthered either position. 
The court also did not reveal to which of these questions it applied 
a due process analysis. Since, however, the court concluded that a 
fifth amendment standard applied to the question,1276 it either was 
discussing amenability directly or was assuming (or concluding) that 
each assertion of personal jurisdiction is entitled to only one due pro- 
cess analysis, regardless of how service was made, a fourteenth amend- 
ment analysis for a state court and a fifth amendment analysis for 
a federal court. Assessing the importance of International Shoe in 
a footnote, the court said: 
International Shoe applied the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in determining the limits of state court in personam 
jurisdiction over non-residents. Because subject-matter jurisdiction 
in the present action is conferred by federal law, the sufficiency of 
Spembly's contacts, whether with the State of Connecticut or with 
the United States, must be tested against the Fifth Amendment. 
Although the Fifth Amendment test is sometimes expressed in more 
general "fairness" terms, International Shoe and subsequent cases 
provide the basis for the fairness test, and the analysis is substan- 
tially similar;'277 
Later, the court considered the -constitutional test applicable to those 
counts of the complaint that arose under federal law: 
[I]t is not necessary to decide whether [the defendant's] contracts 
[sic] with Connecticut are alone sufficient to satisfy the demands 
of the Constitution. When a federal court is asked to exercise per- 
sonal jurisdiction over an alien defendant sued on a claim arising 
out of federal law, jurisdiction may appropriately be determined on 
the basis of the alien's aggregated contacts with the United States 
as a whole, regardless of whether the contacts with the state in which 
the district court sits would be sufficient if considered alone. 
. . . If the defendant's contacts with the United States are sufficient 
to satisfy the fairness standard of the Fifth Amendment, . . . then 
the only limitation on place of trial would be the doctrine of forum 
non convenien~. '~~~ 
Discussing cases that had considered a national contacts approach,1279 
1275. 397 F. Supp. at 288. 
1276. Id. n.3. 
1277. Id. 
1278. Id. at 290. 
1279. Id. at 290-92 (discussing Edward J.  Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 
289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967)) (supra notes 1251-63 and accompanying text); Engineered 
Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (supra notes 1264-68 
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the court noted at least two important reasons for adopting the test 
in cases involving alien defendants: the national contacts test would 
allow suit in a federal district court in those situations in which the 
defendant had substantial but thinly-scattered contacts throughout the 
United States,1280 and, in terms of convenience to the defendant, an 
alien defendant which had contacts throughout the United States but 
which was incorporated and had its place of business in another coun- 
try would have "no reason based on fairness to prefer any one par- 
ticular district to any other. . . . "'2s1 On the other hand, the court 
observed, "[wlhen a defendant is a citizen of the United States, there 
are very real differences in convenience between litigating in a state 
where it does business or resides, and one in which it has only in- 
significant contacts. . . . " I z s 2  Using its announced fifth amendment 
test of national contacts, the court found that the defendant was 
- amenable to suit in the federal district court.1283 The court did not 
discuss the applicability of a state standard based on grounds raised 
by other courts: the use of the state long-arm statute or the "under 
the circumstances" language of Rule 4(e). In support of its national 
contacts test, moreover, the court discussed cases in which service 
had been made by wholly federal methods when the court had adopted 
a national contacts test, as well as cases involving use of state long- 
arm statutes when the court had not adopted expressly a national 
contacts test. This case, therefore, is not entirely persuasive as authority 
for the adoption of a national contacts approach in a 4(e) case in- 
volving service of process pursuant to a state long-arm statute. 
Several other federal courts recently have adopted a national con- 
tacts test for personal jurisdiction in federal question cases, but these 
cases do not fit neatly into the category of cases being considered 
in this section. Although they clearly did not employ a wholly federal 
inethod of service of process, these courts do not specify what part 
of Rule 4 was used to effect service.1284 These probably are 4(e) cases 
and thus are discussed here as related to Cryornedics. 
and accompanying text); First Flight Co. v. National Caroloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 
(E.D. Tenn. 1962) (supra notes 872-84 and accompanying text). 
1280. 397 F. Supp. at 291 (quofing Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Corp., 362 
F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973)). 
1281. 397 F. Supp. at 292. 
1282. Id. 
1283. Id. 
1284. See, e.g., Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 560 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (infra 
notes 1285-1301 and accompanying text); Coats Company, Inc. v. Vulcan Equip. Co. Ltd., 
459 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. 111. 1978) (infra notes 1302-09 and accompanying test); Holt v. Klosters 
Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (infra notes 1310-16 and accompanying text). 
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In a very recent case, Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer,lZs5 the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania treated 
the national contacts approach as established, citing Cryomedics as 
This result could not be predicted from prior cases in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Third C i r ~ u i t , ' ~ ~ '  and 
Cryomedics, a case decided by the District of Connecticut, certainly 
would not bind the Third Circuit on this issue. Daetwyler involved 
an action for patent infringement by a New York corporation against 
an alien defendant. The defendant objected to the personal jurisdic- 
tion of the district court, claiming that "he [had] never been to Penn- 
sylvania and had never done business in Penn~ylvania." '~~~ Plaintiff 
urged that the court could assert jurisdiction based on the defendant's 
contacts with the United States outside Pennsylvania: the defendant 
shipped the allegedly infringing devices to two United States com- 
panies that sold the devices in the United States, and the defendant 
advertised "in trade publications distributed throughout the United 
The plaintiff had urged that the defendant came within the "trans- 
acting business" part of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute.'290 Citing 
Cryomedics, the court responded that "[b]ecause this case presents 
a federal question, however, the issue whether jurisdiction may be 
asserted over defendant must be determined by reference to federal 
law."'29' The court did not discuss or allude to statutory authority, 
state or federal, for service on the defendant, but immediately began 
to examine the defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania, concluding 
that "[\v]ere jurisdiction over defendant to be tested solely by his con- 
tacts with Pennsylvania, one would be hard pressed, on these facts, 
to find contacts sufficient to satisfy Fifth Amendment standards."'292 
Quoting the reasons advanced in Cryomedics for the appropriateness 
of a national contacts test, the court adopted a national contacts stan- 
dard, finding the defendant amenable to 
1285. 560 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (memorandum opinion). 
1286. Id. at 870. 
1287. See infra note 1300 and accompanying text. 
1288. 560 F. Supp. at  870. 
1289. Id. 
1290. Id. at  870. 
1291. Id. 
1292. Id. 
1293. Id. at  870-71 (citing Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D. 
Conn 1975) (contacts with United States) (supra notes 1271-85 and accompanying text); 397 
F. Supp. at 291 (territory with which to measure contacts is entire unit, that is, the United 
States); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722, 728 (D. Utah 1973) 
(national contacts important where defendant's contacts too thinly scattered to permit suit in 
any particular state) (supra notes 1264-68 and accompanying text); Centronics Data Computer 
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This wholehearted espousal by the court of the national contacts 
test has little precedential value. Service could not have been made 
on the defendant by a wholly federal method because (a) no federal 
statute authorizes nationwide or worldwide service of process in patent 
(b) the defendant was not present or residing in Pennsylvania 
as required by Rule 4(d)(1),Izg5 and (c) service was not made within 
Pennsylvania upon some agent of the defendant as authorized by Rule 
4(d)(3).lZy6 Service, therefore, could have been made, as authorized 
by Rule 4(e) and perhaps, former Rule 4(d)(7), only by using the Penn- 
sylvania long-arm statute. That statute, however, expressly goes to 
the limits of the fourteenth amendment,'297 and the court said that 
the defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania probably would be insuf- 
ficient to satisfy this standard.'298 The court might have found that 
when a state long-arm statute expressly purports to permit service 
whenever constitutional, then a defendant may be served with pro- 
cess so long as the appropriate due process standard, fifth amend- 
ment for federal courts and fourteenth amendment for state courts, 
is satisfied.'299 The statutory interpretation and due process questions 
would be analyzed at the same time; the statute would only apply 
if due process were satisfied. The court, however, was silent as to 
manner of service of process, and the analysis suggested above can- 
not be inferred from the opinion. Moreover, the court cited Cryomedics 
as authority, but ignored opinions of Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
and the Third Circuit rejecting a national contacts test in the absence 
of statutory Finally, in Cryomedics, the defendant did 
not argue that he could not be served under the Connecticut long- 
arm statute, and the court interpreted this as a waiver of any non- 
constitutional objection to service.'30' The Cryomedics court, therefore, 
did not have to determine whether any circumstances could arise in 
which service would be appropriate pursuant to the terms of the Con- 
necticut long-arm statute and the "in the circumstances" language 
Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F. Supp. 659 (D.N.H. 1977) (convenience factor for alien defen- 
dant usually not affected by location of suit) (supra notes 1011-38 and accompanying text)). 
1294. See supra note 247 and accompanying text; see also Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp 
Prods. Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 919-20 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
1295. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
1296. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
1297. See supra note 1173. 
1298. See supra note 1292 and accompanying text. 
1299. See infra notes 1348-49 and accompanying text (discussing this possible analysis in 
certain 4(e) cases). 
1300. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (strpra notes 
1123-41 and accompanying text); Brotherhood Cia Naviera S.A. v. Zapata Marine Service, 
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688, 691 n.3 (supra notes 1180-84 and accompanying text). 
1301. See supra notes 1270-72 and accompanying text. 
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of Rule 4(e), but in which only a national contacts test could be 
satisfied. 
In a 1978 case, Coats Company, Inc. v. Vulcan Equipment Com- 
pany Ltd. ,1302 the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois adopted Cryomedics. The district court said that "[slince 
the Seventh Circuit did not, when given the opportunity to do so, 
expressly question or reject the validity of that holding, Honeywell, 
Inc. v. Metz Apparatswerks [sic], . . .this court feels compelled under 
the circumstances to follow the reasoning of [Cryomedi~s]." '~~~ The 
question before the district court was whether the federal district court 
sitting in Iowa, to which this patent infringement action had been 
transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a),I3O4 had personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant alien corporation at the time the suit 
had been instituted in the Northern District of Illinois. If the defen- 
dant was not, at that time, subject to the personal jurisdiction of 
the federal court sitting in Iowa, then the case, according to the ex- 
press terms of Section 1404(a), could not be transferred there.I3O5 The 
requirement was purely technical because six days after the plaintiff 
had commenced his patent infringement action in the Northern District 
of Illinois, the defendant in the Illinois action brought a declaratory 
judgment suit for invalidity and noninfringement against the plaintiff 
in the Southern District of Iowa.1306 In these circumstances, the court 
applied Cryomedics, holding that since the defendant's "contacts with 
the United States were sufficient in quality and nature to satisfy this 
standard . . . the courts of the Southern District of Iowa would have 
been able to validly assert personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] 
on [the date the suit in the Northern District of' Illinois was 
initiated]. " 1307 The court refused to read Cryomedics narrowly as re- 
quiring that some of the contacts with the United States had to be 
with the place of trial.1308 
The precedential value of Coats is unclear in light of recent Seventh 
Circuit opinions.1309 The problem with Coats was that the court merely 
1302. 459 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
1303. Id. at 659 (citation omitted). See supra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text (discussing 
Cryomedics) and notes 1202-12 and accompanying text (discussing Honey~vell). 
1304. 28 U.S.C. $1404(a) (1976) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, 
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district 
or division where it might have been brought." Id. 
1305. 459 F. Supp. at  659. 
1306. Id. at  656. 
1307. Id. at  659. 
1308. Id. at 659-60. 
1309. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off Coast of France, 699 F.2d 909 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (applies "contacts with state" test) (supra notes 1217-23 and accompanying text); 
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1970) (applies "contacts with state" test) 
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had to satisfy technical requirements since the defendant, by bringing 
a declaratory judgment suit, had subsequently waived any objection 
to the personal jurisdiction of the federal court sitting in Iowa. Coats, 
moreover, arises out of unusual circumstances, a decision to change 
venue to a forum selected by the defendant. Finally, no information 
exists as to the authority, either in the federal court in Iowa or the 
federal court in Illinois, for service of process on the defendant alien 
corporation. 
Another national contacts suit that was concerned partly with 
transfer of venue was Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S,I3l0 an admiralty 
action instituted in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Michigan against an alien corporation. The authority for 
service upon the defendant again was unstated; the court observed 
that "[dlefendant, as well as plaintiff, relies upon the Michigan jurisdic- 
tional statutes and case law . . . " but rejected that reference to state 
law because "this is not a diversity case and accordingly, the prin- 
ciples of Erie . . . do not apply."l3I1 Without further consideration 
of the question of service, which, in many cases has dictated analysis, 
the court immediately considered the question of the constitutionality 
of asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The court noted 
that the question arose under the fifth amendment and that the ap- 
propriate test "where the suit is based upon a federally created right 
is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with the United 
States, so as to satisfy due process requirements under the Fifth 
Finding that defendant had substantial contacts with 
other parts of the United States, the court held that it had personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant.I3l3 
The district court recognized that this exercise of personal jurisdic- 
tion might be limited by the federal rules or by federal statutes. No 
limitations, such as the authority for service of process were considered, 
however, because "[d]efendantYs motion to dismiss challenge[d] this 
court's power to render an in personam judgment The court 
asserted, "All other objections which the defendant may have raised 
. . . have been waived."1315 The impact of this case is unclear, 
(supra notes 1213-16 and accompanying text); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 
F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2 (recognizes national contacts test but finds it "need not reach such a 
broad conclusion here") (supra notes 1202-12 and accompanying text). 
1310. 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973). 
1311. Id. at 356. 
1312. Id. at 356-57. 
1313. Id. at 358. 
1314. Id. at 357-58. 
1315. Id. at 358. 
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therefore, since the court might have decided differently had it not 
viewed Holt as involving a pure federal amenability question not tied 
in any way to the authorization for service of process. Subsequent 
to the jurisdictional decision, the court granted the defendant's motion 
for a change of venue to the place in the United States with which 
the defendant had the bulk of its contacts.l3I6 This illustrates that 
change of venue statutes, if liberally applied, can mitigate any in- 
convenience the defendant suffers from application of a national con- 
tacts test of personal jurisdiction. 
Summary and Analysis 
The above-described cases'317 indicate that judicial resistance to adop- 
tion of a federal amenability standard, like national contacts, is most 
pronounced in Rule 4(e) cases. In some cases, this seems to arise from 
the language of Rule 4(e), which permits service only "under the cir- 
cumstances" of the state long-arm statute being adopted.I3ls In other 
cases, courts have been persuaded by lack of federal authority for 
aggregation of national contacts;'319 absent statutory authority, the 
federal courts believe they are limited to using the state statutes as 
would state courts when fourteenth amendment standards are satisfied. 
Still other courts, in arguments that subsume, to some extent, the 
positions described directly above, simply maintain that when a federal 
court adopts a state statute, the court cannot pick and choose the 
parts of state law that it wishes to adopt, but must take the whole 
package, including limiting standards that would apply to state courts 
using the statute.1320 In some cases, courts combine amenability and 
1316. Id. at 359. See supra notes 188, 226, 337, 354, 657, 693, 880, 891, and 1086 and 
accompanying text (discussing use of change of venue statutes to preclude forum inconvenient 
to defendant). 
1317. See supra notes 1103-1316 and accompanying text. 
1318. See, e.g., Burstein v. State Bar of Cal., 693 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1982) (see supra 
notes 1153-62 and accompanying text); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber 
Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (supra notes 1251-63 and accompanying text); 
see also Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497 (D. Minn. 1975) (supra notes 1163-71 
and accompanying text). 
1319. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981) 
(supra notes 1123-33 and accompanying text); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 
156 n.3 (7th Cir. 1979) (supra notes 1213-16 and accompanying text); Brotherhood Cia Naviera 
S.A. v. Zapata Marine Serv., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688, 691 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (supra notes 
1178-84 and accompanying text); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 
289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (supra notes 1251-63 and accompanying text); see 
also Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418 F. Supp. 915, 919 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1976) 
(supra notes 1244-50 and accompanying text). 
1320. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz off Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 
699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983) (supra notes 1217-23 and accompanying text); Kransco Mfg., 
Inc. v. Markwitz, 656 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981) (supra notes 1142-46 and accompanying text); 
Odriozola v. Superior Cosmetic Distrib., Inc., 531 F. Supp. 1070 (D.P.R. 1982) (supra notes 
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statutory construction analyses so that the application of a fourteenth 
amendment standard is required,'32' while other courts simply refuse 
to consider a federal standard because the state standard, admittedly 
narrower, has been satisfied by the facts of their particular cases.1322 
Moreover, those few courts adopting a federal amenability standard 
of contacts with the United States have done so in questionable 
They have: made ambiguous references to national 
contacts; relied on cases from other jurisdictions while other coufts 
in their own jurisdiction have rejected national contacts; adopted 
national contacts in cases in which other procedural objections have 
been waived, allowing courts to avoid national contacts analysis in 
the context of Rule 4(e) service of process. 
After considering all of the judicial positions and arguments, this 
writer concludes that a federal amenability standard of minimum con- 
tacts with the United States, national contacts or aggregation of na- 
tional contacts, can be applied rationally and successfully in federal 
question cases in which process has been served, pursuant to Rule 
4(e), under the long-arm statute of the state in which the federal court 
is sitting, as well as in all other federal question cases discussed 
above.1324 First, applicability of such a standard would meet the clear 
need for an independent fifth amendment standard that would pro- 
p--  
1232-36 and accompanying text); Stanley v. Local 926 of the Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs 
of the AFL-CIO, 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (supra notes 1237-43 and accompanying 
text); see also Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982) (supra notes 1190-1201 
and accompanying text). 
1321. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229 (6th Cir. 1981) (supra 
notes 1147-52 and accompanying text); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 92 F.R.D. 
398 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (supra notes 1172-77 and accompanying text); Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, 
S.A., 404 F. Supp. 497 (D. Minn. 1975) (supra notes 1163-71 and accompanying text); Cruci- 
ble, Inc. v. Stora Kipparsbergs Bergslags AB, 403 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (supra notes 
1224-31 and accompanying text). 
1322. See, e.g., Honeywell v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975) 
(supra notes 1206-12 and accompanying text); Graham Eng'g Corp. v. Kemp Prods. Ltd., 418 
F. Supp. 915, 919 n.3 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (supra notes 1244-50 and accompanying test); Japan 
Gas ,Lighter Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 236 (D.N.J. 1966) (supra notes 1183-69 
and accompanying text). 
1323. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Meyer, 560 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (supra notes 
1285-1301 and accompanying text); Coats Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Co., Ltd., 459 F. Supp. 654 
(N.D. 111. 1978) (supra notes 1302-09 and accompanying test); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, 
Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975) (supra notes 1269-83 and accompanying text); Engineered 
Sports Prods. v. Brunswick Corp., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (supra notes 1264-68 
and accompanying text); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973) 
(supra notes 1310-16 and accompanying text). 
1324. See supra notes 785-98 and accompanying text (suggesting national contacts approach 
in which process is served in a tvholly federal manner pursuant to a federal statute authorizing 
nationwide or worldwide service of process), notes 888-92 and accompanying text (suggesting 
national contacts approach in which process is served in a wholly federal manner pursuant 
to Rules 4(d)(l) and 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), and notes 1039-1 102 
and accompanying text (suggesting national contacts approach in which process is served, pur- 
suant to former Rule 4(d)(7) and present Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), according to state statute). 
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mote uniformity among federal courts in federal question cases, at 
least on the question of the constitutional test to be applied. Second, 
the national contacts standard is rational because it relates directly 
to the United States, the sovereign that is seeking to assert jurisdic- 
tion over the defendant. Third, the structure of the test, examination 
of the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts with the sovereign seeking 
to assert jurisdiction, parallels the test devised for state courts after 
careful and extended judicial consideration. The test, moreover, while 
not promoting total uniformity among federal courts, would eliminate 
the anomaly of basing federal court personal jurisdiction, purported- 
ly limited only by the fifth amendment, on tests applicable to the 
state courts. Lack of uniformity still will exist because of the many 
different ways in which a federal court, under Rule 4, is authorized 
to serve process. 
The national contacts test also could create additional uniformity 
of analysis in that the test could be applied to both alien and nonalien 
defendants. Although federal courts often have drawn a distinction 
between alien and nonalien defendants, with the national contacts ap- 
proach being favored more in regard to alien defendants because they 
would not be "present" in any particular location in the United States, 
such a distinction is not mandated. While alien defendants generally 
would not be more inconvenienced by suit in one federal forum than 
another, whereas a nonalien defendant probably would have a place 
in the United States where most of its activities would be concen- 
trated, any substantial inconvenience of place of trial for nonalien 
defendants would be prevented by venue rules and change of venue 
provisions.'325 The same types of provisions, as well as the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens, would protect alien defendants from abusive 
inconvenience occasioned by a national contacts approach.'326 
Moreover, the basis of any fifth amendment amenability standard 
would be fairness to the defendant; fairness does not require that 
a suit be maintained in the location most convenient to the defen- 
dant, but onIy that the defendant not be inconvenienced unfairly. In 
sum, a national contacts approach could be applied to a United States 
corporation having few or no contacts with the location of the federal 
court seeking to assert jurisdiction just as it could to an alien cor- 
poration in similar circumstances. A United States corporation with 
substantial contacts in one state is analogous to a foreign corpora- 
1325. See supra notes 188, 326, 337, 354, 657, 693, 880, 891, 1086, and 1316 and accom- 
panying text. 
1326. See supra note 1278 and accompanying text. 
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tion with concentrated activity in a single state, and therefore, a na- 
tional contacts standard should apply in both instances. 
Before the benefits of a uniform federal standard of amenability- 
national contacts-can be achieved, however, this writer must deal 
with the particular problems of such a standard in Rule 4(e) cases. 
First, the refusal of some courts to consider any federal standard, 
because the admittedly narrower state standard of minimum contacts 
with the state had been satisfied, provides no impediment to the adop- 
tion of the broader federal standard. This is not a circumstance in 
which each case must be decided on the narrowest possible grounds. 
Moreover, adoption of a broad, uniform federal standard of national 
contacts yould produce desirable results. Courts, for example, would 
begin their jurisdictional analyses with a statement of the standard, 
followed by an application of that standard to the facts of the case, 
instead of selecting a jurisdictional standard that provides the desired 
result in light of the facts of the particular case.1327 
A national contacts amenability standard also should not be pre- 
cluded by the Rule 4(e) language which prescribes that service be made 
"under the circumstances and in the manner" prescribed by the state 
long-arm statute. First, as in former Rule 4(d)(7) cases, a narrow in- 
terpretation for the words "under the circumstances" in Rule 4(e) 
is possible.1328 One might argue that these words merely limit service 
to those defendants who come within the language of the state long- 
arm statute. Most long-arm statutes prescribe both the factual cir- 
cumstances in which the long-arm statute might be used and the 
method for achieving such service of process.1329 The words "under 
the circumstances" in Rule 4(e), therefore, might apply merely to the 
factual requisites necessary to trigger the state long-arm statute, i.e., 
is this a defendant whose behavior comes within the language of the 
long-arm statute? This would parallel the narrow reading of former 
Rule 4(d)(7) that suggests the circumstances in which state methods 
of service can be adopted pursuant to former Rule 4(d)(7) are those 
in which the defendants fit the particular descriptions of Rule 4(d)(l) 
or Rule 4(d)(3).1330 Such an analysis would work admirably in cir- 
cumstances in that state long-arm statutes specify the kinds of behavior 
which the statute is intended to reach.1331 (Statutes providing merely that 
1327. See supra notes 742, 747, 762, 831, 928, 971, 1084, 1210 and 1246 and accompanying 
text. 
1328. See supra notes 1052-61 and accompanying text (discussing narrow interpretation of 
Rule 4(d)(7)). 
1329. See, e.g., supra note 120. 
1330. See supra notes 1052-55 and accompanying text. 
1331. See supra note 120. 
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the state courts can assert jurisdiction "whenever constitutional" will 
be discussed separately below.)1332 Under this narrow interpretation, 
therefore, constitutional analysis would not be appropriate until it 
is determined that the defendant's conduct falls within the long-arm 
statute. At that point, the court would consider the question of whether 
assertion of jurisdiction over such a defendant would violate his con- 
stitutional rights to due process. The applicable standard, however, 
would be the due process clause of the fifth, rather than the four- 
teenth, amendment and that standard would be minimum contacts 
with the United States. One might argue that, if the defendant's con- 
duct comes within the state long-arm statute, he surely would satisfy 
a minimum contacts with the state standard and, thus, a broader 
federal test would be superfluous. This argument presumes, however, 
that every time a defendant comes within a state long-arm statute, 
he has had sufficient contacts with the state to satisfy the fourteenth 
amendment test developed from International Shoe. That clearly is 
not the case. A defendant might, for example, come within the 
language of a long-arm statute that permits service on any defendant 
who commits a tortious act outside the state causing consequences 
within the state.1333 If this single act were the defendant's only con- 
tact with the state in question, a court might find that the fourteenth 
amendment would not permit a state court to assert jurisdiction over 
this defendant. In fact, the facts of World-Wide Volkswagen v. 
W o o d ~ o n l ~ ~ ~  were similar to this hypothetical, and the result was a 
refusal to allow the state court to assert personal jurisdiction.1335 If 
a federal court, on the other hand, in a federal question case (assume, 
for example, that the tort was a federal common law nuisance as 
in Illinois v. City of M i l ~ a u k e e ' ~ ~ ~ ) ,  were permitted to determine con- 
stitutionality by aggregating the defendant's contacts with the United 
States rather than with the state in which it was sitting, the contacts 
might be sufficient to permit assertion of personal jurisdiction. 
Some still might argue that the above analysis is fallatious because 
such a long-arm statute would be unconstitutional on its face, or 
because a state court could not serve process pursuant to the statute 
if assertion of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional. As to the first 
argument, although a long-arm statute might lead to service on an 
individual over whom a court could not constitutionally assert jurisdic- 
1332. See infra notes 1346-49 and accompanying text. 
1333. See supra note 120. 
1334. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
1335. See supra notes 145-55 and accompanying text (discussing World- Wide). x 
1336. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979); See supra notes 1212-15 and accompanying text. 
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tion, that does not mean that the statute itself will be found 
uncon~titutional. '~~~ Obviously, if a statute were written in such a way 
as to lead to unconstitutional results in a substantial percentage of 
cases, a court might determine that the statute was unconstitutional 
on its face.'338 Those statutes, however, which usually lead to con- 
stitutional assertions of jurisdiction, would not be invalidated if asser- 
tion of jurisdiction over a particular defendant were unconstitutional; 
the court merely would decide that the application of the statute in 
that particular situation would not lead to a constitutional assertion 
of personal jurisdiction. 
As to the second argument, that a state long-arm statute cannot 
be used if assertion of jurisdiction would be unconstitutional and thus 
a federal court could not use it unless the fourteenth amendment were 
satisfied, jurisdictional analysis is not conducted in this fashion. 
Whether the defendant comes within the language of the statute for 
service of process is the first question the court should reach to avoid 
unnecessary determinations of constitutional issues.'339 Only after the 
long-arm statute is held to apply to the defendant should the court 
turn to the question of the constitutionality of assertion of jurisdic- 
tion over this defendant. If the court then finds that due process would 
be violated, it refuses to assert jurisdiction. The court does not, 
however, circle back and obliterate service because of the unconstitu- 
tional result. A determination merely is made that the second criterion 
for personal jurisdiction, satisfaction of a due process standard, is 
not met. Consideration of cases in which state court assertions of 
jurisdiction were found to be unconstitutional prove this assertion.'340 
Most courts do not adopt a narrow interpretation of the "under 
the circumstances" language in Rule 4(e). They argue, however, that 
these words limit federal court use of a state long-arm statute to only 
those circumstances in which the state court actually could assert 
jurisdiction over the defendant, that is, only if both the statutory and 
constitutional (fourteenth amendment) tests are met.134' This inter- 
pretation apparently requires that the federal court use a fourteenth 
1337. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen v .  Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (strpra notcs 
145-55 and accompanying text) (application of Oklahoma long-arm statute led to unconstitu- 
tional results in this particular case but statute not invalidated); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 
U.S. 84 (1978) (supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text) (application of California long-arm 
statute led to unconstitutional results in this particular case but statute not invalidated); Hanson 
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1957) (supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text) (application of 
Florida long-arm statute led to unconstitutional results in this particular case but statute not 
invalidated). 
1338. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (1977); see also supra note 3. 
1339. See supra note 120. 
1340. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1337. 
1341. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1318. 
Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 236 1984-1985 
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
amendment amenability standard. One way of solving the problem, 
however, is to argue that in those cases, satisfaction of a separate 
amenability standard would not be important; all of the analysis would 
occur in the statutory interpretation. If a state court could not assert 
jurisdiction because the fourteenth amendment would not be satisfied, 
then the federal court could not assert jurisdiction, not because some 
federal amenability standard had not been satisfied, but because the 
federal court would have no authority to serve process if the state 
long-arm statute could not be used. The federal court, therefore, would 
not be adopting a fourteenth amendment amenability standard by 
which to measure its jurisdiction, but would be deciding only that 
the amenability issue is irrelevant. The court would be using the four- 
teenth amendment only on the question of whether the court is 
authorized to use the state statute in the first place. The problem 
with this analysis, however, is that if the state statute were found 
to be applicable, any federal amenability standard again would be 
irrelevant because the state standard already had been satisfied. While 
the analysis is technically correct, therefore, it does not lead to a 
satisfying solution to the underlying conceptual difficulty raised by 
a broad interpretation of the "under the circumstances" language of 
Rule 4(e). 
A more persuasive argument, however, can be made in opposition 
to the position that the "under the circumstances" language of Rule 
4(e) only permits a federal court to assert its power over a particular 
defendant if a state court actually could do so. Some federal ques- 
tion subject matters are in areas that have been exclusively reserved 
to the federal courts.1342 A state court could not, for example, assert 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a patent litigation, regardless 
of the location of that defendant.1343 Yet, the very federal courts argu- 
ing that the "under the  circumstance^'^ language of Rule 4(e) limits 
them to situations in which state courts could validly use their long- 
arm statutes to reach the defendant fail to recognize that a state court 
could not use its long-arm statute on that defendant. Federal courts 
use state long-arms to reach defendants in actions involving questions 
exclusively reserved to federal courts.1344 Unless federal courts, 
1342. See supra note 19. 
1343. See supra note 19. 
1344. See, e.g., Conwed Corp. v. Nortene, S.A., 404 F. Supp. 197 (D. Minn. 1975) (supra 
1163-71 and accompanying text) (declaratory judgment in patent action); Edward J. Moriarty 
8: Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (supra notes 
1251-63 and accompanying text) (antitrust action). See also Horne v. Adolph Coors Co., 684 
F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982) (supra notes 1190-1201 and accompanying text) (patent action); Kransco 
Mfg., Inc. v. Markwitz, 656 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981) (supra notes 1142-46 and accompanying 
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therefore, are willing to eschew use of state long-arm statutes in areas 
of subject matter jurisdiction reserved exclusively to federal courts, 
they cannot maintain that the "under the circumstances" language 
in Rule 4(e) limits them to cases in which state courts could act validly. 
Since no federal statute authorizes nationwide or worldwide service 
in patent cases,'345 moreover, jurisdiction would be limited severely 
if state long-arm statutes could not be used "under circumstances" 
in which state courts could not use those same statutes. 
Adoption and use of a federal national contacts amenability stan- 
dard seems more problematic when the state long-arm statute merely 
purports to permit jurisdiction "on any basis not inconsistent with 
the Constitution of . . . the United States" ( C a l i f ~ r n i a ) ' ~ ~ ~  or "to 
the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States 
. . . [including] the most minimum contact with [this state] allowed 
under the Constitution of the United States" (Penn~ylvania)."~' The 
first type of statute is not as difficult as the second. The former only 
specifies that assertions of jurisdiction be consistent with "the Con- 
stitution" without specifying by which due process clause this ques- 
tion should be measured; the latter, by its express reference to 
minimum contacts with the state, seems to tie authorized exercises 
of jurisdiction to the due process clause of the fourteenth amend- 
ment. In regard to either type of statute, a fourteenth amendment 
due process examination arguably has been programmed directly into 
the statute; that is, the statute can be used only in those circumstances 
in which the fourteenth amendment would not be violated by asser- 
tion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. If that is the case, 
a fifth amendment national contacts standard would be irrelevant and 
useless, because for the defendant to come within the state long-arm 
statute, the narrower fourteenth amendment standard would have to 
be satisfied. This argument might be countered by the assertion that 
the existence and scope of a uniform fifth amendment test should 
text) (declaratory judgment in patent action); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 
280 (3d Cir. 1981) (supra notes 1123-41 and accompanying text) (admiralty action); Chrysler 
Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1299 (6th Cir. 1981) (srtpra notes 1147-52 and accompanying 
text) (antitrust action); Honeywell v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (supra 
notes 1206-12 and accompanying text) (patent action); Brotherhood Cia Naviera S.A. v. Zapata 
Marine Svc., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (supra notes 1178-84 and accompanying 
text) (admiralty action); Crucible, Inc. v. Stora Kopporsbergs Bergslags AB, 403 F. Supp. 9 
6V.D. Pa. 1975) (supra notes 1224-31 and accompanying text) (patent action); Japan Gas Lighter 
Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.J. 1966) (supra notes 1183-89 and accompany- 
ing text) (patent action). 
1345. See supra note 19. 
1346. See supra note 120. 
1347. See supra note 1173 and accompanying text; see also supra note 115 (Rhode Island 
long-arm statute). 
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not depend on the test being determinative in every federal question 
case in which it arises. This response, while acceptable, is not satisfy- 
ing intellectually and, moreover, would lead to a seemingly anomalous 
result: in cases in which a state, by tying its long-arm jurisdiction 
directly to the constitutional limits on that jurisdiction, sought to give 
its courts the broadest permissible personal jurisdiction, a federal court 
employing that long-arm statute aJso would be limited by the four- 
teenth amendment; however, in cases in which the state long-arm 
statute specified the circumstances in which its courts were to have 
jurisdiction, a federal court, under the above reasoning, only would 
be limited by the fifth amendment. From this, one might conclude 
that for the sake of consistent analysis, a fourteenth amendment stan- 
dard must be implicit in all state long-arm statutes and that therefore, 
a federal court would never get past the statutory construction phase 
of its analysis without having satisfied the fourteenth amendment. 
Another conclusion, however, one more consistent with the fact 
that a federal court can employ state long-arm statutes in cases that 
state courts could not hear1348 and that, thus, would never be subject 
to a fourteenth amendment test, is possible and is urged strongly 
herein. First, in regard to statutes that merely permit state courts to 
exercise personal jurisdiction "whenever constitutional," the limita- 
tion is sensibly read as referring to whichever due process clause ap- 
plied to the particular court hearing the case, the fourteenth amend- 
ment to state courts and the fifth amendment to federal courts. The 
long-arm statute need not be interpreted as incorporating, as part of 
the prerequisites for use of the statute, a fourteenth amendment test. 
The statute should be read, instead, as requiring satisfaction of the 
applicable due process test. As argued above, moreover, the defen- 
dant first must be served with process before a court, even under 
a California-type statute, would be faced with the question of due 
process. Even if the court subsequently decides that due process would 
not be satisfied, it does not reach back and retroactively invalidate 
service of process, but merely denies jurisdiction on the ground of 
unconstitutionality. ' 349 
When a state statute goes further, providing that state courts are 
limited to constitutional exercises of jurisdiction "based on the most 
minimum contacts with the state," a national contacts test still would 
be useful and applicable. Since the reference to "minimum contacts 
with the state" is a legislative effort to program the International 
1348. See supra note 1344 and accompanying text. 
1349. See supra note 1337 and accompanying text. 
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Shoe test directly into the long-arm statute, one might argue that the 
language is surplusage; the limitation to constitutional assertions of 
jurisdiction includes the appropriate test for such assertions. Therefore, 
a federal court still would apply a fifth amendment national contacts 
test because the fifth amendment defines the outer limits of federal 
court assertions of personal jurisdiction. Moreover, the due process 
standard applicable to the particular court using the statute, fifth 
amendment for federal courts deciding federal questions and four- 
teenth amendment for state courts deciding state questions, arguably 
determines the quantum of state contacts sufficient to be the "most 
minimum" permitted by the constitution. In the case of federal courts, 
if a fifth amendment national contacts test would require no contacts 
with the state in which the federal court was sitting, then the 
"minimum contacts with the state" requirement of the statute always 
would be satisfied. The question of personal jurisdiction then would 
turn on whether sufficient national contacts existed to satisfy the fifth 
amendment. Following this analysis, federal courts using state long- 
arm statutes would have the broadest reach in states that have the 
broadest long-arm statutes, a sensible result. 
Some courts have not argued that the "under the circumstances" 
language of Rule 4(e) limits federal courts using state long-arm statutes 
only to circumstances in which the state court validly could assert 
jurisdiction. They reach the same conclusion by maintaining, instead, 
that when Rule 4(e) adopts a state long-arm statute, it adopts 
everything that is "part and parcel" of the statute, including due pro- 
cess limitations on the use of the statute.'350 The above analysis also 
deals with this position. Due process, as a limitation on the court, 
is not peculiar only to the question of personal jurisdiction. Due pro- 
cess clings to the court, not the statute. State long-arm statutes clear- 
ly were drafted with an eye toward fourteenth amendment limitations; 
it did not, however, actually become part of the statute. So long as 
the question of personal jurisdiction includes two inquiries-statutory 
authority and satisfaction of constitutional requirements-the inquiries 
are separate, and the second is not part and parcel of the first. 
Another analytical means of supporting the application of a fifth 
amendment national contacts test in all Rule 4(e) cases derives from 
the dissenting opinion in DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc. 
In that case, Judge Gibbons maintained that the nature of the claim, 
rather than the nature of the court, should determine which due pro- 
1350. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1320. 
1351. 654 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1981); see supra notes 1134-41 and accompanying text. 
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cess clause should be applied on the amenability issue.'352 Implicit 
in this position is the argument that each exercise of personal jurisdic- 
tion is entitled to only one due process analysis. Thus, a federal court, 
as part of its statutory construction, would not consider fourteenth 
amendment limitations for service and then apply a fifth amendment 
standard to amenability. To facilitate this process, the due process 
issues might be analyzed first in any case in which the usual order 
of analysis would create confusion. This would be useful particularly 
in cases in which the state long-arm statute is pinned to constitu- 
tional limitations. Therefore, the court first would decide whether the 
case could proceed under the applicable due process standard before 
looking at the state long-arm statute to determine whether the state 
had limited such exercises of personal jurisdiction. 
This author agrees with the one-case-one-due-process-analysis, but 
disagrees with Judge Gibbons' assertion that the nature of the ques- 
tion, rather than the court, should determine the applicable due pro- 
cess test. If all personal jurisdiction precedent could be eliminated, 
and the courts and Congress could begin with a clean slate, his ap- 
proach might be sensible. At this point, however, state courts clearly 
are limited by the fourteenth amendment, whether the courts are 
deciding state questions or federal questions. Moreover, if the four- 
teenth amendment standard is based, in any part, on federalism,1353 
that factor remains the same regardless of the type of question being 
decided. This author believes, instead, that the nature of the court 
should determine the applicable amenability standard and that a 
uniform fifth amendment standard should apply to all cases heard 
in federal courts, diversity cases as well as federal question cases. This 
conclusion is sensible in light of the historical bases for these courts 
as well as their function as parts of particular judicial systems. 
Before concluding this section, the author must deal with those 
courts that would embrace a national contacts approach only if federal 
legislation provided a ~ t h 0 r i t y . l ~ ~ ~  These courts fall prey to the error 
of failing to separate the issues of service of process and amenability 
to suit. When a state court asserts jurisdiction over a nonpresent defen- 
dant, it serves process on the defendant pursuant to a state long-arm 
statute. The constitutionality of any assertion of jurisdiction is then 
determined by examining the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts 
with the forum state, a test that is not prescribed in any statute. When 
a federal court asserts jurisdiction, it also must satisfy two criteria: 
1352. See supra note 1139 and accompanying text. 
1353. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
1354. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1319. 
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some statutory authority to serve process and satisfaction of a fifth 
amendment due process test. In cases arising under Rule 4(e), the 
federal court must rely on a state long-arm statute to satisfy the first 
criterion-4(e) authorizes the federal court to use the state statute. 
The court, however, does not require statutory authority to engage 
in the due process analysis. Some courts, those that adopt the posi- 
tion that national contacts cannot be embraced without a federal statute 
authorizing the test, note that Congress could have provided for 
nationwide service for federal courts in all cases, or, at least, in all 
federal question cases. Since Congress has not chosen to do so, 
however, but has, on the contrary, through Rule 4(f), generally limited 
federal court authority to the boundaries of the states in which the 
federal courts are sitting, these courts reason that Congress has limited 
federal court personal jurisdiction and has not permitted a test based 
on national contacts. This argument, however, fails to separate 
statutory authority to serve process from the analysis by which a court 
determines constitutionality. While federal courts, lacking a general 
federal long-arm statute, must, in some circumstances, rely on state 
long-arm statutes for service of process, such reliance is authorized 
by federal rule (4(e)). Federal authority exists, therefore, for utiliza- 
tion of such statutes. The other part of the amenability analysis, con- 
stitutionality, is not regulated by statute in state or federal courts. 
The national contacts test, therefore, need not be sanctioned 
legislatively before it can become a measure of the constitutionality 
of assertion by a federal court of personal jurisdiction. 
In sum, strong arguments can be made that even in federal ques- 
tion cases in which federal courts serve process, as authorized by Rule 
4(e), pursuant to the long-arm statutes of the states in which they 
are sitting, federal courts should adopt a uniform federal amenability 
standard of minimum contacts with the United States. The benefits 
of a uniform federal standard have been described Federal 
courts should determine their personal jurisdiction by some well- 
defined, rational test, rather than by the ad hoc system used at present. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Over a period spanning more than a century, courts have been in- 
volved in fashioning an amenability standard for state courts. This 
standard, which is often referred to as "minimum contacts with the 
state," has grown and developed over time. During this period, 
1355. See supra text following note 1324, text accompanying notes 1324-26, and text following 
note 1326. 
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Heinonline - -  16 Pac. L. J. 242 1984-1985 
1984 / Personal Jurisdiction 
however, state courts always have been aware that the constitutionality 
of their exercises of personal jurisdiction was to be measured by this 
standard that derived from the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Federal courts never have been in such an enviable position. 
Although most authorities have agreed that the constitutionality of 
federal court exercises of personal jurisdiction should be limited only 
by the due process clause of the fifth amendment, no all-encompassing 
federal standard ever has been developed. This failure is attributable 
to many causes: federal courts, under diversity subject matter jurisdic- 
tion, must handle many of the same sorts of cases as are handled 
by state the federalism-independent sovereign question did 
not exist in the federal system as a motivating force for amenability 
standards; the historical development of the federal court system did 
not proceed in a direct manner;'357 under Rule 4, federal courts have 
many different methods for serving process and obtaining jurisdic- 
tion over defendants;13ss by the time the federal system was well in 
gear, the state standard had become reasonably well-defined; the federal 
courts were organized territorially inside state borders, thus making 
the adoption of the well-developed state standards particularly tempt- 
ing; in many cases, the narrower state standard is satisfied, thereby 
making the quest for a federal standard seem unimportant. These 
factors have combined to create the present system in which federal 
court amenability standards seem to be devised on an ad hoc basis, 
depending on the facts of the particular case or the manner in which 
service has been made. 
Some definitive answer has been reached in diversity cases, with 
the Supreme Court in the recent case of Insurance Corporation of 
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de G ~ i n e e ' ~ ~ ~  impliedly accepting 
the position of Second Circuit'360 in Arrowsmith v. United Press 
Internati~nal'~~' that federal courts in diversity cases should use the 
amenability standards of the states in which they are sitting. The result 
in Arrowsmith probably derived partly from a misreading of the re- 
quirements of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and partly from the lack of 
1356. When the question of amenability standards in diversity cases was addressed, therefore, 
a natural response was to rely on the state standard. See supra notes 376-492 and accompany- 
ing test (discussing amenability standards in diversity cases). 
1357. See supra notes 196-272 and accompanying text (discussing historical development 
of the federal court system). 
1358. See supra notes 273-94 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 4). 
1359. 456 U.S. 694 (1982); see supra notes 156-82 and accompanying text. 
1360. See supra note 481 and accompanying text; see also supra note 482 and accompany- 
ing text. 
1361. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); see supra notes 453-77 and accompanying text. 
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any genuine federal standard.'362 This writer disagrees with the result 
in Arrowsmith, both when service of process is made by a wholly 
federal method and when service is made, as authorized by Rule 4(e), 
and perhaps, by former Rule 4(d)(7), by using the state long-arm 
statute. Federal court personal jurisdiction should not turn on a stan- 
dard developed for state courts. After all, although the situation ad- 
mittedly is not completely analogous, when state courts decide federal 
questions state courts still use fourteenth amendment amenability 
standards. 
The law m the area of federal question jurisdiction remains un- 
settled, with choice of amenability standard depending in part on the 
manner in which service is made and in part on the exigencies of 
the circumstances of the case. Without any well-developed feiieral stan- 
dard to which to turn, federal courts have often adopted the state 
standard, which "worked out fine" in the circumstances of the case. 
The federal courts could take a lesson from state courts: the state 
court amenability standard is constant, regardless of how process is 
served in the particular case. The answer to the problem of lack of 
uniformity caused by the diversities of Rule 4 perhaps would be to 
formulate a federal long-arm statute, but not to use different due 
process standards for different methods of service of process. 
The answer to the present problem of devising an appropriate fifth 
amendment due process standard applicable in all federal question 
cases would be the adoption of the "national contacts" test. As argued 
above, this standard can be applied whether process is served by a 
wholly federal method or by a state method that has been incorporated 
into federal law by Rule 4(e), and perhaps by former Rule 
4(d)(7)-present Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). The standard is sensible in that 
it relates directly to the sovereign seeking to assert jurisdiction, the 
United States, derives from and is analogous to the well-developed 
state standard, and precludes unfairness to the defendant because of 
venue and transfer of venue provisions and the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens. This standard would provide the proper basis for 
the analysis of an amenability problem in a federal question case 
because the court could begin an opinion by stating the amenability 
standard. Adoption of a uniform federal standard also would eliminate 
the anomaly created when federal courts, deciding federal questions, 
base amenability decisions on state standards. Finally, the question 
of federal court jurisdiction would receive the same careful treatment 
as has been accorded state court jurisdiction. 
c 
1362. See supra notes 453-77 and accompanying text. 
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While this writer strongly urges the adoption of a uniform federal 
amenability standard, minimum contacts with the United States, several 
factors seem to militate against the establishment and adoption of 
such a standard. First, the Supreme Court, in Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland, apparently has approved the use of state amenability stan- 
dards in diversity cases. Second, when recently provided with the 
opportunity, in Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria,'363 to discuss 
amenability standards in federal question cases, the Supreme Court 
ducked the issue c0rnplete1y.l~~~ Third, because the state standard is 
so well-developed, federal courts tend to rely on it whenever possi- 
ble; short of legislation mandating a particular uniform federal stan- 
dard or a Supreme Court ruling to that effect, both of which are 
highly unlikely, federal courts probably will continue this reliance. 
Fourth, the trend in federal courts seems to be to reject national con- 
tacts, except in cases involving service on aliens pursuant to federal 
statutes authorizing worldwide service of process. Fifth, the majority 
of cases that have adopted national contacts have done so in poorly 
reasoned opinions that would be of little value as precedent. Sixth, 
recent amendments in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
reveal no intent to create a single uniform federal method for service 
of process. The only real hope for action, therefore, would be a well- 
reasoned Supreme Court decision embracing national contacts as the 
federal amenability standard, a federal International Shoe opinion. 
Barring such a decision, the area of amenability standards in federal 
questions cases probably will remain as described above, a patchwork 
of amenability standards derived from various sources for a variety 
of reasons. 
1363. 51 U.S.L.W. 4567 (May 23, 1983); see supra notes 520-55 and accompanying text. 
1364. See supra text following note 554. 
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